Showing posts with label M2. Show all posts
Showing posts with label M2. Show all posts

Thursday, December 14, 2017

Asset Prices Are "Prices" Too...

Authored by Thorstein Polleit via The Mises Institute,



We live in inflationary times.


Some people might consider this statement controversial. This is because these days inflation is widely understood as a rise in the consumer price index (CPI) of more than 2 percent per year. However, there are convincing reasons to question this viewpoint. On the one hand, the CPI does not include “assets” such as, for instance, stocks, housing, real estate, etc. As a result, the price developments of these goods are not accounted for by the changes in the CPI.


On the other hand, and even more essential, price changes of goods and services are associated with changes in the quantity of money. This is why economists used to understand a rise in the quantity of money as inflationary (and a decline in the quantity of money as deflationary): Without money sloshing around, there could not be a phenomenon like inflation — that is an ongoing upward trend in all prices of goods and services over time. The truth is that rising prices across the board is inextricably linked to money.


Asset Prices Are Prices


One indicator of an inflationary monetary development is the link between the US money stock M2 and nominal GDP. This ratio can be referred to as a measure of "excess liquidity." Since the outbreak of the crisis 2008/2009, excess liquidity has been growing strongly — as GDP growth lagged behind the increase in the quantity of money. Why? Well, a great deal of the monetary expansion has been driving asset prices upwards — most notably in the stock and housing market.



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The Federal Reserve (Fed) has created yet another “inflationary boom." The US economy is fueled by extremely low interest rates, accompanied by additional credit and money growth created out of thin air. The monetary expansion leads to an artificial rise in consumption and investment spending, resulting in production and employment gains. Furthermore, the newly created liquidity finds its way into financial (asset) markets, driving up asset prices and even valuation levels.


How To Keep the Boom Going: More Inflation


To keep the inflationary boom going - and prevent the “bust,” - the Fed has to make sure that credit and money supply keep increasing and that, by no means less important, borrowing and capital costs remain at fairly low levels. That said, the ongoing inflationary policy must - and for political reasons most likely will - go on. Higher interest rates and a slowdown of credit and money creation would take away the punch bowl - and the party would come to a shrieking halt. The economic boom would turn into bust.


Inflation only works if it comes unnoticed, if there is “surprise inflation.” However, as soon as people find out that the purchasing power of money goes down more than they had expected, the chickens come home to roost: People factor in higher inflation into their contracts for wages, leases and credit. If this happens, there is no longer surprise inflation, and inflation loses its power to stimulate the economy (through misleading price signals, that is).


A central bank that wants to keep the boom going and prevent the bust is left with just one option: it has to create a higher dose of surprise inflation. The reader may already know what such an “inflation game” is leading to. It puts the economy on a high-inflation road or, in the extreme case, a super-inflation road or even a hyper-inflation road that will ultimately destroy the purchasing power of the currency.


Why There Is No Perceived Crisis


So far, financial markets have remained fairly relaxed. Inflation is not seen as a major problem as proven by, for instance, inflation expectations. How come? There might be two reasons for this. First, the majority of people derive their inflation expectations from experienced CPI inflation (we can speak of “adaptive inflation expectations”). As the latter has been relatively low for many years, people do not expect inflation to edge up in the years to come.



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Second, many people still do not seem to realize that “asset price inflation” ruins the purchasing power of money in the same way as CPI inflation does: If you want to buy stocks, houses or land with your money, you will get less for your money if prices for these goods go up. However, as long as asset price inflation is not understood as a form of "true inflation," inflation expectations are tamed, and central banks can continue their inflationary scheme. 


Against this backdrop we can draw two conclusions. First, inflation is alive and kicking, it is currently raging in asset price increases. Second, an inflationary boom runs the risk of turning into a bust at some point — a scenario which would hit the economy, the financial system, and asset prices hard. Unfortunately, one cannot forecast (with any scientific precision) when the boom will turn into bust; it really depends on certain conditions.


That said, the current boom may go on for quite a while — with the economies keeping expanding and asset prices rushing from one record level to the next. However, we do know from sound economics that the current inflationary boom — which is presumably welcomed by many as it provides more jobs and additional incomes — is actually sowing the seeds of a bust.


The investor should keep in mind that central banks do not only set into motion an inflationary boom in the first place (which will end in tears), but that they will fight an approaching bust with even more inflation (by increasing the quantity of money even further). That said, investors are well-advised to live up to a rather uncomfortable truth: We"ve had inflation, and there will be more of it. Money will continue to lose its purchasing power.










Wednesday, November 29, 2017

China Hits A Brick Wall: For First Time Ever, Record Chinese Credit Creation Fails To Stimulate Economy

Submitted by Gordon Johnson of Axiom Capital


We believe that exhibit 1 says a lot: it shows that despite a record level of new credit issued by China’s PBoC YTD through Oct. 2017 (which stands in stark contrast to government authorities continued statements that China is de-levering), China’s economic backdrop is currently experiencing:


  • (a) monthly construction new start (commercial + residential + office) growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 2),

  • (b) monthly fixed asset investment growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 9),

  • (c) monthly cement output slowing Y/Y (Ex. 5),

  • (d) monthly electricity production slowing Y/Y (Ex. 6),

  • (e) monthly M2 money supply growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 7),

  • (f) monthly household loan growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 8),

  • (g) monthly private fixed asset investment growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 10), and

  • (h) monthly home price growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 12) – in fact, select data points have turned negative Y/Y.

Stated differently, while the lion’s share of our client base continues to tell us, with respect to our bearish views on China… “President Xi Jinping will simply stimulate more if/when things get bad”, we would highlight, again as detailed in Ex. 1 below, China stimulated at a record pace in 2017, yet it did not resonate in improved economic activity (in fact, the exact opposite appears to be unfolding – i.e., economic growth is slowing across a number of data points).


Furthermore, underpinning our view that China’s debt stimulus was targeted specifically at the months preceding the 19th Party Congress in Oct. 2017 (i.e., when President Xi Jinping consolidated power to become the strongest Chinese leader since Mao Zedong), implying we may see a phase of debt fatigue, we note that in the first 10 months of 2016, incremental credit issued in China on a month-over-month (“M/M”) basis was negative three times (i.e., May, July, and Oct.), and averaged $189 billion on a monthly basis; yet, in the first 10 months of 2017, incremental credit issued on a M/M basis was positive in each month outside of Oct., and averaged $429 billion on a monthly basis (in Oct. 2017, the month the 19th Party Congress concluded, new credit issued fell by $11.9 billion M/M).


WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? The broader point is… when you issue an unprecedented amount of credit targeted at a growing number of negative ROI projects multiple decades, at some point the law of diminishing marginal returns sets in (since 1/1/09, China’s credit has grown by CNY153.9 trillion while GDP has grown by a much more modest CNY 48.5 trillion, or a multiple of 3.17x, meaning a lot of bad investments have stacked up over the years) – keep in mind that China’s $3.6 trillion in credit issued in 2017 YTD through Oct. is more than the entire developed world combined. Put in the simplest of terms, at some point the incremental dollar in new credit created actually does more harm than good.


Ex. 1: China New Credit Created YTD Through Oct.



Note: Credit created = TSF + Local Gov"t Debt.
Source: PBoC; NBS; ChinaBond.


SO WHERE FROM HERE? When considering China hit the afterburners on new credit issuance in 2017, yet the impact seems to be quickly fading, it would appear we may have reached the point of “no return” (while Consensus, at this point, seems completely oblivious to this possibility, the recent sell-off across the Chinese stock markets suggest investors on-the-ground in China may be catching on).


CONCLUSION: In the face of China’s TTM 3Q17 credit as a percentage of GDP coming in at 250%, to “keep the party going”, Xi Jinping would have to force new credit issuance far in excess of $4.0 trillion in 2018 (which could trigger a number of ratings downgrades, as well as a reassessment by the IMF of China’s “market economy” status).


Moreover, given what we’ve seen this year – i.e., 101.7% Y/Y new credit issuance growth YTD through Oct. 2017 – it seems the level of credit necessary to stimulate growth in China could prove elusive at this point (we don’t recall any economist’s forecasts exiting 2016 pointing to China’s new credit issuance more than doubling Y/Y in 2017, yet that’s exactly what’s happened – had this been our base case, we would have expected all economic indicators in China to be moving substantially higher at this point in the cycle). Thus, to the thesis that rests on a view that: “Xi will just stimulate more”, we would argue that the extent of the stimulus necessary may be so high at this point that President Xi Jinping may have lost sight of how much debt he needs to “get things going again”. Should this prove to be the case, China’s economy will continue slowing, putting pressure on bulk commodity prices, and, ultimately, industrial/steel stocks (CAT, URI, FMG, RIO, X, CLF, GATX, and TRN, all of which we have SELL ratings on).


HOW’S THE DATA LOOK IN THE FACE OF CHINA’S RECORD 2017 CREDIT “BINGE”? So how do the data points look? Well, here’s a few (we feel the charts say it all)…


Ex. 2: Monthly Construction Starts (Residential + Commercial + Office)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 3: GDP Growth Internals - China (FAI, Industrial Production, & Retail Sales)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 4: China Monthly Steel Production by Year

Source: World Steel Association (WSA), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 5: China Cement Output

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 6: Y/Y Growth in Electricity Production by Month

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 7: China M2 Money Growth, Y/Y% - Multi Decade Low (bearish)

Source: Peoples" Bank of China (PBOC), Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 8: 3MMA Household Loan Growth, Y/Y%

Source: Axiom Capital Research, Bloomberg, National Bureau of Statistics.


Ex. 9: Monthly Total Fixed Asset Investment and Y/Y Growth

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 10: Monthly Private Fixed Asset Investment and Y/Y Growth

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 11: Private Investment in Industrial Sector and Y/Y Growth

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 12: Average Price Change of New Residential Buildings, by Tiered-Cities, %Y/Y

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Axiom Capital Research.


In short, we feel China could be the “black swan” that ruins the stock market rally party for many in the industrials space. Caveat emptor.









Tuesday, November 21, 2017

Learning From The "80s: The Power And Irony Of "MDuh"

Authored by Daniel Nevins via FFWiley.com,


Forget about big hair, Ray-Bans, and Donkey Kong. Don’t even think about Live-Aid, Thriller, and E.T. Above all else, the 1980s were the gravy days of the money supply aggregates.


Beginning in late 1979, the Fed built its policy approach around the aggregates - primarily M1 but occasionally M2, and policy makers also monitored M3 while experimenting with M1B and, later, MZM. But those were just the “official” figures. Economists and pundits debated the Fed’s preferred measures while concocting their own home-brewed variations.


Notably, the Fed allowed interest rates to fluctuate as much as necessary to achieve its money growth targets. Fluctuate they did - rates soared and dipped wildly as a direct result of the Fed’s policy. The world, meanwhile, watched the action as attentively as a Yorkie watches breakfast, studying every wiggle in every M. Missing one wiggle could have meant the difference between exploiting the volatility that the Fed unleashed or being sunk by that same volatility.


And to make sense of it all, the world looked to the most famous economist of his day, Milton Friedman. By converting a large swath of his profession to his strict brand of Monetarism, Friedman more than anyone else had triggered the monetary frenzy.


But then, almost as quickly as the frenzy blew in, it blew right back out. With none of the Ms living up to their billings as economic indicators, the Monetarists drifted from view. Not in five minutes but in five years, give or take a couple, their period of fame was over. Friedman’s reputation as an economics savant fell particularly hard—his highly publicized forecasts proved inaccurate in each year from 1983 to 1986. And the Fed once again redesigned its approach, first deemphasizing and eventually dropping its money growth targets.


But maybe the Monetarists came closer to explaining the economy than their critics allowed?


Maybe the best indicator - I’ll call it “MDuh” - was somehow hidden in plain sight?


Those are the arguments I’ll make in this article, and I’ll back each one with up-to-date data. I’ll propose a way of thinking that’s considered common sense in some circles even as it’s blasphemous within the mainstream core of the economics profession. And I’ll explain why MDuh was the true lesson of Friedman’s research.


Before we get to MDuh, though, there are two things you should know about Friedman and his co-researcher Anna Schwartz (if you didn’t already know them).


  • First, they relied on data, not theory, when they shaped their version of Monetarism. They found a strong historical correlation between money growth and economic activity, and they also found that money growth predicts activity. They published those results in a groundbreaking 1963 book, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.

  • Second, to their credit they never claimed to understand the monetary “transmission mechanism,” meaning the reasons the historical correlations were as strong as they were. But they offered their best guess, which lined up with prevailing Monetarist thinking. They believed that “there is a fairly definite real quantity of money that people wish to hold” and that our continual efforts to adjust money holdings to those fairly definite levels are the business cycle’s driving force. (See here for source.)

The Glaring but Rarely Acknowledged Problem with M1 and M2


The second point above explains why Monetarists defined the aggregates as they did. They defined each aggregate according to the characteristics that might influence the “fairly definite real quantity of money that people wish to hold.” But the characteristics they believed important, such as liquidity, stability, and value as a medium of exchange, led to unreliable indicators, as shown in the chart below:


mduh chart


The chart compares the most popular Monetarist measures, M1 and M2, to two measures that I created, MDuh and NBL. I’ll define MDuh and NBL in just a moment. I’ll first offer an explanation for why M1 and M2 lost their pre-1980s mojo as GDP correlates. And to do that, I’ll need to review a fallacy that underpins not only Monetarism but all of mainstream macro.


Mainstream theory relies on the false premise that bank loans are no different to other loan types. It ignores the reality that bank loans are unique, because banks are the only institutions that create deposits (money) while delivering loan proceeds. Bank borrowers receive money that banks create from thin air, and that brand new money has powerful effects. It boosts spending without requiring prior saving, meaning it’s mostly additive to economic activity. That is, it doesn’t have a large “crowding out” effect on other spending - bank-created money flows directly into nominal GDP. It might affect prices, real growth, or a combination of prices and real growth, depending on how the new money is spent. But it’s important to remember that the new money connects to a bank loan. The money–GDP correlation is merely a byproduct of a lending–GDP correlation. Bank lending, not money, is the driving force.


Back to M1 and M2: Why did those highly touted measures lose their strong correlations to GDP, whereas MDuh didn’t?


I would say it’s because they lost their connections to bank lending. The economists who created them made both additions to and subtractions from bank-created money, whereas I made no such adjustments when I calculated MDuh. I didn’t bother with the differences between checking, savings, and time deposits, and I didn’t bother with money that’s not created by banks, such as money market funds. In other words, I didn’t bother with the characteristics of money that absorb the attention of mainstream economists - liquidity, stability, and value as a medium of exchange. For what it’s worth, I doubt that people maintain definite money holdings, as the Monetarists claimed.


MDuh depends on a single question: Is a potential MDuh component initiated by a private entity with the legal authority to create money, meaning either a commercial bank or a similar deposit-taking institution? If the answer is yes, I include the component in MDuh. Otherwise, I don’t. By using only that criterion, I’m estimating the amount of new money that banks pump into the economy when they make loans and buy securities. Not surprisingly, MDuh correlates almost perfectly with net bank lending - the correlation between 1959 and 2016 was 0.97. And net bank lending, as you might have guessed, is “NBL” in the chart above.


To say it again, banking realities tell us that bank lending, not money, is the business cycle’s driving force, as shown by the data in my chart.


Why Friedman and Schwartz Were Almost “on the Money”


Now for the irony.


Over the 94-year period covered in Friedman and Schwartz’s Monetary History, data only existed for a few types of money. The authors couldn’t separate different types of bank accounts as finely as statisticians do today. They couldn’t measure any non-currency, non-bank-created money that may have existed over the period of study. In other words, they couldn’t add and subtract the various components of the Ms that disconnect them from bank lending.


So MDuh is far from an original measure. It consists of currency in circulation plus bank deposits less bank reserves, which is equivalent to the measure Friedman and Schwartz used in their book for the period until the Fed’s inception in 1913 (there were no central bank–held reserves) and almost equivalent thereafter. Their monetary history could have just as accurately been called “The History of MDuh.” In effect, their study of MDuh triggered the 1980s monetary frenzy in the first place.


(The only discrepancy between MDuh and Friedman–Schwartz is my adjustment for bank reserves, which isolates private sector–supplied credit by excluding deposits that arise though the Fed’s open market operations. Without the adjustment for bank reserves, MDuh would mix apples with oranges. It would combine private sector lending, which is pro-cyclical, with the Fed’s lending, which is intended to be counter-cyclical. Private sector lending is more strongly correlated to GDP, as you would expect.)


In an ideal world, Friedman and Schwartz’s followers would have recognized that MDuh mostly demonstrates the connections between business cycles, inflation, and bank credit cycles. But that’s not what happened. They stuck to their training, which told them that bank loans are identical to other types of lending. And then they obsessed over how to define money supply, as if economic insight comes down to whether to include, say, overnight repos in your favorite M. By so doing, they moved further and further from MDuh.


Next Steps for Those Who See Things as I Do


As mentioned above, my conclusions probably sound like common sense to many of you, even as they conflict with mainstream macro. You might wonder if you can exploit that discrepancy, and I explain how in my book Economics for Independent Thinkers (website here, Amazon link here).


For now, though, I’d say the next time your favorite analyst breaks down M1 or M2, comment politely that those indicators emerged from long-standing fallacies about money and banking.


Suggest that maybe people don’t fine-tune their money holdings to a “fairly definite” level as Monetarist theory requires. Or, even if they do, the desired money holdings wouldn’t propel the economy in the same way bank loans do. And then ask her to look at MDuh instead. Or, better yet, ask her to look at net bank lending and be done with it. Money, while occasionally interesting, mostly sows confusion among those who study it.









Monday, October 16, 2017

Overheating China PPI Sends 10Y Yields To 30 Month Highs As Banks Inject Another Quarter Trillion Dollars In Loans

Despite a disappointing US CPI report on Friday, which saw core inflation miss once again despite an expected spike due to the "hurricane effect", moments ago China reported that in September, its CPI printed at 1.6% Y/Y, in line with expectations, and down from, 1.8% in August largely due to high year-over-year base effects, but it was PPI to come in smoking hot, jumping from 6.3% last month to 6.9% Y/Y, slamming expectations of a 6.4% print and just shy of the highest forecast, driven by the recent surge in commodity costs and strong PMI surveys.



While there has been no reaction in the Yuan, either on shore or off, the stronger than expected PPI has pushed China"s 10Y yield to the highest in 30 months, or since April of 2015.



Adding fuel to the flame was PBOC head Zhou Xiaochuan who said earlier that China’s GDP would pick up from the 6.9%  figure recorded in the first six months of the year "thanks to a boost from household spending", according to a synopsis of his comments at the G30 International Banking Seminar posted to the People’s Bank of China website on Monday." The reason why his comments have impacted the long-end is that the reported, and completely fabricated number, is higher than the previous consensus forecast of a goalseeked Q3 Chinese GDP of 6.8%.


And while spiking Chinese yields wouldn"t be concerned if China was indeed deleveraging as the Communist Party and the PBOC claim it is doing, the reality is, of course, that China continues to add more and more debt as the latest weekend credit numbers out of the PBOC revealed. As Bloomberg reported earlier, China"s broadest credit aggregated, Total Social Financing, jumped to 1.82 trillion yuan, or over a quarter trillion dollars in September ($276BN to be precise), vs a Wall Street estimate of 1.57 trillion yuan and 1.48 trillion yuan the prior month. New yuan loans also beat expectations, at 1.27 trillion yuan, versus a projected 1.2 trillion yuan, while for the first time in months, the broader M2 money supply did not hit fresh fresh record lows, and instead beat expectations, rising to 9.2% from an all time low of 8.9%.



Just as notable, after China"s shadow banking credit appeared to have finally been tamed after several months of contraction, shadow banking finance saw a pick-up in Sept (trust loans, entrusted loans and undiscounted bills), which accounted for 22% of Sept TSF vs. 18% in August. This was due mostly to milder deleveraging pace post the completion of self-checking of CBRC regs.



Commenting on the latest burst of credit creation by China, Kenneth Courtis, chairman of Starfort Investment Holdings and a former Asia vice chairman for Goldman Sachs Group, said that "Momentum continues to be very strong. Loan demand of the private sector has finally turned up in recent months."


It also means that just two weeks after the PBOC cuts its RRR for most banks in an unexpected monetary easing on Sept 30, “there is little hope of further policy easing in the fourth quarter as the monetary policy is very accommodative," said Zhou Hao, an economist at Commerzbank AG in Singapore. "There could be even a tightening bias."


Of course, confirming what we have been saying for years, Christopher Balding who is an associated professor in Peking Univeristy in Shenzhen said that "deleveraging is not happening if we look at any measure of credit growth" and that "lending in 2017 has actually accelerated significantly from 2016." This is shown in the chart below, which confirms that to keep its GDP at 6.9% or some other goalseeked number, China has to inject more than double that amount in credit every single month, in this case 15%. The biggest question is what happens to China"s credit impulse after the 19th Party Congress which begins on Wednesday.



When looking at the boost in household spending noted above by Zhou Xiaochuan, all of this is the result of a surge in household lending: "Household short-term loans have increased too rapidly, with some funds being invested in stock and property markets," said Wen Bin, a researcher at China Minsheng Banking Corp. in Beijing. "Regulators have started to pay attention to the sector and required banks to strengthen credit review. I think the momentum will show signs of slowing in the fourth quarter."


Commenting on the recent burst in Chinese household leverage, where short-term household loans soared to 1.53 trillion yuan, versus 524.7 billion yuan this time one year ago, Deutsche Bank"s Hans Fan writes that "noticeably China households are levering up quickly. We welcome the personal loans driven by genuine consumption growth, but there may be a notable portion of short-term consumer loans that were used to finance property purchases, which in our view contains higher risks." 




Some more details:





A breakdown by borrower suggests household and corporate sectors continued to lever up, making up 31%/41% of new system credit in Sept (35%/38% in Aug). For households, while mortgage growth had slowed, s/t retail loan growth accelerated to 17.6% yoy in Sept (vs. 15.8% in Aug or 7.3% in 1Q17) to make up c.10% of credit creation. We attribute this to both decent consumption growth with rising credit penetration and property-related lending. We estimate 1/3 of new consumption loans may be used to finance purchases of second homes. However, PBOC and local CBRC offices have started to crack down on property-related consumer loans in September and we expect consumer loan growth momentum to moderate in the coming months.




However, as so often happens in China, this surging leverage "sugar high" will not last, as "regulatory crackdown on property-related consumer loans together with monetary policy staying neutral lead us to expect slower credit growth in 4Q17." The implications for China"s economy and the global credit impulse will be adverse, and will lead to a global economic slowdown just as all central banks enter tightening moment together.


Finally, for those wondering what the biggest timebomb in the global financial system was, is and will be until such time as it finally blows up, here is a lovely up close schematic courtesy of Deutsche Bank.


Friday, October 13, 2017

"Game Changer"

Authored by Paul Brodsky via Macro-Allocation.com,


Investors understand that asset markets are experiencing dynamic change (think ETFs), but have not yet broadly recognized that the fundamental nature of wealth itself is changing too. Before the decline of active asset management runs its course there will be an imperative to focus on active currency management. Wealth maintenance and creation demands a clear understanding of this transformation. 


Debt Tokens 


The majority of us are not as rich as we think. Our wealth is held in debt tokens or assets denominated in them with increasingly dubious prospects. Some accounting identities are in order.


Classically, an asset is something with intrinsic value that transcends time and money. It has some value no matter how or when one measures it. Only two people – a potential buyer and seller – need to value something for it to be an asset.


A currency, meanwhile, is a unit of account that provides users with a means of measuring and exchanging value. In a hypothetical barter economy, production itself is would be currency. Currencies representing saved wealth are necessary because we need to value goods, services and assets relative to each other.


Modern currencies are widely misunderstood. They are actually the product of bank system double-entry accounting – ultimately un-reserved, 100 percent faith-based obligations of centralized entities (governments, central banks or currency boards) to manufacture enough actual base money in the future (i.e., inflate) to settle all claims for money that was already created by private banks through the lending process. It is important to note that credit and credit-currencies are claims on money, not claims on assets. Depending upon how one counts, there is either 3 times (M2), 5 times (bank assets), 12 times (total credit market debt), or 25 times (total unfunded liabilities) the amount of claims on US dollars than the amount of actual US dollars in existence (base money). There are no plans to remedy this overwhelming leverage. In fact, this month the Fed is beginning to increase currency leverage again by reducing the size of its own balance sheet, which will effectively re-leverage banks by reducing bank reserves.


This state of monetary affairs is a big deal for financial asset investors. As it stands today, investors could not hypothetically exchange all assets (or liabilities) for base money, or even for credit currencies (M2), at or near current prices. To do so, banking systems would have to first create new liabilities, which in turn would dilute and diminish the purchasing power value of currencies in which assets are denominated.


To be good money, a currency must also be a store of value, meaning it also has to be an asset or be backed by an asset. In the current regime, there are no assets with quantifiable value directly associated with fiat currencies…other than the ability to tax.


The ability to tax is indeed an asset of governments, but one with greatly diminished value. In the US, fiscal year 2016 tax revenues were $3.3 trillion.1 Meanwhile, baseline government spending was about $3.4 trillion, including $1.06 trillion for Medicare and Medicaid; $910 billion for Social Security; $600 billion for non-defense discretionary spending to fund federal departments and agencies; $585 billion for the Defense Department; and $240 billion for interest on federal debt.2 These expenditures are rising faster than tax revenues and do not include truly discretionary government spending. (It seems legislators only have true discretion over how they deficit-spend.) 


While the incalculable value of assets of the United States government (including its strong military and hegemonic control over shipping lanes and bilateral trade) may exceed its currency obligations, such assets cannot be transferred to creditors (i.e., dollar holders) to satisfy obligations. Thus, from both stock (leverage) and flow (budget deficit) perspectives, the US dollar is a very poor credit in real terms. Indeed, other fiat currencies may be worse and all of them are effectively unreserved debt tokens.


The quantity of systemic liabilities – including debt-based credit and credit-currencies – has come to vastly exceed the forward real value of unencumbered assets (adjusted for necessary currency devaluation). It is not possible to net all assets against all liabilities without dramatically reducing the real purchasing power value (PPV) of assets. What does this imply for assets denominated in credit-currencies? Today’s wealth has been borrowed to such an extent that it cannot be broadly recognized in the currencies in which assets are currently denominated. Looking forward, we think the most influential input into wealth creation will be getting the underlying currency right.


If today’s currencies are, in realty, unreserved debt tokens, and assets are denominated and measured in them, then how does one value assets in real terms? Here’s three-step logic we think makes sense:





1. Take the nominal value of an asset priced in a certain currency



2. Adjust the nominal value by the implicit leverage embedded in that currency



3. Present Value the future nominal cash flows of the asset against future currency dilution



Applying this metric makes clear that assets – equity, debt, plant, equipment, labor, goodwill, whatever – priced in certain currencies may hold significantly more or less value today than similar assets priced in other currencies with similar nominal asset valuation metrics (i.e., P/Es, Price to Book, Cap Rates, etc.).


Not surprisingly, assets have taken on many of the qualities of currencies, which makes sense given that both are effectively unfunded obligations. Neither assets nor currencies can have intrinsic value. Currencies may only be valued against other currencies and assets may only be valued against other assets. Is it any wonder that financial asset markets have become places to “save” and that low-cost passive investment vehicles like ETFs are becoming the vehicles of choice? It was inevitable that today’s government-sponsored, bank-executed monetary system would eventually be disintermediated, and the shift to “saving” through passive investing in asset markets is a step in that process.


Value Exchange


What happens when value begins to be exchanged directly on the internet itself, rather than through centralized portals that sit atop it like toll booths? Block chain technology is effectively an open source triple-entry accounting system that includes all participants in the value transfer process. The combination of the technology, its applications, and its accessibility are genuinely transformative.


What will happen to the value of highly-leveraged credit-currencies relative to less leveraged or zero leveraged stores of value that arise from this transformation? What will happen to Foreign Exchange (FX) cross rates in a peer-to-peer world where nothing is foreign? What about the real value of assets?


Looking forward, a growing portion of value, regardless of what form it takes, will be exchanged peer-to-peer, and any value leftover will be stored in whichever form counterparties agree – fiat currencies, cryptocurrencies, commodity-backed currencies, maybe even direct claims for commodities, goods, services or equity.


Value Exchange (VX) rates could look something like the hypothetical table below:


Table 1: Hypothetical Value Exchange Rate (VX) Table - 2027



We should expect value to flow directly between producers and consumers of that production, rather than through public and private sector intermediaries charging them rent. Rentiers and sovereign authorities will formally embrace this brave new world – not out of a sense of altruism, but because the technology is already here and human incentives cannot be denied.
 

Sunday, October 8, 2017

Kyle Bass Sounds Off On "Worthless" Puerto Rican Debt, The Crypto "Gold Rush", And Guns

With the dollar’s recent post-Fed bout of appreciation providing some much-needed relief for Haymarket Capital’s P&L, its founder Kyle Bass sat for an interview on Friday with Bloomberg’s Erik Schatzker. During the 20 minute discussion, Bass expounded on the importance of holding gold, his cautiously optimistic view on digital currencies, the misguided notion that holders of Puerto Rican debt will someday be made whole – oh, and Bass’s next big call: Long Greece - particularly the stocks and debt of Greek banks.



A few weeks ago, Bloomberg view published a Bass-penned editorial in which the hedge fund founder and CIO called on the IMF to stop bullying Greece -  publicizing the fact that he is now effectively long Greece. Greek government bonds have performed reasonably well so far this year: They’re up about 16%.


And if Bass is right, they could have another 20% to 30% over the next 18 months if the IMF abandons its insistence on austerity and acknowledges that debt relief will need to be part of the long-term alleviation of debt. Bass added that, in the near future, voters will elect a more business-friendly government that will help reestablish the country’s creditworthiness, much like the government of Mauricio Macri did for Argentina. 





I think you also have an interesting political situation in Greece where I think there"s going to be a handoff from the current Syriza government to kind of a more slightly-center-right but very economically independent new leadership in the next, call it, 18 months.



And so, I think you asked why now? And I think you"re starting to see green shoots. You"re starting to see the banks do the right things finally in Greece and you are about to have new leadership.



So, I think that you"re going to see - and if you remember Argentina as Kirschner was going to hand-off – hand the reins over to someone that was much more let"s say focused on business and economics than being a kleptocrat, I think you"re going to see something again slightly similar in Greece where you have leadership today that might not be the right leadership and the government-in-waiting, I believe, and I think you know Mr. (Mitsutakous) - I think you"re going to see something great happen to Greece in the and next, kind of, two years.



Asked if he still considers himself a China bear after the yuan’s surprising run of strength against the dollar, Bass answered in the affirmative. But the language he uses to talk about China has softened notably, with the investor now expecting a correction instead of an all-out collapse.


Chinese President Xi Jinping has been laser-focused on consolidating power during this year’s quinquennial Communist Party National Congress, set for Oct. 18. Once it passes, Bass believes that the PBOC’s grip on the yuan exchange rate will loosen and market forces will reassert themselves. Meanwhile, the country will also relax its focus on appeasing President Trump.





What I"m telling you is my guess is their laser-like focus on exchange rates and dealing with the Trump Administration is going to be relaxed a bit once Xi consolidates his power.



You know, their electoral cycle is a little different than ours if you want to call it that. Their NPCs happen every five years. Xi - this is the end of his first term. He"s going to solidify a second term. He"s going to reconstitute the Standing Committee of the Politburo and we think that he has consolidated power.



He"s quickly becoming the most powerful Chinese ruler since Mao and the question is will he have a third term. And so, once this consolidation of power is over and the NPC is finished I think you"re going to see more natural economic forces acting on their banking system.



He acknowledged that the appreciation of the yuan "has been terrible this year" for his hedge fund, which has predicted that the yuan would fall more than 30%. But he’s standing by the position for now with the expectation that over the next nine months “you’ll see the rubber hit the road.”





It"s been terrible this year. And again, you think about the time continuums of these big global macro events.



Unfortunately, it doesn"t fit into a nice envelope that works every month, every quarter, every year. And so, you have to stick with it as long as you can and in this environment, I think in the next call it nine months from October you"ll see the rubber hit the road.



Bass scoffed at the notion of investing in Puerto Rican debt, saying that investors would be lucky to walk away with between 10 and 20 cents on the dollar. The idea that the island, with a workforce of just 1.4 million people, will ever be able to pay back $70 billion in debt is ridiculous, he said.





These are two different questions - one is, should we help with hurricane? Absolutely. We should do everything possible.



Puerto Rico is just a simple math 101 question.



But on the debt question I just think you have to be a little crazy to think that $100 billion worth of debt or even $70 billion of on-balance sheet debt is worth anything with 1.4 million workers in an economy like Puerto Rico"s.



…



When you look at sovereigns and you look at history of sovereign defaults, recoveries and wipeouts are $0.10-$0.20 on the dollar - that"s what I think people are going to end up with.



Asked for his view on bitcoin, Bass said he’s accepted that he was wrong to dismiss it early on, saying he failed to grasp the technology. He acknowledges now that digital currencies are a “real asset class”. While he hasn’t yet figured out how to value digital assets, bitcoin’s deflationary features would presumably make it a strong performer as inflation rebounds over the coming years, Bass said. Bass said he doesn’t own digital currencies.  





Early on I summarily dismissed bitcoin and I shouldn"t have. And didn"t understand - truthfully, I don"t understand the depth of the algorithms, the technology and the fundamental foundation of bitcoin I didn"t understand. I spent a lot of time trying to understand it in the last call it six months and I believe that the digital-asset class of cryptocurrency is a real asset-class but in terms of kind of how the world views digital currencies we talked - when you look at global cash positions today given global Q/E, they"re now north of 110 percent of global GDP. So, we"re talking about almost $100 trillion of cash in the world.



That has never happened before in world history and so when I think about inflation - you"re starting to see wages move. You"re starting to see the price of all goods and services move. The thing that"s been really deflationary in the globe has been technology. It"s been a very positive deflationary force and I think that"s played out.



The technological deflation has played out so, now I think you"re going to start to see inflation and wages move. And this gets into crypto-currency.



The collective value of crypto currency is a little over $100 billion today. Global M2, global cash is like $80 trillion, $100 trillion; so, what"s $100 billion? The question is, what"s it worth? And as a store of value, a media of exchange and other currency I don"t think there"s any true institutional investor has any money in bitcoin – I know some have a little bit. They have nominal amounts invested but I think it will be an asset class that will work over time. I"m not sure how to value it yet - I really have no idea.



To be sure, Bass expressed skepticism about the red-hot market for ICOs, referring to it as a “digital gold rush” that will end with “a lot of people losing a lot of money.”





I think there"s a digital gold rush that"s gone on.



I think a whole bunch of people are going to lose a lot of money. These ICOs - you"re going to see a bunch of them go completely broke - a bunch of them are frauds. And that"s going to be problematic for all the people that just rushed in and so I feel like it"s a bit of a mania at the moment but



With the end of the interview approaching, the conversation veered toward gun control. Bass said that he and his son own dozens of guns and are close to many members of the armed service. However, he still believes that the state and federal government should maintain comprehensive gun registries, even though such precautions probably wouldn’t have stopped Las Vegas shooter Stephen Paddock from carrying out his horrifyingly deadly crime.





My son and I have this - we have this place here that we enjoy and when I think about this debate - should guns be registered? Absolutely. Should people be able to sell a gun from one to another without recording the buyer and the seller? Should every gun have a serial number and be registered with the federal government and local authorities?



I think this is a no-brainer. That"s just a pragmatist. The NRA fights that tooth-and-nail.



After all, people need to register their cars with the state, Bass said. Why not guns, too?


So, to sum up: Buy Greek bonds, buy Greek debt; hold gold, hold bitcoin; sell Puerto Rican debt, sell ICOs, sell yuan warning that "within nine months, the rubber will hit the road" on China"s currency collapse, and register all your guns...
 

Thursday, October 5, 2017

China's Shadow-Lending Ecosystem Could Be As Large As $40 Trillion, PBOC Guesses

Authored by Deep Throat at Deep Throat Blog


Today, I"d like to take some time to revisit a couple of related topics that we first started discussing a few years ago. I am, of course, referring to the burgeoning increases in China"s Debt levels, Shadow Bank Assets (loans) and M2, along with a high-level analysis of the most recent PBOC Financial Stability Report and FSB Global Shadow Bank Monitoring Report. (No!....please don"t click this page closed....I promise this will eventually get interesting...)


As a starting point, let"s begin by reviewing the February, 2015 McKinsey report  Debt and (not much) Deleveraging .  I first referenced the report in this blog in March of 2015. The report focused on the world"s, and particularly China"s, rapidly building debt/leverage phenomenon (2014 Year End Data).  I encourage you to re-read the entire report, but for those of you who are pressed for time, I"ll give you the executive summary bullet-points right here:


  • Debt continues to grow  

  • Reducing government debt will require a wider range of solutions

  • Shadow banking has retreated, but non?bank credit remains important

  • Households borrow more

  • China’s debt is rising rapidly

I"m hoping that the McKinsey authors will consider updating the report, bringing the figures current, as I believe these observations, figures and analysis are even more pertinent today than they were back in 2015.


China"s Debt


So now, using McKinsey as a reference point, let"s take a look at where we are today, via the FRED (St. Louis FED)data below.


The FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data - Citations below) Chart below represents US Core Debt (as defined and provided by the BIS - Bureau of International Settlements) compared to China Core Debt, as a percentage of GDP.  The third (bold Red) line represents China"s debt levels adjusted for a "what-if" constant I"ll explain shortly.


Lets dig into the numbers.  We see from 2006 thru 2016 US Core Debt increased modestly from roughly 220% of GDP to 250% of GDP.  However, China"s Core Debt, relative to GDP nearly doubled during the same period, to roughly 260% of GDP.



Before we discus the above, let"s talk about what GDP is (and isn"t).  GDP is:


C+I+G+(NX) or:


(Consumption + Investment + Government Spending + (Exports-Imports)).  


First, it"s important to understand that increased GDP does not necessarily increase wealth or improve quality of life.  A GDP calculation is measuring-stick for economic activity....nothing more.  A GDP figure makes no representations as to the quality, efficiency or economic utility of the activity producing the GDP.  i.e.) When my Dad was in the Army (WWII....the "big one") he talked about "practicing" digging fox holes.  He and thousands of other soldiers would be told/ordered to dig holes and fill them in.....for no apparent reason other than to keep them busy.  This activity, since he was being paid to do it, would increase GDP, even though it accomplished nothing more than wear them out and keep them out of the English pubs.


That said, here are a few examples of things that would significantly increase GDP.


  • Building a Superhighway, Bridge or Bullet Train connecting two uninhabited deserts or islands. (I+G)

  • Building a Ghost City. (I+G)

  • A military build up. (I+G)

  • Producing millions of tons of steel and cement held in a developer"s CIP inventory. (I+G+C)

  • Creating even more manufacturing capacity (factories and mines) for steel, cement, etc.(I)

  • Building infrastructure.  i.e.) Public works, water, power plants, tunnels, wells, utilities etc. (I+G)

  • Manufacturing phones, computers, clothing and consumer goods for export. (C+NX)

  • Buying tons of eCommerce stuff. (C)

  • Tearing down an abandoned building/high rise. (C+G)

Here are a few more you might not think about.....again, these are events/activities that increase GDP but don"t necessarily increase wealth or quality of life.


  • A hurricane....all of the destruction has to be financed and rebuilt. (C+I+G)

  • Public Welfare and Housing Assistance Checks (C+G)

  • Single Payer Health Care (C+G)

  • Paying 10x as much for a medical procedure as you might pay in other countries (C)

So you get the point.....although it looks good on paper, incurring debt to build/finance things that aren"t economically viable, produce little (or no) economic utility or fail to generate earnings and cash flow doesn"t work too well over the long haul.  At some point, the lenders won"t be paid back.....or, as should happen in a free-floating world, if they are eventually paid back, they"ll be paid back with a currency having a fraction of the purchasing power of the currency they initially loaned out to finance the activity.


China"s "Productive GDP"


Now, let"s get back to the bold Red line on the chart above and take some time to coin a phrase. We"ll call it "Productive GDP" or PGDP.  As any economist will tell you, desperate times call for desperate measures.....and new terminology!  Let"s say that China"s "Productive" GDP, for lack of a better term, is defined as GDP excluding all of the over-building, non-productive excess capacity and accounting games created simply to hit the arbitrary 7%, etched in stone, silly, CCP mandated GDP growth target.


So let"s further say that rather than the published, rock solid, 7%, annual NBS GDP growth rate, the "Productive", un-fudged, non-incentivized, PGDP growth rate is only 4.6%, (2/3rds of the published/reported rate), but still a remarkable number for an economy the size of China"s.  Extrapolating the bold Red Line above, if GDP is "overstated" by a third, we illustrate/conclude that the ratio of Core Debt to "Productive" PGDP explodes to nearly 400%, much higher than the current G20 average of 240%.


Author"s Note:  You math aficionados out there might be observing that the bold red line doesn"t consider the compounding impact (i.e. reducing the GDP growth rate in a prior year impacts the current year starting point).  So the method illustrated (multiplying GDP by a constant) actually overstates GDP.  That"s absolutely correct.  However, since I have no actual data to base my adjustment on, it"s a guess, an arbitrary adjustment, so the compounding doesn"t matter.  Besides using a constant was just simply easier than trying to program the FRED model to compound the change.  In any case, I"m just illustrating a point.


So far so good?


Shadow Banking


Now lets revisit the 2015 McKinsey Report (2014 data) bullet points above.  Specifically:


  • Shadow banking has retreated, but non?bank credit remains important

Unfortunately, per the People"s Bank of China (PBOC), Shadow Bank lending has reversed course abruptly and skyrocketed since the 2015 McKinsey report.  Nobody really knows how big China"s Shadow Bank ecosystem is, but the PBOC recently offered a rather shocking guess in their 2017 Financial Stability Report (pg.48).  China"s Off-Balance-Sheet, un-regulated, "Shadow" loans have grown to nearly US $37 Trillion (RMB 252.3 Trillion) and have surpassed China"s US$34 Trillion, "On-Balance Sheet" bank assets as of the close of 2016.  They also restated the 2015 numbers, increasing the 2015 figures to US$ 28 Trillion (RMB 189 Trillion), roughly doubling the 2015 figure.


Keep in mind, the PBOC estimating Non-Bank Shadow loans is a bit like the local Sheriff estimating "unreported financial crime".  He doesn"t have authority over the mechanics of the activity, lacks enforcement resources and therefore can"t do much about preventing the crime(s).  Even if he had authority and resource, he"d have a hard time zeroing in on the metric....criminals generally don"t respond to surveys or self-report their schemes.  Moreover, the Sheriff would have an incentive to under-estimate the problem and hope everything works out, since, at some point, someone is going to be held accountable.  As history shows, and Chinese Bankers are well aware of this, financial scoundrels are normally exiled to horrific disgrace on a private tropical island with access to boatloads of Cayman Islands money.....so it goes.


Again, based solely on the usual, limited transparency inherent in PBOC reporting (good things are trumpeted and bad things are swept under the rug), a disclosure like this would indicate that the problem is potentially much larger than they are letting on.  In the 2017 Financial Stability Report (an oxymoron if I"ve ever heard one) the PBOC restates the Shadow Bank Assets for 2014 and 2015 (as shown by the dotted line in the chart below). To my knowledge, no other major economy has ever experienced an acceleration anywhere near these levels of Non-Bank, Shadow debt relative to GDP, much less restated it in a gigantic "ooppps....our bad" buried in a couple of paragraphs in the bowels of a report.  In China....they do things big.  The bigger the better.  The two Charts below, prepared by Capital Economics illustrate that we"ve apparently entered uncharted waters.




Although the fiercely independent citizens, politicians and bankers of Hong Kong and Singapore might disagree, we can generalize that the leverage in those economies (tall bars on the left of the chart) is inextricably linked to the Chinese financial system. If there were ever a potential "ground-zero" for a default-induced financial contagion Shang-Hong-apore would be it.


Moreover, when we examine the PBOC/CE Charts above, it wouldn"t be much of a reach to conclude that Shadow/Non-Bank Credit has become an absolutely essential tool for keeping all of the financial balls in the air. As reported by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in a piece for the Telegraph:


Jahangir Aziz and Haibin Zhu from JP Morgan said the debts of the state-owned entities (SOEs) have alone reached 90pc of GDP or $13.3 trillion.  


Nearly 60pc of new credit this year is being used to repay old loans. It takes four times as much new credit to generate a given amount of extra of GDP as it did a decade ago. “China’s rising indebtedness has come to represent all that is disconcerting about their economy,” they said in a report entitled “The Sum of All Fears”.


Hmmmm....."The Sum of All Fears"....catchy little title for a financial/policy report!  Tom Clancy would be proud....


Viewed another way, when we add the current, 2016 BIS figure, roughly US$28 Trillion of China"s Core Debt plus the estimated US$37 Trillion +/- of Shadow debt (RMB 253.5 Trillion), we have a Debt/PGDP ratio approaching 900% of "Productive" PGDP.  The Comparable, relatively constant, US ratio (250% +/-) is shown in blue below.




"Total Social Financing" (TSF)


Total Social Financing (TSF), a term of art the Chinese government introduced a few years ago to track the leverage in their economy, grew to RMB 155.99 trillion RMB (US$ 23 Trillion),  up 12.8 percent from 2015, per the PBOC Report. (Pg. 28)  The intent of this statistic is to track the "total financing" required by households and businesses.  The process goes awry when we try to decipher exactly what"s included in this metric and how the data is collected.  There are numerous articles written on this topic and I"ve listed a few of them in the citations below.  Suffice it to say that the consensus is, that a significant amount of Non-Bank Shadow financing is excluded from TSF.  Interestingly, this metric, intended to show changes in the composition of how economic growth is financed, is actually misleading, since significant Shadow risk is omitted from the calculations.



Some Verifiable Numbers.....Bonds


As difficult as it is to measure China"s fragmented Shadow Financial System, there are a few reported metrics which are presumably more reliable than others.  China"s bond markets are one such example.  In the last two years (2015 & 2016) the value of new "Major" Chinese Bond issues (below) has actually exceeded the total amount outstanding of America"s Corporate Bond market (about US$ 8.6 Trillion).  Why is all of this new debt necessary?  Again, most (60%?) of the new issues are used to roll over other bonds/debts/financing coming due.



Continuing the theme, Non-Performing Loans (NPL"s) have somehow remained relatively constant, hovering just under 2% since 2011 as shown below.  (pg. 44 of the PBOC Report)


How can this be?  Perhaps it"s just little old skeptical me, but usually, when borrowing skyrockets like this, underwriting is lax and bad loans go bad much quicker.  The universally accepted game bankers play to keep a bad loan from being reported as non-performing is to refinance it and change the terms....and (drum roll please....) ....like magic, it"s a performing loan again!  In all likelihood, that"s what"s happening with this fake NPL statistic.  It"s hard to believe that China"s financial system hasn"t already broken its economic foot as a consequence of kicking all of these NPL cans down the road, but somehow it just keeps chugging merrily along.  As my favorite Irish pub drinking song goes...."Roll me over in the clover.....roll me over lay me down and do it again...this is number one....we"ve only just begun....."

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

How Much Space Does $1,500 Rent In The World's 'Most Magnetic' Cities?

New Yorkers who wince every time they slip a $1,500 rent check under their super’s door should consider moving to Shanghai, or maybe Berlin.


According to a new study published on RentCafe, $1,500 will buy you three times more space in Shanghai than in Los Angeles and twice as much in Frankfurt. Meanwhile, rents per square foot are five times higher in San Francisco than they are in Berlin.


Rentcafe used data from the Global Power Index and data on price-to-square footage ratios that it had collected for a previous study to compare how much space $1,500 will buy in the world’s 30 “most magnetic” cities - i.e. cities that are popular tourism hubs.


The study’s authors presented their results in an interactive graphic that allows users to compare costs between cities. Some of the most expensive markets include San Francisco, Manhattan and Zurich. Among the least expensive are Istanbul, Shanghai and Berlin.




Manhattan, for example, offers only 277 square foot (26 m2) for $1,500.  In Seoul, the same amount of money will rent you no less than a 1,389 square foot (129 m2) apartment, ample space for one person.



In San Francisco, $1,500 a month will rent you a 316 square foot apartment. Meanwhile, in Austria, $1,500 will rent you 1,009 square feet – almost three times as much. Rentcafe adds that, while SF has some of the most widely regarded cultural amenities in the world, Vienna - the City of Music – has plenty of entertainment options, from museums, vintage cinemas, live shows to recreational parks and hiking trails.


That is to say that one doesn"t necessarily need to pay sky-high rents to live in a fun urban environment.
 

Wednesday, August 2, 2017

Venezuela Bolivar Loses A Third Of Its Value In The Past Week

With events in Venezuela now well into the endgame, following US sanctions that named "dictator" Maduro personally and a likely subsequent sanction that will cripple Venezuela"s oil industry promptly resulting in the nation"s insolvency as it loses its last remaining source of revenue, things are moving fast. So fast, in fact, that according to Reuters, Venezuela"s money supply surged 10% in just one week earlier this month, its largest single-week rise in a quarter of a century.


Meanwhile, in addition to now daily protests and strikes, Venezuela is undergoing a major economic crisis, with millions suffering food shortages, monthly wages worth only the tens of U.S. dollars, and soaring inflation - although no official data is available.  The central bank said late on Friday the total amount of local currency in circulation, or M2 as of July 21, was 27.3 trillion bolivars, up 9.66% from the previous week.


Obviously, the exponential rise in M2, the sum of cash, together with checking, savings, and other deposits, also means an exponential rise in the amount of currency circulating. As a result, Venezuela"s money supply is up 384% in the last year. In contrast, the United States" money supply is up 5.5% in the same period.


This means that Venezuelans are forced to carry huge bundles of cash to make basic purchases, if they can afford to do so given weekly price rises on many goods of course.


This means hyperinflation.


Today, the Dolar Today website reported that Venezuela"s black market exchange rate surged past 14,000 bolivars per dollar.



When President Nicolas Maduro came to power in April 2013, it was at 24 per dollar.


Putting the country"s bitter economic end in context, the bolivar has lost a third of its value in the past week.




That takes care of the economy, as for how how socialism ends in a social context, in a poll released today Gallup found the Venezuela is now the least safe country in the world.





Venezuela"s score on Gallup"s Law and Order Index -- its annual global gauge of how secure people feel -- continued to follow the country"s descent into chaos in 2016. The country"s index score of 42 out of 100 was the lowest in the world last year. This number is likely even worse now as the country"s economic and political crisis deepens, including the election on Sunday that critics, including the U.S. and a growing list of nations, are denouncing as a "sham."



Across 135 countries, Law and Order Index scores in 2016 ranged from a high of 97 in Singapore to the low of 42 in Venezuela. The index is based on people"s reported confidence in their local police, their feelings of personal safety, the incidence of theft in the past year and -- for the first time in 2016 -- the incidence of assault and mugging in the past year.



Venezuela"s scores on all of the individual questions that make up the current index were worse last year than at any point in the past decade. Just 12% of Venezuelans in 2016 said they felt safe walking alone at night where they live, and 14% expressed confidence in their police. These are not only the worst on record for Venezuela, but the worst for any country last year -- and for the past 10 years.



To put Venezuela"s 12% who feel safe walking alone at night into perspective, the next-lowest figure in 2016 was more than twice as high as Venezuela: 28% in El Salvador. Among the 12 countries in which residents are least likely to say they feel safe walking alone at night, five are in Latin America. Another six are in sub-Saharan Africa -- including two of that region"s more economically developed countries, South Africa (37%) and Botswana (38%).



At the same time, 38% of Venezuelans said they had had property or money stolen in the past year. This is up more than 10 percentage points from the previous year and a new record high for the country. Only five countries -- all in sub-Saharan Africa -- had higher percentages than Venezuela in 2016. 



Thursday, June 15, 2017

A New Chinese Threat Emerges: Net Bond Issuance Crashes Most On Record

One month ago, we first highlighted a troubling development for China"s banking system, one which we called the "Great Shadow Unwind" and which showed that entrusted loans, a broad proxy for China"s unregulated ‘shadow banking’ system, contracted for the first time since 2007, confirming Beijing"s ongoing crackdown of China"s runaway $8.5 trillion shadow banking system. Well, overnight, the PBOC released its latest Chinese loan data, and it had several notable highlights, most of which got lost in today"s overall noise.


First, the one aspect of the latest Chinese data most commentators focused on and discussed, was the collapse in China"s M2 aggregate to just 9.6%, which not only missed expectations of 10.4%, but was also the lowest print on record.



However, unlike most developed nations, M2 in China has largely become an anachronism from China"s pre-shadow banking past, which excludes many of the broad monetary-equivalents in circulation. This is how Goldman explained this morning why those concerned about the plunge in M2 growth shouldn"t lose much sleep: "We put more weight on the adjusted total social financing data, because M2 data are heavily distorted by borrowings between financial institutions which may have relatively limited impacts on the real economy, though TSF has its own problems-- such as not including all forms of financing, especially newly developed ones."


Touching on the plunge in M2, on the PBOC"s website, the central bank explained that slower M2 growth was a result of declining leverage, and the implementation of a "prudent, neutral monetary policy, and intensified supervision that has compelled the financial system to reduce leverage," adding that as deleveraging continues, "slower M2 growth than in the past will become a new normal."


Which, in turn brings us to the far more important, for China, loan number: Total Social Financing - a monetary aggregate that captures both traditional bank loans as well as shadow loans, including trusted, entrusted loans and undiscounted bankers accepetances, which in May likewise dropped to CNY 1.06tn, missing consensus estimates of CNY 1.19tn and down from 1.39 tn in April.



And while the PBOC has aggressively clamped down on shadow financing, the central bank has refrained from cutting off traditional bank loans to companies, aiming to support growth. And, sure enough, in May China"s new Yuan loan creation did beat estimates modestly, rising by CNY1.11tn vs CNY 1tn expected. This number is hardly anything to write home about however, because as Goldman explains, "strong broad credit growth is mainly a reflection of continued strength in credit demand and the willingness of the central bank to maintain just enough liquidity to the real economy to maintain growth at the current near-trend level. This is likely the main driver of stronger RMB loan growth in April and May, which offset the fall in non-loan credit in total social financing data."


But while loan growth was stable, it was the broader TSF which demanded further attention, not least of all because - by definition - it should be bigger than its loan component. Since that was not the case, it suggests that one or more of the other TSF components declined. But before that, here is a look at China"s broadest credit growth on a annual basis: just like M2, the slowdown in the overall growth rate is, while not quite as sharp, quite visible and is a bright red flag that China"s credit impulse is turning sharply negative.



So what decline?


The answer brings us back to the abovementioned entrusted loans, a topic we first brought up a month ago. As the chart below shows, not only did entrusted loans drop for the second month in a row, but in May, they posted the biggest drop on record, dropping by CNY28 billion.



However, this time it wasn"t just entrusted loans: bankers" acceptance bills, another key, if far more volatile, shadow funding conduit also posted a monthly decline in the past month, dropping by CNY124 billion.



For those unfamiliar, here is a breakdown of the three main "shadow" credit components,  all unique to China:


  • Entrusted loans: Loans organized by a bank between borrowers and lenders. These are essentially inter-enterprise loans due to the difficulties involved in direct borrowing and lending between commercial enterprises.

  • Trust loans: Loans made by trust companies. Typical investors are high net worth individuals and corporations, and typical maturity of these products is two years. Trust loans are often used to finance infrastructure and real estate projects and are an important source of funding for private entities and risky borrowers who have difficulties in accessing bank loans.

  • Undiscounted bankers’ acceptance: A type of short-term credit issued by a firm with a bank’s guarantee. The firm’s deposit at the bank serves as both the collateral for the credit and the source of payment at a future date. While normally used in commercial transactions, this is also a way for banks to move assets off balance sheet and to engage in high-risk lending.

And yet, neither the drop in entrusted loans, nor the decline in undiscounted bankers acceptance was the highlight of the latest Chinese data: China"s "Great Shadow Unwind" was last month"s story, and is a continuation of the previously discussed crackdown on shadow banking -  which for now appears to be gaining traction - amid moves to contain excessive borrowing as Beijing tries to push all loan creation into the "open" via regulated pathways. 


The real story of the latest loan data was the record collapse in net corporate bond financing, the latest and far more "tangible" threat to China"s debt-fuelled economy. As shown in the chart below, in May a quarter trillion yuan in corporate bonds matured, or was repaid, or defaulted, resulting in the biggest corporate debt drain in history.



This has now emerged as the latest major, and most imminent, threat facing China"s financial sector and $10 trillion corporate debt market.


What happened?


It turns out, amid the continued pressure on shadow banking, Beijing"s leverage crackdown has also forced local companies to confront their addiction to traditional short-term corporate bond sales that they use to roll over debt. And, as Bloomberg warns, the shock therapy is worsening the outlook for corporate defaults in the second half of this year, just as borrowing costs jumped to a two-year high.


With various Chinese interest rates - both secured and unsecured  - surging, from Repo and Shibor...



... to short-term funding, as discussed yesterday when we most recently observed the historic inversion in China"s 1s10s curve...



... credit to China"s corporate issuers is suddenly grinding to a halt. In fact, non-banking firms sold 131 billion yuan ($19.3 billion) of bonds with a maturity of one year or less in May, the least since January 2014 and less than half of the same month last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg which also adds that about 87% of the short note sales last month will be used for refinancing.


For those familiar with the lock up in US shadow markets during the financial crisis, this is a huge warning flag , as the growing asset-liability maturity mismatch is traditionally one of the biggest threats facing an overly indebted financial system. According to Bloomberg, Chinese firms" habit of relying on borrowing short-term money to repay maturing debt - one could call it a Ponzi scheme, and one would not be wrong - has pushed up such liabilities to a total of 5.2 trillion yuan on China’s listed non-financial companies’ balance sheets as of March 31, the highest on record. Meanwhile, with no sign of an end to the government’s campaign against leverage, the average coupon rate for bonds with a maturity of one year or less has risen to a massive 5.5% in June, deterring issuers from raising money to roll over debt. In fact, not only deterring, but making debt repayment in some cases impossible.



Unable to rollover maturities, an unknown number of Chinese companies may have no option but to default According to Ma Quansheng, of Fullgoal Fund Management, "small issuance of short-term bonds will be a normal phenomenon in the coming six months because cash supply will probably remain tight. Both default risks and the number of corporate bond defaults may increase."


To be sure, Chinese companies have managed to avoid repayment pressure so far in 2017 because thanks to loose funding environment last year, they were able to raise enough money. That, however, is no longer the case. Take for example one-year AAA rated company bonds, whose yield averaged 4.19% this year, up nearly 50% from 2.97% in 2016. According to HFT Investment Management, more note defaults may come "as the economy doesn’t look good." In the second half of this year, Chinese non-banking firms must repay 2.36 trillion yuan of bonds, according to Bloomberg data.


“The current rising borrowing costs may have a big impact on companies’ operations and finance,” HFT"s Lu Congfan told Bloomberg. "What can you do when you must refinance to repay maturing debt while facing such high borrowing costs? That would be a question challenging many local companies in the second half or next year.”


Still, some firms refuse to throw in the towel and are selling bonds despite the soaring yields. One such company is Xingjiang Guanghui Industry Investment, a AA+ rated automobile service provider, which issued one-year bonds at a whopping yield of 7.3% this month, the highest among all notes maturing in one year or less. A recent Moody’s report said that Xinjiang Guanghui’s short-term debt amounted to around 54 billion yuan as of Dec. 31, well exceeding its cash holdings. It is clear that if and when the debt can no longer be rolled over, it and many of its peers, will have no choice but to default.



Meanwhile, the worst issuers’ liquidity problems are getting worse by the day, according to China"s CIC Corp. About 14.6% of bond issuers’ cash and cash equivalents is less than 30% of their short-term borrowings as of March 31. The percentage is higher than the year-end level in 2015 and 2016, said CICC.


“Any temporary halt in high-leverage issuers’ access to the short-term bond market could trigger more defaults,” said Wang Ying, head of China research initiative at Fitch in Shanghai. “The government is showing more tolerance for corporate defaults. But if there is any sign of regional risk, it may intervene to prevent default risks from spreading.”


Which brings us back to the chart above: if the biggest net reduction, or drain, in corporate bonds on record is just the start, how far will this spread?



As for the final nail in China"s economy, it may have been the result of Yellen"s own rate hike earlier today: Chen Qi, chief strategist at private fund management company Shanghai Silver Leaf Investment Co., told Bloomberg said the surging borrowing costs will make matters even worse for struggling companies. Recall that in March, after the last Fed rate increase, China had no choice but to match it. Will it risk doing so again, knowing that the outcome could be a wave of corporate bankruptcies as Chinese corporations finds themselves starved of liquidity and locked out of the bond market?


“High-quality companies will still be able to borrow money from banks even if they cancel bond sales,” said Chen in Shanghai. “But it’s difficult for lower-quality companies to get money elsewhere. They may face something bad down the road.”


* * *


Finally, the reason why all of the above matters for not only the Chinese, but global, economy is because as we showed two days ago, China"s credit impulse is already crashing and has already suffered its biggest drop since the financial crisis. As UBS calculated, "from peak to trough the deceleration in global credit growth is now approaching that during the global financial crisis (-6% of global GDP), even if the dispersion of the decline is much narrower."


If one adds tens, if not hundreds of billions in Chinese corporate bond defaults to the China, and thus global credit drain next, the global credit impulse, and global deflationary tsunami, may surpass that observed during the financial crisis. And ironically, this "credit crunch" will come at a time when the Fed, unlike back in 2009 when Bernanke had just launched QE1, is hiking rates and preparing todo what it has never done before: reduce its balance sheet without crashing the market.