Showing posts with label Economy of China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economy of China. Show all posts

Sunday, December 24, 2017

China"s Raging Against Dying Of The Light (Or Why Peak Employment Is Imminent)

Authored by Chris Hamilton via Econimica blog,


China"s working age population is clearly defined as those aged 16 to 50 years old for females (55 for "white collar" females) and 16 to 60 years old for males.  China mandates retirement at these outer age limits.  Perhaps of some interest should be that this working age population peaked in 2011 and has been declining since.  This decline will continue indefinitely as China has a collapsing childbearing population (detailed HERE), net emigration (outflow), and a still decidedly negative birthrate.


There is no evidence to believe the working age declines will abate any decade soon.  As the chart below shows, China"s potential workforce will be shrinking indefinitely... and by 2030 China"s potential workforce will be over 100 million fewer than the 2011 peak (an 11% decline)...and only further down from there.




China has one of the youngest average retirement ages in the developed world.  On average, according to a recent study (HERE), Chinese leave the work force by age 55 compared to age 63 in the US (Norway has the latest average departure at age 67).  So, perhaps China will be raising the retirement age to curb the ballooning 60+yr/old population entering retirement (chart below)?  More on that later.



Comparing the working age population versus the 60+yr/old population (chart below).  A shrinking potential workforce since peaking in 2011 and a rapidly growing elderly population.



Below, that elderly growth versus the working age depopulation as a % of all adults (chart below)...think hockey stick.  After nearly six decades of maintaining a consistent 60+yr/old % of the adult population...the elderly explosion is just beginning.



If we take the now declining total potential working age population vs. China"s still rising total number of employed individuals (according to Statista)...the chart below shows that if China adds just a mere million employees a year (about a third of the annual average employment growth seen from "06 through "16)...that by 2030 China"s employment will exceed 100% of the potential workforce.  Wait...what?!?  Or perhaps working from the premise that people who don"t exist can"t be employed...it"s time to start considering China"s employed population is set to begin falling.



This idea that there are "millions upon millions of Chinese just waiting to be incorporated into the workforce"...not so much.  While a continuing shift from rural to urban is likely, China has already or will soon experience peak employment. Simply put, there will be fewer consumers of everything (homes, cars, appliances, etc.) every year than the year before. 


Whatever overcapacity exists now will be joined by massive increases in excess housing, excess production, excess shopping malls as this depopulation plays out over the coming years and decades.


Five big points here:


1) China ends one child policy, with little to no impact...



  • Although China implemented its one child policy in 1979 and officially phased it out in 2015, China"s birthrate was actually consistently higher than most of the other major economies in East Asia (Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore...chart below) and only N. Korea"s fertility rate is currently higher.





  • None of these other East Asia nations ever implemented birth restrictions.  Instead, their populaces chose not to replace themselves responding to the availability of birth control, surging costs of child rearing, and inclusion of females into the workforce, etc.  Simply put, the one child policy was inevitable and has now organically gone global.  The phase out of this policy will have little to no impact of China"s fertility rates.



2) China to raise retirement age, but no time soon...



  • In early 2015, China suggested it would detail in 2017 (which I still have not seen) a gradual, multiyear process to raise the retirement age (China"s version of political suicide).  Suggestions focused on slowly, incrementally, raising female retirement ages to match males and likewise, pushing retirements out by a month or two per year.  However, none of this was even suggested to start within the next five years and like most things, almost surely be back-end loaded so any real impacts are overstated.  Regardless Communist or "Capitalist" politicians, the game is the same.  A little "razzle-dazzle" that ensures any negative policy impacts never occurs on your watch.



3) China to institute Universal Pension Plan...



  • In late 2015, China said "We will achieve a basic pension for all employees nationally".  Currently, about 800 million of China"s 1.3 billion are eligible for state pensions.  According to Sinosphere, pensions for non-state employees vary widely, as high as 3000 RMB ($480) month in Beijing to as little as 80 RMB for rural farmers.  Civil Servants pensions are generally higher than those of non-state employees.  The party statement said, China would be;



    • “Building a fairer and more sustainable social welfare system.



      Implementing plans for every person to take part in social insurance.




      Diverting capital from state-owned enterprises to social security funds.





      Offering all urban and rural residents insurance for serious illness.”









4) Chinese wages & average per capita disposable income rising but gains are hugely variable...







  • While Chinese factory wages in tier 1 urban areas are now inline with Portugal or S. Africa, this terrific rise has created it"s own problems.  The rise in wages has been met with inflationary spikes in rents, fuel, food, etc. etc.  Average disposable income has risen in the urban areas but flat at best across rural China.  However, the response of employers to the spectacular rising wages has been automation, a shift away from labor intensive production, and outsourcing to lower cost countries.  This is at odds with the generally low skill/low education rural population looking for opportunity in the urban areas.  The breadth and size of further gains in disposable income is likely to be limited.  Economically, a declining total number of workers making marginally more money will not provide the desired growth.



5) China cannot export its way out of this...



  • The annual change to the 0-64yr/old combined populations of the 35 OECD nations (US, Canada, Europe, Japan, S. Korea, Australia/NZ) plus China, Brazil, and Russia begin declining in 2018 (chart below).  The core populations of the nations responsible for consuming 80%+ of all Chinese exports have peaked and begin shrinking.  Fewer consumers every year than the year before, indefinitely.  As for the nations that are doing all the growing, India and Africa, they consume about 4% of all Chinese exports.  BTW, the chart below shows when each nation/region 0-64yr/old population began declining.




Simply put, China is offering to increase and broaden it"s pension system to a ballooning population of elderly but will have a decreasing potential number of employees from which to pay for that increase?!? 


How will China achieve this?  Well, as the chart below shows, as Chinese core population growth has been decelerating, Chinese debt growth has been accelerating. 


While China"s GDP and energy consumption have led the world, they have not responded in kind to China"s debt explosion and exponentially more will be necessary to continue to show "growth".  Over a third and perhaps half of all the debt has been mal-invested in a housing bubble for a population that is never coming. 


What comes next isn"t going to be good for China nor the rest of the world as China looks to flood a depopulating nation with new debt only creating more housing overcapacity... China will look to beat the Japanese at the debt game.



For instance, the Chinese public-pension system as of 2014, took in 2.33 trillion yuan in revenue and paid out almost 2 trillion...with 3 trillion in net funds.  The net outflows and drawdown of those net funds is imminent.


But not to worry, the Communist Party explained that..."We will look at some opportunities with higher yields but will contain risk".  Again, no details were offered.  However, one asset it is clear the Chinese will not be buying...US Treasury"s (chart below, showing the net purchases since the debt ceiling debate of July 2011 according to TIC).  Since that date, China has been a net seller of US Treasury debt despite running record US dollar surplus" (BLICS = Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Cayman Island, Switzerland).



From 2000 "til July 2011, China recycled 50% of its dollar trade surplus into US Treasury debt accumulating over $1.3 trillion.  Since July 2011, China has net sold over $100 billion and as of October, held about $1.2 trillion (chart below).



But I"m pretty sure those dollars aren"t sitting fallow and are finding their way into some asset, probably one in particular that is selling on the cheap about right now.




 









US Tax Cut and Rate Hikes Threaten China Currency

Authored by Valentin Schmid via The Epoch Times,


Seven was the line in the sand.


But the Chinese yuan never crossed that line vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. It only crept up to 6.96 yuan per dollar on Dec. 16, 2016, before starting an impressive comeback, down to 6.5 in the middle of this year.


Last year was a bad one for the Chinese economy. Growth was slow, and the world was worried China would finally land the hard way, as many have been predicting for years.


And more than GDP growth or any other metric, the Chinese currency was the barometer of whether China could keep things stable - stability is the mantra of the ruling communist regime - or suffer a crisis of debt deflation.


If it declined in value, it meant citizens and companies were moving money out of the country in droves because they didn’t believe in the Chinese dream anymore.


So another measure of how bad things had gotten in the second-largest economy of the world was capital outflows.


According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a record $725 billion left China in 2016, putting pressure on the currency and the Chinese interbank market.




All these factors have changed in favor of the dollar in the last quarter, and it’s going to be hard for China to compete.



Trying to stem the tide, the central bank sold record amounts of foreign currency. Chinese foreign exchange reserves, $4 trillion at the peak in 2014, went down to $3 trillion, and analysts started to question whether this was enough to finance the world’s largest trading economy.


Then, miraculously in time for the 2017 National Congress of the Communist Party, all of this stopped. The yuan never went above 7, the exchange reserves never went below 3, and capital outflows subsided thanks to draconian regulations making it harder for individuals and companies to move money out of the country.



Weak Dollar


But something else helped China to strengthen its currency to reduce capital outflows and to balance foreign exchange reserves: a weak dollar.


The dollar didn’t only decline against the yuan. It declined against virtually all of its major trading partners in 2017, dropping 12 percent from its Jan. 2 peak to its Sept. 4 trough.


A weak dollar takes pressure off the yuan and makes it less desirable for Chinese to invest in U.S. assets if they stand to lose money on the currency. A weak dollar makes Chinese foreign currency holdings in other currencies worth more.


But the weak dollar is bound to reverse in 2018, and for China, this means going back to the uncertainty of 2016.


Currencies move for a myriad of reasons, but this year’s drop in the dollar had three major pillars.


The first one was political. After the dollar spiked 8 percent in the wake of the election of President Donald Trump last November, it dropped when it became clear Trump could not quickly push through his “America first” agenda, which included tax cuts and getting tough on trade with China and Mexico.


 


The second pillar was the interest policy of the Federal Reserve. The Fed always lagged behind its announced rate hiking schedule for 2016 and 2017, thereby disappointing market expectations of higher interest rates and a higher yield for the U.S. dollar.


 


The third pillar was the economy. Relative to expectations, the United States underperformed against the emerging markets, including China and even Europe and Japan in the first half of the year.



Strong Dollar


All of these factors have changed in favor of the dollar in the last quarter, and it’s going to be hard for China to compete.


Trump managed to deliver on key campaign promises in the last inning of 2017. The tax bill is a boon for national and international corporations, making it more competitive to invest in the United States again. It also incentivizes companies to bring back trillions in offshore money. Although this money likely won’t come from China, it will boost the dollar and indirectly punish the yuan.


China, on the other hand, has become ever less competitive both regarding taxes (the corporate rate is 45 percent) as well as cheaper wages. Its main advantage nowadays is scale. So according to a report by The Wall Street Journal, China is already preparing a contingency plan to counter the Trump reforms by raising interest rates, tightening capital controls, and micromanaging the currency by intervening in the foreign exchange markets.




President Trump managed to deliver on key campaign promises in the last inning of 2017. The tax bill is a boon for national and international corporations, making it more competitive to invest in the United States again



Lower taxes for companies and individuals in the United States should also boost an already much-improved economy and therefore make U.S. assets like stocks and real estate more attractive for foreign buyers again.


But the United States is also threatening China on trade, whose $309 billion good trade surplus in 2017 provides powerful support for the yuan.


In late November, the United States filed a legal submission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a third party in a case China had brought against the European Union (EU) in late November. China is unhappy that, despite some WTO provisions, the EU has not granted it “market economy” status 15 years after joining. The United States rejects China’s arguments and sides with the EU.


On Dec. 18, Trump accused China of challenging American power and stealing intellectual property as he unveiled his national security strategy.


“The United States will no longer tolerate economic aggression or unfair trading practices,” his letter states, without mentioning China by name.



If the administration follows through with its tough talk and uses the investigation into Chinese intellectual property theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose sanctions on China, a smaller trade surplus will hurt Chinese exports and the currency at the same time. Although a trade war will be costly for both sides, China has more to lose here.


Independent of politics, the Fed is also starting to deliver on its interest rate hikes, making the dollar more attractive in international markets. It raised its benchmark policy rate 0.25 percent to 1.50 percent at its December meeting on Dec. 13.


The Chinese promptly followed suit, with the People’s Bank of China raising its benchmark rate by 0.05 percent to 3.25 percent. But research firm Capital Economics believes this won’t be a game changer and that financial conditions in China are still relatively loose.


“Despite this, we aren’t convinced by the narrative of policy tightening. A five basis point move in rates is too small to have a meaningful impact,” it writes in a note to clients.



However, if China doesn’t deliver on its reform schedule sooner than anticipated, it’s going to be 2016 all over again.









Tuesday, December 5, 2017

China: Systemic Risk Surges As HNA"s High Coupon Borrowing Binge Accelerates

In early November 2017, we returned to one of our favourite subjects, systemic risk in China related to its big four highly-indebted conglomerates, HNA, Anbang, Evergrande and Dalian Wanda. In particular, we asked whether the extortionately high coupon of 9% on an HNA dollar bond issue, with less than one year to maturity, marked the beginning of China’s Minsky moment? As we noted at the time, HNA has $28 billion of short-term debt maturing before the end of June 2018, much of it accumulated during an acquisition binge over the last two years, which has seen it become a major shareholder in companies such as Deutsche Bank AG and Hilton Worldwide Holdings.


Speaking to Bloomberg at the time, Warut Promboon, managing partner at credit research firm, Bondcritic, noted...


“Nine percent is really high for one year. Basically, it tells you that the worry is real."



In a sign that HNA is under pressure, both from the Chinese government and its creditors, CEO Adam Tan announced last week that the company was reversing its previous strategy. From Reuters.


HNA Group CEO Adam Tan said the acquisitive company is making adjustments to conform with national policies, and has sold some investments and real estate projects to improve its liquidity, domestic media reported on Tuesday.




 


Tan said the company would not invest in those areas not backed by the government, while supporting Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative, the 21st Century Herald reported. “Companies cannot invest chaotically overseas, because chaotic investment creates trouble,” Tan was quoted in a separate article by the media portal Sina.com.



HNA is already in trouble, the question is how much? The group is planning an IPO of Gategroup Holding AG, an airline catering company it only purchased in 2016 for $1.5 billion, next year. However, its interest expenses have been rising rapidly and paying 9% coupons is only going to make it worse.


Meanwhile, it continues to tap bond markets at high rates, this time paying 8.2% for an issue by a subsidiary of Hainan Airlines, the core business from which HNA developed. According to Bloomberg, units of HNA Group Co. are stepping up fundraising in the local bond market even as borrowing costs soar, adding to concerns about the Chinese conglomerate’s debt burden. Yunnan Lucky Air Co., a unit of Hainan Airlines Holding Co. -- HNA’s flag carrier -- sold a 270-day yuan bond to yield 8.2 percent last week, the highest coupon rate ever for the Yunnan airline. Tianjin Airlines Co., another subsidiary of Hainan Airlines, issued similar-maturity notes at the highest coupon rate in five years in November.



As Bloomberg notes, while other Chinese companies have cancelled bond issues, HNA doesn’t have that luxury.


While surging onshore bond yields last month forced Chinese companies to cancel the most bond offerings since April, HNA’s units didn’t slow their pace of financing. They revived debt sales from November, following a lull after news emerged in June about a crackdown by China’s banking regulator. The accelerated fundraising suggests a need for money and may hurt the conglomerate’s credit profile, according to credit research firm Bondcritic Ltd.


“They just keep piling on debt,” said Warut Promboon, managing partner at Bondcritic. “It’s not going to work.”


 


Two calls to Hainan Airlines’ public relations officers weren’t answered. There were no replies to questions sent via text messages.




The flood of issues from constituents of the HNA group is expected to continue, assuming that bond markets are amenable.


Hainan Airlines said last week that it is planning to sell 1 billion yuan of perpetual bonds on Dec. 6. That would be its third note sale in the local Chinese market in a month, according to Bloomberg-compiled data. In the carrier’s most recent sale of onshore securities last month, the company, which has top ratings from local credit assessors, issued local bonds at yields equivalent to junk notes in the nation.


 


Another HNA unit, Sanya Phoenix International Airport Co., is planning its third bond sale in three weeks on Monday, according to a statement on Nov. 29.



During his presentation last week, CEO Adam Tan commented that “Each of our business groups has its own cash flow management”. However, if Hainan Airlines is paying junk rates despite its “top” local ratings, it suggests that creditors are assessing risk from a group perspective…and unfavourably. Last week, Bloomberg noted that S&P cuts the HNA Group’s credit rating to five times below junk, citing its significant debt maturities, rising borrowing costs and proposed acquisition of New Zealand’s UDC Finance (will it ever learn).


S&P said on Wednesday it lowered HNA’s credit profile by one notch to b, or five levels below investment grade, from b+. The change was disclosed in a report by S&P on New Zealand’s UDC Finance Ltd., which HNA is seeking to buy.


 


“HNA Group has significant debt maturities over the next several years and its funding costs are meaningfully higher than that of a year ago," Andrew Mayes and Sharad Jain, analysts at S&P, wrote in their report. "We will closely monitor HNA Group’s access to capital markets and funding costs to determine whether additional actions are necessary.”


 


As to Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.’s UDC Finance, S&P said it may cut the company’s long-term debt rating by four notches to a junk level of BB- from BBB if its sale to HNA is completed. The deal, announced in January, has yet to be completed pending approval from New Zealand’s overseas investment approvals board.



It’s possible that HNA is approaching the “catastrophic margin call”, from its practice of pledging its own shares and those of its investments, which we first postulated in July 2017 in “A Reverse Rollup From Hell’: China"s ‘Boldest Dealmaker’ Faces Margin Call Disintegration”. From our post.


…while most Chinese companies pledged "only" their own shares to get loans, a handful of companies also used shares of the acquired companies as pledged collateral. This is precisely what HNA Group did, which now faces not only growing regulatory scrutiny from Beijing that threatens to spook bond investors and raise HNA’s financing costs, but also send its shares plunging as holders are forced to liquidate even as most of the shares pledged to fund its buying spree are already declining, accelerating its demise. And, in a scenario that can only be dubbed as a "reverse rollup from hell" - on steroids and margin - one that would make even Valeant blush and snicker, if the value of its collateral, i.e. stock price, falls enough, HNA will soon be forced to sell its holdings to repay debt, thereby resulting in the disintegration of the company.



HNA is a private company, hence a detailed breakdown of its borrowing position and its share pledges is not available. However, the circumstantial evidence remains highly negative and the systemic risk it poses for China is likely rising not falling.









"We Witnessed The DPRK Missile Blow Up": Cathay Pacific Flight Crew Observed North Korean ICBM Launch

Officials from Hong Kong"s flagship Cathay Pacific airline confirmed that the crew of a flight from San Francisco to Hong Kong reported seeing North Korea"s recent test of its most powerful ICBM conducted last Wednesday, according to the South China Morning Post. According to flight trackers, flight CX893 was over Japan when the missile was launched on November 29 at approximately 2:18 a.m. Hong Kong time. A spokeswoman from the airline said that the crew made a report of the suspected re-entry of the North Korean missile after the incident.



"Be advised, we witnessed the DPRK missile blow up and fall apart near our current location" said Mark Hoey, GM of operations at Cathay.



“Though the flight was far from the event location, the crew advised Japan ATC [air traffic control] according to procedure,” said the spokeswoman, adding that the sighting did not affect operations, and that while the airline will remain alert and review the situation with North Korea as it evolves, there are no plans to change any routes or operating procedures.


Rerouting affected routes is always an option, says Hong Kong lawmaker and former Cathay pilot Jeremy Tam Man-ho, adding that virtually no passenger planes are equipped with military-grade radar, making them susceptible to missile threats in the event a rogue nation targets them.


As Asia Times notes, a passenger jet has a very “slim” chance of escape if targeted by a missile, as seen in multiple past incidents, including Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, which was shot down by a surface-to-air missile while en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur in 2014, as well as a Korean Airlines plane that was downed by a Soviet fighter after it deviated from its original route in 1983.


Such incidents fall under the purview of Hong Kong"s Security Bureau and Civil Aviation Department, which Tam Man-ho says should establish a panel to coordinate intelligence sharing efforts with their counterparts in the region, including Russia, Japan and South Korea.


According to a leaked memo by Mark Hoey, Cathay airlines will start providing satellite phones for crews on its flights bound for South Korea, Canada and the United States. More via Asia Times: 


Several Hong Kong newspapers reported this Monday that satellite phones, among others, have been allocated to crews operating flights to and from South Korea in the event that if normal communication is rendered dysfunctional within the Seoul Flight Information Region should there be an attack from the north, Cathay pilots can still contact the airline’s Hong Kong headquarters.




A Cathay Pacific cargo flight from Hong Kong to Anchorage was also over Japan during the launch, and could have been quite a bit closer.


“Looking at the actual plots, CX096 may have been the closest, at a few hundred miles laterally,” Hoey wrote.









Friday, December 1, 2017

This Cycle: It"s Not The Economy, It"s China, Stupid!

Authored by Kevin Muir via The Macro Tourist blog,


I know everything is fan-freaking-tastic - with the tax reform bill and global synchronized expansion and all. I figure the last thing you need is some nattering naysayer throwing cold water on this unbelievable party, so I won’t. At least not for the short run.



This rally will end when it ends. Maybe tomorrow, maybe next week, maybe next month, maybe next year. I don’t know and every time I try to guess, I just end up looking foolish.


But I recently listened to this terrific Bloomberg Masters in Business interview of the legendary hedge fund manager, Felix Zulauf, and he articulated such a compelling argument for the timing of the next slowdown, I felt like Felix was my Spirit Bear.



I have always enjoyed Felix’s viewpoint, but Barry Ritholtz did such a great job during this interview, that I have a new found appreciation for Felix’s career, and more importantly, his market calls. I had mistakenly assumed Felix was always bearish, but the truth of the matter is that he definitely switches from side to side, and is not the pro-typical Swiss hard money uber-bear. I didn’t agree with all of his economic philosophy by any means, but his market (and political) analysis was some of the most compelling dialog I have listened to in quite some time. If you haven’t heard it, then give it a listen.


If you don’t want to take the time, don’t fret - I have transcribed the most important part for you.


Felix: China I believe is in an interesting position right now. You heard President Xi’s speech last week, and in 2021 there is the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist party and it’s very clear that they want to have a strong economy at that time. If you want to have a strong economy in 2021, you stimulate in 2020. And they are central planners. So that’s means they have to take their foot off the pedal in 2018, 2019. I think in ‘18 and ‘19, they will address the imbalances in the financial sector and that will slow down the Chinese economy in ‘18 and ‘19, which will also slow down the rest of the world.


 


So we are entering a period where sometime in ‘18, I would say the peak of the market will be in the first half, the peak in the economy is probably from mid-2018 on, and then we slow down into 2020.


 


And 2022 is the next Chinese Congress, and President Xi is probably the first leader who tries to run for a third time. So he wants to have a very good economy in 2021 and 2022. That means he has to first slow things down, restructure some of the imbalances in the system because if he tries to carry through, it could backfire on him. It could be the worst of all worlds. Namely a completely overheated situation, with high inflation rates, etc…


 


That’s why I think the leader of this cycle, China, is going to slow down next year.


 


Barry: So the whole global economy is dependent on President Xi’s re-election desires in 2022?


 


Felix: As I said before, you always need to figure out what is the leading theme in the market cycle. In the last cycle, it was real estate, in this cycle it is China. And that’s why China is so important. China is the second largest economy, and in 10 or 15 years, it will be the largest economy of the world.



Longtime readers will instantly see why Felix’s theory appealed to me. I have long argued that China’s fiscal and monetary policy might be the most two important variables when it comes to forecasting the global economy. And here was Felix making the case that the entire global economic cycle is being driven by China. Felix - you had me at hello.


Now, make no mistake. This is a longer-term call. It’s not going to affect market prices next week, and probably not even next month. But in the coming quarters, it has the potential to be the most important determinant of financial asset performance.


I will take a little more nuanced approach to Felix’s theory, but in broad strokes, I completely agree with his analysis. The Chinese government will not allow their 100th anniversary be anything less than a rocking success. And President Xi is smart enough to know that he can’t just keep the pedal to the metal for the next four years and hope that the economic expansion lasts.


China’s performance over the past year


Remember all the dire warnings from your favourite star hedge fund managers about China’s coming collapse? Well, I don’t want to be prematurely counting any chickens, but it looks like Xi & Co. have managed to successfully navigate another year without the end of the world financial Armageddon scenario coming to fruition.


And it’s not like this has been achieved through growth-at-any-cost with super easy monetary policy. In fact, during the past year, both interest rates and the Chinese Yuan have risen.




It appears as if, bit-by-bit, China has slowly tightened monetary policy. And I suspect that trend will not only continue, but even accelerate from now. President Xi will continue strangling the excesses out of the Chinese financial economy through tighter monetary policy. The PBOC won’t plunge China into a recession, but instead slowly choke off the speculative froth.


But there’s more to the story


Now here is where I will expand on Felix’s theory. China is in the midst of a massive infrastructure spending program with their One-Belt-One-Road initiative. The program is massive, and entails many complicated and extensive transportation system upgrades in all parts of their country. This sort of development is not something that you easily turn on and off. And nor should it be. This is true investment in the future of China. Much like Eisenhower’s interstate highway program that set up America to become an economic powerhouse for decades to come, China’s OBOR initiative is a crucial step for China’s development. Xi will not alter this plan. The course is set, and the money will be spent.


In fact, it’s already happening. And it’s causing China to run the greatest fiscal stimulus in history. Have a look at this chart from the world’s most charming and well-spoken China bear, Kyle Bass:



Yup, that’s crazy. China is running a fiscal deficit of 14% of GDP. Any wonder why the global economy is cruising along so nicely? It sure helps when you have this sort of fiscal stimulus wind in our sails.


Will Xi tap this back? Sure, he might try to trim around the edges, but the reality is that he will not make any meaningful cuts to the OBOR policy.


Therefore, China will be running a hot fiscal policy for years to come, and the only way to counteract its effect, will be by tightening on the monetary side. This will also have the added benefit of causing the financial economy to slow. In fact, we are already seeing this play out in the housing market.



While I was thinking about this situation, I was reminded of a passage in the Market Wizards book where Stanley Druckenmiller spoke about his trade surrounding the unification of East and West Germany:


Everything started to come together at that time. Not only was I trading on my own without any interference, but that same eastern European situation led to my first truly major trade for Soros’s Quantum Fund. I never had more conviction about any trade than I did about the long side of the Deutsche mark when the Berlin wall came down. One of the reasons I was so bullish on the Deutsche mark was a radical currency theory proposed by George Soros in his book, The Alchemy of Finance. His theory was that if a huge deficit were accompanied by an expansionary fiscal policy and tight monetary policy, the country’s currency would actually rise. The dollar provided a perfect test case in the 1981-84 period. At the time, the general consensus was that the dollar would decline because of the huge budget deficit. However, because money was attracted into the country by a tight monetary policy, the dollar actually went sharply higher.


 


When the Berlin wall came down, it was one of those situations that I could see as clear as day. West Germany was about to run up a huge budget deficit to finance the rebuilding of East Germany. At the same time, the Bundesbank was not going to tolerate any inflation. I went headlong into the Deutsche mark. It turned out to be a terrific trade.



Now I know this isn’t the perfect analogy, but I can’t help but wonder if it will be more correct than all the Yuan bears who are predicting a China collapse.


Putting it all together


We have a Chinese President who wants to be re-elected shortly after his party’s 100th anniversary celebration in 2021. Therefore, it will be important that the Chinese economy is humming along at full speed at that time. To do that, he needs to stimulate in 2020, but the problem is, if he doesn’t tap the brakes now, he might risk overheating before then. President Xi will therefore take the hit, and get the pain over with in 2018 and 2019. Yet the story is further complicated by the fact that China’s long run infrastructure program is causing a hot fiscal policy. All of these factors add up to a much tighter PBOC for the next couple of years.


Call me an idiot, but I am tempted to take the long Yuan trade. I know that seems insane - all those really smart hedge fund managers are all forecasting a China collapse. But buying Yuan is probably better than betting on stocks going down because of the tight Chinese monetary policy. Not convinced it’s the best trade, and not even sure if I am going to do it in any real size, but I have often found the hardest trades, are often the best trades.


Either way, be aware of this multi-year seasonal Chinese economic timing dynamic. Maybe Felix just laid out a timetable for the market to finally roll over, albeit still many months away. That’s probably good because it certainly feels like it will be that long before we get any meaningful correction…


 









Wednesday, November 29, 2017

China Hits A Brick Wall: For First Time Ever, Record Chinese Credit Creation Fails To Stimulate Economy

Submitted by Gordon Johnson of Axiom Capital


We believe that exhibit 1 says a lot: it shows that despite a record level of new credit issued by China’s PBoC YTD through Oct. 2017 (which stands in stark contrast to government authorities continued statements that China is de-levering), China’s economic backdrop is currently experiencing:


  • (a) monthly construction new start (commercial + residential + office) growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 2),

  • (b) monthly fixed asset investment growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 9),

  • (c) monthly cement output slowing Y/Y (Ex. 5),

  • (d) monthly electricity production slowing Y/Y (Ex. 6),

  • (e) monthly M2 money supply growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 7),

  • (f) monthly household loan growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 8),

  • (g) monthly private fixed asset investment growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 10), and

  • (h) monthly home price growth slowing Y/Y (Ex. 12) – in fact, select data points have turned negative Y/Y.

Stated differently, while the lion’s share of our client base continues to tell us, with respect to our bearish views on China… “President Xi Jinping will simply stimulate more if/when things get bad”, we would highlight, again as detailed in Ex. 1 below, China stimulated at a record pace in 2017, yet it did not resonate in improved economic activity (in fact, the exact opposite appears to be unfolding – i.e., economic growth is slowing across a number of data points).


Furthermore, underpinning our view that China’s debt stimulus was targeted specifically at the months preceding the 19th Party Congress in Oct. 2017 (i.e., when President Xi Jinping consolidated power to become the strongest Chinese leader since Mao Zedong), implying we may see a phase of debt fatigue, we note that in the first 10 months of 2016, incremental credit issued in China on a month-over-month (“M/M”) basis was negative three times (i.e., May, July, and Oct.), and averaged $189 billion on a monthly basis; yet, in the first 10 months of 2017, incremental credit issued on a M/M basis was positive in each month outside of Oct., and averaged $429 billion on a monthly basis (in Oct. 2017, the month the 19th Party Congress concluded, new credit issued fell by $11.9 billion M/M).


WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? The broader point is… when you issue an unprecedented amount of credit targeted at a growing number of negative ROI projects multiple decades, at some point the law of diminishing marginal returns sets in (since 1/1/09, China’s credit has grown by CNY153.9 trillion while GDP has grown by a much more modest CNY 48.5 trillion, or a multiple of 3.17x, meaning a lot of bad investments have stacked up over the years) – keep in mind that China’s $3.6 trillion in credit issued in 2017 YTD through Oct. is more than the entire developed world combined. Put in the simplest of terms, at some point the incremental dollar in new credit created actually does more harm than good.


Ex. 1: China New Credit Created YTD Through Oct.



Note: Credit created = TSF + Local Gov"t Debt.
Source: PBoC; NBS; ChinaBond.


SO WHERE FROM HERE? When considering China hit the afterburners on new credit issuance in 2017, yet the impact seems to be quickly fading, it would appear we may have reached the point of “no return” (while Consensus, at this point, seems completely oblivious to this possibility, the recent sell-off across the Chinese stock markets suggest investors on-the-ground in China may be catching on).


CONCLUSION: In the face of China’s TTM 3Q17 credit as a percentage of GDP coming in at 250%, to “keep the party going”, Xi Jinping would have to force new credit issuance far in excess of $4.0 trillion in 2018 (which could trigger a number of ratings downgrades, as well as a reassessment by the IMF of China’s “market economy” status).


Moreover, given what we’ve seen this year – i.e., 101.7% Y/Y new credit issuance growth YTD through Oct. 2017 – it seems the level of credit necessary to stimulate growth in China could prove elusive at this point (we don’t recall any economist’s forecasts exiting 2016 pointing to China’s new credit issuance more than doubling Y/Y in 2017, yet that’s exactly what’s happened – had this been our base case, we would have expected all economic indicators in China to be moving substantially higher at this point in the cycle). Thus, to the thesis that rests on a view that: “Xi will just stimulate more”, we would argue that the extent of the stimulus necessary may be so high at this point that President Xi Jinping may have lost sight of how much debt he needs to “get things going again”. Should this prove to be the case, China’s economy will continue slowing, putting pressure on bulk commodity prices, and, ultimately, industrial/steel stocks (CAT, URI, FMG, RIO, X, CLF, GATX, and TRN, all of which we have SELL ratings on).


HOW’S THE DATA LOOK IN THE FACE OF CHINA’S RECORD 2017 CREDIT “BINGE”? So how do the data points look? Well, here’s a few (we feel the charts say it all)…


Ex. 2: Monthly Construction Starts (Residential + Commercial + Office)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 3: GDP Growth Internals - China (FAI, Industrial Production, & Retail Sales)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 4: China Monthly Steel Production by Year

Source: World Steel Association (WSA), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 5: China Cement Output

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 6: Y/Y Growth in Electricity Production by Month

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 7: China M2 Money Growth, Y/Y% - Multi Decade Low (bearish)

Source: Peoples" Bank of China (PBOC), Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 8: 3MMA Household Loan Growth, Y/Y%

Source: Axiom Capital Research, Bloomberg, National Bureau of Statistics.


Ex. 9: Monthly Total Fixed Asset Investment and Y/Y Growth

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 10: Monthly Private Fixed Asset Investment and Y/Y Growth

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 11: Private Investment in Industrial Sector and Y/Y Growth

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Axiom Capital Research.


Ex. 12: Average Price Change of New Residential Buildings, by Tiered-Cities, %Y/Y

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Axiom Capital Research.


In short, we feel China could be the “black swan” that ruins the stock market rally party for many in the industrials space. Caveat emptor.









Sunday, November 19, 2017

The Coming Economic Downturn In Canada

Authored by Deb Shaw via MarketsNow.com,



  • Canadian GDP growth has outperformed this year, helping the Canadian dollar

  • As GDP growth slows and the Bank of Canada turns neutral, catalysts turning negative

  • Crude oil and real estate look set for a downturn, with negative implications for the currency



Given its natural resource-based economy, Canada is a boom and bust kind of place. This year, the country has enjoyed a significant boom. Thanks to a government stimulus program, rising corporate capital expenditures and consumer spending, Canada’s GDP growth has been nothing short of spectacular in 2017. According to Statistics Canada, the latest reading for year-over-year GDP growth is a healthy 3.5% (as of August 2017). While this is stronger than all major developed countries, growth is decelerating from its most recent peak in May 2017 (when GDP growth was an astounding 4.7%). A visual overview of historical GDP growth is shown below for reference:


Turning a corner: Canadian growth comes back down to earth


11-17-2017 CAD GDP growth


Source: Statistics Canada


Following the crude oil bust in the second quarter of 2014, Canadian growth rates cratered. While the country avoided a technical recession, the economic outlook was poor until early 2016. After crude oil returned to a bull market in the first quarter of 2016, the fortunes of the country turned. Given limited growth in 2015, the economy had no problem delivering 2%+ year-over-year growth rates in 2016. As a substantial stimulus program ramped up government spending in 2017, growth rates have continued to accelerate this year.


Storm clouds on the horizon: crude oil and real estate


While Canada has delivered exceptional growth in the last two years, the future outlook is much more challenging. Beyond the issue of base effects (mathematically, year-over-year GDP growth will be much tougher next year), key sectors including the oil & gas industry and Canadian real estate look ripe for a downturn.


Crude bull market intact today, but at risk in 2018


As WTI crude strengthens beyond $55, crude oil is clearly in a bull market today. Looking at figures from the International Energy Agency, global demand growth continues to run ahead of supply growth. Thus the ongoing bull market is supported by fundamentals. Thanks to the impact of hurricanes and infrastructure bottlenecks in 2017, US shale hasn’t entirely fulfilled its role as the global ‘swing producer’ this year. The dynamics of supply growth versus demand growth are shown below:


Who invited American shale? US supply ruins the crude oil party


10-13-2017 crude oil supply demand


Source: International Energy Agency, forward OPEC supply estimates via US EIA


Unfortunately, the status quo looks set to change as US supply returns with a vengeance. According to estimates from the IEA, supply growth will outstrip demand growth in the first quarter of 2018. Digging deeper into supply estimates, US shale is once again to blame. Our view is that this changing dynamic will lead to a new bear market in crude oil. Looking back at recent history, crude prices formed a long-term top in the second quarter of 2014 once supply growth overtook demand. Similarly, crude prices bottomed in the first quarter of 2016 once supply growth fell below demand in early 2016. Given Canada"s dependence on crude oil exports, a bear market for the commodity is likely to result in a weaker currency.


As China enters its latest real estate downturn, Canada not far behind


While Canadian real estate has enjoyed a great year, the future outlook is much tougher. Similar to its peers in Australia and New Zealand, Canadian real estate prices tend to lag real estate prices in China. This is both because Canada’s economy is deeply intertwined with China, and because the country is a big destination for overseas investment from China. While overseas investors make up a relatively small portion of buyers (around 5% according to government estimates), they serve an important role by acting as the marginal buyer for prime property. A comparison of new house prices in China versus Canada is shown below for reference:


Canadian real estate boom set to run out of steam


11-17-2017 China Canada real estate


Source: Statistics Canada, China National Bureau of Statistics


As Chinese new house prices accelerated significantly in early 2015, Canadian real estate prices followed in 2016. As the Chinese market is now decelerating, negative growth appears to be on the horizon. In March 2015, Chinese house price growth bottomed at -6.1%. While the Canadian bull market continues for now (September new house prices registered at 3.8%), a downturn is likely over the next 6-12 months. As real estate makes up 13% of Canadian GDP, a significant decline in the fortunes of the industry are likely to spill over to the broader economy.


Implications for the Canadian dollar


At the beginning of the year, the Canadian dollar enjoyed a wide number of bullish catalysts including accelerating GDP growth, rising rate hike expectations, a relatively strong crude oil market and speculator sentiment that was at a bearish extreme. These catalysts, and the Bank of Canada’s actions in particular, helped the currency strengthen until late September.


Today, almost every factor that drives the Canadian dollar is working against it. Future GDP growth rates are set to keep decelerating. Looking at the Bank of Canada, its outlook for future rate hikes is now “cautious”. This is a big change from its hawkish tilt earlier this year. While speculator sentiment is no longer at bullish extremes, waning interest in the Canadian dollar is weighing on the currency. The ongoing NAFTA negotiations are another source of potential political risk. Finally, an impending downturn for both crude oil and Canadian real estate further worsen the picture. Thus, our longer term outlook on the Canadian dollar is bearish.