In a tweet about the Oscars, the Department of Defense quite literally bragged about working in Hollywood, to ensure that the military is only portrayed in a manner they see fit.
The post DoD Blatantly Admits on Twitter It Works With Hollywood to Sell You War Propaganda appeared first on The Free Thought Project.
The folks at Open The Books decided to take a deep dive into the salaries of 1.97 million federal employees, using data collected from the Office Of Personnel Management and the USPS via FOIA requests, and the endless examples of excessive pay and pure waste are sure to make you sick, if not downright suicidal. Here are just some of the key takeaways as summarized by OTB:
1. The federal government pays its disclosed workforce $1 million per minute, $66 million per hour, and $524 million per day. In FY2016, the federal government disclosed 1.97 million employees at a cash compensation cost of $136.3 billion.
2. Over a six-year period (FY2010-2016), the number of federal employees making $200,000 or more has increased by 165 percent; those making $150,000 or more has grown by 60 percent; and those making more than $100,000 has increased by 37 percent.
3. On average, federal employees are given 10 federal holidays, 13 sick days, and 20 vacation days per year. If each employee used 13 sick days and took 20 vacation days in addition to the 10 federal holidays, it would cost taxpayers an estimated $22.6 billion annually.
4. In FY2016, a total 406,960 employees made six-figure incomes – that"s roughly one in five disclosed federal employees. Furthermore, 29,852 federal employees out-earned each of the 50 state governors receiving more than $190,823.
5. At 78 out of the 122 independent agencies and departments we studied, the average employee compensation exceeded $100,000 in FY2016.
6. With 326 employees at a total cash compensation of $28.8 million, we found a federal agency in San Francisco – Presidio Trust – paid out three of the top four federal bonuses including the largest in the federal government in FY2016. The biggest bonus went to an HR Manager in charge of payroll for $141,525.
7. Together, the United States Postal Service (USPS) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employ more than half of the disclosed federal workforce. As the largest civilian employer within the federal government, the USPS employed 32 percent of all disclosed federal employees, totaling 621,523 people on payroll in FY2016. The VA employed the second most employees with 372,614 or 19 percent of the disclosed federal workforce.
8. Only one-third of the 35,000 lawyers in the federal workforce work at the Department of Justice. The entire staff of federal lawyers earned $4.8 billion in FY2016.
9. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) employed 3,498 police officers at a total cost of $172 million in FY2016. When asked about corresponding crime statistics, the VA was unable to provide any information on the number of crimes or incidents.
10. There are an additional 2 million undisclosed employees at the Department of Defense and in the active military. Their estimated cash compensation value, combined with $1 billion in undisclosed bonuses and $125 billion in hidden pension data, amounts to roughly $221 billion in undisclosed federal cash compensation per year.
So where is all the money going? As it turns out, federal employees working in "the beltway" and California receive 22% of all federal compensation dollars. Meanwhile, employees located in just the top 10 states received 41% ($55.5 billion). Of course, out of that top 10, only two states, Georgia and Texas, consistently vote "red" in national elections which may help to explain why the Trump administration has struggled with leaks from a variety of agencies since moving into the White House.
The growth in the number of federal employees earning over $150,000 per year is simply mind numbing. Keep in mind, these salaries are doled out regardless of whether or not these employees take advantage of their 8 weeks of paid time off every year.
There are now 29,852 federal employees who out-earn every governor of the 50 states, receiving more than $190,823 each. Over a six-year period (FY2010-2016), the number of federal employees making $200,000 or more has increased by 165 percent, those making $150,000 or more has grown by 60 percent, and those making more than $100,000 has increased by 37 percent.
Of the roughly 2 million disclosed federal employees, 406,960 made six figures in cash compensation in FY2016. Additionally, 24,799 federal employees earned $200,000 or more while 3,154 made $300,000 or more. The top-paid federal employee overall, Dr. David Harpole, made $403,849 as a thoracic and cardiac surgeon for the Department of Veterans Affairs. This department employs more top earners than any other department or independent agency
As if the above isn"t bad enough, things get really disturbing when you learn that various agencies employee an army of "Interior Designers" making up to $150,000 per year...
The Department of State displayed the most egregious trends in regards to interior designers, doling out - on average - $122,093 to each of its 24 interior designers. The highest-paid interior design employees, however, worked for the Department of Treasury, earning $132,438, on average. In all, the federal government paid 40 interior designers more than $100,000 each.
...and an even larger army of "Gardeners" making up to $160,000.
Perhaps it"s time for a career change? Here"s an idea...you could pick up a job mowing the lawn at the State Department for 40 hours a week at a salary of $141,555 and then use the other 128 hours of every week to get an Interior Design gig at Treasury for $152,687...all the while collecting two pensions and making nearly 5x the average American household yet still working less hours despite having two jobs...
Here is the full report from Open The Books:
Authore by Leonid Brershidky via Bloomberg.com,
During Russian President Vladimir Putin"s annual press conference on Thursday, a friendly journalist asked Putin whether the escalating tension in relations with the U.S. and the crumbling of arms control treaties would draw Russia into an unsustainable arms race. "We will ensure our security without engaging in an arms race," the president replied, citing widely diverging dollar numbers for the U.S. and Russian defense budgets.
That"s a simplistic answer from a politician starting an election campaign (of sorts: Putin is headed for re-election in March without giving anyone else a chance). The more pointed question that should be asked is this: How, with a relatively small and decreasing military budget -- 2.77 trillion rubles ($42.3 billion) for 2018, down from some 3.05 trillion rubles this year -- is Russia is still a formidable military rival to the U.S., with its enormous and increasing budget of almost $692.1 billion in 2018, up from $583 billion this year?
The equalizing value of the two countries" well-balanced nuclear deterrents is enough of a reason to avoid direct confrontation. But leaving that aside, Putin may well understand the nature of modern military challenges better than U.S. President Donald Trump and U.S. legislators -- and Russia"s authoritarian system may be more efficient when it comes to military allocations. Note that Russia is now almost an equal to the U.S. as a power broker in the Middle East, where the Russian military has just helped Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad effectively win a civil war -- in which the U.S. was helping the other side. At the same time, Russian defense spending numbers are deceptive. The country is far more militarized than its defense spending suggests. That level of security spending is only sustainable at the expense of Russia"s future.
Trump"s military spending hike, which makes it necessary to remove the existing cap on defense expenditure, is a dubious and likely outdated response to decreased global security.
Quite aside from the cost of maintaining the world"s most powerful military, the U.S., according to the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, has spent at least $2 trillion on its wars since 2001. But, considering the less transparent costs, such as those of caring for veterans, war-related increases to the Department of Defense base budget and interest on the debt taken on to cover defense spending, it"s closer to $4 trillion at the very least. The Afghan conflict has cost the U.S. at least $840 billion -- more than four times Afghanistan"s cumulative GDP since 2001. Since the 2018 U.S. defense budget contains additional funds for sending 3,500 more troops to Afghanistan, the results of the massive outlay over the years are clearly suboptimal.
Today"s wars aren"t fought with fat wads of money. The adversaries are mostly small, agile forces that aren"t as well-resourced as nation states. Fighting them requires a combination of local knowledge, brute force applied only at important points in a conflict and ability to shift risks onto the shoulders of irregular fighters. Russia kept cutting its defense budget all through its participation in the Syrian war. Yabloko, an opposition party, earlier this year put the cost of the Syrian operation for Russia at about 140.4 billion rubles ($2.4 billion at the current exchange rate) since September, 2015; that"s some 4 percent of what the U.S. allocated to overseas contingency operations in 2017 alone -- and the outcome is as good as Russia could have expected.
The U.S. is pumping money into comparatively inefficient warfighting -- and into preparing for the kind of large-scale war that"s not likely to take place because of existing nuclear arsenals and unauthorized nuclear proliferation. Even North Korea, with its unknown but probably small nuclear capability, is dangerous enough to deter the U.S. from attacking. At his press conference, Putin made the point that the U.S. couldn"t know for sure where to strike in North Korea -- and if the Kim regime managed to get a single long-range, nuclear-armed missile in the air, the results could be catastrophic.
U.S. defense budgets, of course, feed a large, powerful domestic industry; even the indirect U.S. involvement in a conflict lifts the stock prices of major defense contractors, research has shown. In Russia, the biggest contractors are state-controlled; they have far less lobbying clout, and the technocratic Russian government has kept them on a short leash, though some of the military"s purchasing decisions have served regional development rather than defense purposes. Such an arrangement, which would have been inefficient in most other industries, probably reduces wasteful spending in the budget-dependent military-industrial complex.
That said, in relative terms, Russia is spending more on force-related functions than the U.S. does. Trump"s budget proposal allocated $71.8 billion to the Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department. Add that up with the defense spending, and the total security budget will stand at $764 billion, less than 19 percent of total federal spending. Russia will spend a combined 29 percent of its federal budget -- some 4.8 trillion rubles -- on defense and domestic security. That"s probably not all of the security-related outlay either, as Mark Galeotti pointed out earlier this year: Even some of the education and development spending in Russia goes toward military goals.
In the U.S., federal law enforcement outlay is a fraction of defense spending. In Russia, the two areas of government expenditure are almost equal. That"s the difference between a country with a relatively liberal domestic order and a near-dictatorship, which relies heavily on the suppression of dissent and must keep large law enforcement agencies under centralized control.
Russia could show the world how to spend efficiently on more than adequate defense -- but instead it is engaged in an arms race against its own development. For years, it has been underfunding areas such as education and health, undermining what Putin told the press conference was his vision of the country"s future -- flexible, technology-driven, highly productive. Judging by Putin"s answers to reporters on Thursday, he still prefers not to notice that.
The U.S. government went from missing $2.3 trillion on the day before 9/11, to missing more than $30 trillion today—costing Americans $58,386 every second.
Authored by James Cobett via The Corbett Report,
When WWII ended and the American deep state welded the national security establishment into place with the National Security Act, the world entered into a new era: the era of the military-industrial complex.
But when the Cold War ended and the “Clash of Civilizations” became the new existential threat, the deep state found an opening for another paradigm shift. As the all-pervasive threat of terrorism became the carte blanche for total surveillance, the powers-that-shouldn’t-be found the organizing principal of our age would not be military hardware, but data itself. Welcome to the age of the information-industrial complex.
“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”
It is not difficult to see why these words passed so quickly into the political lexicon. Think of their explanatory power.
Why did the US use inflated estimates of Russian missile capabilities to justify stockpiling a nuclear arsenal that was more than sufficient to destroy the planet several times over?
The military-industrial complex.
Why did America send 50,000 of its own to fight and die in the jungles of Vietnam, killing untold millions of Vietnamese (not to mention Cambodians)?
The military-industrial complex.
Why did the US use the public’s fear and anger over 9/11 and a phony panic over non-existent weapons of mass destruction to justify the illegal invasion and trillion-dollar occupation of Iraq?
The military-industrial complex.
Why did Nobel Peace Prize laureate Obama expand the fictitious “war on terror” into Pakistan and Yemen and Somalia, refuse to close Guantanamo despite his earlier promises to the contrary, commit US forces to “kinetic military action” in Libya without so much as seeking Congressional approval, and launch a new era of covert drone warfare?
The military-industrial complex.
Why has Trump not only continued but further expanded the US military presence in Africa, increased US aid to Israel and Saudi Arabia, actively enabled the war crimes in Yemen that have led to the largest cholera outbreak in human history, and killed more civilians in his first six months in office than former drone-king Obama killed in his entire eight-year presidency?
The military-industrial complex.
When you think about it, it’s rather remarkable that such a phrase was ever uttered by a President of the United States, much less a former five-star general. Could you imagine any modern-day President talking about something like the “military-industrial complex” and its attempted “acquisition of unwarranted influence” without immediately dismissing the idea as a conspiracy theory? Over the decades there has been much speculation about Eisenhower’s use of the phrase, and what precisely he was warning against. Some have argued that the phrase was prompted by Eisenhower’s discovery that the Rand Corporation was grossly misrepresenting the Soviet’s military capabilities to John F. Kennedy, who ended up using the Rand invented (and completely fictitious) “missile gap” threat as a cornerstone of his 1960 presidential election campaign.
Whatever the case, it is perhaps time to revisit Eisenhower’s most famous speech. What Eisenhower is ultimately describing is the rise of American fascism; the merger of government and corporate power. What term can better capture the nature of early 21st century American political life? Is there any longer any doubt that the military-industrial complex has reached its ultimate expression in firms like Blackwater (aka “Xe” aka “Academi”) and its military contractor brethren? Is there any other word but “fascism” to describe a state of affairs when a Secretary of Defense can commission a study from a private contractor to examine whether the US military should be using more private contractors, only for that same Secretary of Defense to leave office and become president of the company that conducted the study, only to leave that company to become Vice President of the US and begin waging a war that relies heavily on no-bid contracts awarded to that same company based on the recommendation that it made in its original study? Yet this is precisely the case of Dick Cheney and Halliburton. It would be difficult to think of a more blatant example of the military-industrial complex fascism that Eisenhower was warning of.
But as it turns out, there was another warning about fascism embedded in that farewell address that has received far less attention than the “military-industrial complex” formulation, perhaps because there is no catchphrase hook to describe it:
“Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.”
Given that this warning came in 1961, before the age of communications satellites or personal computers or the internet, it was a remarkably prescient observation. If scientific research half a century ago was dominated by federal grants and expensive computer equipment, how much more true is that for us today, half a century later?
So what is the problem with this? As Ike explained:
“Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.”
Here, again, the warning is of fascism. But instead of the military-industrial fascism that dominated so much of the 20th century, he was describing here a new fascistic paradigm that was but barely visible at the time that he gave his address: a scientific-technological one. Once again, the threat is that the industry that grows up around this government-sponsored activity will, just like the military-industrial complex, begin to take over and shape the actions of that same government. In this case, the warning is not one of bombs and bullets but bits and bytes, not tanks and fighter jets but hard drives and routers. Today we know this new fascism by its innocuous sounding title “Big Data,” but in keeping with the spirit of Eisenhower’s remarks, perhaps it would be more fitting to call it the “information-industrial complex.”
The concept of an information-industrial complex holds equally explanatory power for our current day and age as the military-industrial complex hypothesis held in Eisenhower’s time.
Why is a company like Google going to such lengths to capture, track and database all information on the planet?
The information-industrial complex.
Why were all major telecom providers and internet service providers mandated by federal law to hardwire in back door access to American intelligence agencies for the purpose of spying on all electronic communications?
The information-industrial complex.
Why would government after government around the world target encryption as a key threat to their national security, and why would banker after banker call for bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to be banned even as they plan to set up their own, central bank-administered digital currencies?
The information-industrial complex.
The effects of this synthesis are more and more felt in our everyday lives. Every single day hundreds of millions of people around the world are interfacing with Microsoft software or Apple hardware or Amazon cloud services running on chips and processors supplied by Intel or other Silicon Valley stalwarts. Google has become so ubiquitous that its very name has become a verb meaning “to search for something on the internet.” The 21st century version of the American dream is encapsulated in the story of Mark Zuckerberg, a typical Harvard whizkid whose atypical rise to the status of multi-billionaire was enabled by a social networking tool by the name of “Facebook” that he developed.
But how many people know the flip side of this coin, the one that demonstrates the pervasive government influence in shaping and directing these companies’ rise to success, and the companies’ efforts to aid the government in collecting data on its own citizens? How many know, for instance, that Google has a publicly acknowledged relationship with the NSA? Or that a federal judge has ruled that the public does not have the right to know the details of that relationship? Or that Google Earth was originally the brainchild of Keyhole Inc., a company that was set up by the CIA’s own venture capital firm, In-Q-Tel, using satellite data harvested from government Keyhole-class reconnaissance satellites? Or that the former CEO of In-Q-Tel, Gilman Louie, sat on the board of the National Venture Capital Association with Jim Breyer, head of Accel Partners, who provided $12 million of seed money for Facebook? Or that, in 1999, a back door for NSA access was discovered in Microsoft’s Windows operating system source code? Or that Apple founder Steve Jobs was granted security clearance by the Department of Defense for still-undisclosed reasons while heading Pixar in 1988, as was the former head of AT&T and numerous others in the tech industry?
The connections between the IT world and the government’s military and intelligence apparatus run deep. In fact, the development of the IT industry is intimately intertwined with the US Air Force, the Department of Defense and its various branches (including, famously, DARPA), and, of course, the CIA. A cursory glance at the history of the rise of companies like Mitre Corporation, Oracle, and other household electronics and software firms should suffice to expose the extent of these relations and the existence of what we might dub an “information-industrial complex.”
But what does this mean? What are the ramifications of such a relationship?
Although the signs have been there for decades, perhaps the most startling example of what lies at the heart of this relationship has been revealed by the whistleblowers at the heart of the National Security Agency, one of the most secretive arms of the American intelligence apparatus. While Edward Snowden has received the most attention with his “revelation” of the PRISM program, much of the information about the NSA’s ability to surveil all electronic communications has been revealed over the past decade by NSA whistleblowers like Russ Tice, William Binney, Thomas Drake and J. Kirk Wiebe, third-party contractors like Snowden and AT&T whistleblower Mark Klein, and independent journalists like James Bamford. Together, the story they tell is of a truly Orwellian society in which all communications are being captured and analyzed by the NSA, and, with the advent of facilities like the new data center in Utah, presumably stored indefinitely for use at any future time in any future investigation for any pretense by anyone with authorization to access that data. According to Snowden, this includes lowly third-party contractors like himself operating at NSA subcontractors like Booz Allen Hamilton in the vast (and expanding) private intelligence industry that has grown up around the information-industrial complex in the exact same way as private military contractors like Blackwater formed around the military-industrial complex.
In some ways, this information-industrial complex is even more insidious than its military-industrial counterpart. For all of the ills caused by the military-industrial complex (and there are many), at the very least it required some sort of excuse to drain the American people’s resources, and its failures (like the Vietnam quagmire or the debacle in Iraq) happened in the clear light of day. In the information-industrial complex, where vast spying programs happen in the shadows and under the cover of “national security,” it takes whistleblowers and insiders willing to risk it all even to find out what is being done by these shadowy agencies and their private-sector contractors. Even worse, the entire Orwellian spy grid is being run on the flimsiest of pretenses (the “war on terror”) that has no defined end point, and “justifies” turning that spy grid inward, on the American people themselves.
Surely Eisenhower never envisaged the monstrosity that this information-industrial complex has become, but the foresight he had in identifying its early stages over half a century ago is remarkable. The problem is that we are even further away from heeding the warning that he delivered in that 1961 address than we were at that time:
“It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.”
If only this were the rhetoric that was shaping today’s debate on the issue, instead of the well-worn canard that we must “strike a balance” between freedom and security. Sadly, until such time as the National Security Act of 1947 is repealed and the cover of national security is lifted from the dark actors that populate this sector, the information-industrial complex is unlikely to be quashed—or even hampered—anytime soon.
Authored by Eric Zuesse via The Strategic Culture Foundation,
Due to a historic data-dump on December 10th, the biggest swindle that occurred in the 20th Century (or perhaps ever) is now proven as a historical fact; and this swindle was done by the US Government, against the Government and people of Russia, and it continues today and keeps getting worse under every US President.
It was secretly started by US President George Herbert Walker Bush on the night of 24 February 1990; and, unless it becomes publicly recognized and repudiated so that it can stop, a nuclear war between the US and all of NATO on one side, versus Russia on the other, is inevitable unless Russia capitulates before then, which would be vastly less likely than such a world-ending nuclear war now is.
This swindle has finally been displayed beyond question, by this, the first-ever complete release of the evidence.
It demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt (as you’ll verify yourself from the evidence here), that US President G.H.W. Bush (and his team) lied through their teeth to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (and his team) to end the Cold War on Russia’s side, when the US team were secretly determined never to end it on the US-and-NATO side until Russia itself is conquered.
And this swindle continues today, and keeps getting worse and worse for Russians.
Until now, apologists for the US-Government side have been able to get away with various lies about these lies, such as that there weren’t any, and that Gorbachev didn’t really think that the NATO issue was terribly important for Russia’s future national security anyway, and that the only limitation upon NATO’s future expansion that was discussed during the negotiations to end the Cold War concerned NATO not expanding itself eastward (i.e., closer to Russia) within Germany, not going beyond the then-existing dividing-line between West and East Germany — that no restriction against other east-bloc (Soviet-allied) nations ever being admitted into NATO was discussed, at all. The now-standard US excuse that the deal concerned only Germany and not all of Europe is now conclusively disproven by the biggest single data-dump ever released about those negotiations.
The release on December 10th, by the National Security Archives, of a treasure-trove of all the existing documentation — 33 key documents — that’s been made available to them from numerous archives around the world, and brought together finally for the very first time complete and in chronological order, makes crystal clear that the American apologists’ lies about the lies WERE lies, not accurate accounts of the history, at all.
The assemblers at the National Security Archives assume that the numerous and repeated false promises that were made by Bush’s team were mistakes, instead of as what they so clearly were (but you’ll judge it here for yourself): strategic lies that were essential to Bush’s goal of America ultimately conquering a future isolated Russia that would then have little-to-no foreign allies, and all of whose then-existing-as-Soviet allied nations within the Soviet Union itself, and beyond, including all of its former Warsaw Pact allies, would have become ultimately swallowed up by the US-NATO bloc, which then would be able to dictate, to a finally alone nation of Russia, terms of Russia’s ultimate surrender to the US That view (which the National Security Archives documents to be clearly true, even as it denies it and says that only Bill Clinton and subsequent Presidents were to blame) is now exposed irrefutably to have been the US plan ever since GHW Bush’s Presidency.
In other words: This release of documents about the turning-point, provides capstone evidence that the US never really had been in the Cold War against communism; the US was instead aiming ultimately to be the imperial nation, controlling the entire planet.
For America’s Deep State, or what President Eisenhower famously warned about as the “military-industrial complex,” the Cold War was actually about empire, and about conquest, not really about ideology at all. This also had been shown, for example, by America’s having assisted so many ‘former’ Nazis to escape and come to America and to be paid now by the US Government. After World War II, the top level of the US power-structure became increasingly taken over by the military-industrial complex, America’s Deep State, so that increasingly the US Government is in a condition of “perpetual war for perpetual peace” — a warfare state and economy: fascism.
Here, then, are highlights from this historic data-dump, presented in chronological order, just as in the release itself, and with a minimum of added commentary from myself [placed in brackets], but all stripping away here the dross of accompanying inconsequentials, and leaving only the golden steady core of stunningly successful American deceit of Russia. These are those highlights, from the data-dump, which the National Security Archives headlined “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard” and sub-headed “Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major, and Woerner,” so that the swindlers (or as the National Security Archive view them as having instead been blunderers) can become immediately recognized and known.
All of these documents pertain to negotiations that occurred throughout the month of February 1990, and a few relate also to the immediate aftermath. That’s the crucial period, when the geostrategic reality of today (which all the world now know to be a continuation of the Cold War, but this time against only Russia, and not against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact) was actually created.
At the negotiations’ start, West Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s agent, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, stated publicly to the whole world, West Germany’s initial offer to the Soviet Union’s President Mikhail Gorbachev, and this offer did not include a simultaneous termination of both military alliances — the Soviets’ Warsaw Pact and America’s NATO — but instead only a promise that NATO would never absorb any additional territory, especially to the east of West Germany (and this publicly made promise was never kept). So: right from the get-go, there was no actual termination of the Cold War that was being proposed by the US group, but only an arrangement that wouldn’t threaten Russia more than the then-existing split Germany did (and yet even that promise turned out to have been a lie):
Document 01
US Embassy Bonn Confidential Cable to Secretary of State on the speech of the German Foreign Minister: Genscher Outlines His Vision of a New European Architecture.
1990-02-01
Source: US Department of State. FOIA Reading Room. Case F-2015 10829
“This US Embassy Bonn cable reporting back to Washington details both of Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s proposals – that NATO would not expand to the east, and that the former territory of the GDR in a unified Germany would be treated differently from other NATO territory.”
Document 02
Mr. Hurd to Sir C. Mallaby (Bonn). Telegraphic N. 85: Secretary of State’s Call on Herr Genscher: German Unification.
1990-02-06
Source: Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, volume VII: German Unification, 1989-1990.
“The US State Department’s subsequent view of the German unification negotiations, expressed in a 1996 cable sent to all posts, mistakenly asserts that the entire negotiation over the future of Germany limited its discussion of the future of NATO to the specific arrangements over the territory of the former GDR.” [The National Security Archives’ calling that Bill-Clinton-era State Department cable ‘mistaken’ is unsupported by, and even contradicted by, the evidence they actually present from the February 1990 negotiations.]
Document 03
Memorandum from Paul H. Nitze to George H.W. Bush about “Forum for Germany” meeting in Berlin.
1990-02-06
Source: George H. W. Bush Presidential Library
“This concise note to President Bush from one of the Cold War’s architects, Paul Nitze (based at his namesake Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies), captures the debate over the future of NATO in early 1990. Nitze relates that Central and Eastern European leaders attending the ‘Forum for Germany’ conference in Berlin were advocating the dissolution of both the superpower blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, until he (and a few western Europeans) turned around that view and instead emphasized the importance of NATO as the basis of stability and US presence in Europe.”
Document 04
Memorandum of Conversation between James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow.
1990-02-09
Source: US Department of State, FOIA 199504567 (National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection, Box 38)
“Baker tells the Soviet foreign minister, ‘A neutral Germany would undoubtedly acquire its own independent nuclear capability. However, a Germany that is firmly anchored in a changed NATO, by that I mean a NATO that is far less of [a] military organization, much more of a political one, would have no need for independent capability. There would, of course, have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward.’”
Document 05
Memorandum of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow.
1990-02-09
Source: US Department of State, FOIA 199504567 (National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection, Box 38)
“Even with (unjustified) redactions by US classification officers, this American transcript of perhaps the most famous US assurance to the Soviets on NATO expansion confirms the Soviet transcript of the same conversation. Repeating what Bush said at the Malta summit in December 1989, Baker tells Gorbachev: ‘The President and I have made clear that we seek no unilateral advantage in this process’ of inevitable German unification. Baker goes on to say, ‘We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.’”
Document 06
Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow. (Excerpts)
1990-02-09
Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 1.
“The key exchange takes place when Baker asks whether Gorbachev would prefer ‘a united Germany outside of NATO, absolutely independent and without American troops; or a united Germany keeping its connections with NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO’s jurisdiction or troops will not spread east of the present boundary.’ … Turning to German unification, Baker assures Gorbachev that ‘neither the president nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,’ and that the Americans understand the importance for the USSR and Europe of guarantees that ‘not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.’”
Document 07
Memorandum of conversation between Robert Gates and Vladimir Kryuchkov in Moscow.
1990-02-09
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, NSC Scowcroft Files, Box 91128, Folder “Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive.”
“This conversation is especially important because subsequent researchers have speculated that Secretary Baker may have been speaking beyond his brief in his ‘not one inch eastward’ conversation with Gorbachev. Robert Gates, the former top CIA intelligence analyst and a specialist on the USSR, here tells his kind-of-counterpart, the head of the KGB, in his office at the Lubyanka KGB headquarters, exactly what Baker told Gorbachev that day at the Kremlin: not one inch eastward. At that point, Gates was the top deputy to the president’s national security adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, so this document speaks to a coordinated approach by the US government to Gorbachev.”
Document 08
Letter from James Baker to Helmut Kohl
1990-02-10
Source: Deutsche Enheit Sonderedition und den Akten des Budeskanzleramtes 1989/90
“Baker especially remarks on Gorbachev’s noncommittal response to the question about a neutral Germany versus a NATO Germany with pledges against eastward expansion.”
Document 09
Memorandum of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl
1990-02-10
Source: Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros, edited by Alexander Galkin and Anatoly Chernyaev, (Moscow: Ves Mir, 2006)
“Prepared by Baker’s letter and his own foreign minister’s Tutzing formula, Kohl early in the conversation assures Gorbachev, ‘We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity. We have to find a reasonable resolution. I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union, and I realize that you, Mr. General Secretary, and the Soviet leadership will have to clearly explain what is happening to the Soviet people.’ Later the two leaders tussle about NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with Gorbachev commenting, ‘They say what is NATO without the FRG. But we could also ask: What is the WTO without the GDR?’ When Kohl disagrees, Gorbachev calls merely for ‘reasonable solutions that do not poison the atmosphere in our relations’ and says this part of the conversation should not be made public.”
Document 10-1
Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze notes from Conference on Open Skies, Ottawa, Canada.
1990-02-12
Source: Hoover Institution Archive, Stepanov-Mamaladze Collection.
“Notes from the first days of the conference are very brief, but they contain one important line that shows that Baker offered the same assurance formula in Ottawa as he did in Moscow: ‘And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about nonexpansion of its jurisdiction to the East.’”
Document 10-2
Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze diary, February 12, 1990.
1990-02-12
Source: Hoover Institution Archive, Stepanov-Mamaladze Collection.
“This diary entry is evidence, from a critical perspective, that the United States and West Germany did give Moscow concrete assurances about keeping NATO to its current size and scope. In fact, the diary further indicates that at least in Shevardnadze’s view those assurances amounted to a deal – which Gorbachev accepted.”
Document 10-3
Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze diary, February 13, 1990.
1990-02-13
Source: Hoover Institution Archive, Stepanov-Mamaladze Collection.
“Stepanov-Mamaladze describes difficult negotiations about the exact wording on the joint statement. … ‘During the day, active games were taking place between all of them. E.A. [Shevardnadze] met with Baker five times, twice with Genscher, talked with Fischer [GDR foreign minister], Dumas [French foreign minister], and the ministers of the ATS countries,’ and finally, the text of the settlement was settled.”
Document 11
US State Department, “Two Plus Four: Advantages, Possible Concerns and Rebuttal Points.”
1990-02-21
Source: State Department FOIA release, National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection, Box 38.
“The American fear was that the West Germans would make their own deal with Moscow for rapid unification, giving up some of the bottom lines for the US, mainly membership in NATO.”
Document 12-1
Memorandum of conversation between Vaclav Havel and George Bush in Washington.
1990-02-20
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons (https://bush41library.tamu.edu/)
“Bush took the opportunity to lecture the Czech leader about the value of NATO and its essential role as the basis for the US presence in Europe.”
Document 12-2
Memorandum of conversation between Vaclav Havel and George Bush in Washington.
1990-02-21
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons (https://bush41library.tamu.edu/)
“Bush’s request to Havel to pass the message to Gorbachev that the Americans support him personally, and that ‘We will not conduct ourselves in the wrong way by saying “we win, you lose.” Emphasizing the point, Bush says, ‘tell Gorbachev that … I asked you to tell Gorbachev that we will not conduct ourselves regarding Czechoslovakia or any other country in a way that would complicate the problems he has so frankly discussed with me.’ The Czechoslovak leader adds his own caution to the Americans about how to proceed with the unification of Germany and address Soviet insecurities. Havel remarks to Bush, ‘It is a question of prestige.’”
[I think that Havel was deceived to believe that “prestige” was the issue here. This is what the US team wanted the Soviet team to think was the US team’s chief motivation for wanting NATO to continue. But subsequent historical events, especially the US team’s proceeding under President Bill Clinton and up through Donald Trump to expand NATO to include, by now, virtually all of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union itself except for Russia, in NATO, proves that US aggression against Russia has been the US aim from the start, and the US Government has been working assiduously at this plan for ultimate conquest. I think that Havel’s use there of the word “prestige” was very revealing of the total snookering of Gorbachev that Bush achieved. Gorbachev and his team trusted the US side. Russia has paid dearly for that. If the US side continues and NATO isn’t voluntarily terminated by the US Government, then WW III will be the inevitable result. NATO will end either after the ‘conquest’ of Russia or before that WW-III ‘conquest’ (likelier to be actually destruction of the entire world) even happens. The world, today, will decide which. NATO should have ended in 1991, when the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact did.]
Document 13
Memorandum of Conversation between Helmut Kohl and George Bush at Camp David.
1990-02-24
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons (https://bush41library.tamu.edu/)
“The Bush administration’s main worry about German unification as the process accelerated in February 1990 was that the West Germans might make their own deal bilaterally with the Soviets (see Document 11) and might be willing to bargain away NATO membership. … The German chancellor arrives at Camp David without [West German Foreign Minister] Genscher because the latter does not entirely share the Bush-Kohl position on full German membership in NATO, and he recently angered both leaders by speaking publicly about the CSCE as the future European security mechanism.[11] … Bush’s priority is to keep the US presence, especially the nuclear umbrella, in Europe: ‘if US nuclear forces are withdrawn from Germany, I don’t see how we can persuade any other ally on the continent to retain these weapons.’ … [Bush wanted Lockheed and other US weapons-makers to continue booming after the Cold War ‘ended’ — not for the nuclear-weapons market to end. Bush continued:] ‘We have weird thinking in our Congress today, ideas like this peace dividend. We can’t do that in these uncertain times.’ [For the US team, ‘perpetual war for perpetual peace’ would be the way forward; a ‘peace dividend’ was the last thing they wanted — ever.] … At one point in the conversation, Bush seems to view his Soviet counterpart not as a partner but as a defeated enemy. Referring to talk in some Soviet quarters against Germany staying in NATO, he says: ‘To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t. We cannot let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.’” [I earlier had placed that crucial secret statement from Bush into historical perspective, under the headline, “How America Double-Crossed Russia and Shamed the West”.]
Document 14
Memorandum of conversation between George Bush and Eduard Shevardnadze in Washington.
1990-04-06
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons (https://bush41library.tamu.edu/)
“Shevardnadze mentions the upcoming CSCE summit and the Soviet expectation that it will discuss the new European security structures. Bush does not contradict this but ties it to the issues of the US presence in Europe and German unification in NATO. He declares that he wants to ‘contribute to stability and to the creation of a Europe whole and free, or as you call it, a common European home. A[n] idea that is very close to our own.’ The Soviets — wrongly — interpret this as a declaration that the US administration shares Gorbachev’s idea.”
Document 15
Sir R. Braithwaite (Moscow). Telegraphic N. 667: “Secretary of State’s Meeting with President Gorbachev.”
1990-04-11
Source: Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, volume VII: German Unification, 1989-1990. (Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
“Ambassador Braithwaite’s telegram summarizes the meeting between Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd and President Gorbachev, noting Gorbachev’s ‘expansive mood.’ Gorbachev asks the secretary to pass his appreciation for Margaret Thatcher’s letter to him after her summit with Kohl, at which, according to Gorbachev, she followed the lines of policy Gorbachev and Thatcher discussed in their recent phone call, on the basis of which the Soviet leader concluded that ‘the British and Soviet positions were very close indeed.’”
Document 16
Valentin Falin Memorandum to Mikhail Gorbachev (Excerpts)
1990-04-18
Source: Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros, edited by Alexander Galkin and Anatoly Chernyaev, (Moscow: Ves Mir, 2006)
“This memorandum from the Central Committee’s most senior expert on Germany sounds like a wake-up call for Gorbachev. Falin puts it in blunt terms: while Soviet European policy has fallen into inactivity and even ‘depression after the March 18 elections in East Germany, and Gorbachev himself has let Kohl speed up the process of unification, his compromises on Germany in NATO can only lead to the slipping away of his main goal for Europe – the common European home. ‘Summing up the past six months, one has to conclude that the “common European home,” which used to be a concrete task the countries of the continent were starting to implement, is now turning into a mirage.’ While the West is sweet-talking Gorbachev into accepting German unification in NATO, Falin notes (correctly) that ‘the Western states are already violating the consensus principle by making preliminary agreements among themselves’ regarding German unification and the future of Europe that do not include a ‘long phase of constructive development.’ He notes the West’s ‘intensive cultivation of not only NATO but also our Warsaw Pact allies’ with the goal to isolate the USSR. … He also suggests using arms control negotiations in Vienna and Geneva as leverage if the West keeps taking advantage of Soviet flexibility. … The main idea of the memo is to warn Gorbachev not to be naive about the intentions of his American partners: ‘The West is outplaying us, promising to respect the interests of the USSR, but in practice, step by step, separating us from “traditional Europe”.’”
Document 17
James A. Baker III, Memorandum for the President, “My meeting with Shevardnadze.”
1990-05-04
Source: George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, NSC Scowcroft Files, Box 91126, Folder “Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989 – June 1990 [3]”
“Baker reports, ‘I also used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure – one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.’”
Document 18
Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow.
1990-05-18
Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1
“When Gorbachev mentions the need to build new security structures to replace the blocs, Baker lets slip a personal reaction that reveals much about the real US position on the subject: ‘It’s nice to talk about pan-European security structures, the role of the CSCE. It is a wonderful dream, but just a dream. In the meantime, NATO exists. …’ Gorbachev suggests that if the US side insists on Germany in NATO, then he would ‘announce publicly that we want to join NATO too.’ Shevardnadze goes further, offering a prophetic observation: ‘if united Germany becomes a member of NATO, it will blow up perestroika. Our people will not forgive us. People will say that we ended up the losers, not the winners.’”
Document 19
Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand (excerpts).
1990-05-25
Source: Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros
“[Miterrand] implies that NATO is not the key issue now and could be drowned out in further negotiations; rather, the important thing is to ensure Soviet participation in new European security system. He repeats that he is ‘personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs.’ Gorbachev expresses his wariness and suspicion about US effort to ‘perpetuate NATO’.” [This was extraordinary documentation that the US team had deceived Gorbachev to think that they were trying to suggest to him that both military alliances — NATO and Warsaw Pact — would be ended, but that Gorbachev was “wary” and “suspicious” that maybe they didn’t really mean it. Stunning.]
Document 20
Letter from Francois Mitterrand to George Bush
1990-05-25
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, NSC Scowcroft Files
True to his word, Mitterrand writes a letter to George Bush describing Gorbachev’s predicament on the issue of German unification in NATO, calling it genuine, not ‘fake or tactical.’ He warns the American president against doing it as a fait accompli without Gorbachev’s consent implying that Gorbachev might retaliate on arms control (exactly what Mitterrand himself – and Falin earlier – suggested in his conversation). Mitterrand argues in favor of a formal ‘peace settlement in International law,’ and informs Bush that in his conversation with Gorbachev he “‘indicated that, on the Western side, we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.’”
Document 21
Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. White House, Washington D.C.
1990-05-31
Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Moscow, Fond 1, opis 1.[12]
“Baker repeats the nine assurances made previously by the administration, including that the United States now agrees to support the pan-European process and transformation of NATO in order to remove the Soviet perception of threat. Gorbachev’s preferred position is Germany with one foot in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact — the ‘two anchors’ — creating a kind of associated membership. Baker intervenes, saying that ‘the simultaneous obligations of one and the same country toward the WTO and NATO smack of schizophrenia.’ After the US president frames the issue in the context of the Helsinki agreement, Gorbachev proposes that the German people have the right to choose their alliance — which he in essence already affirmed to Kohl during their meeting in February 1990. Here, Gorbachev significantly exceeds his brief, and incurs the ire of other members of his delegation, especially the official with the German portfolio, Valentin Falin, and Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev. Gorbachev issues a key warning about the future: ‘If the Soviet people get an impression that we are disregarded in the German question, then all the positive processes in Europe, including the negotiations in Vienna [over conventional forces], would be in serious danger. This is not just bluffing. It is simply that the people will force us to stop and to look around.’ It is a remarkable admission about domestic political pressures from the last Soviet leader.”
Document 22
Letter from Mr. Powell (N. 10) to Mr. Wall: Thatcher-Gorbachev memorandum of conversation.
1990-06-08
Source: Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, volume VII: German Unification, 1989-1990. (Foreign and Commonwealth Office
“Gorbachev says he wants to ‘be completely frank with the Prime Minister’ that if the processes were to become one-sided, ‘there could be a very difficult situation [and the] Soviet Union would feel its security in jeopardy.’ Thatcher responds firmly that it was in nobody’s interest to put Soviet security in jeopardy: ‘we must find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured.’”
Document 23
Record of Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, Moscow (Excerpts).
1990-07-15
Source: Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros
“This key conversation between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev sets the final parameters for German unification. Kohl talks repeatedly about the new era of relations between a united Germany and the Soviet Union, and how this relationship would contribute to European stability and security. Gorbachev demands assurances on non-expansion of NATO: ‘We must talk about the nonproliferation of NATO military structures to the territory of the GDR, and maintaining Soviet troops there for a certain transition period.’ The Soviet leader notes earlier in the conversation that NATO has already begun transforming itself. For him, the pledge of NATO non-expansion to the territory of the GDR in spirit means that NATO would not take advantage of the Soviet willingness to compromise on Germany.”
[Of course, Gorbachev never knew that Bush had instructed his agents, on the night of 24 February 1990, “To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t. We cannot let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat,” indicating that for the US aristocracy, conquest of an isolated Russia was the actual ultimate aim — there would be no actual end of the Cold War until the US would conquer Russia itself — grab the whole thing. Gorbachev was, it is now absolutely undeniable, conned.]
Document 24
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush
1990-07-17
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, Memcons and Telcons ((https://bush41library.tamu.edu/)
“In this phone call, Bush expands on Kohl’s security assurances and reinforces the message from the London Declaration: ‘So what we tried to do was to take account of your concerns expressed to me and others, and we did it in the following ways: by our joint declaration on non-aggression; in our invitation to you to come to NATO; in our agreement to open NATO to regular diplomatic contact with your government and those of the Eastern European countries; and our offer on assurances on the future size of the armed forces of a united Germany – an issue I know you discussed with Helmut Kohl. We also fundamentally changed our military approach on conventional and nuclear forces. We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.’”
Document 25
September 12 Two-Plus-Four Ministerial in Moscow: Detailed account [includes text of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and Agreed Minute to the Treaty on the special military status of the GDR after unification]
1990-11-02
Source: George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, NSC Condoleezza Rice Files
“the agreed text of the final treaty on German unification. The treaty codified what Bush had earlier offered to Gorbachev – ‘special military status’ for the former GDR territory. At the last minute, British and American concerns that the language would restrict emergency NATO troop movements there forced the inclusion of a ‘minute’ that left it up to the newly unified and sovereign Germany what the meaning of the word ‘deployed’ should be. Kohl had committed to Gorbachev that only German NATO troops would be allowed on that territory after the Soviets left, and Germany stuck to that commitment, even though the ‘minute’ was meant to allow other NATO troops to traverse or exercise there at least temporarily. Subsequently, Gorbachev aides such as Pavel Palazhshenko would point to the treaty language to argue that NATO expansion violated the ‘spirit’ of this Final Settlement treaty.”
[Obviously, now, it was no “Final Settlement” at all.]
Document 26
US Department of State, European Bureau: Revised NATO Strategy Paper for Discussion at Sub-Ungroup Meeting
1990-10-22
Source: George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, NSC Heather Wilson Files,
“Joint Chiefs and other agencies, posits that ‘[a] potential Soviet threat remains and constitutes one basic justification for the continuance of NATO.’ At the same time, in the discussion of potential East European membership in NATO, the review suggests that ‘In the current environment, it is not in the best interest of NATO or of the US that these states be granted full NATO membership and its security guarantees.’ The United States does not ‘wish to organize an anti-Soviet coalition whose frontier is the Soviet border’ – not least because of the negative impact this might have on reforms in the USSR. NATO liaison offices would do for the present time, the group concluded, but the relationship will develop in the future. In the absence of the Cold War confrontation, NATO ‘out of area’ functions will have to be redefined.” [Clearly, they wanted the revolving door to land them in high-paid positions supported by US weapons-making corporations, not just in retirements with only military pensions. Or else, they just loved war and, like Bush, didn’t want there to be any “peace dividend.”]
Document 27
James F. Dobbins, State Department European Bureau, Memorandum to National Security Council: NATO Strategy Review Paper for October 29 Discussion.
1990-10-25
Source: George H. W. Bush Presidential Library: NSC Philip Zelikow Files
“This concise memorandum comes from the State Department’s European Bureau as a cover note for briefing papers for a scheduled October 29, 1990 meeting on the issues of NATO expansion and European defense cooperation with NATO. Most important is the document’s summary of the internal debate within the Bush administration, primarily between the Defense Department (specifically the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney) and the State Department. On the issue of NATO expansion, OSD ‘wishes to leave the door ajar’ while State ‘prefers simply to note that discussion of expanding membership is not on the agenda….’ The Bush administration effectively adopts State’s view in its public statements, yet the Defense view would prevail in the next administration.”
[This allegation, by the National Security Archives, fundamentally misrepresents, by its underlying assumption that the Bush Administration’s statements such as that NATO would move “not one inch to the east” weren’t lies but instead reflected Bush’s actual intention. They ignore altogether Bush’s having secretly told his vassals on the crucial night of 24 February 1990, “To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t. We cannot let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.” Gorbachev believed that this was to be a win-win game; but, the US side were now under secret instructions that it’s to be purely more of the win-lose game, and that now a lone Russia would end up being its ultimate loser. The despicable statement by the National Security Archives, “yet the Defense view would prevail in the next administration,” presumes that it didn’t actually already ‘prevail’ in the Bush Administration itself. It prevailed actually in George Herbert Walker Bush himself, and not only in his Defense Department. Bush brilliantly took advantage of Gorbachev’s decency and expectation that Bush, like himself, was decent. Bush lied — and his team and their successors ever since have been carrying out his vicious plan. The National Security Archives downplays to insignificance Bush’s crucial instruction to his people, “To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t. We cannot let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.” That statement, at that crucial moment, is what enables us to understand what was actually going on throughout these negotiations. The Archives’ blaming only Bill Clinton and the other Presidents after Bush is a despicable lie. And it wasn’t just “the Defense view” — Cheney — who prevailed within the Bush Administration there. Cheney, like Baker, were doing what GHW Bush had hired them to do. Baker’s job was to lie. If it weren’t, then he’d have told Gorbachev the next day not to trust what the Bush team were saying, but instead to demand everything to be put in writing in the final document, and to assume the worst regarding anything that the Bush team were refusing to put in writing in the final document. Baker was a lawyer, and a very skilled liar, who was just doing his job for Bush. For some inexplicable reason, the National Security Archives simply assumes otherwise.]
Document 28
Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite diary, 05 March 1991
1991-03-05
Source: Rodric Braithwaite personal diary
“British Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite was present for a number of the assurances given to Soviet leaders in 1990 and 1991 about NATO expansion. Here, Braithwaite in his diary describes a meeting between British Prime Minister John Major and Soviet military officials, led by Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitry Yazov. The meeting took place during Major’s visit to Moscow and right after his one-on-one with President Gorbachev. During the meeting with Major, Gorbachev had raised his concerns about the new NATO dynamics: ‘Against the background of favorable processes in Europe, I suddenly start receiving information that certain circles intend to go on further strengthening NATO as the main security instrument in Europe. Previously they talked about changing the nature of NATO, about transformation of the existing military-political blocs into pan-European structures and security mechanisms. And now suddenly again [they are talking about] a special peace-keeping role of NATO. They are talking again about NATO as the cornerstone. This does not sound complementary to the common European home that we have started to build.’ Major responded: ‘I believe that your thoughts about the role of NATO in the current situation are the result of misunderstanding. We are not talking about strengthening of NATO.’”
Document 29
Paul Wolfowitz Memoranda of Conversation with Vaclav Havel and Lubos Dobrovsky in Prague.
1991-04-27
Source: US Department of Defense, FOIA release 2016
“These memcons from April 1991 provide the bookends for the ‘education of Vaclav Havel’ on NATO (see Documents 12-1 and 12-2 above). US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz included these memcons in his report to the NSC and the State Department about his attendance at a conference in Prague on ‘The Future of European Security,’ on April 24-27, 1991. During the conference Wolfowitz had separate meetings with Havel and Minister of Defense Dobrovsky. In the conversation with Havel, Wolfowitz thanks him for his statements about the importance of NATO and US troops in Europe. … In conversation with Dobrovsky, Wolfowitz remarks that ‘the very existence of NATO was in doubt a year ago.’“
Document 30
Memorandum to Boris Yeltsin from Russian Supreme Soviet delegation to NATO HQs
1991-07-01
Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Fond 10026, Opis 1
“This document is important for describing the clear message in 1991 from the highest levels of NATO – Secretary General Manfred Woerner – that NATO expansion was not happening. The audience was a Russian Supreme Soviet delegation, which in this memo was reporting back to Boris Yeltsin (who in June had been elected president of the Russian republic, largest in the Soviet Union), but no doubt Gorbachev and his aides were hearing the same assurance at that time. The emerging Russian security establishment was already worried about the possibility of NATO expansion, so in June 1991 this delegation visited Brussels to meet NATO’s leadership, hear their views about the future of NATO, and share Russian concerns. Woerner had given a well-regarded speech in Brussels in May 1990 in which he argued: ‘The principal task of the next decade will be to build a new European security structure, to include the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. The Soviet Union will have an important role to play in the construction of such a system. If you consider the current predicament of the Soviet Union, which has practically no allies left, then you can understand its justified wish not to be forced out of Europe.’ Now in mid-1991, Woerner responds to the Russians by stating that he personally and the NATO Council are both against expansion — ’13 out of 16 NATO members share this point of view’ — and that he will speak against Poland’s and Romania’s membership in NATO to those countries’ leaders as he has already done with leaders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.”
President Trump signed into law the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act on Tuesday, a $700 billion defense policy bill that mandates for a “briefing on cyber applications of blockchain technology.” Language within the bill is part of a much wider effort to modernize the United States military, before decades of hybrid wars breakout (see: US Army Is Preparing For Decades Of Hybrid Wars.)
The blockchain study, according to the bill text (Sec.1646), will create “an assessment of efforts by foreign powers, extremist organizations, and criminal networks to utilize such technologies;…[and] an assessment of the use or planned use of such technologies by the Federal Government and critical infrastructure networks.”
Further, the study is to be delivered to Congress “not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this act.”Coin Desk adds while the study is set to be prepared by the Department of Defense, the final report could include input from other federal agencies and departments.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of such other departments and agencies of the Federal Government as the Secretary considers appropriate, shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the cyber applications of blockchain technology.
So you ask, what is blockchain? And why would the Department of Defense be interested in this technology?
Coin Desk further notes,
And though it constitutes a minor element in major funding law, the measure, proposed by Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio, could help spur investigation into possible blockchain uses within the U.S. government, some observers say.
“Blockchain was clearly one of the technological capabilities that Congress meant for agencies to look at, and what they were trying to do was create dollars with some flexibility to them so that agencies would have their own discretion on what they invest in,” Trey Hodgkins, senior vice president of public sector at the Information Technology Industry Council in Washington, D.C., told CoinDesk last month.
And lastly, a 2016 military doctrine from the United States Airforce (USAF) outlines the future importance of blockchains in cyber defense systems,
The ability of the USAF to prevail in the highly contested environment of 2040 will be dictated by its ability to defend cyber-enabled systems, and the data within them, from compromise and manipulation. Yet contemporary cyber defense is faltering, and incremental improvements seem unlikely to overcome an exponentially growing cyber threat. Thus, an entirely new model for cyber defense strategy is needed.
Blockchains are a new information technology that inverts the cyber security paradigm. First, blockchain networks are trustless; they assume compromise of the network by both insiders and outsiders. Second, blockchains are transparently secure; they do not rely on failure-prone secrets, but rather on a cryptographic data structure that makes tampering both exceptionally difficult and immediately obvious. Finally, blockchains networks are fault tolerant; they align the efforts of honest nodes to reject those that are dishonest.
As a result, blockchain networks not only reduce the probability of compromise, but also impose significantly greater costs on an adversary to achieve it. The Air Force should research and develop blockchain technology and leverage it for national defense.
If America wants to maintain her empire, she better adopts blockchain technologies, as what it appears to be the future strategy of the Department of Defense.
After the Department of Defense admitted to spending millions on a UFO program, a video was declassified showing a shocking encounter with an unknown craft.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Kristine Svinicki responded to questions raised by Senator John Barrasso (R-WY) regarding a key aspect of the Uranium One deal, agreeing that the Obama Administration had not "fully depicted" the complexity of the transaction which ultimately gave the Kremlin control over 20% of US uranium.
“I would note that, as your letter makes clear, the responses you have received have not fully depicted the complexity of this issue” -Kristine Svinicki, NRC Chair
Svinicki"s response fell short of agreeing with Barrasso that he had been "misled" over the deal to export yellowcake uranium from the Senator"s home state of Wyoming out of the country.
Barrasso says he was given "misleading" answers on whether or not Russian mined US uranium would be allowed to leave the country, based on revelations from The Hill which revealed the Obama administration allowed the uranium to leave the country by "piggy-backing" onto an export license held by shipping company, RSB Logistic Services Inc.
Rep. John Barrasso (R-WY)
In a Monday letter to the NRC and the Energy Department, Barrasso wrote:
Prior to the approval of the sale [of Uranium One], I wrote to then-President Barack Obama registering my strong concerns regarding Russian control over American uranium production facilities and Russia"s ability to ship U.S. uranium overseas. I also requested immediate notification should ARMZ file for a license to export U.S. uranium. Based on information that has recently come to light, I now believe the response I received, and the process by which I received it, were both misleading.
On March 21, 2011, former NRC Chairman Greg Jaczko responded to my letter on behalf of then-President Obama stating:
‘At this time, neither Uranium One Inc. nor ARMZ holds a specific NRC export license. In order to export uranium from the United States, Uranium One, Inc. or
ARMZ would need to apply for and obtain a specific NRC license authorizing the export of uranium for use in reactor fuel’
The NRC staff made a similar statement in their recommendation to approve the transfer control of Uranium One to ARMZ, stating:
"before the licensee may export uranium to a foreign country, they must first comply with the NRC"s regulations and seek a specific license for such purpose."
Recent reporting by The Hill uncovered that Uranium One was able to export uranium without obtaining a specific export license. Beginning in 2012, Uranium One exported U.S. uranium by ‘piggy-backing’ as a supplier on an export license held by the shipping company, RSB Logistic Services Inc.
Barrasso originally wrote to the Obama administration in 2010 with concerns over Russia"s ability to export uranium overseas. In 2011, Obama-appointed NRC chairman Gregory Jaczko off the letter, noting the company would need an export license.
Barrasso says this was misleading during a Wednesday Senate hearing, stating “I specifically raised concerns about future exports of U.S. uranium by Uranium One,” adding “I believe the Obama administration’s response to my letter was at best misleading.”
Following Barrasso"s comments, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works requested that the NRC and the Energy Department produce documents related to the Obama administration"s response to the 2010 letter. Barrasso says he has evidence that the Energy Department misled him on their role in approving the uranium exports, and pointed out the enormous loophole which allowed Uranium One to export without a license.
“Uranium One did not need a specific NRC license to export U.S. uranium,” said Barrasso, adding “Instead, Uranium One only needed to be, and later was, listed as a supplier on a transport company’s NRC export license.”
The New York Times covered the Uranium One story in 2015, detailing donations which poured into the Clinton Foundation from individuals associated with the deal - which was later found to be upwards of $140 million. Meanwhile, a series of follow-up reports from The Hill have filled in the gaps with several bombshells, including:
As he prepared to collect a $500,000 payday in Moscow in 2010, Bill Clinton sought clearance from the State Department to meet with a key board director of the Russian nuclear energy firm Rosatom — which at the time needed the Obama administration’s approval for a controversial uranium deal, government records show.
Arkady Dvorkovich, a top aide to then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and one of the highest-ranking government officials to serve on Rosatom’s board of supervisors, was listed on a May 14, 2010, email as one of 15 Russians the former president wanted to meet during a late June 2010 trip, the documents show.
“In the context of a possible trip to Russia at the end of June, WJC is being asked to see the business/government folks below. Would State have concerns about WJC seeing any of these folks,” Clinton Foundation foreign policy adviser Amitabh Desai wrote the State Department on May 14, 2010, using the former president’s initials and forwarding the list of names to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s team. -The Hill
The agencies which received the request included the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Dept. of Treasury, the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI James Clapper), The National Counter Terrorism Center, and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
Five days after the initial request, the same FBI agent sent another round of notifications to the same agencies, adding the National Security Agency (NSA) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS).
The next day, September 3rd, 2015, three more agencies were added to the preservation request: The CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)
At this point, every single member of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) which signed off on the Uranium One deal was served with a notice to preserve records.
There is so much more to the deal involving players like Tony Podesta, Paul Manafort, and various members of the Obama administration - one wonders if, and when, the dam will ever break under the overwhelming weight of malfeasance - sending waves of corrupt politicians and lobbyists down the drain.
