Showing posts with label M3. Show all posts
Showing posts with label M3. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 21, 2017

Learning From The "80s: The Power And Irony Of "MDuh"

Authored by Daniel Nevins via FFWiley.com,


Forget about big hair, Ray-Bans, and Donkey Kong. Don’t even think about Live-Aid, Thriller, and E.T. Above all else, the 1980s were the gravy days of the money supply aggregates.


Beginning in late 1979, the Fed built its policy approach around the aggregates - primarily M1 but occasionally M2, and policy makers also monitored M3 while experimenting with M1B and, later, MZM. But those were just the “official” figures. Economists and pundits debated the Fed’s preferred measures while concocting their own home-brewed variations.


Notably, the Fed allowed interest rates to fluctuate as much as necessary to achieve its money growth targets. Fluctuate they did - rates soared and dipped wildly as a direct result of the Fed’s policy. The world, meanwhile, watched the action as attentively as a Yorkie watches breakfast, studying every wiggle in every M. Missing one wiggle could have meant the difference between exploiting the volatility that the Fed unleashed or being sunk by that same volatility.


And to make sense of it all, the world looked to the most famous economist of his day, Milton Friedman. By converting a large swath of his profession to his strict brand of Monetarism, Friedman more than anyone else had triggered the monetary frenzy.


But then, almost as quickly as the frenzy blew in, it blew right back out. With none of the Ms living up to their billings as economic indicators, the Monetarists drifted from view. Not in five minutes but in five years, give or take a couple, their period of fame was over. Friedman’s reputation as an economics savant fell particularly hard—his highly publicized forecasts proved inaccurate in each year from 1983 to 1986. And the Fed once again redesigned its approach, first deemphasizing and eventually dropping its money growth targets.


But maybe the Monetarists came closer to explaining the economy than their critics allowed?


Maybe the best indicator - I’ll call it “MDuh” - was somehow hidden in plain sight?


Those are the arguments I’ll make in this article, and I’ll back each one with up-to-date data. I’ll propose a way of thinking that’s considered common sense in some circles even as it’s blasphemous within the mainstream core of the economics profession. And I’ll explain why MDuh was the true lesson of Friedman’s research.


Before we get to MDuh, though, there are two things you should know about Friedman and his co-researcher Anna Schwartz (if you didn’t already know them).


  • First, they relied on data, not theory, when they shaped their version of Monetarism. They found a strong historical correlation between money growth and economic activity, and they also found that money growth predicts activity. They published those results in a groundbreaking 1963 book, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.

  • Second, to their credit they never claimed to understand the monetary “transmission mechanism,” meaning the reasons the historical correlations were as strong as they were. But they offered their best guess, which lined up with prevailing Monetarist thinking. They believed that “there is a fairly definite real quantity of money that people wish to hold” and that our continual efforts to adjust money holdings to those fairly definite levels are the business cycle’s driving force. (See here for source.)

The Glaring but Rarely Acknowledged Problem with M1 and M2


The second point above explains why Monetarists defined the aggregates as they did. They defined each aggregate according to the characteristics that might influence the “fairly definite real quantity of money that people wish to hold.” But the characteristics they believed important, such as liquidity, stability, and value as a medium of exchange, led to unreliable indicators, as shown in the chart below:


mduh chart


The chart compares the most popular Monetarist measures, M1 and M2, to two measures that I created, MDuh and NBL. I’ll define MDuh and NBL in just a moment. I’ll first offer an explanation for why M1 and M2 lost their pre-1980s mojo as GDP correlates. And to do that, I’ll need to review a fallacy that underpins not only Monetarism but all of mainstream macro.


Mainstream theory relies on the false premise that bank loans are no different to other loan types. It ignores the reality that bank loans are unique, because banks are the only institutions that create deposits (money) while delivering loan proceeds. Bank borrowers receive money that banks create from thin air, and that brand new money has powerful effects. It boosts spending without requiring prior saving, meaning it’s mostly additive to economic activity. That is, it doesn’t have a large “crowding out” effect on other spending - bank-created money flows directly into nominal GDP. It might affect prices, real growth, or a combination of prices and real growth, depending on how the new money is spent. But it’s important to remember that the new money connects to a bank loan. The money–GDP correlation is merely a byproduct of a lending–GDP correlation. Bank lending, not money, is the driving force.


Back to M1 and M2: Why did those highly touted measures lose their strong correlations to GDP, whereas MDuh didn’t?


I would say it’s because they lost their connections to bank lending. The economists who created them made both additions to and subtractions from bank-created money, whereas I made no such adjustments when I calculated MDuh. I didn’t bother with the differences between checking, savings, and time deposits, and I didn’t bother with money that’s not created by banks, such as money market funds. In other words, I didn’t bother with the characteristics of money that absorb the attention of mainstream economists - liquidity, stability, and value as a medium of exchange. For what it’s worth, I doubt that people maintain definite money holdings, as the Monetarists claimed.


MDuh depends on a single question: Is a potential MDuh component initiated by a private entity with the legal authority to create money, meaning either a commercial bank or a similar deposit-taking institution? If the answer is yes, I include the component in MDuh. Otherwise, I don’t. By using only that criterion, I’m estimating the amount of new money that banks pump into the economy when they make loans and buy securities. Not surprisingly, MDuh correlates almost perfectly with net bank lending - the correlation between 1959 and 2016 was 0.97. And net bank lending, as you might have guessed, is “NBL” in the chart above.


To say it again, banking realities tell us that bank lending, not money, is the business cycle’s driving force, as shown by the data in my chart.


Why Friedman and Schwartz Were Almost “on the Money”


Now for the irony.


Over the 94-year period covered in Friedman and Schwartz’s Monetary History, data only existed for a few types of money. The authors couldn’t separate different types of bank accounts as finely as statisticians do today. They couldn’t measure any non-currency, non-bank-created money that may have existed over the period of study. In other words, they couldn’t add and subtract the various components of the Ms that disconnect them from bank lending.


So MDuh is far from an original measure. It consists of currency in circulation plus bank deposits less bank reserves, which is equivalent to the measure Friedman and Schwartz used in their book for the period until the Fed’s inception in 1913 (there were no central bank–held reserves) and almost equivalent thereafter. Their monetary history could have just as accurately been called “The History of MDuh.” In effect, their study of MDuh triggered the 1980s monetary frenzy in the first place.


(The only discrepancy between MDuh and Friedman–Schwartz is my adjustment for bank reserves, which isolates private sector–supplied credit by excluding deposits that arise though the Fed’s open market operations. Without the adjustment for bank reserves, MDuh would mix apples with oranges. It would combine private sector lending, which is pro-cyclical, with the Fed’s lending, which is intended to be counter-cyclical. Private sector lending is more strongly correlated to GDP, as you would expect.)


In an ideal world, Friedman and Schwartz’s followers would have recognized that MDuh mostly demonstrates the connections between business cycles, inflation, and bank credit cycles. But that’s not what happened. They stuck to their training, which told them that bank loans are identical to other types of lending. And then they obsessed over how to define money supply, as if economic insight comes down to whether to include, say, overnight repos in your favorite M. By so doing, they moved further and further from MDuh.


Next Steps for Those Who See Things as I Do


As mentioned above, my conclusions probably sound like common sense to many of you, even as they conflict with mainstream macro. You might wonder if you can exploit that discrepancy, and I explain how in my book Economics for Independent Thinkers (website here, Amazon link here).


For now, though, I’d say the next time your favorite analyst breaks down M1 or M2, comment politely that those indicators emerged from long-standing fallacies about money and banking.


Suggest that maybe people don’t fine-tune their money holdings to a “fairly definite” level as Monetarist theory requires. Or, even if they do, the desired money holdings wouldn’t propel the economy in the same way bank loans do. And then ask her to look at MDuh instead. Or, better yet, ask her to look at net bank lending and be done with it. Money, while occasionally interesting, mostly sows confusion among those who study it.









Sunday, June 4, 2017

Realism Is The New Pessimism (Or Why 4% GDP Targets Are Ludicrous)

Authored by Chris Hamilton via Econimica blog,


The American core population (aged 15-64) is the greatest economic consumptive force on earth.  They make up 2/3rds of the total US population and 95% of US employment.  When considering growth, particularly the all important annual growth in Gross Domestic Product, the growth of this population should be the first consideration (although it is strangely nowhere in typical economists or Federal Reserve accounting).  From a growth perspective, it doesn"t matter if this population is 3.25 million or 325 million...all that matters is how many more there are than the year before.  Some will point to wage growth but this is essentially equally offset by rising prices.  It is the growth in this population that drives the need for new housing, new infrastructure, and generally adds millions of new consumers every year (aka, demand growth)...until now.


The core US population growth has been slowing since "00 and as of this year (drum roll please) that growth is ending.  To be clear, this wasn"t "supposed" to happen.  Not according to the Census or all those planning on perpetual growth.  But as the chart below highlights (yoy change on a monthly basis), for the first time since WWII (and perhaps in US history) the core US population has ceased growing...and is likely to begin declining in the coming months and years.  FYI - The spikes of "90, "00, "10, and more since are due to Census adjustments, not sudden population changes.  Further downgrades should be expected as Census estimates for growth remain overly optimistic.



A combination of factors are driving this cessation of core growth including decades of negative birth rates (even among the recent immigrants), the graduation of the boomers to the 65+ population, and little to no net illegal immigration since "08 (now combined with political and enforcement factors further turning net immigration to significant levels of net emigration).  This all adds up to a fast decelerating basis for US consumption growth...and out the window with it, the notion that superior immigration driven US demographics will save America.


Yes, the total US population is still expected to grow this year by 2.2 million, at a total level more in-line with that seen in the 1980"s (when the US population was 2/3rds it"s current size).  However, even that 2.2 million number is likely to be significantly downgraded due to the factors above...perhaps downgraded by as much as 50%...such is the impact of net negative illegal immigration?!?



Some real world correlations may be found in plotting housing starts vs. the annual change in core population...below.  The current divergence of rising housing starts for a core population no longer growing should be setting off alarm bells.



And vehicle sales vs. change in core population...below.  Selling massive quantities of debt fueled vehicles for a core population no longer growing...what could go wrong?



If this trend persists, all net US population growth is now solely among the 65+yr/old population living a decade+ longer than the previous generation.  From a GDP growth perspective, the impact of a declining 0-64yr/old population (the big population that drives economic activity) only offset by a much smaller but growing 65+yr/old population (that is leaving the work force, credit averse, and moving to fixed incomes) should be pretty straight forward.  Simply put, the basis for GDP growth (among other things) is in deep shit!


The chart below detailing US population growth among the demographic segments versus annual GDP.  The last column on the right is a death knell for growth in a world already awash in overcapacity and debt.



And as for GDP, it is now simply a reflection of new federal debt.  The chart below shows annual GDP growth minus the annual growth in federal debt...and since "08, there is no growth but the growth in un-repayable federal spending...and it"s going to get much worse.  Full details HERE.



And for those who struggle to understand the impact of the core population, the chart below highlights the substitution of federal debt since the core growth began decelerating.  And what level of federal debt creation (and CB asset purchasing) will need happen as the core ceases growing or outright declining?  Well, I guess we"re all about to find out how you make fewer people consume more stuff (or at least how you make the numbers appear so) and simultaneously avoid asset bubbles from imploding.



Of course, none of this is reflected in the "markets" as the chart below highlights.  The Wilshire 5000 (blue line representing all publicly traded US equities) has blasted $10 trillion higher than the acknowledged "bubbles" of "01 and "08.  Talk of further interest rate hikes, the Fed reducing its balance sheet, and true economic growth is simply a most vexing discussion in the face of a likely declining consumer base!?!  I attempt to pull together the growth of flood of M3 "money" HERE and decelerating population vs. consumption HERE.  Lastly, I try to outline who is buying the Treasury bonds HERE and likewise how the stock market is levitating HERE.



And as always, there will be those who suggest it will be global growth that is lifting all boats...again, bullshit...as outlined and detailed HERE, HERE, HERE, and especially HERE and HERE. The current system of infinite growth on a finite planet is up against some very hard stops...and how much longer the papering over of widening chasms can be maintained is unknowable (as is which assets may survive the great fall and the subsequent reset).  The only thing I know for sure is the fall is imminent, the heights from which we will begin our descent are dizzying, but it"s unsure what will arrest our fall into depopulation, deflation, and depression.  Realism is the new pessimism.