Showing posts with label Currency intervention. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Currency intervention. Show all posts

Saturday, October 28, 2017

The World"s New Reserve Currency? Everything You Need To Know About PetroYuan

Earlier this week, we pointed out that the "PetroYuan" is on the verge of becoming reality with Graticule"s Adam Levinson noting that the birth of a yuan-denominated oil contract will be a “huge story” in the fourth quarter, and will be a “wake up call” for investors who haven’t paid attention to the plans.


As a reminder, nothing lasts forever...



Judging by the interest in the topic, investors are less informed than many believed and so the different teams within Société Générale Cross Asset Research examine what this contract would mean for the global oil markets and for the internationalisation of the yuan - if it gets off the ground.


 


Part 1 The proposed yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract


  • Why is a yuan-denominated Chinese crude futures contract interesting to think about?  Why is it potentially significant?

  • Would yuan-denominated Chinese crude futures affect the physical markets?

  • Has China actually proposed changing its crude buying from USD to yuan?

  • What about the crude producers and exporters?

  • How much non-USD crude trade currently exists?

  • If small volumes don’t change how the oil market operates, how big would the volumes have to be to make a difference?

  • Is there another commodity that trades in multiple currencies at different exchanges that we can learn lessons from?

Part 2 Another step towards currency internationalisation?


  • Why does China want to introduce a yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract? 

  • How can the yuan succeed in becoming a reserve currency?

  • What does the status of an international currency mean for the yuan?

  • What will an internationalised yuan mean to China’s FX reserves?

*  *  *


Part 1: The proposed yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract


In November 2013, the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE) was established. Fully owned by the Shanghai Futures Exchange, the INE began efforts to offer an alternative crude oil futures contract to the global oil markets. After four years, these efforts are continuing. The proposed contract is for medium sour crude oil, is physically deliverable, and – most significantly – would be denominated in yuan.


We begin with the oil markets.


Why is a yuan-denominated Chinese crude futures contract interesting to think about? Why is it potentially significant?


Such a contract would be a tool that would make it possible for crude exporters selling to Chinese refiners to hedge their sales in yuan. This could help any future effort by China to import crude using yuan; on the other side of the coin, it could also help any future effort by various crude exporters to sell crude in a currency other than USD. 


In the abstract, the potential volumes are large, which is why this is worth thinking about.  China is the world’s biggest crude importer, with net imports in January-July 2017 of 8.4 Mb/d (and trending higher); the second biggest crude importer is the US, with net imports of 7.2 Mb/d in January-July 2017 (and trending lower). 


To put this into context, according to the IEA, in 4Q17, global product demand will be 98.5 Mb/d and global crude demand will be 82.2 Mb/d (including refinery runs and direct burn).  Crude trade is much less, at 42.4 Mb/d in 2016, according to the BP Statistical Review; this excludes crude that is produced and consumed in the same country. In other words, Chinese net crude imports account for over 10% of the global crude market and almost 20% of global crude trade. 


Would yuan-denominated Chinese crude futures affect the physical markets?


No, not at all. That’s not what this is about – there would be no impact on physical supply (like the example of natural gas – see below). In theory, if this were to happen, it would purely be about pricing. The global oil markets are denominated almost entirely in USD, so it is interesting to think about that landscape changing.


Has China actually proposed changing its crude buying from USD to yuan?


No. In recent years, there has been occasional general talk from China of moving away from the USD for purchases of crude oil and other commodities; however, we are not aware of any serious or concrete proposal on the table to start buying crude in yuan any time soon. That said, it is worth acknowledging that most Chinese crude buying is done by three large stateowned oil companies. Therefore, if it so chooses, the Chinese government certainly has the ability to push such an agenda; similarly, the government has the ability to push the use of INE crude futures for hedging crude in yuan.


What about the crude producers and exporters?


This is an important question to ask because it’s not just about what the Chinese want. As with any commercial transaction, both the buyer and the seller need to agree. In the case of crude oil, they need to agree on the volume, price, type and quality of crude as well as the delivery date and delivery location, among other things. However, the currency is almost always the USD – that is not a point of negotiation.


Over the years, including 2017, major crude producers such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela have talked about selling and exporting crude in non-dollar currencies. The reasons have been general geopolitical tensions with the US and Europe, and more specifically, oil-related sanctions; the use of non-dollar currencies may offer a way to circumvent oil-related sanctions, at least partially.  


Hypothetically, if China were to have serious talks with Iran, Russia and Venezuela about importing crude and paying in yuan, that would be important because it would add another dimension to the geopolitical analysis. If sanctioned countries could simply side-step the measures by selling crude in yuan or other non-dollar currencies, it would mean that the risk of supply disruptions and potential upside risk for oil prices would be reduced.


How much non-USD crude trade currently exists?


It is very difficult to make an accurate and confident estimate. Again, depending on the political context, talk of non-dollar crude trade from the countries mentioned above comes and goes, and sometimes some deals are done more for political and public relations purposes than for anything else. 


Our “guesstimate” is that such volumes probably amount to no more than 300-350 kb/d out of the 82.2 Mb/d global crude market noted above. For reference, to put that in terms of physical crude trade, 5 VLCC-size tankers each month carrying 2 Mb each would equal 333 kb/d. We would consider that, or its equivalent in smaller vessels, to be a generous estimate. We would consider 10 VLCCs or equivalent each month, or 666 kb/d, to be an extreme upside estimate but highly unlikely. This excludes barter arrangements and loans-for-crude deals. China lent Russia large sums of money after the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 in exchange for longterm crude supply deals; more recently, China had such an arrangement with Venezuela.


The bottom line, in our view, is that actual crude trade paid in cash but not using USD has never amounted to more than a few token cargoes. Importantly, when this does happen, the entire transaction and negotiation of the price is done in USD as usual, with pricing done the normal way; for example, both Urals and Dubai, which are key marker crudes in their own right, are priced as differentials to Brent. The only difference when a non-USD currency is used is that a last step is added, where the amount for the invoice is converted from USD into a different currency.


If small volumes don’t change how the oil market operates, how big would the volumes have to be to make a difference?


The question is really: what is the tipping point? How much non-USD crude trade does there need to be for the entire negotiation to take place in yuan, or rubles, or euros?  In other words, what does it take for price discovery and price formation to take place not in USD but in another currency?


The short answer is that we don’t know. But something on the order of 7-8 Mb/d of crude trade seems to be a sensitive level from a practical standpoint. How do we come up with this?  It’s simple: we are thinking about Saudi Arabia. Saudi crude exports have averaged 7 Mb/d through the first eight months of this year; in 2016, before the current OPEC cuts took effect, they averaged 7.6 Mb/d. The 7-8 Mb/d range works out to 16-19% of the 42.4 Mb/d global traded crude volumes.


Our view is that physical efforts to shift global crude trade away from US dollars seem doomed to failure unless the Saudis fully participate. Usually in matters of pricing, the other Middle East exporters follow the lead of the Saudis, so there is a “double whammy” effect and the volumes could start to increase quickly.


In this context, the warming relationship between Saudi Arabia and Russia becomes more interesting, too. Could the two countries cooperate on this in the same way they’ve cooperated on cutting production this year, in order to stabilise prices? Perhaps. That would add even more volumes because Russia is the second-biggest crude exporter in the world.  According to the BP Statistical Review, Russian crude exports averaged 5.5 Mb/d in 2016.


However, the geopolitics of oil quickly gets complicated. Why would the Saudis want to do something (like encourage non-USD crude trade) that would benefit Iran? This is always true, but is even more true now at a time when US-Iran tensions are ramping up and the US is threatening to re-impose oil sanctions on Iran. Also, why would the Saudis want to do something that would diminish the value of their currency, which is pegged to the USD, their huge USD reserves, and other USD-denominated assets?


If it would take the Saudis to make a real fundamental change in moving the oil markets away from a sole reliance on the USD to a multiple currency market, from a Saudi perspective, the arguments “against” are at least as strong as the arguments “in favour”. In short, we are sceptical of Saudi support for such a move.


Rather than support from Saudi Arabia or a cooperative effort between Saudi Arabia and Russia, a more realistic and higher-probability scenario would be a move to non-USD crude exports led by Russia on its own or perhaps a cooperative effort between Russia and Iran – with China being the key crude buyer, using yuan, in all the scenarios. Without the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and other Middle East exporters such as the UAE, Kuwait and Iraq, the volumes involved with Russia and Iran would be much less; this would make a fundamental change in oil price formation away from USD slower and more difficult but not impossible.


Is there another commodity that trades in multiple currencies at different exchanges that we can learn lessons from?


The answer to this question is yes and the best example is natural gas. The point of making this comparison is that ultimately different denominated prices in the same underlying commodity do not affect the physical balances but do influence trade flows, arbitrage and market analysis.


The US natural gas market is the largest regional market in the world (IEA estimates it alone represented 21% of total global gas demand) and is almost entirely priced in USD (AECO, Canada’s most liquid supply point, prices in CAD/GJ). The US LNG market (imports and exports) are also denominated in USD.


The global LNG market is heavily indexed to USD as well, but that is due to the dominance of oil indexation in long-term LNG sales agreements; the USD dominance of the global LNG market thus reflects the dominance of USD in oil prices.


In Europe (which represents 13% of total global gas demand according to IEA estimates), there are two main natural gas price points. In the UK, the National Balancing Point (NBP) – the hub of UK gas trading – is denominated in GB pounds and pence/therm. In the Netherlands, the hub of natural gas trading is known as Title Transfer Facility (TTF), and this contract is in euros and euro cents per MWh. Recently, there has been an observed shift in the dominance of these price points regionally; critically, this is a function of the physical characteristics of the market rather than the currency used or the exchange rate.


Historically, NBP was the most liquid point and also the price structure included in European LNG sales contracts, making it the dominant global representation of the European market. Recently, however, TTF has seen an increase in liquidity (increased open interest) and has become increasingly reflective of the physical continental European market. Factors such as the higher carbon price in the UK, which has an impact on gas competitiveness/pricing within the regional power generation stack, the declining trend of the UK production profile, and the region’s increased dependence (seasonal switching) on the Interconnector pipeline between the UK and continental Europe have all contributed to the reduced ability of NBP to reflect the wider European market; hence the rise of TTF. Importantly, it is the changes in the physical market that have changed the competitive landscape among TTF and NBP, and it has little to nothing to do with the different exchange rates (although Brexit may have decreased NBP’s popularity).


The existence of varying price structures in the global natural gas market is a critical comparison to make for oil, which has the potential to see a rise in pricing in currencies other than the USD. It is important to emphasise that even with multiple price structures, global natural gas trading behaviour is dominated by physical market conditions. At the same time, there is sometimes an influence from fluctuations in exchange rates, making analysis of flows, arbitrage, and trading somewhat more complicated; however, supply and demand dynamics are not fundamentally affected.


Part 2: Another step towards currency internationalisation? 


Why does China want to introduce a yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract? 


The Chinese government wants the yuan to become an international currency. This means that it wants the yuan to be used widely in international transactions (a settlement currency), to be adopted as a pricing currency for goods and services in global markets (an invoicing currency), and to be considered as a store of value by international investors (an investing currency). The goal of internationalisation also goes hand in hand with the profile objective for the yuan to obtain a reserve currency status since these two are highly correlated. While it is currently unclear (or too early to discern) whether China is aiming for the yuan to become the reserve currency – dethroning the dollar – Chinese policymakers are certainly eyeing the yuan as one of the major reserve currencies.



China has been working much harder on this project since 2009. The process has moved at varying speeds depending on capital account pressures, domestic asset prices and growth considerations, but much progress has been made (see the timeline on the next page). A quarter of China’s exports and imports are settled in yuan, although most of them are still invoiced in other hard currencies.


The proposed yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract to be listed on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE), fully owned by the Shanghai Futures Exchange, is another step on the road to promote internationalisation and erode the USD hegemony in the global financial system. While over the years, there have been some relatively small volumes of oil traded in non-USD currencies, including the yuan (as discussed in the oil section above), the value of oil is still priced in dollars. One of the main impacts of the proposed new crude futures contract, and presumably one of the intentions behind the proposal, is that by providing a yuandenominated financial hedging tool for crude oil, this will likely help to promote the appeal of the yuan as a pricing currency in global oil trade.


From the Chinese policymakers’ perspective, China should arguably have a bigger say in the pricing of commodities since it has become the biggest consumer of many of them. Also, the petro-dollar system seems to be a successful model to imitate: first, the yuan would be more widely accepted by natural resource exporters, and in turn, these exporters could invest their yuan revenues (as FX reserves) into yuan-denominated financial assets.



How can the yuan succeed in becoming a reserve currency?


To improve the yuan’s chances of becoming an international and reserve currency, the main areas of development would be strengthening the institutional framework, fully opening the capital account to foreign residents, allowing market forces to play a greater role and establishing and managing a policy framework that alleviates the risk of crisis over an extended period.


China technically joined the reserve currency club when the IMF added it to the SDR basket in September 2016. The narrow definition of a reserve currency is for currencies used for international trade and willing to be held by other central banks as part of their reserves. On these narrow criteria, China has achieved what few currencies have been able to do.


Realising “true” reserve status and supplanting or even meaningfully competing with the USD in the global financial system is a very high hurdle that will take time (maybe 10-20 years) and require further enhancements in various areas. A broader set of criterion (listed below) of a reserve currency highlights the enormous challenges that China faces:


Medium of exchange. Entities outside China would need to widely adopt the RMB for transactional purposes (i.e. trade settlement). The yuan trade/investment settlement, the offshore yuan market and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) would need to be promoted. China is making steady strides in this area, with now 25% of China’s cross-border transactions settled by yuan. According to the SWIFT, however, the yuan share in international payments has not been able to advance and has hovered around 2% since late 2014.


 


Store of value. Individuals, companies and central banks would need to have faith in the currency as able to preserve wealth. About 60 central banks now hold some RMB assets in their portfolios, but this amount only represented 1% of total global reserves at the end of 2016.


 


Liquidity and market access. To become widely accepted, a currency would need to have high liquidity with foreigners having unencumbered access to local financial markets. China has created numerous schemes for global investors to access its equity and bond markets, but it is only a start, with foreign investors’ share in onshore capital markets at merely 2%. Further liberalising the capital account for foreign residents would be a necessary condition.


 


Institutional framework. Ultimately, confidence in the legal, regulatory and policy framework would need to be paramount for foreigners to hold large quantities of the currency. The current (USD) and previous (GBP) dominant global reserve currencies already had these qualities before attaining their status.



In many ways, China is working in reverse order – pushing internationalisation before the others condition are in place. Critically, policy priorities would need to be reoriented. It will be a challenge for China to meaningfully challenge the USD’s dominance, but it is not insurmountable over the next 10-20 years provided China takes steps in opening up (full capital account convertibility), giving up control of markets and strengthening and improving transparency in its legal, regulatory and policymaking framework.


What does the status of an international currency mean for the yuan?


Before the reserve currency status can support the yuan, the yuan may have to continuously prove itself as a stable currency to boost its status as a reserve currency. We think that the fundamental factors of economic growth, debt risk and interest rate differentials will continue to play dominant roles in the yuan’s FX trends over the medium term.  
A quick check of the history of the four major currencies – the dollar, euro, yen and sterling – since the 2000s suggests a visible and positive correlation between a currency’s traded weighted performance and its share in global FX reserves. However, correlation does not necessarily mean causality, and the causality can go both ways.


For instance, in the case of the yen and sterling, however, changes in their valuations look to have led their changing popularity among global reserve managers. The strength of the yen between 2009 and 2013 did not attract significantly more reserve inflows right away, probably because of the lacklustre economic development at the time. Sterling only started to gain a share in global reserves in 2003 despite its persistent strength since late 1990s.



For the yuan, we observe that the pace of yuan internationalisation was faster during the phase of currency appreciation or stability and slower when the yuan depreciated. This came despite the continuous policy efforts.


For the past seven years, USD/CNY has moved surprisingly closely with US-China yield differentials, and in the past three years the correlation of CNY to broad dollar moves has increased. Contrary to popular belief, the CNY shows few idiosyncratic tendencies and rather behaves in a similar manner to other EM/G10 currencies.


No matter what happens, the correlation between the CNY and the USD could remain high. The simple fact is that the correlation across most currencies is high over the cycle given that many top-down macro factors tend to drive FX over the medium term. 


The CNY may, however, play an increasing role in leading currency cycles, just as the USD does now. This would mean an increasing importance of Chinese data, monetary and fiscal policy in affecting global currency trends.



What will an internationalised yuan mean to China’s FX reserves?


The project of yuan internationalisation comprises currency liberalisation, capital account open-up and domestic capital market deepening. Liberalising the currency implies that the central bank will intervene less and less in the currency market, and a relatively stable level of FX reserves is therefore most consistent with the goal of making the yuan an international currency. 


Indeed, Chinese policymakers have repeatedly expressed their commitment to making the yuan a more flexible currency, freer from direct currency interventions by the central bank. However, it is also a stated goal for the yuan to maintain relatively stability against a basket of China’s major trade partners’ currencies. These two goals are only compatible when there is no major depreciation (or appreciation) pressure on the yuan resulting from major outflow (or inflow) pressure. 


China’s FX reserves can recover this year after the $1tn drop over the previous 2.5 years because the yuan has managed to stabilise against the dollar and a basket of currencies. The yuan’s stability should be a function of 1) dollar weakness, 2) capital controls and 3) China’s stable growth this year. These three factors will likely be the main drivers of the trend in China’s FX reserves over the next few years. While there remains much uncertainty around the dollar, it seems that Chinese policymakers have honed the skill of capital controls. This ought to reduce the risk of sharp declines in FX reserves going forward.


In the meantime, we think the chance of China persistently increasing its FX reserves is also limited unless the weak dollar trend continues and accelerates. The relationship with the US is one factor, and domestically there will likely remain strong demand from Chinese households and corporates for investment diversification if China continues to rely on rapid debt growth and money creation to sustain its economic model (see Anatomy of China"s outflows). As the developments in 2015 and 2016 proved, such capital outflow pressure could outweigh the support from a decent current account surplus for the yuan.



What will the yuan’s internationalisation mean to global FX reserves?


China’s share of global reserve portfolios should increase over time. Depending on whether it achieves true reserve currency status in the eyes of foreign participants, that share will be either low (5%), high (25%) or very high (25%+). 


Emerging market central banks still need a significant amount of dollars to undertake intervention assuming their currency regimes are not fully flexible, and a precautionary stockpile is desired to manage balance of payments shocks. Against all EM currencies, except most notably the CEE euro bloc, the dollar is by far the most widely traded and liquid FX cross. Virtually all intervention is done in USD crosses, and one prerequisite for central banks to shift their anchor currency to the RMB would be CNY crosses that are tradable without underlying dollar transactions being required. For instance, while EUR/CNY is quoted and traded onshore through the CFETS, it requires dealers to facilitate the trade through two separate transactions (USD/CNY and EUR/USD). The sheer size of the Chinese economy, growing global financial linkages and increasing RMB trade settlement will see a shift in this direction over time, but it will be a very long and slow process. Products such as the proposed yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract will help to marginally speed up the progression. 


Reserves can be divided into two broad categories: precautionary and excess. The precautionary portion needs to be in liquid assets to meet demand for foreign currency/dollars on short notice and mitigate balance of payments stress. Currently, these are mostly held in US government bonds or deposits, followed by European bonds, then UK, Japan, Canada and Australia down the list. China is below these. Gold is liquid but somewhat lower on the scale compared to deposits or government bonds, so there are natural limitations to how much central banks would hold. 


The excess portion of reserves can be invested in anything, and central banks have an excess globally. Central banks have undertaken various diversification efforts over the past few decades, with the share of euros in global reserve portfolios for example having increased from 20% in 2002 to 27% in 2008 before falling back to 20% in 2016. Central banks have been more active in holding commodity currencies (CAD and AUD) over the past five years.  
Russia has been buying a lot of gold. To do this, it either sells existing USD or other currency holdings, or when it intervenes and accumulates dollars it then diverts the currency to gold instead of treasuries. If central banks have excess reserves or do not want to accumulate more dollars, they could hold gold instead. 


The proposed yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract reduces the need to use dollars for the transaction, but it does not change the outcome or address the fundamental question: do central banks want/need USD or yuan? They could have bought yuan previously. The proposed yuan-denominated crude oil futures contract does not make it an easier process. But for those countries subject to sanctions, it might be attractive. According to the 4Q16 IMF COFER report (link), foreign central banks held USD85bn in allocated reserves in the CNY (or 1% of global reserves). Total foreign holdings of Chinese bonds amounted to USD135bn, according to ChinaBond, suggesting the vast majority of holdings are from central banks.



If reserve manager allocations to the RMB doubled over the next five years, and if those inflows were spread out evenly over the period, they would amount to roughly USD6bn per quarter (or another USD100bn). While not insignificant, that is still a drop in the ocean compared to other balance of payments components. However, if reserve manager allocations reached the weighting of the JPY in allocated global reserves (4%), the inflows could be closer to USD500bn over five years. An allocation equivalent to the euro (around 20% of global) reserves could see nearly USD1.5trn in inflows.


It could be challenging for the CNY to reach a high weight if global reserves are not rising. In 2002-2008, when central banks were diversifying into euros, global FX reserves were rising sharply and a significant portion of the growth in reserves was due to China. During this period, central banks were buying dollars through intervention (in an attempt to keep their currencies weaker than otherwise) and with some of those newly acquired dollars they decided to diversify their holdings and buy euros. However, in the absence of a strong increase in global FX reserves going forward, it would present a significantly higher hurdle for reserve managers to diversify into the CNY. It would require active diversification out of other currency holdings (i.e. sell existing dollar assets) to acquire the CNY.









Saturday, October 14, 2017

Rickards Warns "Prepare For A Chinese Maxi-Devaluation"

Authored by James Rickards via The Daily Reckoning,


China is a relatively open economy; therefore it is subject to the impossible trinity.



China has also been attempting to do the impossible in recent years with predictable results.


Beginning in 2008 China pegged its exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. China also had an open capital account to allow the free exchange of yuan for dollars, and China preferred an independent monetary policy.


The problem is that the Impossible Trinity says you can’t have all three. This model has been validated several times since 2008 as China has stumbled through a series of currency and monetary reversals.


For example, China’s attempted the impossible beginning in 2008 with a peg to the dollar around 6.80. This ended abruptly in June 2010 when China broke the currency peg and allowed it to rise from 6.82 to 6.05 by January 2014 — a 10% appreciation.


This exchange rate revaluation was partly in response to bitter complaints by U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner about China’s “currency manipulation” through an artificially low peg to the dollar in the 2008 – 2010 period.


After 2013, China reversed course and pursued a steady devaluation of the yuan from 6.05 in January 2014 to 6.95 by December 2016. At the end of 2016, the Chinese yuan was back where it was when the U.S. was screaming “currency manipulation.”


Only now there was a new figure to point the finger at China. The new American critic was no longer the quiet Tim Geithner, but the bombastic Donald Trump.


Trump had threatened to label China a currency manipulator throughout his campaign from June 2015 to Election Day on November 8, 2016. Once Trump was elected, China engaged in a policy of currency war appeasement.


China actually propped up its currency with a soft peg. The trading range was especially tight in the first half of 2017, right around 6.85.


In contrast to the 2008 – 2010 peg, China avoided the impossible trinity this time by partially closing the capital account and by raising rates alongside the Fed, thereby abandoning its independent monetary policy.


This was also in contrast to China’s behavior when it first faced the failure of its efforts to beat impossible trinity. In 2015, China dodged the impossible trinity not by closing the capital account, but by breaking the currency peg.


In August 2015, China engineered a sudden shock devaluation of the yuan. The dollar gained 3% against the yuan in two days as China devalued.


The results were disastrous.


U.S. stocks fell 11% in a few weeks. There was a real threat of global financial contagion and a full-blown liquidity crisis. A crisis was averted by Fed jawboning, and a decision to put off the “liftoff” in U.S. interest rates from September 2015 to the following December.


China conducted another devaluation from November to December 2015. This time China did not execute a sneak attack, but did the devaluation in baby steps. This was stealth devaluation.


The results were just as disastrous as the prior August. U.S. stocks fell 11% from January 1, 2016 to February 10. 2016. Again, a greater crisis was averted only by a Fed decision to delay planned U.S. interest rate hikes in March and June 2016.


The impact these two prior devaluations had on the exchange rate is shown in the chart below.


Major moves in the dollar/yuan cross exchange rate (USD/CNY) have had powerful impacts on global markets. The August 2015 surprise yuan devaluation sent U.S. stocks reeling. Another slower devaluation did the same in early 2016. A stronger yuan in 2017 coincided with the Trump stock rally. A new devaluation is now underway and U.S. stocks may suffer again.



By mid-2017, the Trump administration was once again complaining about Chinese currency manipulation.


This was partly in response to China’s failure to assist the United States in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and missile testing programs.


For its part, China did not want a trade or currency war with the U.S. in advance of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which begins on October 18.


President Xi Jinping was playing a delicate internal political game and did not want to rock the boat in international relations. China appeased the U.S. again by allowing the exchange rate to climb from 6.90 to 6.45 in the summer of 2017.


China escaped the impossible trinity in 2015 by devaluing their currency.


China escaped the impossible trinity again in 2017 using a hat trick of partially closing the capital account, raising interest rates, and allowing the yuan to appreciate against the dollar thereby breaking the exchange rate peg.


The problem for China is that these solutions are all non-sustainable.





China cannot keep the capital account closed without damaging badly needed capital inflows. Who will invest in China if you can’t get your money out?



China also cannot maintain high interest rates because the interest costs will bankrupt insolvent state owned enterprises and lead to an increase in unemployment, which is socially destabilizing.



China cannot maintain a strong yuan because that damages exports, hurts export-related jobs, and causes deflation to be imported through lower import prices. An artificially inflated currency also drains the foreign exchange reserves needed to maintain the peg.



Since the impossible trinity really is impossible in the long-run, and since China’s current solutions are non-sustainable, what can China do to solve its policy trilemma?


The most obvious course, and the one likely to be implemented, is a maxi-devaluation of the yuan to around the 7.95 level or lower.


This would stop capital outflows because those outflows are driven by devaluation fears. Once the devaluation happens, there is no longer any urgency about getting money out of China. In fact, new money should start to flow in to take advantage of much lower local currency prices.


There are early signs that this policy of devaluation is already being put into place. The yuan has dropped sharply in the past month from 6.45 to 6.62. This resembles the stealth devaluation of late 2015, but is somewhat more aggressive.


The geopolitical situation is also ripe for a Chinese devaluation policy. Once the National Party Congress is over in late October, President Xi will have secured his political ambitions and will no longer find it necessary to avoid rocking the boat.


China’s President Xi Jinping awaits appointment to a second term at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, starting October 18. His reappointment is a foregone conclusion.



China has clearly failed to have much impact on North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions. As war between North Korea and the U.S. draws closer, neither China nor the U.S. will have as much incentive to cooperate with each other on bilateral trade and currency issues.


Both Trump and Xi are readying a “gloves off” approach to a trade war and renewed currency war. A maxi-devaluation of the yuan is Xi’s most potent weapon.


Finally, China’s internal contradictions are catching up with it. China has to confront an insolvent banking system, a real estate bubble, and a $1 trillion wealth management product Ponzi scheme that is starting to fall apart.


A much weaker yuan would give China some policy space in terms of using its reserves to paper over some of these problems.


Less dramatic devaluations of the yuan led to U.S. stock market crashes. What does a new maxi-devaluation portend for U.S. stocks?


We might have an answer soon enough.

Friday, May 12, 2017

Bullish Stocks and Bearish Gold? You're Actually Just Trying the Yen.

If you are a stock bull, congratulations, you’ve unwittingly bought the market base don abject currency manipulation and nothing else.


Stocks have been propped up via abject manipulation of the $USD/ Yen pair and nothing else.  The two are been moving lockstop via one of the greatest market rigs in a history: a 10-day period in which stocks refused to move even 0.2%.



Put simply, you’re not actually a stock bull, you’re a Yen bear. Thank the Bank of Japan for it.


Similarly, if you’ve been bearish on Gold… once again, you’re actually playing the $USD/Yen pair, this time in reverse with Gold plunging to follow the drop in the Yen/ $USD pair.



Again, you thank the Bank of Japan for this.


Put simply, the markets have just experienced a 1 in 125-year market rigs. And it’s now ending.



We offer a FREE investment report outlining the current market bubble and three investment strategies to profit from the market dropping.


We made 1,000 copies to the general public.


Currently just 49 are left.


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Chief Market Strategist


Phoenix Capital Research

Monday, May 8, 2017

Is North Korea The Excuse China Needs To Launch Monetary Armageddon?

Authored by Mark St.Cyr,


If one were only to get their “news” via the main-stream media outlets, it wouldn’t be wrong to assume when it came to the understanding of what is really going on across the globe, along with the consequences, most haven’t a clue. This point is made manifest with no greater example than the elections currently taking place in France.


I’m sorry, but the French election doesn’t trump, to all but exclusion, the potential for the breakout of WWIII. That is – unless you’re the main stream media. Yes, one has the potential for near immediate electoral upheaval (i.e., A potential Frexit, and possible finality for the E.U. experiment.) However, the other has the potential for a near immediate global war. That, of course, is the current standoff with N.Korea. And the reaction via the main-stream media? (Insert most recent Kardashian escapade here.)


Not to belittle the French elections and their possible consequences should the results go awry for the entrenched bureaucrats (not to mention the financial markets.) There is another standoff which may bring even more immediate consequences than the other.


Currently the Korean peninsula is in play much the same way Cuba was during the Kennedy administration known as “The Cuban Missile Crisis.” The overall situation and its possible consequences for missteps are eerily similar.


Missiles have been moved onto the peninsula in what can only be described as “outrage” via not only N. Korea, but also China. Whether or not one agrees with the move (along with the stationing of war ships off the Korean coast) as to send a message to Pyongyang to cease all provocation via its nuclear ambitions is irrelevant.


The real player (and the one to pay attention too) in this standoff is China. And how they go about resolving this issue at its doorstep. Both internally, as well as externally.


Make no mistake: China is not just juggling one possible conflict, it is also currently fighting another within its own borders. For China is simultaneously on the precipice of an another possible disaster. i.e., An outright monetary disaster of its own making which needs to be resolved with the same immediacy as this external one.


I’m of the opinion this kerfuffle with N. Korea may be the catalyst which drives China to either embark on an outright kinetic posture against the West to resolve. (e.g., If no one backs down or worse) Or – will be the inflection point as to allow the monetary fallout within its financial markets to begin in earnest. Crippling the entire global economy in ways not fully understood (or envisioned) by many, especially “The West”, in what may be akin to a “First Strike” monetary (rather than kinetic) action.


Aside from the obvious “trigger” events that could arise as I stated in the above. (e.g., N. Korea) There are a few other events which when taken as a collection, rather, than just their stand alone value, portend for far further cracking in the facade that is China.


Since we’re in the middle of a possible armed standoff the analogy of “Did China dodge a bullet?” seems fitting when juxtaposed to the recent tightening into weakness launched in earnest via the Federal Reserve.


As strange as anything resembling “normal” monetary effects have been, e.g., Central banks buying equities. One of the latest has a few scratching their heads, and it’s this: As the Fed. hiked not just once, but twice in 90 days, and, is signaling even more along with a reduction of its balance sheet – the $Dollar has weakened.


There are far too many factors to list as to what might be the catalyst. Yet, what is clear (and the only thing that matters currently) is that this manifestation has subsequently given China some form of “borrowed time” when it comes to the Yuan. For if the $Dollar had strengthened as it has during such cycles? The Yuan would be in a world of depreciating hurt.


Back in October I penned the following, “Why All The Yawning Over The Yuan?” And in it I made the following point. To wit:





“Now some will think “Maybe there’s no concern because the politburo has it under control?” It’s a fair response, but there’s a problem inherent with the answer, or answers.



First: If the Chinese are doing it in a “controlled” type manner, it reeks of “currency manipulation” tactics for others (think U.S. presidential politics as of today) to latch onto and build support, as well as strengthen a case for retaliation. i.e., placing tariffs, etc, etc.



If you think about it from the Chinese perspective: that would mean you were openly, and intentionally goading as to fuel some version of a trade, or currency war. When you come at it using that thought process; it just doesn’t make sense. Both from a tactical standpoint, as well as political. Hence lies what maybe even a more troubling scenario. e.g., They’ve lost control.



The only other reason more troubling than the first – is the second. For it is here where things become quite precarious, as I’ve stated many times: “The currency markets are where you must keep your eyes and ears affixed. It’s where the real games are played and won.” And losing control of one’s currency has implications for all others, both warranted, as well as unintended. And it seems this latter scenario might be more on point than the former.”



Where does the relationship between the Yuan and the $Dollar now stand? One would think with such a sell off currently taking place within the $Dollar market that the cross-rate should be in a much more manageable area for the politburo than before all things being equal, correct? Hint: It’s not. Again, to wit:




As one can see by the chart above we are currently hovering at the 6.900 range. That’s important not just for its “spitting distance” away from the all important psychological 7.000 level, but rather, how (and why) it’s there at all.


All things being equal as the $Dollar had strengthened it put pressure on the Yuan. That pressure was/is wreaking havoc within China exacerbating the already near unmanageable capital flight taking place which shows no sign of letting up as evidenced by the chart above. For the higher the cross-rate ascends – the greater the issues weigh on the Chinese politburo via capital flight and more. And which lies-the-rub…


For if the index is rising as the $Dollar is weakening? (as it is currently) That means the Yuan is losing value far faster than it was only months ago. And that’s a very, very, very (did I say very?) big problem for the current monetary status quo. Not to mention the global economy in general.


The current financial underpinnings within the Chinese economy are once again under pressure in ways very few understand. With that said all one needs to watch as to perceive significant clues into the health of its underpinnings is the price stability in commodities. For much of China’s internal, and interwoven financial constructs for collateral are based on them. And one of the main players of that is iron ore. And guess what? Hint: Prices are/have collapsed at a precarious pace.


The easiest way to categorize the relationship of commodity prices and the financial underpinnings within China is this: Commodities are the collateral and pricing foundation to much of China’s financial obligations – as real estate values are to MBS and all their counterparts. Yes, much of China’s financial problems are now with real estate, but what all that real estate was built and financed on was? Hint: Commodity collateralization. (Think CDS/MBS times a factor of 1000, if not more.)


Now you have some idea of just how massive this problem is.


Just remember what a sudden (like in 2007/08) real estate value collapse can do (or did) to an economy, and you have the same scenario in earnest via commodity prices currently happening in China, where the full effects (let alone realizations) of such have yet to even be calculated, never-mind felt.


Add to this the current enactment of steel tariffs placed only weeks ago by the U.S and you know what you also get? Hint: An even more ticked-off Beijing. Again: All this in conjunction as some U.S. steel warships hold fast off the Korean coast threatening to possibly launch a first strike upon its next door neighbor and so-called Sino-influenced “underling.”


If the politburo decides that there is no other way (and easier timing for a scapegoat) than now as to suddenly devalue the currency and put a world of financial hurt squarely on the West (and the U.S. in-particular) while simultaneously using all the turmoil as to hasten the pace (and possibly secure the position for more SDR influence) the table for such a move has probably never been set so neatly, so perfectly, and so probable as it is today.


Waiting to see if the $Dollar reverses and brings the hurt on in ways that are out of the politburo’s control or sphere of influence will not be seen as “prudent” by anyone within the Chinese authority. “Waiting” from their viewpoint might be the last thing they can consider, especially since “warships” and “missiles” are now needed to be factored into the immediacy for monetary decision-making.


They may decide to act, and act sooner, rather than later.


No matter what happens in France or N.Korea.

Thursday, April 6, 2017

How To Trade The Trump-Xi Summit

While today"s market was certainly more exciting than many had expected, first surging on the blockbuster ADP report, then plunging in the biggest intraday drop in 14 months after "some" Fed members warned stock prices are "quite high", there is a chance that it will get even more exciting tomorrow, should either Trump or Xi utter a word "out of place" during the first summit between the two world leaders at Mar-A-Lago.


How should traders approach tomorrow"s key risk event? Courtesy of Bloomberg"s ex-FX trader Mark Cudmore, here are some thoughts.





With fundamental trading semi-paralyzed ahead of Thursday’s Trump-Xi meeting, it’s only prices that matter for the moment.


  • The summit between the Chinese and U.S. leaders could have profound implications, but it’s nearly impossible to have any bias going in to the meeting. There’s genuine potential for both positive and negative surprises.

  • As a result, markets are in a holding pattern as we wait to see whether risk-aversion is really ready to step it up a notch. Key levels across assets have not yet broken, with the 2.3% line in 10-year Treasury yields being the most critical.

  • The context is a global economy that’s strengthening. Excess liquidity remains in the system meaning that yield and returns will continue to be chased overall. The flip side is that there are flickers of risk-aversion in markets that are not used to volatility.

  • That environment leads to an adamantly divided market. On one side are those who cite growth and liquidity as a reason to always buy the dip. On the other, those who fear calamity, citing the idea that low volatility has induced excess leverage to chase returns and a misallocation of capital.

  • I have sympathy with both views and while trading each individual asset requires conviction, sensible risk management of a portfolio requires a more balanced perspective. I believe markets are vulnerable to a larger correction this month, but the structural macro story leads me to be bullish longer-term, so I don’t expect a sustained bear market.

  • Thursday’s high-profile meeting may not provide any concrete outcomes, but it’s likely to at least provide sufficient excuses for markets to act, even if it is on a pre-ordained path.


Unsatisfied by Cudmore"s take? Here are some more analyst opinions on what to expect tomorrow.


Citigroup Global Markets Asia (Ken Peng, investment strategist)


  • “It’s more a bargaining game rather than one where punishments are doled out”

  • Markets feel “comfortable” as there isn’t universal support in the Republican Party for a protectionist trade policy. Failure of the president’s health-care bill is also a factor

  • Still, hard to predict how talks will pan out

Oanda Asia Pacific (Jeffrey Halley, senior market analyst)


  • China will strive for market stability during the talks

  • “The chances of the onshore- and offshore-traded yuan being allowed to trade materially weaker while Mr Xi is visiting the U.S. will be almost zero”

Guotai Junan Fund Management (Guo Rui, vice president)


  • Don’t anticipate any news that will move markets

  • “The meeting will be more likely about two leaders tentatively figuring out each others’ card hands. Trump tends to be hawkish on words, but the meeting itself signals there is common ground for cooperation”

ING (Jingyi Pan, markets strategist)


  • “The market’s imagination appears to be running wild with the possibilities of the outcome from this meeting”

  • That will likely make many stay on sidelines ahead of the meeting. “A pickup in volatility post event could nevertheless lure traders out”

  • Trump’s past colorfulness when it comes to China’s perceived transgressions means talks could go a number of ways

ANZ (Khoon Goh, head of Asia research)


  • Still a risk U.S. could take a strong line on China in the Treasury’s semi-annual currency report

  • “Hopefully the Xi-Trump meeting will ease some of the tension”

  • Lack of concern in markets shows traders don’t expect rhetoric over China being a currency manipulator to be followed through

Mizuho Bank (Ken Cheung, Asia currency strategist)


  • Don’t expect any kind of deal out of the talks

  • Don’t think China will be slapped with manipulator tag

  • “We’re not looking for breaking news that would change the yuan’s outlook at the summit. The meeting will be smooth as Trump has softened his stance against China”

Sunday, March 26, 2017

Buckle Up, the Bank of Japan Has Blown Up the Markets (Again)

If you have been long US stocks since Election night, you have been a Yen bear and nothing else.


Last September the Bank of Japan announced a new policy of targeting a 0% yield on its 10-Year Japanese Government Bonds. Many in the investment community took this to represent a “tightening” of policy.


It was no such thing.


Targeting a 0% rate on 10-Year JGBs opens the door to unlimited currency devaluation as the Bank of Japan prints Yen to buy JGBs.


Note the collapse of the Yen that followed this announcement.



This policy was implemented strictly to devalue the Yen which had been appreciating rapidly due to the BoJ’s policy mistake of implementing NIRP earlier in 2016 (NIRP is highly deflationary as both the BoJ and ECB have discovered).


Since this time, the Yen has been the single largest driving force for the markets, as Gold and Bonds sold off and the $USD and US stocks rallied based on the BoJ’s interventions.


Yen Down=Bonds and Gold down.



Yen down= US stocks up.



If you were trading in any of these assets since September 2016, you were effectively trading the Yen and nothing else.


But this period has ended.


The $USD/Yen pair has taken out critical support. The Yen carry trade has begun to blow up. Yes we will have bounces here and there (like the one late last week) but this trend is OVER.



And stocks are about to play “catch up.”



On that note, we are already preparing our clients for a sharp correction. Market "rigs" such as this never end well.


We just pu


In it, our  Stock Market Crash Survival Guide we detail how the coming drop will unfold…which investments will perform best… and how to take out "market insurance" trades that will pay out substantial returns when the inevitable hits.


We are giving away just 99 copies of this report for FREE to the public.


We"re down the last 5.


To pick up yours, swing by:


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Best Regards


Graham Summers


Chief Market Strategist


Phoenix Capital Research

Friday, March 24, 2017

SNB Spent $68 Billion On Currency Manipulation In 2016

While Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his displeasure with China for manipulating its currency, he appears to have recently figured out that over the past 2 years Beijing has been spending hundreds of billions in dollar to strengthen, not weaken, the Yuan and to halt the ~$1 trillion in capital flight from China. But while everyone knows that the biggest currency manipulation in the world, and perhaps the Milky Way galaxy is Japan, which now owns 40% of all JGBs in its ongoing attempt to pressure the Yen lower and explains why Abe was trembling when he met with Trump, terrified the US president would tell him to stop, one place where Trump may want to look is Europe"s famously "neutral" country, which however continues to be quite bellicose when it comes to currency warfare. Overnight, the SNB announced that in 2016 it spent 67.1 billion Swiss francs, or $67.6 billion, to purchase foreign currencies in an effort to weaken its currency.


The amount, published in the central bank’s annual report on Thursday, was roughly CHF20 billion lower than the 2015 total of 86.1 billion francs and a record of 188 billion spent in 2012. What is notable is that in 2015, the Swiss National Bank ended its 1.20 EURCHF peg, which ended up costing the SNB tens of billions in FX losses.


As shown in the chart below, the SNB has used interventions for the better part of a decade to keep the franc, Europe"s preeminent flight to safety currency, in check and lessen the risk of deflation. After it gave up its currency cap in early 2015, the SNB has also relied on a negative deposit rate to counter appreciation pressure. It reaffirmed that two-pillar policy stance last week.



Additionally, as part of its annual report, the SNB reported that at the end of 2016, the SNB’s assets hit a record CHF 747 billion, compared to CHF 641 billion the previous year, higher than the country"s total GDP. The central bank"s assets consisted almost exclusively of currency reserves, that is gold and foreign currency investments. Currency reserves were up by CHF 89 billion year-on-year to CHF 692 billion, principally due to inflows from foreign currency purchases and valuation gains.


And since the SNB is the only central banks which admits it is an aggressive hedge fund, it also reports both the composition of its balance sheet and the return on assets, and in 2016 it generated a profit on currency reserves of 3.8%. Meanwhile, returns on gold and foreign exchange reserves were 11.1% and 3.3% respectively.



What is paradoxical is that despite gold generating the SNB"s highest return not only in 2016 (11.1%) and over the entire 2002-2016 period, at 6.5%, the central bank has been aggressively reducing the relative size of its gold-denominated assets over the past 7 years, mostly as a result of purchases of USD-denominated stocks and bonds.



In 2016, both fixed income investments and equities contributed to the SNB"s bottom line. On the other hand, the slight appreciation of the Swiss franc reduced the return.


The SNB also revealed that in 2016, the SNB held 20% of its foreign exchange reserves in the form of equity investments. Measured in Swiss francs, the average annual return on equities since their introduction in 2005 has been 2.8%; the return on bonds has averaged 0.7%.



Finally, for those confused that the SNB is so open about its purchases and holdings of mostly US stocks, this is how the central bank justifies its policy of active stock management:





The contribution of equities to preserving the value of the currency reserves and building the SNB’s equity base has thus been very substantial during this period.



We look forward to how this boilerplate language will change after the next equity market crash which will wipe out tens of billions in "value" from the SNB"s balance sheet.

Sunday, February 26, 2017

Back From Never Gone: CURRENCY WARS

US Dollar Chinese Yuan


In the previous episode of the currency wars, a few years ago, the Euro-Dollar exchange rate was in the spotlight. This has now completely disappeared to the background and whilst the countries of the Eurozone must be pretty happy with the weak currency (which boosts the export and increases the demand for domestically produced goods), the United States are less than happy as it weakens the position of the country on the export market.


China 4


Source: Tradingeconomics


You might have missed it when the mass media were falling over themselves to crucify president Trump, but we had the impression currency wars, and protecting the position of the United States on the world market were pretty high on his ‘to do list’ after decades of huge trade deficits. As you can see on the next image, there clearly is a huge discrepancy in the trade numbers between China and the United States. A substantial trade deficit, which has been nipped in the bud by China using their hard dollars to purchase US Treasuries.


China 2


Source: Danske Bank


Whereas the president was definitely pointing fingers at China during his election campaign, he seems to have been softer after a recent call with the Chinese president.


Does this mean the USA and China are now best buddies again? Probably not. It’s far more likely the president has realized he won’t be able to get much done when he gets in a direct confrontation with China. His staff has now launched a ‘test balloon’ and widened the scope of the currency manipulation investigation. Instead of singling out China, the White House will now be using a more general approach, and has even singled out Germany.


China 1


Source: Danske Bank


In order to be able to ‘sell’ this idea to concerned countries and entities, the Trump administration might present its own ‘alternative facts’, according to the Wall Street Journal. Even though the trade deficit between the United States and China is very clear in the previous image, it’s entirely possible the White House will introduce a new standard to calculate the trade deficit, to increase the deficit numbers.


According to a paper published by the Trump camp during the election campaign, China was really the main focus of the Economic plan. According to the paper; ‘In a world of freely floating currencies, the US dollar would weaken and the Chinese yuan would strengthen because the US runs a large trade deficit with China and the rest of the world. American exports to China would then rise, Chinese imports to America would fall, and trade should come back towards balance’.


China 3


Source: The Trump Economic Plan


That’s an absolutely accurate description, and even in the white paper, the Trump camp looked to things on a larger scale instead of focusing on China. Even the European Monetary Union and specifically Germany were singled out as examples of ‘currency manipulators’.


So don’t be surprised if the White House suddenly announces a plan to use a new method to calculate the trade deficits, in order to make the deficits appear to be larger than they really are. And this could absolutely re-shape the world and increase the impact from currency exchange rates. This doesn’t mean things will definitely change for the worse, but it’s always a very thin line when you’re dealing with powerful trading partners.


It will be difficult to create a win-win situation, but let’s hope it doesn’t turn into a lose-lose situation, as that could cripple the worldwide economy again.


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Thursday, February 23, 2017

Mnuchin Praises Strong Dollar, Adds To Currency Confusion

Following today"s more dovish than most expected minutes, the dollar tumbled and its main carry counterpart, the yen spiked. However, shortly after 4pm, the USDJPY resumed its levitation, a time when the traditional trust bank intervention on behalf of the BOJ was not yet in play. The reason for the updraft in the dollar was the publication of an interview in the WSJ with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, his first since being sworn in as Treasury Secretary last week, in which he appeared to advocate a "strong dollar", and said the strong U.S. currency "is a reflection of confidence in the U.S. economy", adding that its performance compared with the rest of the world and was a “good thing” in the long run.



“I think the strength of the dollar has a lot to do with kind of where our economy is relative to the rest of the world, and that the dollar continues to be the leading currency in the world, the leading reserve currency, and a reflection of the confidence that kind of people have in the U.S. economy,” Mr. Mnuchin said.


Mnuchin"s remarks are notable because like in his confirmation hearing in January, he contradicts many other White House officials, including not only Trump"s key trade advisor Peter Navarro, but President Donald Trump himself, both of whom have suggested in the past that they favored a weaker currency to support the U.S. trade position.


The dollar has appreciated by 23% over the past three years and added to those gains since Mr. Trump’s November election; recent US export weakness and numerous disappointing corporate earnings results have been blamed on the stronger dollar. A stronger dollar goes against the very basis of Trump"s desire to make the US into an export powerhouse.


“For longer-term purposes, an appreciation of the dollar is a good thing, and I would expect longer-term, as you’ve seen over periods of time, the dollar does appreciate,” Mr. Mnuchin added.


It was the short term, however, that was far more interesting to FX traders whose P&L is updated on a daily, not decade basis


“In the short term, there are certain aspects [of a strong currency] that are positive about the dollar for our economy and there are certain aspects that are not as positive,” Mr. Mnuchin said. “A lot of the appreciation of the dollar since the election in particular is a sign of confidence in the Trump administration and the economic outlook for the next four years.”


It is unclear if that statement was a veiled pitch to begin selling the dollar.


As reported yesterday, perhaps it was the "short term" that Mnuchin was discussing when he held his first phone call with Christine Lagarde, and told the IMF"s managing director that he expects the IMF to provide "frank and candid" analysis of exchange rate policies.


As the WSj adds, the Treasury Department traditionally has been the leading voice from the U.S. on foreign exchange policy and notes that "the past several administrations have for the most part signaled support for a strong currency, even though at times an appreciation of the currency has hurt exports." Of course that ignores the fact that it was the historic debasement of the dollar with the Fed"s various QE programs that provided the US with an extensive trade advantage for years against its main trading peers, who only joined the currency devaluation race far later.


Mnuchin deferred when asked about China’s currency and said he looked forward to “healthy bilateral relations” with the world’s second largest economy.


“There’s trade issues that will make sense to look at, and I think there’s investment issues that will make sense to look at,” he said. “There are many things that we will need to collaborate on.” Previously Trump said he would label China a currency manipulator on his first day as president, although he may have since changed his mind upon learning that for the past two years China was intervening to strengthen, not weaken, its currency in order to mitigate and prevent China"s historical capital outflows, which have so far resulted in over $1 trillion in capital flight.

Friday, February 17, 2017

Trump's Currency War Hit List - Is Canada a Target?

A lot has been said about the potential for a US-Canada trade war. And judging from a lot of what’s happened, especially with respect to a strengthen USD, it looks like currencies may be what could light the spark to the barrel of gunpowder.


THE BACKDROP


The fact of the matter is that a strong dollar isn’t necessarily good for all sectors of the U.S economy. A strengthening dollar can have a “deleterious feedback loop” for export-oriented companies, since it means their products are now more expensive for foreign customers to buy. The net effect is that US-based manufacturers could suffer tremendously – including in terms of having to cut jobs and downsize their operations.


Another sour pill to swallow for Team Trump, if the USD continues to rise against major currencies, is the fact that foreign corporations, such as German pharmaceutical giant Bayer or Euro aerospace behemoth Airbus that do significant business in the U.S, profit more than U.S corporations selling overseas.   


And that’s exactly contrary to the platform of ‘Buy America”, job creation and boosting exports that Mr. Trump ran on during his campaign. So when a country’s currency weakens, in relation to the USD (i.e. the Greenback grows comparatively stronger), the war hawks in the Trump administration sit up and take notice!


WAR CLOUDS GATHER


Since November 2016, the PowerShares DB US Dollar Index (UUP), which tracks the USD against a basket of world currencies, has been on a steady increase, from $25.59 (Nov 11, 2016) to a high of $26.70 (Dec 20th, 2016). Granted that some of those gains have been paired back by Mr. Trumps jawboning statements ($25.89 at the time of writing); but it still represents a nearly 4.8% rise over a 6-month period ($24.71 on Aug 15, 2016).


Back on the campaign trail, Mr. Trump had already started beating the war drums. However, his war cries were largely directed towards China, and to his neighbour to the South – Mexico. But the battle cries keep getting louder. More recently, Trump senior trade advisors have levied similar accusations against Germany, and have also been severely critical about the Japanese currency “malpractices”. 


CANADA IN TRUMP’s CROSSHAIRS?


Things could get messy for Canada’s economy, if the same rhetoric is applied to the US dollar’s performance versus the Canadian dollar. Back in November, the USD traded at $1.34 per CAD, with “Trump Talk” pushing it up in strength to $1.36 (Dec 27, 2016). At the time of writing, the Greenback has lost some steam, trading at $1.31 per CAD – roughly just about where it traded 6 months ago.


So what will a stronger USD mean for the Canadian economy, if the Trump Administration decides to label Canada a “Currency manipulator”? What could a currency war with the US mean for Canada?


Well, the US is Canada’s largest trading partner, and any strengthening of the Greenback against the Loonie is positive for Canadian exporters, but negative for the US – since it tilts the balance of trade. Mr. Trump may therefore do all he can to ensure the dollar does not gain too much strength versus the CAD. One way to retaliate might be to target specific Canadian industries, like Energy, Forestry and Auto. 


In terms of specific impacts to Canadian economy, New Brunswick, Alberta and Ontario will be the worst three provinces to be hit by any currency war fallout; that’s according to TD Economics analysis. These three provinces have exports that are significantly exposed to the US, and any retaliatory measures by the US, such as a border tax, will have deleterious effect on provincial economies.


With respect to specific industries that could become casualties of any currency-initiated trade war between the two neighbours, based on TD Economics figures (Share of total goods exported to the US), it is likely that Auto Parts, Regulatory Consultants, Consumer goods and Forestry products will be the hardest hit.


SILVER LINING?


Searching for a sliver of sunlight peeking out of the dark currency war clouds, Trump advisors have assured Canada that, should trade and currency be up for discussions and renegotiations, then Canada may have nothing to be worried about from the new administration. However, as has been the hallmark of the new occupant at the Whitehouse, what’s said (or promised) and what’s actually delivered might be two entirely different things.


Brace for it…the USD-CAD currency wars might just be about to begin!

Saturday, February 11, 2017

Is Trump the largest FX Trader in the world?

Trump met with Shinzo Abe friday, the famous inflationist Prime Minister of Japan.  The issue in question is if Trump will label Japan a "currency manipulator" - whatever that means.  It seems to be the equivalent of "Currency Headwinds" in publicly traded companies.  Because, every currency is manipulated!  The only currency in use today that"s not manipulated, is Bitcoin and the Bitcoin alternatives (Author"s note: Bitcoin is actually really useful, try it here).  From Bloomberg:





President Donald Trump vowed Friday that the currencies of the U.S., China and Japan would soon be on "a level playing field," a day after a phone call with China’s president, Xi Jinping.


The two leaders, Trump said in a news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, "discussed a lot of subjects. It was a long talk.  "As far as the currency devaluations, I have been complaining about that for a very long time," he said.


Trump promised as a presidential candidate that he would have the Treasury Department declare China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. Three weeks into his presidency, that has yet to happen. Last week, he accused Japan of manipulating the yen, a charge Abe and other Japanese government officials have denied.  Trump did not explain how the three countries would reach a level playing field, or what he meant by the phrase.



What is "a level playing field" ?  Sounds good, but what does it mean - if anything?  In FX, it means nothing (because, what is "level" ?  It"s all relative.  A cheap currency is a trade advantage, but these distinctions need to be made clear for traders.


The Yen was up a little on the day, but movement was really sideways - the market was looking for a "big" statement.  They were watching.  In fact, no one in FX has ever watched a President like Trump.  He has accused many countries of being currency manipulators and the market waits for an action (such as an EO) or a statement.  Trump could be the biggest FX market mover of our generation.  


When FX markets were "manipulated" (this was a misleading description of the case, what they did was manipulate the price FOR THEIR CUSTOMERS - it"s impossible to manipulate the FX market it"s too big) many said that it was impossible to manipulate FX markets, and this is generally true.  However, central bankers like Mario Draghi can make a statement and the EUR/USD can move by 200 pips in a tick.   Trump may have a larger effect on FX, although we haven"t seen something like a 200 pip spike on an announcement.  We have seen it in the stock market, when Trump tweets stocks move.  During the elections and a little post election we"ve seen it in USD/MXN - the Mexican Peso.


A Citi strategist said all this talk is "hot air":





Hogwash. Hot air.


That’s what Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citigroup Inc., makes of the Trump administration’s comments on exchange rates. The world’s largest foreign-exchange trading firm sees the dollar rising this year even as the president talks the greenback down and blasts some of the nation’s biggest trading partners for currency manipulation.


“This is all basically hogwash,” Buiter said in an interview on Bloomberg Television, referring to Trump’s criticism of China and Japan on their exchange rates. “All this currency-manipulator talk is, I think, basically hot air.”



Wow - thank you Willem for clearing that up, now it is clear for investors.. it"s just "hot air" - now we can make better decisions about FX.


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Citigroup's Gold "Expert" Slams Trump's Currency Talk As "Hogwash, Hot Air"

As President Trump and Japan"s Shinzo Abe begin their weekend of golf, the topic of currency manipulation will likely be top of mind. However, for Citigroup"s "gold expert" Willem Buiter, all of Trump"s FX chatter is "hogwash" and "hot air."



Speaking during a Bloomberg TV interview, Citi"s Chief Economist sees the dollar rising this year even as the president talks the greenback down and blasts some of the nation’s biggest trading partners for currency manipulation.





“This is all basically hogwash,” Buiter said in an interview on Bloomberg Television, referring to Trump’s criticism of China and Japan on their exchange rates. “All this currency-manipulator talk is, I think, basically hot air.”



In recent weeks, Trump and administration officials have complained that the dollar is too strong, while accusing major trading partners -- China, Japan and Germany -- of weakening their currencies to gain trading advantages. That’s muddied the outlook for the greenback, which fell the past six weeks and has given back more than half of its gains since the developer and reality-TV star’s November election victory.



"No matter how hard the Trump administration rattles the cage in an attempt to talk the dollar down, if the markets anticipate significant future stimulus in the U.S. and further tightening by the Fed, then whatever short-term wobbles there may be in the U.S. dollar, the dollar will only go one way relative to most other currencies," Buiter said. “And that’s up.”



Buiter further believes that The Fed is likely to hike only two times this year...



Trump “probably would do well to look at basic economics of exchange rates,” Buiter said.


“You cannot have anticipated fiscal expansion and anticipated monetary tightening while the rest of the world, by and large, is in a monetary loosening mode still and expect your currency to weaken."

Sunday, February 5, 2017

Schauble Agrees With Trump That Euro Is "Too Low" For Germany, Blames Mario Draghi

In surprising comments that may rekindle a verbal currency war between president Trump and Europe, German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble told German newspaper Tagesspiegel that in his opinion the Euro is "too low" for Germany, echoing criticism from Trump"s trade advisor Peter Navarro, who last week told the FT that Germany was exploiting its US and EU partners by using a “grossly undervalued” euro to create a vast trade surplus. The comment placed Germany, alongside China and Japan, in a category of countries that the Trump administration has accused of currency manipulation for competitive advantage.


As the FT reports on Sunday morning, Schauble acknowledged that the ECB had to set monetary policy for the eurozone as a whole, but said: “It is too loose for Germany.” A recent chart from Morgan Stanley confirms that on a PPP basis, the EUR is over 40% undervalued for exporting and current surplus powerhouse Germany on a standalone basis, however for many of Europe"s peripheral countries it still remains expensive.



What was more curious about Schauble statement is that the German finance minister blamed the European Central Bank for the low exchange rate.


“The euro exchange rate is, strictly speaking, too low for the German economy’s competitive position,” he told Tagesspiegel. “When ECB chief Mario Draghi embarked on the expansive monetary policy, I told him he would drive up Germany’s export surplus . . . I promised then not to publicly criticise this [policy] course. But then I don’t want to be criticised for the consequences of this policy.”


However, as events last week showed, an otherwise hawkish Germany being criticized for ECB"s monetary policy is preicsely what happened.


Schäuble pointed out that Germany was not able to set exchange rate policy and pinned responsibility for the euro’s weakness against the dollar on the ECB. The German finance ministry was “not an ardent fan” of the ECB’s policy of quantitative easing that had helped to weaken the single currency.


In other words, if Trump wants to blame anyone for the weak Euro - according to the German - he should direct his anger at Mario Draghi.


As the FT notes, Germany"s Ifo Institute recorded a trade surplus of nearly $300bn last year, outpacing China by more than $50bn to hold the world’s largest trade surplus. Critics not only in Washington, but also Brussels have called for Germany to reframe its fiscal policy and stimulate domestic demand to increase imports. So far, however, any European criticism of Germany has been mostly lip service, which is why the arrival of Trump as a vocal critic of German trade policy has sparked renewed concern in Germany.


Additionally, in the interview Schäuble questioned why a US president would want to divide Europe given that the continent “is closer to them than anybody else in the world”. He added he did not believe that Mr Trump was seriously trying to split up Europe, but he was “testing” a lot.


Despite implicitly agreeing with Trump that the ECB is at fault for keeping the Euro too low, Schauble scorned U.S. accusations that Europe’s biggest economy is using an undervalued currency as a tool to gain unfair trade advantages, saying aides to President Donald Trump apparently don’t understand that the euro’s exchange rate isn’t set by the government.


“In America, the savvy advisers to the new president are now concerned with the question of why the German economy is to a certain extent competitive and performing well,” Schaeuble said on Friday in Saarbruecken, cited by Bloomberg. “They have not entirely understood, or at least not everyone, that the German federal government isn’t responsible for monetary policy in Europe, but someone else.”


As per his latest clarification on Sunday, that "responsible someone" is Mario Draghi.


Schauble added that “the problem is that we have a structure in the monetary union, a common currency without a common finance and economic policy, and that member states - the ECB isn’t tiring of saying that - aren’t doing what they committed to,” Schaeuble said. “One of the big problems of monetary policy” is how to begin an exit from the “unusual” stance without “risking bigger economic upheavals in other European countries,” Schaeuble said.


Schäuble’s Sunday comments on monetary policy comprise his latest attack on the ECB’s easy money policies. Last year, the hawkish finance minister blamed Draghi for “50 per cent” of the success of the populist rightwing Alternative for Germany party. Schäuble and others on the conservative wing of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ruling CDU/CSU bloc are concerned that as well as profiting from the refugee crisis, the Eurosceptic AfD, which wants an end to the common currency bloc in its present form, is winning support from voters worried about the euro’s stability and the low interest on their savings.


Draghi, meanwhile, was on Friday hailing efforts at European unification, defending the common currency and applauding some of Germany’s labour reform policies in a speech given in Ljubljana, Slovenia.


“There are some today who believe that Europe would be better off if we did not have the single currency and could devalue our exchange rates instead,” Mr Draghi said. “But, as we have seen, countries that have implemented reforms do not depend on a flexible exchange rate to achieve sustainable growth. And for those that have not reformed, one has to ask how beneficial a flexible exchange rate would really be. After all, if a country has low productivity growth because of deep-rooted structural problems, the exchange rate cannot be the answer.”


While it remains to be seen if Trump will pivot his attacks away from Germany and to the rightful source of Europe"s weak currency, the European Central Bank which continues to monetize a record amount of debt instruments, now owns over 10% of Europe"s entire stock of corporate debt, and whose balance sheet has ballooned to over 36% of the Eurozone"s GDP...


 



... it would certainly make for a welcome change for Trump to launch an occasional twitter attack at the ECB, instead of focusing all his social media energy on the US Judicial System, although with his cabinet being comprised of numerous former coworkers of Mario Draghi, who would rather keep the ECB"s role in facilitating Germany"s surplus under wraps, it does not appear too likely.