Showing posts with label Euro. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Euro. Show all posts

Monday, April 23, 2018

Iran Dumps The US Dollar: ‘The Dollar Has No Place In Our Transactions Today’


The nation of Iran has dumped the United States dollar in favor of the European euro amid tensions with Washington.  Tehran’s supreme leader has proclaimed that the “dollar has no place in our transactions today.”


According to RT, The governor of Iran’s central bank (CBI) Valiollah Seif said that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had welcomed his suggestion of replacing the dollar with the euro in foreign trade, as the “dollar has no place in our transactions today.” The new policy could reportedly encourage government bodies and firms linked to the state to increase their use of the euro at the expense of the American currency.


The dollar’s downward spiral continues as financial analyst Peter Schiff predicted in 2008 and has been warning of ever since.  Schiff pulled no punches when saying that the long-term trend for the dollar is essentially a slow death.


They’re going to print money until they revive the economy. You can’t revive the economy by printing money. They’re going to suffocate it to death. It’s going to die by hyperinflation. –Peter Schiff


France will start offering euro-denominated credits to Iranian buyers of its goods later this year to keep its trade out of the reach of US sanctions, said the head of state-owned French investment bank Bpifrance. According to CBI’s Director of Foreign Exchange Rules and Policies Affairs Mehdi Kasraeipour, the share of the greenback in Iran’s trade activities is not high. As part of a trade embargo, US banks are banned from dealing with Iran.


Last month, Tehran announced that purchase orders by merchants that are based on US currency would no longer be allowed to go through import procedures. The step followed an official request by the CBI and was specifically meant to address fluctuations in market rates of the US dollar. –RT


Iran is also seeking to develop cryptocurrencies to beat the United States at their own sanctioning game.




Tehran, which has long sought to switch to a non-dollar-based trade, had already signed agreements with several countries. It is also currently in talks with Russia on using national currencies in settlements.


While meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in November, Khamenei said the best way to beat any US sanctions against the two countries was joint efforts to dump the American currency in bilateral trade. He told President Putin that, by using methods such as eliminating the US dollar and replacing it with national currencies in transactions between two or more parties, the sides could “isolate the Americans.”


But Peter Schiff says that it’s the Federal Reserve that will crash the dollar.  Iran’s decision to no longer use the dollar will only add a small scratch to the gaping wound that’s the problem. Schiff holds firm that the consequence of the Federal Reserve manipulating the economy will be the crash of the dollar.


They [the Fed] actually made the bubbles bigger than the ones that popped. So now, the dollar’s collapse is going to be that much bigger, because it’s now a bigger bubble with more air to come out of it. And I think they have no more tricks up their sleeves. When this happens – it’s over. –Peter Schiff

Sunday, December 24, 2017

US Tax Cut and Rate Hikes Threaten China Currency

Authored by Valentin Schmid via The Epoch Times,


Seven was the line in the sand.


But the Chinese yuan never crossed that line vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. It only crept up to 6.96 yuan per dollar on Dec. 16, 2016, before starting an impressive comeback, down to 6.5 in the middle of this year.


Last year was a bad one for the Chinese economy. Growth was slow, and the world was worried China would finally land the hard way, as many have been predicting for years.


And more than GDP growth or any other metric, the Chinese currency was the barometer of whether China could keep things stable - stability is the mantra of the ruling communist regime - or suffer a crisis of debt deflation.


If it declined in value, it meant citizens and companies were moving money out of the country in droves because they didn’t believe in the Chinese dream anymore.


So another measure of how bad things had gotten in the second-largest economy of the world was capital outflows.


According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a record $725 billion left China in 2016, putting pressure on the currency and the Chinese interbank market.




All these factors have changed in favor of the dollar in the last quarter, and it’s going to be hard for China to compete.



Trying to stem the tide, the central bank sold record amounts of foreign currency. Chinese foreign exchange reserves, $4 trillion at the peak in 2014, went down to $3 trillion, and analysts started to question whether this was enough to finance the world’s largest trading economy.


Then, miraculously in time for the 2017 National Congress of the Communist Party, all of this stopped. The yuan never went above 7, the exchange reserves never went below 3, and capital outflows subsided thanks to draconian regulations making it harder for individuals and companies to move money out of the country.



Weak Dollar


But something else helped China to strengthen its currency to reduce capital outflows and to balance foreign exchange reserves: a weak dollar.


The dollar didn’t only decline against the yuan. It declined against virtually all of its major trading partners in 2017, dropping 12 percent from its Jan. 2 peak to its Sept. 4 trough.


A weak dollar takes pressure off the yuan and makes it less desirable for Chinese to invest in U.S. assets if they stand to lose money on the currency. A weak dollar makes Chinese foreign currency holdings in other currencies worth more.


But the weak dollar is bound to reverse in 2018, and for China, this means going back to the uncertainty of 2016.


Currencies move for a myriad of reasons, but this year’s drop in the dollar had three major pillars.


The first one was political. After the dollar spiked 8 percent in the wake of the election of President Donald Trump last November, it dropped when it became clear Trump could not quickly push through his “America first” agenda, which included tax cuts and getting tough on trade with China and Mexico.


 


The second pillar was the interest policy of the Federal Reserve. The Fed always lagged behind its announced rate hiking schedule for 2016 and 2017, thereby disappointing market expectations of higher interest rates and a higher yield for the U.S. dollar.


 


The third pillar was the economy. Relative to expectations, the United States underperformed against the emerging markets, including China and even Europe and Japan in the first half of the year.



Strong Dollar


All of these factors have changed in favor of the dollar in the last quarter, and it’s going to be hard for China to compete.


Trump managed to deliver on key campaign promises in the last inning of 2017. The tax bill is a boon for national and international corporations, making it more competitive to invest in the United States again. It also incentivizes companies to bring back trillions in offshore money. Although this money likely won’t come from China, it will boost the dollar and indirectly punish the yuan.


China, on the other hand, has become ever less competitive both regarding taxes (the corporate rate is 45 percent) as well as cheaper wages. Its main advantage nowadays is scale. So according to a report by The Wall Street Journal, China is already preparing a contingency plan to counter the Trump reforms by raising interest rates, tightening capital controls, and micromanaging the currency by intervening in the foreign exchange markets.




President Trump managed to deliver on key campaign promises in the last inning of 2017. The tax bill is a boon for national and international corporations, making it more competitive to invest in the United States again



Lower taxes for companies and individuals in the United States should also boost an already much-improved economy and therefore make U.S. assets like stocks and real estate more attractive for foreign buyers again.


But the United States is also threatening China on trade, whose $309 billion good trade surplus in 2017 provides powerful support for the yuan.


In late November, the United States filed a legal submission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a third party in a case China had brought against the European Union (EU) in late November. China is unhappy that, despite some WTO provisions, the EU has not granted it “market economy” status 15 years after joining. The United States rejects China’s arguments and sides with the EU.


On Dec. 18, Trump accused China of challenging American power and stealing intellectual property as he unveiled his national security strategy.


“The United States will no longer tolerate economic aggression or unfair trading practices,” his letter states, without mentioning China by name.



If the administration follows through with its tough talk and uses the investigation into Chinese intellectual property theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose sanctions on China, a smaller trade surplus will hurt Chinese exports and the currency at the same time. Although a trade war will be costly for both sides, China has more to lose here.


Independent of politics, the Fed is also starting to deliver on its interest rate hikes, making the dollar more attractive in international markets. It raised its benchmark policy rate 0.25 percent to 1.50 percent at its December meeting on Dec. 13.


The Chinese promptly followed suit, with the People’s Bank of China raising its benchmark rate by 0.05 percent to 3.25 percent. But research firm Capital Economics believes this won’t be a game changer and that financial conditions in China are still relatively loose.


“Despite this, we aren’t convinced by the narrative of policy tightening. A five basis point move in rates is too small to have a meaningful impact,” it writes in a note to clients.



However, if China doesn’t deliver on its reform schedule sooner than anticipated, it’s going to be 2016 all over again.









Monday, November 27, 2017

Which Europeans Carry The Most Cash?

How much cash do you have in your wallet right now?


Historically, it has been found that the amount of cash people carry is a key indicator of their use of cash. According to research from the European Central Bank, people in the eurozone carried an average of €65 in their wallets in 2016.


Infographic: Which Europeans Carry The Most Cash? | Statista


You will find more statistics at Statista


As Statista"s Niall McCarthy notes, on a country by country basis, Germans tended to carry the most cash on average, €103.


People in Luxembourg had an average of €102 in their wallets while Austrians had €89.


People in France and Portugal had the least on average with €32 and €29 respectively.









Thursday, November 16, 2017

Goldman Reveals Its Top Trade Recommendations For 2018

It"s that time of the year again when with just a few weeks left in the year, Goldman unveils its top trade recommendations for the year ahead. And while Goldman"s Top trades for 2016 was an abysmal disaster, with the bank getting stopped out with a loss on virtually all trade recos within weeks after the infamous China crash in early 2016, its 2017 "top trade" recos did far better. Which brings us to Thursday morning, when Goldman just unveiled the first seven of its recommended Top Trades for 2018 which "represent some of the highest conviction market expressions of our economic outlook."


Without further ado, here are the initial 7 trades (on which Goldman :


  • Top Trade #1: Position for more Fed hikes and a rebuild of term premium by shorting 10-year US Treasuries.

  • Top Trade #2: Go long EUR/JPY for continued rotation around a flat Dollar.

  • Top Trade #3: Go long the EM growth cycle via the MSCI EM stock market index.

  • Top Trade #4: Go long inflation risk premium in the Euro area via EUR 5-year 5-year forward inflation.

  • Top Trade #5: Position for ‘early vs. late’ cycle in EM vs the US by going long the EMBI Global Index against short the US High Yield iBoxx Index.

  • Top Trade #6: Own diversifed Asian growth, and the hedge interest rate risk via FX relative value (Long INR, IDR, KRW vs. short SGD and JPY).

  • Top Trade #7: Go long the global growth and non-oil commodity beta through long BRL, CLP, PEN vs. short USD.

As Goldman"s Francesco Garzarelli writes, "these trades represent some of the highest conviction market expressions of the economic outlook we laid out in the latest Global Economics Analyst, as well as in our Top 10 Market Themes for 2018. Some of the key market themes reflected in our trade recommendations include:


  • Strong and synchronous global expansion. We forecast global n GDP growth of around 4% in both 2017 and 2018, suggesting that next year’s global economy will likely surprise on the upside of consensus expectations.

  • Relatively low recession risk. Given the low inflation and well-anchored inflation expectations across DM economies, we think central banks have little reason to risk ‘murdering’ this expansion with the kind of aggressive rate hikes that would have historically been warranted to fight the risk of inflation becoming entrenched.

  • But relatively high drawdown risk. Even if growth remains strong in the coming year, markets are still susceptible to temporary drawdowns, especially given the high level of valuations. We think the two most prominent risks to markets in 2018 are (1) pressures on US corporate margins from rising wages and 2) a swing in market psychology around the withdrawal of QE, which could lead to a faster re-pricing of interest rate markets than we assume.

  • More room to grow in EM.While most developed economies are currently growing well above potential, most emerging market economies still have room for growth to accelerate in 2018.

More from Goldman:








Our Top Trade recommendations reflect our Top Ten Market Themes for the year ahead. To capture the gradual normalization of the bond term premium and position for a more hawkish path of the Fed funds rate than the market currently expects, we recommend going short 10-year US Treasuries. Given our expectations of a ‘soggy Dollar’ in 2018, we think investors should position for a rotation into Euro area assets and continued Yield Curve Control from the BoJ by going long EUR/JPY. We expect EM growth to accelerate further in the coming year and suggest going long the EM growth cycle via the MSCI EM stock market index. At the same time, the EM credit cycle appears ‘younger and friendlier’ than the ageing US credit cycle, so we recommend going long the EMBI Global against US High-Yield credit. The combination of solid global growth and supportive domestic factors should help the Indonesian Rupiah, the Indian Rupee and Korean Won rally in 2018, while we expect the low-yielding Singaporean Dollar and Japanese Yen to underperform. Since the strong global demand environment should also help the commodity complex perform well but commodities as an investment carry poorly, we recommend going long BRL, CLP and PEN to gain diversified exposure to the commodities story.



And some more details on the individual trades:


Top Trade #1: Position for more Fed hikes and a rebuild of ‘term premium’ by shorting 10-year US Treasuries


Go short 10-year US Treasuries with a target of 3.0% and a stop at 2.0%.


We forecast that the yield on 10-year US Treasury Notes will head towards 3% next year, levels last seen before the decline in oil prices in 2014. By contrast, the market discounts that 10-year yields will be at 2.5% at the end of 2018, a meagre 20bp above spot levels. Our view builds on two main assumptions. First, QE and negative rate policies conducted by central banks in Europe and Japan have amplified the fall in  the term premium on bonds globally and have contributed to flatten the US yield curve this year – a central ingredient in our macro rates strategy for 2017. As a result of this, we think that US monetary conditions are too accommodative for the Fed’s comfort in light of the little spare capacity left in the jobs market. This will likely lead the FOMC to deliver policy rate hikes in excess of those discounted by the market (Exhibit 1). On our US Economists’ baseline projections, Dec 2018 Eurodollar futures, trading at an implied yield of 2.0%, will settle at 2.5%.


Second, we expect a normalization in the US bond term premium from the current exceptionally low levels over the coming quarters (Exhibit 2). This will reflect the compounding of two forces. One is an increase  in inflation uncertainty as the economic cycle continues to mature. The other reflects the interplay of the lower amount of Treasury bonds that the Fed will roll over (quantitative tightening, QT) and higher Treasury issuance. We expect these dynamics to come to the fore particularly in the second half of the year.



* * *


Top Trade #2: Go long EUR/JPY for continued rotation around a flat Dollar


Go long EUR/JPY with a target of 140 and a stop at 130.


Although most economies are sharing in the upturn in global activity, there remains scope for divergence in capital flows and therefore FX performance. Among the major developed markets, we think this is particularly true for the Euro and Yen. We expect both currencies to head back to one twenty—1.20 for EUR and 120 for JPY—over the coming months. We therefore recommend that investors go long the cross, with a target of 140 and stop of 130 (Exhibit 3).


We interpreted the run-up in the Euro in 2017 as a kind of ‘short-covering’ rally. Euro area growth picked up, national politics trended in a favourable direction, and the ECB began to turn its attention away from monetary easing and towards the eventual normalisation in policy by tapering bond purchases. Against this backdrop, many investors seem to have decided that Euro shorts were no longer appropriate—especially given estimates of long-run ‘fair value’ for EUR/USD of around 1.30. Direct measures of investor positioning bear this out. For instance, net speculative Euro length in futures swung from a short of $9bn at the start of the year to a long of $12bn as of last week. These portfolio shifts seem to have more room to run: bond funds remain long USD in aggregate, and FX reserve managers have not started to  cover their substantial EUR underweight. Continued inflows into Euro area assets should support the EUR currency, even as interest rates remain low.


The opposite holds true for the Japanese Yen. Because of the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control (YCC) policy, USD/JPY has remained highly correlated with yields on long-maturity US Treasuries (Exhibit 4). As a result of the recent general election—in which the LDP won another supermajority—a continuation of YCC appears very likely for the time being. Although the policy is beginning to bear fruit—in terms of improving price and wage trends—we suspect that Governor Kuroda (or his possible replacement) will judge these favourable signs as well short of what is needed to consider reversing course. Therefore, with global yields pushing higher on the back of solid growth, we think USD/JPY can again approach its cyclical highs.



* * *


Top Trade #3: Go long the EM growth cycle via the MSCI EM stock market index


Go long EM equities through the MSCI EM Index with a target at 1300 (+15%) and a stop at 1040 (-8%).


As we outline in our Top Themes for 2018, we expect strong and synchronous global growth to continue into 2018. We prefer to own growth exposure in emerging economies, which we think have more room to grow. When EM growth is above-trend and rising, equities typically outperform on a volatility-adjusted basis.


From an earnings perspective, we see much more scope for EM corporates to surprise to the upside, driving equity performance in 2018 (Exhibit 6). MSCI EM EPS have rebounded quite quickly from a six-year stagnation and, in local currency terms, EM earnings per share (EPS) has repaired the ‘damage’ of the 2010-2016 period. We expect MSCI EM EPS to rise another 10% in 2018, which should drive the bulk of the upside in this trade.


From a valuation perspective, EM equities are not cheap relative to their own history (they are currently trading in the 86th percentile of the historical P/E range), but they are cheap relative to US equities (38th percentile of historical relative P/E range), which should hopefully offer some cushion in a global risk-off event. We find that the relative valuation of EM to DM equity is largely influenced by the growth  differential between the two regions; and we forecast this differential to widen another 60bp next year, which in turn should drive EM valuations to expand relative to DM by around 3%. To be sure, a long-only EM equity trade carries significant ‘pullback risk’, especially given the current entry point. Accordingly, we have set a stop on the recommended trade at -8%, which provides enough buffer to accommodate for a shock similar to the EM equity sell-off around the US election. Although EM equities have had a good run in 2017, we do not view the asset class as over-owned. Indeed, the cumulative foreign flow into major EM equity markets is still tracking below historical averages.



* * *


Top Trade #4: Go long the inflation risk premium in the Euro area via EUR 5-year 5-year forward inflation swaps


Go long EUR 5-year 5-year forward inflation with a target of 2.0% and a stop at 1.5%.


We recommend going long Euro area 5-year inflation 5-years forward (henceforth 5y-5y) through EUR inflation swaps, for an target of 2.0% – levels last seen in mid-2014 ahead of the fall in crude oil prices. The rationale for the trade is the following.


First, the risk premium on Euro area forward inflation is currently depressed, offering an attractive entry point. A low inflation risk premium can be inferred from the flat term structure of inflation swap yields. The difference between 5-year inflation, which is priced roughly in line with the expectations of our European Economists (Exhibit 7), and 5y-5y forward is near the lowest levels observed since the 2011 crisis.


Second, the inflation options market assigns high odds to Euro area headline inflation staying at or below 1% over the next 5 years. Against this backdrop, the ECB has reiterated its determination to keep monetary policy accommodative in order to encourage a rebuild of inflationary pressures. With the expansion in activity and job creation likely to continue, we expect the inflation risk premium to increase.



* * *


Top Trade #5: Position for ‘early vs. late’ cycle in EM vs. the US by going long the EMBI Global Index against short the US High Yield iBoxx Index


Go long EM USD credit through the EMBI Global against US High-Yield credit through the iBoxx USD Liquid High Yield Index, with a 1.5x1 notional ratio, indexed at inception to 100, with a total return target at 106 and a stop at 96.


The EM credit cycle is ‘younger and friendlier’ relative to an ageing US corporate credit cycle. With the improvement in macro fundamentals across EM, namely better current account balances, dis-inflation and FX reserve accumulation, we do not see a near-term risk of Dollar funding concerns. While EM credit spreads are not cheap per se, we see relative value against the US High-Yield market. In addition to the growing exposure of the latter to secularly challenged sectors, with the US cycle maturing and profit margins potentially eroding, we see more fundamental concerns in US High-Yield than in the EMBI (of which 70% of the constituents are sovereign bonds and the remainder in ‘quasi-sovereigns’).


Unlike most EM trades, long EM credit vs. US High-Yield has yet to fully recover from the sell-off following the US election. Since the ‘taper tantrum’, EM has generally outperformed with the exception of a few sharp risk-off events that had specific negative-EM implications (such as the sharp decline in oil prices and Russian recession in late 2014/early 2015, and the 2016 US presidential election). However, other risk- off periods, such as the Euro crisis in early 2011, saw EM credit outperform US high-yield.


The relative performance of EM vs. US High-Yield consistently tracks the EM-DM growth differential (Exhibit 10). We expect the general trend of EM outperformance to continue in a pro-risk environment and see the entry point as attractive, albeit admittedly slightly less so following the recent High-Yield sell-off. Finally, this trade is positive carry and should perform well if global spreads move sideways to tighter. We have set the stop at -4%, which coincides roughly with the bottom reached after the US election.



* * *


Top Trade #6: Own diversifed Asian growth, and the hedge the interest rate risk via FX relative value (long INR, IDR, KRW vs. short SGD and JPY)


Go long an equal-weighted basket of INR, IDR, KRW against an equal-weighted  basket of SGD and JPY, indexed at inception to 100, with a total-return target at 110 and stop at 95.


INR, IDR and KRW provide diversified exposure to the strong global growth we forecast in 2018 and specific idiosyncratic factors that should support their currencies in the year ahead. The combination of commodity exporting (IDR) and commodity importing (INR and KRW) currencies on the long leg of the recommended trade offers some protection against swings in commodity prices. By funding out of SGD and JPY, not only do we take advantage of their low yields, but JPY underperformance should also provide a hedge should the move higher in US yields lead to wobbles in the currencies where we recommend being long. The overall trade carries positively to the tune of about 4% over the year.


Country-specific factors in India, Indonesia and South Korea should boost their currencies, on top of the strong global growth environment we expect next year. Specifically:


India’s bank re-capitalization plan should impart a powerful positive impulse to investment in the coming year and should break the vicious cycle of higher non-performing loans, weaker bank balance sheets and slower credit growth. As the drags from GST implementation and de-monetization also fade, we expect growth to move from 6.2% in 2017 to 7.6% in calendar 2018. In addition to the three hikes we expect the Reserve Bank of India to deliver by Q2-2019, the high carry, FDI and equity inflows should also be supportive for the INR. We have moved our 12-month forecast for $/INR stronger to 62.


We continue to see Indonesia as a good carry market. As the drag on domestic consumption from the tax amnesty fades in 2018, we expect economic growth to move up to 5.8% in 2018 (from 5.2% in 2017), while the current account, inflation, and fiscal deficit should remain stable. We think Bank Indonesia is done easing and should move to hike rates by 50bp in H2-2018. We also expect Indonesia to be included in the Global Aggregate bond index, which could prompt one-off inflows worth US$5bn in Q1-2018 (vs. US$10bn bond inflows YTD in 2017). We have moved our 12-month forecast for $/IDR stronger to 13000. Finally, Indonesia, like India, has accumulated reserves over the past year that now stand at record high levels and should help mitigate volatility.


We expect the KRW to outperform other low-yielding Asian peers in 2018. The strong memory chip cycle should extend at least through H1-2018, while the government’s income-led growth policy provides a fiscal boost. Together with the boost from improving exports, this should allow the Bank of Korea to withdraw monetary accommodation in the face of rising financial stability concerns, with three policy rate hikes to 2.0% penciled in by the end of 2018. The thawing of China/South Korea relations and rebound in Chinese tourists should also help the travel balance. Overall, we expect the current account to remain stable at around 5% of GDP in 2018. Further deregulation in outbound capital flows could temper KRW strength over the medium term, but might not pass the National Assembly in the near future given  fragmentation in the legislative body. Our 12-month forecast for $/KRW is now stronger at 1060.


On the funding side, not only do SGD and JPY offer a low yield, we expect them to underperform in the year ahead. While we expect the Monetary Authority of Singapore to steepen its appreciation bias in October, we do not expect any significant SGD appreciation versus Asian peers given that the SGD is already trading on the strong side of the policy band. Meanwhile, we forecast USD/JPY at 120 in 12 months. With the BoJ controlling the yield curve as US rates move higher, JPY should continue to weaken, especially if US rates move higher than the forwards discount, as we expect.



* * *


Top Trade #7: Go long the global growth and non-oil commodity ‘beta’ through BRL, CLP, PEN vs. short USD


Go long a volatility-weighted basket of BRL, CLP and PEN (weights of 0.25, 0.25 and 0.5) against USD, indexed at inception to 100, with a total return target of 108 and a stop at 96.


The ongoing strength of global growth should continue to support a rally in most industrial metal prices. Our seventh Top Trade recommendation aims to capture this dynamic by going long the ‘growth and metals beta’. All three currencies on the long side have reliably responded to upswings in global trade and external demand over the past two decades. Moreover, each has performed particularly well in the pre-crisis decade, a period that also featured strong global growth and buoyant industrial metals prices. CLP offers direct exposure to a particularly encouraging story in copper, while BRL and PEN provide more varied metals exposures. The recommended trade has a positive carry of roughly 2.5% a year, and our 12-month forecasts are stronger than the forwards in all cases: we forecast USD/BRL at 3.10 in 12 months, USD/CLP at 605 in 12 months and USD/PEN at 3.15 in 12 months.


Beyond these global factors, our recommended Top Trade allows for diversified exposure to an encouraging Latin American growth recovery. Not only should growth in Brazil pick up as it recovers from a deep recession (and a recent BRL sell-off, creating an attractive entry-point), but BRL screens as strongly undervalued on our GSFEER currency model due to a combination of contained inflation and current account rebalancing, making BRL an attractive high carry currency. Meanwhile, PEN – the low-vol ‘tortoise’ of Andean FX – offers exposure to one of the most attractive valuation stories in the EM low- to mid-yielder space. Last but not least, CLP – the ‘hare’ of Andean FX – has moved quickly in 2017, so sends a somewhat less attractive valuation signal, but provides direct exposure to our most encouraging metals view, copper, and what opinion polls suggest is likely to be a market-friendly outcome in the upcoming Chilean election.


Finally, although it is designed for our global base case of strong growth, our Top Trade #7 can perform well in other external environments, potentially including a global growth disappointment. In particular, while BRL is a high-yielding and ‘equity-like’ currency, CLP and PEN are each lower-yielding and more ‘debt-like’: they have historically shown relatively resilient performance vs. the USD during periods of both declining growth and falling core rates.










Saturday, October 28, 2017

What Could Pop The Everything Bubble?

Authored by Charles Hugh Smith via PeakProsperity.com,


I’ve long held that if a problem can be solved by creating $1 trillion out of thin air and buying a raft of assets with that $1 trillion, then central banks will solve the problem by creating the $1 trillion out of thin air - nothing could be easier.




This is the lesson of the past eight years: if a problem can be solved by creating new money and buying assets, then central banks will solve that problem.


Problem: stock market is declining. Solution: create new money and buy, buy, buy stock index funds. Problem solved! Market stops falling and quickly rebounds as “central banks have our backs.”


 


Problem: interest rates are inhibiting lending and growth. Solution: create a few trillion units of currency and buy enough sovereign bonds to drop interest rates to near-zero.


 


Problem: nobody’s left who can afford to buy the new nosebleed-priced flats that underpin China’s miracle-grow economy. Solution: create new currency, lend it to local government agencies who then buy the empty flats.


 


Problem: stagnant employment and deflation. Solution: create a trillion in new currency, buy a trillion in new government bonds that then fund infrastructure projects, i.e. bridges to nowhere.



And so on. Any problem that can be solved by creating a few trillion out of thin air and buying assets will be solved.  The mechanism to solve these problems - creating currency out of nothing - is like a perpetual motion machine: there are no intrinsic limits on the amount of new money that can created at near-zero interest, as the interest payments can be funded by new money.


Even better, the central bank (the Federal Reserve) buys Treasury bonds with the new currency that generate income, which is then returned to the Treasury: a perpetual-motion money machine!


The policy of creating trillions in new currency and buying trillions in assets has inflated an everything bubble, a bubble in all the asset classes being supported or purchased by central banks and their proxies.


Many observers wonder what, if anything, could pop the everything bubble.


This leads to an interesting question: what problems can’t be solved by creating another trillion and buying assets?


What Problems Can’t Be Solved by Creating Another Trillion and Buying Assets?


The past eight years have created the comforting illusion that essentially all problems in the modern era of globalized, centralized, debt-based, state-cartel capitalism in all its flavors (Chinese, Japanese, European, American, etc.) can be solved by creating as many trillions as are needed (whatever it takes) and buying assets or issuing guaranteed lines of credit with the new currency.


But there are some structural problems that can’t be solved by this mechanism. Some are primarily economic, some are primarily political-social, but all of them affect the entire system, not just the financial realm.


Inflation


We’re told that inflation—the loss of purchasing power of a currency—is near death and this greatly saddens the globe’s central bankers, who desperately need inflation to push wages higher and reduce the burden on debtors.


So let’s say, just as a thought experiment, that central banks get their much-desired inflation, but it runs hotter than their 2% annual target.  Once inflation is embedded in expectations and the supply chain, printing another trillion and using it to buy stocks, bonds, empty flats, etc. won’t make inflation go away.  Rather, the inflation in asset valuations generated by endless central bank buying if assets ends up feeding real-world inflation as all this new currency doesn’t actually produce more goods and services; it simply expands the supply of currency sloshing around the world looking for speculative yield.


The chorus of voices advocating for Universal Basic Income (UBI) is growing, and central banks will increasingly be pressured to issue new currency to fund UBI and its equivalents—what’s known as helicopter money, as the central bank issues currency that then funds deficit spending, i.e. the government dropping cash into the real economy.


Helicopter money comes in a variety of forms: debt forgiveness, negative tax rates (i.e. tax rebates to those who owe no income taxes), and cash stipends such as UBI. In every case, this helicopter money doesn’t expand the supply of goods and services; all it does is expand the funds available for consumption.


While China may be able to export deflation in goods that are tradable, that is, commoditized goods that can be made anywhere and shipped to markets elsewhere, nontradable goods and services such as local government services, housing, groceries, fast food, most healthcare services, haircuts, education, etc.—the bulk of the real economy—soar in price as the supply of money expands faster than the supply of these goods and services.


This is why inflation is already running extremely hot in nontradable sectors (which are often dominated, funded or controlled by the public sector/government), while deflation is still visible in tradable goods such as TVs, software, etc. I covered real-world inflation rates in The Burrito Index: Consumer Prices Have Soared 160% Since 2001 (August 1, 2016))


Much of the real-world inflation in sectors such as healthcare is invisible to protected classes because it’s being absorbed by employers and the government, a topic I covered in Inflation Isn"t Evenly Distributed: The Protected Are Fine, the Unprotected Are Impoverished Debt-Serfs (May 25, 2017)



Real-world inflation is also distorted by hedonics and substitution, tricks that lower the official rate of inflation but don’t change the reality that the average prices paid for vehicles have risen substantially, despite the official claim that vehicle prices have been flatlined for years, a topic I addressed in About Those "Hedonic Adjustments" to Inflation: Ignoring the Systemic Decline in Quality, Utility, Durability and Service (October 11, 2017)


Be Careful What You Wish For: Inflation Is Much Higher Than Advertised (October 5, 2017)


As political pressure on central banks mounts to fund QE for the people, QE for Main Street, etc., that is, helicopter money in one form or another, the introduction of new currency into the real economy has the potential to make real-world inflation undeniable.


Once inflation is undeniably in the 5% to 7% range, who will be willing to buy a negative-interest rate bond, or a bond paying 1%?


Another potential engine of inflation that’s widely discounted is global shortages of key commodities such as oil, grain, fresh water, etc. The global economy has come to view cheap, abundant commodities as the natural and permanent state of affairs, but history tells us that abundance and low prices are not permanent.  Since essential commodities are integral to the global supply chain, any price increases due to scarcity or supply disruption quickly feed inflation into the entire supply chain.


Inflation is a problem that creating another trillion won’t solve; creating and distributing another trillion or two will actually make the problem worse.


Rising Social Disorder Due to Soaring Wealth-Income Inequality


Famed financer Ray Dalio recently penned a commentary labeling the divergence of the wealthy elite from the bottom 90% The Most Important Economic, Political And Social Issue Of Our Time.


This is a topic many alt-financial bloggers have covered for years; I’ve penned dozens of essays on the topic, most recently The Fading Scent of the American Dream (October 16, 2017)


This chart depicts the inconvenient reality: central bank currency-creation-asset-buying has enriched the top of the wealth-power pyramid, with limited trickledown to the top 10% and negative effects on the bottom 90%.



The consequences of this outcome of central bank stimulus-for-the-already-wealthy can manifest in all sorts of ways.


Political pressure on central banks may grow, forcing policy changes or even limiting the scope of central bank largesse to banks and financiers.


Social movements demanding UBI and other income-distribution policies may become mainstream, a dynamic that as described above will add to the inflationary pressures building in the real world.


Once again, creating another trillion and buying more assets held by the wealthy won’t fix this problem—it will only make it worse.


Fragmentation of the Elites


As I have often noted, historian Michael Grant identified profound political disunity in the ruling class as a key cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire. Grant described this dynamic in his excellent account The Fall of the Roman Empire, a book I have been recommending since 2009.


The chapter titles of the book provide a precis of the dynamics Grant identifies:


The Gulfs Between the Classes


The Credibility Gap


The Partnerships That Failed


The Groups That Opted Out


The Undermining of Effort


I’ve discussed profound political disunity in dozens of essays since 2009, for example, When Did Our Elites Become Self-Serving Parasites? (October 4, 2016)


The Real Trouble Begins When Rising Inequality Splinters the Elites (October 22, 2015)


There are a number of manifestations of profound political disunity we can discern:


-- The splintering of the technocrat class as soaring wealth and income inequality narrows opportunities for financial security for the class that considered security and wealth a birthright.


 


-- The fragmenting of the Deep State, the unelected, permanent leadership of the Establishment, a subject I’ve addressed since 2014: The Age of Disintegration: Political Disunity and Elites At War. (November 21, 2016)


 


-- The fragmentation of the two political parties into warring camps that have little common ground in a struggle for control of the rising tide of populism.


 


-- The splintering of the social order into conflicting classes of Haves and Have-Nots, a topic I covered in America"s Nine Classes (April 13, 2015).



Once again, creating another trillion and buying assets—a policy that enriches the financial elites at the expense of every other class and elite—doesn’t solve the problem, it only makes it worse.


Popping the Everything Bubble Created by Central Bank Currency Creation-Asset Buying


As central bank creation of currency and asset purchases fail to solve the problems outlined above, these dynamics will undermine the status quo rather than prop it up.  As central bank policies are increasingly fingered by the mainstream as the source of soaring wealth-income inequality, central bank policies supporting credit/asset bubbles will either be limited or cut off, and at that point all the credit/asset bubbles will pop.


In Part 2: What To Invest In When The Everything Bubble Bursts, we lay out our how to best prepare for the social discord, political disorder and financial upheaval that will result when the central banks inevitably lose control of the system. As today"s bubble-drunk asset prices start plummeting, what investment opportunities will offer the best returns? To find out, click here to read Part 2 of this report (free executive summary, enrollment required for full access)










Thursday, October 26, 2017

ECB Preview: Here"s What Draghi Will Announce On Thursday

Thursday"s ECB meeting is expected to be one of the most important in recent years: Mario Draghi has signaled, and is widely expected to announce a blueprint of what the central bank"s QE tapering will look like beyond 2017, and while no actual tightening will be implemented - either via rates of asset purchases - the ECB is expected to announce it will cut its €60bn/month bond purchases in roughly half starting in January 2018 and lasting for the next 9-15 months.



Courtesy of RanSquawk, here are the key parameters of Thursday"s meeting:


  • Rate Decision due at 1245BST/0645CDT and Press Conference at 1330BST/0730CDT

  • The ECB is widely  expected to keep all rates on hold, with rate hikes not expected until after conclusion of current QE programme

  • The ECB is expected to unveil a road-map for reducing the pace of asset purchases given rhetoric from Draghi at the previous press conference

  • Consensus far from clear on how much the ECB will reduce purchases by and how long they will be extended for 

RATE/ASSET PURCHASE EXPECTATIONS


  • DEPOSIT RATE: Forecast to remain unchanged at -0.40%. The rate was last adjusted in March 2016, when it was cut by 10bps.

  • REFI RATE: Forecast to remain unchanged at 0.00%. The rate was last adjusted in March 2016, when it was cut by 5bps.

  • MARGINAL RATE: Forecast to remain unchanged at 0.25%. The rate was last adjusted in March 2016, when it was cut by 5bps.

  • ASSET PURCHASES: Views on this front are particularly wide-ranging. A Reuters poll suggests that the ECB will start trimming monthly asset purchases to EUR 40bln from current EUR 60bln in January. Views are mainly split on  whether this will be via a 6- or 9-month extension. However, Bloomberg News reports that the Bank will half purchases to EUR 30bln (a view backed by recent source reports) while extending the programme by 9-months in order to take the total size of purchases to around EUR 2.5trl; a level seen by some as their maximum purchase limit. (Discussed in greater detail later on in the report)

CURRENT ECB FORWARD GUIDANCE


  • RATES: “We expect [rates] to remain at their present levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases.” (ECB statement, 7/Sept)

  • ASSET PURCHASES: “Net asset purchases, at the current monthly pace of EUR 60bln, are intended to run until the end of December 2017, or beyond, if necessary” (ECB statement, 7/Sept)

  • GROWTH: “The risks to the growth outlook are broadly balanced.” (ECB statement, 7/Sept)

  • INFLATION: “While the ongoing economic expansion provides confidence that inflation will gradually head to levels in line with our inflation aim, it has yet to translate sufficiently into stronger inflation dynamics. Measures of underlying inflation have ticked up slightly in recent months but, overall, remain at subdued levels. Therefore, a very substantial degree of monetary accommodation is still needed for underlying inflation pressures to gradually build up and support headline inflation developments in the medium term.” (ECB statement, 7/Sept)

POTENTIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO ECB FORWARD GUIDANCE


  • RATES: Expected to stick to current rhetoric with any adjustments on rates not expected until QE unwind as part of their ‘sequencing’ efforts.

  • ASSET PURCHASES: This will hinge on what action the ECB will take. (Expectations for this are discussed below).

  • GROWTH: No change to guidance expected on this front. RBC states there has been little in the way of economic data flows to materially alter the economic backdrop.

  • INFLATION: Similarly to the growth story, little has changed on the inflation front to require any adjustment to current guidance. 

FUTURE PATH OF QE PROGRAMME


Background:


Despite inflation in the Euro-area (1.5% Y/Y headline) still short of the ECB’s ‘close to but below 2%’ target, the Bank has

found itself under pressure to set out a road-map on how they will curtail purchases. This is a by-product of a pick-up

in Euro-area sentiment and growth expectations but more pertinently, the concerns on the governing council surrounding the

Bank moving ever closer to their alleged self-imposed purchase limit of around EUR 2.5trl (set to reach EUR 2.28trl by yearend)


Expectations for such a blueprint were stoked by comments from ECB Draghi at his most recent press conference stating that very

preliminary talks had begun on asset purchases with discussions based on the length of the programme and size of the

purchases. Draghi then went on to add that the ‘bulk of decisions will be taken in October’.


Since then, rhetoric from the Bank has done little to pull-back expectations of a major announcement this month. However, many

members appear to be trying to soothe markets by not being too bullish in the desires to remove accommodation with the likes of Draghi, Praet and Hansson all opting to use the phrase ‘recaliberation’ instead of ‘taper’ when talking about unwinding

purchases. Furthermore, even some of the more hawkish members such as Weidmann have tried to reassure markets by stating

that policy will remain accommodative even after QE exit, with his German counterpart Lautenschlaeger suggesting that current

downward forces on in inflation are merely temporary. As such, this suggests that any action taken by the bank will likely be mindful

of any market backlash by being too aggressive with members stressing the need for patience and persistence. However, there

has been little communication by policymakers on the specifics of what to look out for and as such, unless there are any

further developments heading into the meeting after this report has been published, consensus will likely be far from

clear.


Current expectations:


Overview: Expectations for the Bank’s future plans focus on two key aspects of the programme; it’s size and it’s duration with purchases currently running at EUR 60bln a month and due to expire in December of this year. For the reasons stated above, the current size is expected to be reduced from its current level with the programme to be extended in order to avoid any type of ‘taper-tantrum’.


Source reports: In the immediate aftermath of the previous press conference, source comments suggested the Bank could cut asset purchases to EUR 20 or 40bln a month, with extension options including 6- or 9- months. Given the wide range of potential future purchases from these source reports (EUR 120-360bln), markets have been struggling to get a gauge on where the balance of views at the Bank lies. As such, source reports have been one of the main tools used by the market to gain consensus. The most recent of these reports suggested that the Bank could cut purchases to EUR 30bln with a 9-month extension due to fears regarding limits on available purchases. The same sources also reported that EUR 25bln for 9 months could be a more secure approach to avoid falling short of available bonds. That said, the report highlighted that no key decision have yet been made and as such, the decision taken by the bank could be one that goes right to wire. Given the lack of market consensus, it is plausible that the ECB could release further source reports in order to communicate their potential decision  ahead of the event.


Newswire polling: Given the lack of clarity in market expectations it is useful to look at newswire surveys given they typically highlight where the balance of views lie in the market. However, even on this front, major vendors report differing views on what action the ECB could take. A Reuters poll suggests the ECB will start trimming monthly asset purchases to EUR 40bln from current EUR 60bln in January. Expectations were, however, relatively wide-ranging with expectations of cuts between EUR 5-40bln. Fourteen of 32 surveyed (who expect a fixed end-date) think the programme will run for a further 6-months from January, thirteen of 42 look for an extension to September (a view backed by recent source reports) and the remainder expect it to run until December 2018. Note, some also hold the view that the ECB could leave the programme open-ended in order to not cause too much of a stir in the market via a ‘taper-tantrum’. Separately, Bloomberg News reported that the consensus is for asset purchases to be cut to around EUR 30bln and extended by 9-months which would take the bank’s total size of purchases to just over EUR 2.5trl; the bank’s alleged self-imposed bond-buying limit.


 



Market reaction:


 The market reaction to this week’s meeting could carry a lot of volatility given the lack of clear consensus. As such, to help

clients we have referenced Rabobank’s, BofA"s and Citi"s cheat sheets to depict what could be interpreted as ‘hawkish’ or ‘dovish’ reactions. Note, a

hawkish reaction would typically lead to (all things equal and in very basic terms), appreciation of the EUR, downside in equities

and fixed income markets. A dovish reaction would be the converse of these moves. Note that the below categorizations are based

on views provided by Rabobank and not out own. Furthermore, the values stated below refer to what the pace of future purchases

would be, not the size of the cut.


Here"s Rabo:


  • Very hawkish: EUR 20bln and a 6-month extension

  • Hawkish: EUR 20bln and a 9-month extension or EUR 30bln and a 6-month extension

  • Neutral: EUR 20bln and a 12-month extension or EUR 30bln and a 9-month extension

  • Dovish: EUR 40bln and a 6-month extension or EUR 30bln and a 12-month extension

  • Very Dovish: EUR 40bln and a 9-month extension or EUR 40bln and a 12-month extension


Alternatively, here is Bank of America"s Matrix...



... and Citigroups.



Below are Citi"s conclusions:


  • For 10yr Bunds, yields fall around 25bp in the most dovish scenario (€40bn x 12mth) and rise around 24bp in the most hawkish scenario (€20bn x 6mth). Figure 1 above summarizes the full set of results for Bunds.

  • The most market neutral scenarios, according to the model, are €20bn x 12mth, €30bn x 9mth and €40bn x 6mth.

  • This is broadly consistent with the Reuters poll (taken 11-14 September) which suggested the consensus amongst economists was for €40bn (range €30- 50bn) over 6mths (range 3-12mths).

  • Cross-checking the model output (based on policy signals) with the total size of APP extension shows a clear relationship (Figure 2). The model therefore assumes that there is less of a role for the ‘intensity’ of purchases.

  • The market neutral size for APP upsizing appears to be around +€250bn

  • The Citi house view is for an extension in the form of an ‘envelope’ (without specifying a monthly purchase rate) of €150bn (with upside risk of €210bn). That could lead to a near-term sell-off of around 15-20bp.

  • The scenarios presented assume deliverability. But, the most dovish options undoubtedly would be more challenging to implement (see below) given scarcity constraints. In terms of likelihood, we would put less weight on these scenarios which skews the risk towards a bearish reaction on 26 October.

Finally, a breakdown of expectations by bank:


  • Barclays - Think that QE will be extended for a longer period (nine months) but at a lower pace of EUR 30bln per month, and do

    not rule out a 12-month extension at an even lower pace of EUR 20-25bln. Do not expect the ECB to commit to tapering towards

    zero at the end of the extended programme as the GC will likely want to keep all options open in case economic or market

    conditions deteriorate in the meantime.

  • Deutsche Bank - Now expect a larger reduction in the pace of QE – from EUR 60bln to EUR 30bln (not EUR 40bln). To

    compensate, expect (i) a longer extension of QE – nine months rather than six months – (ii) a commitment to not changing the

    sequencing of exit and (iii) the introduction of conditionality into the definition of “well past” within the rates guidance.

  • HSBC - Expect six months of asset purchases at a reduced pace of EUR 40bln per month to start in January. Although, it is hard to

    have huge conviction given the near infinite possibilities. Do not think the ECB will set an end-date for purchases given concerns

    that underlying inflation pressures are still insufficient.

  • IFR - Central scenario is for the ECB to buy EUR 20bln per month over 12-months. The most important element to the ECB’s exit

    strategy is not QE but sequencing of when rate hikes will happen.

  • ING - Expect the ECB to announce a ‘lower for longer’ tapering, as in December 2016, reducing the monthly QE purchases to 25bn

    and extending them until the end of 2018. Expect Draghi to emphasise ‘sequencing’, i.e. the fact that interest rates will remain low

    (far) beyond the end of QE which should help to anchor interest rate expectations. Such a strategy would also help to immunise the

    ECB’s monetary policy against further exchange rate fluctuations.

  • Lloyds - Forecast an announcement of a reduction in monthly purchases to EUR 30bln from the current pace of EUR 60bln, but

    an extension of the programme to at least September 2018. The ECB is likely to maintain its flexibility, keeping open the option to

    increase monthly purchases, should it be needed.

  • Morgan Stanley - Have slightly amended their call and now expect the central bank to announce that the APP will be extended up

    to September 2018, or beyond if necessary. But, from January onwards, the pace of purchases will likely be lowered to EUR 30bln

    per month.

  • Nordea – Expect an extension of the asset purchases by at least six months, by reducing the monthly net purchase volume from

    EUR 60bln per month to EUR 30bln, effective from January 2018. This would be in line with the need for further substantial

    monetary accommodation, while at the same time reflecting bond scarcities and the ECB’s confidence that ongoing growth above

    potential should drive core inflation further up over time.

  • Pictet – Expect the ECB to announce a 9-month extension of asset purchases, until at least September 2018, at a monthly pace of

    EUR 30bln. The ECB’s emphasis on “patience and persistence” means that an even longer QE extension is possible, e.g. at EUR

    20-25bln for 12 months.

  • Rabobank – Believe that QE will be wound down in three steps of EUR 20bln, bringing purchases to zero in H2 2018. Rabo admit

    that their scenario is on the more hawkish side of the tapering spectrum. If the ECB opts for such an exit, this could lead to a

    negative market reaction in the short-run. However, they would argue that ultimately the flexibility given by this approach could

    actually help stabilising yields in the long run (and so limit sharp movements).

  • RBC - Look for a reduction by at least EUR 30bln in net terms, possibly even more. The duration of the programme is likely to

    remain open ended with an initial date set at least 9 months from the current end date, i.e. in Sep 2018. Forward guidance should

    be strengthened and re-iterated in the press conference and Q&A – particularly the sequencing element.

  • SocGen - Expect the ECB to extend QE for nine months, at a monthly pace of EUR 25bln. Expect the ECB to keep the door open

    to more QE thereafter if needed. Maintain their view of rate hikes in March and June 2019 to put an end to the negative deposit

    rate.

  • TD Securities - look for the ECB to announce QE at EUR 30bln/month for 12 months. Recent ECB communication has suggested

    that emphasis will be on the duration of QE rather than the pace. This longer extension of QE should be coupled with unchanged

    forward guidance, where Draghi will emphasise that purchases will continue through December 2018 “or beyond, if necessary” and

    will remain firm on sequencing, with rates not rising until “well past” the end of QE. This should see any expectations for rate hikes

    pushed back into the second half of 2019.

  • UBS - Expect the ECB will cut its monthly asset purchases from EUR 60bln to EUR 30bln as of January, with a commitment for

    nine months, i.e., until end-September 2018. UBS think the ECB will leave open whether it will extend QE after September and hint

    that this decision will be taken in a data- dependent fashion, closer to the time.






Wednesday, October 18, 2017

Carney Reveals Europe's Potential Achilles Heel in Brexit Talks

This morning, BoE Governor Mark Carney discussed the risks of a hard Brexit during his testimony to the UK Parliamentary Treasury Committee. There was renewed weakness in Sterling during his testimony.



Ironically, given the fall in Sterling, Carney explained why Europe’s financial sector is more at risk than the UK from a “hard” or “no-deal” Brexit. We wonder whether Juncker and Barnier appreciate the threat that a “no-deal” Brexit poses for the EU’s already fragile financial system?


When asked does the European Council “get it” in terms of potential shocks to financial stability, Carney diplomatically commented that “a learning process is underway.” Having sounded alarm bells about clearing in his last Mansion House speech, he noted “These costs of fragmenting clearing, particularly clearing of interest rate swaps, would be born principally by the European real economy and they are considerable.”


Calling into question the continuity of tens of thousands of derivative contracts, he stated that it was “pretty clear they will no longer be valid”, that this “could only be solved by both sides” and has been “underappreciated” by Europe. Moving on to the possibility that there might not be a transition period, Carney had a snipe at Europe for its lack of preparation “We are prepared as we should be for the possibility of a hard exit without any transition…there has been much less of that done in the European Union.”


Maybe it’s Europe, not the UK, that needs the transition period most.


In Carneys view “It’s in the interest of the EU 27 to have a transition agreement. Also, in my judgement given the scale of the issues as they affect the EU 27, that there will ultimately be a transition agreement. There is a very limited amount of time between now and the end of March 2019 to transition large, complex institutions and activities…If one thinks about the implementation of Basel III, we are alone in the current members of the EU in having extensive experience of managing the transition for individual firms of various derivative and risk activities from one jurisdiction back into the UK. That tends to take 2-4 years. Depending on the agreement, we are talking about a substantial amount of activity.”


Returning to the theme of financial stability, he stated “As a general thing, in an uncooperative outcome, at least initially, the UK will be long financial services. We will have more capacity, capital, individuals, collateral in the UK. The EU will be short of financial services because not all of that capacity will be able to go across. The entire economic impacts are greater for the UK but, from a financial stability perspective, they are greater for the EU.”


On further questioning, Carney outlined the other two major issues, along with derivatives and wholesale banking, which would be affected, i.e. cross-border provision of insurance (UK domiciled entities would be unable to pay out) and data protection and transfer (there is more data in the UK which is relevant to the EU than vice versa).


Summing up, Carney stated “These issues are bigger for Europe than they are for us, but they’re material for us.” That comment prompted the following question “In which case we have much more leverage in order to get a deal?” The diplomatic reply was “I wouldn’t want to use financial stability issues as leverage. I wouldn’t want them to be addressed in a bloodless technocratic way in the interests of all the citizens.” Didn’t he just describe Juncker’s modus operandi.

Monday, October 16, 2017

Italy's Parallel Fiscal Currency: All You Need To Know

Authored by Marco Cattaneo, from Basta con l’Eurocrisi, via GEFIRA,


There is an increased talk in Italy about fiscal money as an instrument to resolve the economic crisis, which is not over yet.



Despite the optimism shown by the Italian government and the EU, the Eurozone economy is far from being in an acceptable condition, and this applies in particular for Italy.


In 2017 Italy’s real GDP will grow by 1.5% compared to the previous year, which is 6% less than what it was in 2007, ten years earlier! Within the same period unemployment has doubled, the number of people in poverty tripled from 1.5 million to almost 5, and this trend does not seem to be reversing. The Italian economic system is working far below its potential: this gap has been created first by the global financial crisis of 2008 and then by the austerity policies “prescribed” by the EU in 2011. Italy can solve this problem by introducing an adequate quantity of purchasing power in its economic system. It can’t do it by issuing euros, nor (due to the mechanisms of the Eurozone) by increasing the state deficits.


All these difficulties stem from the fact that Italy is not an issuer but a user of the currency, the euro. The introduction of a fiscal currency might help to bypass the constraint that Rome cannot print money and maintain the impression that the euro works. The fiscal money concept goes back to chartalism theorised by German economist Georg Friedrich Knapp at the beginning of 1900 and then expanded by the economists adhering to the “Modern Monetary Theory” (MMT).


The basic principles of the fiscal money are two:


  1. First: it is a particular government bond that has a value given to it by the state, even if it does not enjoy the status of a legal tender. In other words, the state binds itself to accept it, e.g. for the payment of taxes or governmental services, while business and citizens are free to use it or not. .

  2. Second: as the bond is not designed to be reimbursed with the euro, which the state can no longer emit, the state is always able to honour its agreement. The bond cannot be exchanged for euros, but bondholders can use this special bond to pay their taxes or services provided by the state. It principle looks like a discount coupon that cannot be exchanged for euros but has a value, and oblige the issuer to provide a discount.

Since the state agrees to accept it but not to redeem it, it can’t default on its obligation. Such a bond is equivalent to a sovereign currency.


How can the fiscal money work in Italy?


Right now in Italy, three opposition parties are evaluating the fiscal money proposal.


Forza Italia (Berlusconi’s party), proposes Fiscal Credit Certificates (CCF). CCFs were initially invented by Marco Cattaneo and then developed with the help of various economists and researchers in numerous articles, books and an ebook that gained widespread popularity. The state emits CCFs witch gives the right to a reduction in the payment of taxation (or any other financial transaction with the public sector) two years after their emission.


CCFs are distributed in different ways: To workers to increase their income, as some reverse tax; To businesses to reduce the weight of taxation on income (which implies an immediate increase in competitiveness with foreign businesses. and prevents the economic recovery from deteriorating the trade balance);
To low-income groups as a form of social spending; as an addition to what they already get in euros.


They can also be used to finance public investment.


While the CCFs are not legal tender, they have value because everybody can use them to pay taxes or buy government services. And since they have value, they can be exchanged for goods or euros. Suppose that the Italian government issues CCFs worth 100 euros in tax. It is highly likely that commercial operators, such as shops, will accept CCFs as an alternative for the euro. Commercial operator can use the acquired CCFs to fulfil their tax obligation.


CCFs are officially not government debt and do not add to the total amount of Italian public debt. The Italian government will accept the CCFs two years after issuance, in the meantime they can be used as a parallel currency. Two years between the emission and the use to pay taxes will be enough for the economic recovery in the form of GDP increase, simply because CCFs have increased purchasing power and economic activities, and thus tax revenue increase, compensating for the reduction of state revenue caused by payment via CCFs. During the two years that they are in circulation, the CCFs will function as legal tender, and the Italian government can increase its spending by paying its expenditures partly in CCFs, and without increasing the national debt.


Movimento 5 Stelle (the movement started by comedian Beppe Grillo) has expressed interest in the model proposed by Gennaro Zezza.


It envisages digital fiscal money in the form of electronic cards distributed among the public. Units of value can be used for the purchase of goods and services in the private sector. Unlike the other versions of ”fiscal money”, this one would not require the 2 years delay after the emission. The use to pay taxes will be possible in installments, say 20% per year starting from the beginning.


Lega Nord and in particular Claudio Borghi, responsible for economic policies, propose the emission of “Minibots”, or CCFs that would circulate in the form of paper with the same size as the euro banknotes. Minibots would be issued to businesses or individuals who have the right to a fiscal deduction. Instead of a tax deduction, the company or person receive an equal amount of “Minibots”, Minibots could be used immediately to pay taxes or as a form of payment for services by state enterprises.


Minibots do not increase the receiver’s assets because they cancel out the right of a promised tax deduction or another form of a credit of the state. It transforms, however, an illiquid credit, the government owes a private company or person, into an instrument that can circulate and be used immediately.


Fiscal money: a permanent or provisional solution?


Fiscal money is an instrument manageable by the national government to boost both internal demand and increase the competitiveness of Italian businesses by lowering the taxation. It restores in the euro-system the flexibility necessary to correct its dysfunctions, without necessarily breaking it. The emission time can be organized to ensure


  1. high levels of employment,

  2. an optimum trade balance,

  3. meeting public finance budget constraints.

When it comes to Point (iii) in particular, given a goal of fiscal deficit (the difference between expenditure and revenue of the state), the necessary level to end the negative economic cyclical phase will be obtained via an adequate level of emission of fiscal money.
The parallelism between fiscal money and the euro gives the possibility to create a stable eurozone. In this sense, fiscal money must become an instrument permanently available to governments to enact anti-cyclical policies and overcome moments of difficulty for the economy (starting with the current one). It is possible that the emission of fiscal money will lower to zero during a particularly positive economic cycle. The instrument would always be available in case of need.


Fiscal money and EU legislation


The fiscal money idea is not in conflict with any existing EU legislation. It is not a currency as the law does not force its acceptance. Therefore it does not violate the principle of monetary monopoly of the ECB when it comes to emitting legal tender, the euro. It is not public debt. Eurostat rules clarify without ambiguity that it is not debt as long as the public sector is not forced to make payments in it. Fiscal money is a non-payable tax credit: it does not create a right to be paid but a right to reduce the tax payments due. There is no due date or coupon payment. When the Italian government issues 1 billion euro future tax credits, it does not increase the national debt.


Most importantly, the regulations of the Eurozone are based on the principle of not increasing the risk of default on public debt by member states. Emitting fiscal money does not conflict with this goal because no state can be forced to default on a bond that is a future fiscal discount. The Italian government will never be forced to redeem CCFs or Minibots in the euro, a currency that the Italian state has no sovereignty over and cannot create.


Naturally, the existence of fiscal money can constitute a first step for a state to leave the euro system if at a certain point the fiscal money is declared legal tender instead of the euro. The Emission of fiscal currency comes with a risk: it could be the end of the euro. However, the real risks of the end of the euro result from the design flaws of the Eurozone and are not created by the emission of fiscal money. The Eurozone problems already exist and will continue until the ongoing dysfunctions are fixed, dysfunctions that the fiscal money helps to overcome.

Sunday, October 15, 2017

How Will The ECB's QE Tapering Impact The Market? Here Are The Possible Scenarios

It was supposed to come with a "bang." Instead, the double trial balloon launched by the ECB on Thursday night, delivered at the same time by both Reuters and Bloomberg to make sure that everyone got it and according to which the ECB was considering slashing its QE in half from €60 billion to €30 billion and keeping the program active for at least 9 months, revealed one of the biggest market reaction "whimpers" to an ECB leak in years.


For those who missed it, here again are the bullets:


  • ECB has consensus to extend asset purchases at lower volumes on Oct 26

  • Agreed on reducing buys from €60 bln/month for nine months

  • Debating buys between €25-40 bln - with a likely final bogey of €30 bln - and whether program should be open-ended

Perhaps the market reaction was unexpectedly muted because the announcement was i) largely in line with expectations and ii) still to be finalized. Naturally, the lack of an acute selloff in Bunds (and rates globally) was welcome news to the European central bank, for which another major bond tantrum would be the worst case scenario, one which could promptly unravel the entire carefully planned pre-tapering edifice.


The problem, however, is that the complete lack of a reaction failed to give Mario Draghi a sense of whether the €30 billion bogey was too high, too low or, maybe, just right.


Still, as Citi"s Harvinder Sian writes in a Friday note, the market impact from the ECB meeting is likely to be determined by the signaling channel for policy rates which is imbedded in the QE extension. In other words, the final framework of the ECB"s QE will certainly move markets, "although the purchase horizon is not the only variable that matters: the size of purchases will signal whether QE is most likely to come to a hard-stop or be open to continuation."


So what are the possible scenarios for the ECB to achieve it aim of tapering without tantrum, and via signaling. That will require a judgement on how the rates market will react to the new calibration of size and horizon, of which there are many options.


To answer that question, Citi take a look at the market impact from the various ECB policy permutations.





The starting point is that rates do not rise until ‘well past’ the net asset purchase period. The purchase horizon, however, is not the only variable to assess because a hard-stop at €20bn is easier to envisage than a hard-stop on a €40bn announcement. We look through these size/horizon combinations and model the EONIA curve for timing of the first rate hike, time to zero rates and the average hike per meeting thereafter. That is the framework for assessing euro swaps and Bund impacts. The bullish to bearish scenarios for 10yr Bunds range from -25bp to +24bp (one-week impacts) from current levels. The market neutral level of APP extension appears to be around +€250bn.



Or, just under €30 billion over 9 months, precisely what Reuters and BBG "leaked."


Below, Citi presents its EONIA-signaling driven model which aims to judge the near-term market impact (around one-week) across the euro swap and Bund curve for a range of QE scenarios.



Below are its key findings:


  • For 10yr Bunds, yields fall around 25bp in the most dovish scenario (€40bn x 12mth) and rise around 24bp in the most hawkish scenario (€20bn x 6mth). Figure 1 above summarizes the full set of results for Bunds.

  • The most market neutral scenarios, according to the model, are €20bn x 12mth, €30bn x 9mth and €40bn x 6mth.

  • This is broadly consistent with the Reuters poll (taken 11-14 September) which suggested the consensus amongst economists was for €40bn (range €30- 50bn) over 6mths (range 3-12mths).

  • Cross-checking the model output (based on policy signals) with the total size of APP extension shows a clear relationship (Figure 2). The model therefore assumes that there is less of a role for the ‘intensity’ of purchases.

  • The market neutral size for APP upsizing appears to be around +€250bn

  • The Citi house view is for an extension in the form of an ‘envelope’ (without specifying a monthly purchase rate) of €150bn (with upside risk of €210bn). That could lead to a near-term sell-off of around 15-20bp.

  • The scenarios presented assume deliverability. But, the most dovish options undoubtedly would be more challenging to implement (see below) given scarcity constraints. In terms of likelihood, we would put less weight on these scenarios which skews the risk towards a bearish reaction on 26 October.

Is Every scenario as plausible?


The scenarios covered above include the four cited in the ECB sources story following the September ECB meeting (€20bn x 6mth, €20bn x 9mth, €40bn x 6mth, €40bn x 9mth).


The maximum implied extension of the four is +€360bn, which presumably is seen as achievable if it is on the table as an option. But, that would seem a stretch given existing scarcity constraints on Bunds and the extra challenge presented by reinvestments, which will grow to around €3.2bn/month for Bunds in Q4 2018.


The Citi scenarios include an even more dovish scenario which totals +€480bn. This really does seem to be pushing it. But, the ECB has proven to be resourceful in ‘using the full flexibility of programme’.


That said, there are various technical adjustments that could be deployed:


  • The QE rules could change (again), such as allowing purchases below 1yr maturity.

  • The composition of overall APP could also be altered. By that, we mean that the bulk of the reduction in purchases falls in PSPP. Note this would not mean an increase in the nominal purchase amount of CBPP3 and CSPP. Rather, that could be left unchanged allowing them to take up a greater share of a smaller overall APP (Figure 8 and Figure 9). There are challenges in these markets too, in terms of sourcing paper, especially with re-investments growing in CBPP, but new issuance may allow purchases to continue at around the same pace. The legal limits are also further away with the ECB estimated to hold around 40% of the covered bond universe vs a legal limit of 70%.


  • Another option within PSPP is for some of the Bund share to be substituted for supras (ECB probably hold around 35-40% vs the limit of 50%).

  • A greater portion could also be directed to agencies and regional debt.

  • Deviations from the capital key could also be stretched further, though a complete disregard of the capital key is unlikely.

A long extension at €40bn/month, if deemed necessary from a macro perspective, is not easy to implement, but might be possible at a stretch. Perhaps this is why recent ECB speak (Praet, Smets) has been pointing to a more plausible lower-for-longer.


* * *


Citi"s conclusion is that the market risk, as of this moment, appears tilted to the bearish side. And even as the ECB looks to their models for QE calibration to meet the inflation target, ultimately the decision will be a compromise.


  • The hawks will argue that deflation risk has disappeared, the benefits of QE are diminishing, the growth backdrop has improved significantly, and that financial stability risks are on the rise.

  • The doves will point out that core inflation is not yet sustainable, wages are still low against the backdrop of a persistent inflation undershoot, and the euro has strengthened 12% since April.

The compromise reached is likely to respect the ECB’s demonstrated mantra of slow and steady policy withdrawal (a.k.a confident, persistent, patient, and prudent). The aim is a taper without tantrum. Anything else would risk a premature tightening in financial conditions.


Citi"s analysis shows that a super-dovish extension could drive 10yr Bund yields back down by 25bp to around 0.20% (close to the year-to-date lows). A super-hawkish extension could push 10yr Bund yields back up by close to 25bp to 0.70% (not seen since 2015).


Neither seems most probable. Emboldened hawks and implementation problems act against the dovish end of the spectrum while the desire to avoid a tantrum – especially if the euro rises again into the meeting – argues against the most hawkish scenario.


  • If the middle ground seems most likely then the model indicates that a total extension worth around +€250bn or so is needed to avoid higher Bund yields. That can be achieved in various versions of a taper - €20bn x 12mth, €30bn x 9mth and €40bn x 6mth, with the shorter horizons and larger sizes leaving the scope for further extension on the table. This is where we think the consensus expectation sits.

  • The risks are however skewed towards higher yields and bear-steepening, in Citi"s view. That’s because issuer limit constraints, which are probably a pivotal factor in recent ECB communication of lower sizes for longer, suggest more forcefully that the next QE extension should be more clearly interpreted as the last in this cycle.

  • It is not hard to see the ECB take up the longer 9mth extension at a net €20bn, as discussed already at the September meeting. This could also be presented as 9mth x gross €30-35bn (including re-investments). That would lift 10yr Bunds towards 0.60%

Citi"s trade advice: "We continue to like steepeners, long USD rates versus EUR and are waiting for levels in 10yr Bunds near 0.65% and will then buy on expectation of a year-end squeeze as the ECB  purchase operations have to chase higher duration Bund holdings."