Showing posts with label Abenomics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abenomics. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 26, 2017

One Bank Is Unsure If Any Humans Still Trade Stocks In Japan, Or Have All Moved To Bitcoin

While the wholesale disappearance of retail traders from stock markets is hardly a novel observation, it has taken on a whole new meaning in Japan, where the lack of carbon-based investors has prompted Deutsche Bank to ask if "Japan"s stocks are still traded at all by humans."


As Deutsche strategist Masao Muraki writes, since the US presidential election, Japanese stocks (in this case the TOPIX index) have been almost entirely defined by just three things: US stocks (S&P 500), the implied volatility (VIX), and USDJPY. This is shown in the model correlation chart below.



And while some observers think that foreigners are buying Japanese stocks on hopes for Abenomics following the Lower House election, this aspect is not apparent in the Figure above according to Deutsche. Instead, according to the German bank, it is the 10Yr US yields  that determine relative performance of Japanese and US financial stocks most directly. Additionally, interest rates, forex, and option prices (implied volatility) are defining absolute share prices for Japanese life insurers and banks, as shown in the charts below.



Furthermore, while financial institutions delivered some surprises in earnings announcements and shareholder returns and major developments took place in bank and insurers capital regulations in 2017 too, Deutsche notes that it "cannot find any indications of active change in allocations to life insurers and banks by investors due to these factors."


These observations prompt Deutsche to ask "a basic question", namely "whether the power of price decisions for Japanese stocks (particularly financial stocks) have shifted from people to algorithms or AI." Some additional thoughts:








Shift to passive fund management has accelerated, partially due to the impact of the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rules, and the trading share of active funds, which follow decisions led by human, is declining. With reduced influence, active funds appear to be focusing on sectors with drastic fundamentals changes (such as technology sector). In fact, more than 70% of inquiries from overseas equity investors to our insurance, securities, and other financial sectors team in December were about SBI, which indirectly owns cryptcurrencies. Reduction of active management costs due to MiFID2 might accelerate this activity.



And since Deutsche is clearly correct that increasingly more, if not the vast majority, of trading decisions and execution has shifted from humans to machines, the outcome is concerning, because as the German bank notes, "if the price formation based on model is prolonged, the gap between price and fundamentals will be wider. Thus, stock price correction may occur periodically."


Yet while Japanese equities may no longer be interesting to local humans, the same can not be said for bitcoin, where as the same DB strategist "discovered" two weeks ago, it was mostly "Mr. Watanabe" trading the world"s most popular cryptocurrency:








An 11 December Nikkei report stated that 40% of cryptocurrency trading in Oct-Nov was yen-denominated. Japanese traders have reportedly come to account for nearly half of cryptocurrency trading since China started to shut down cryptocurrency exchanges, and this is said to be widely known among industry insiders (various estimates exist). This report shows that Japanese men in their 30s and 40s who are engaged in leveraged FX trading (or who used to trade but have stopped) are driving the cryptocurrency market.



This in turn prompted us to wonder, tongue-in-cheek, if Bitcoin wasn"t a secretive ploy by the BOJ - which has had a far more permissive approach to bitcoin cryptocurrencies than its central bank peers - to boost Japanese animal spirits, which had been squashed by three decades of chronic deflation and disenchantment with rigged equities. Today, Deutsche Bank poses a similar question when it asks "Will Bitcoin ignite the “speculative spirit” of Japanese people?"








We will be closely monitoring the risk-taking stance of Japanese retail investors in 2018 in light of the management of ¥900trn of the ¥1,800trn as deposits in overall personal financial assets. Japanese retail investors eagerly purchased certain assets at prices with little support from fundamentals during the bubble period in the 1980s and the IT bubble period around 2000. Symbolic choices were NTT shares that listed in February 1987 for the former and Hikari Tsushin shares that listed in 1999 for the latter (Figure 1).


 


 


 


The emergence of “Bitcoin wealthy” might ignite the “speculative spirit” of Japanese people with strong follower aspirations.



Taken to its extreme, encouraging speculation in bitcoin - and in general any asset that is up over 15x YTD - would be a perfect way to rekindle not only animal spirits, but Japan"s reflationary impetus.  One can see why the BOJ could, if not would, be behind such a "wealth creation" mechanism.


Finally, as Deutsche accurately points out, "of course, speculation at prices with flimsy fundamentals support unleashes strong backlash once asset prices weaken. Overly leveraged trades, in particular, are a concern. Cryptocurrency prices plunged on 22 December, and we think this impacted retail investors using margin trades."


Well, not really, because the December 22 plunge is now long forgotten, and the real question one should ask is whether the Bank of Japan had anything to do with the sharp rebound in bitcoin which plunged as low as $10,500 last week before surging back to $16,000 earlier today...









Wednesday, November 29, 2017

DB"s "2018 Credit Outlook" - Killer Charts Point To Bearish Not Benign Conclusion

DB’s Jim Reid has released his “2018 Credit Outlook”. In our first pass on this 60-pager earlier, we noted that Reid characterised 2017 as the most “boring year ever”, since it will go down as one of, if not the least, volatile year for the majority of asset classes.



Heading into 2018, Reid characterises risk assets as a tightrope walker who’s successfully negotiated a hire wire since the 2008 crisis. However, the confidence of our risk asset funambulist was always fortified by the knowledge that there was a huge safety net direct beneath him in the shape of the central bank put. In Reid’s own words.


The best analogy for our view on 2018 is that risk assets are like a highly skilled but still relatively inexperienced tightrope walker. Our tightrope walker started his career immediately after the GFC and earned his apprenticeship in very difficult conditions with lots of crosswinds but with the knowledge that a huge safety net existed beneath him. This allowed him to walk across the narrow line with slow but ever-increasing confidence, skill and aplomb. In our analogy the safety net is the central bank put that has continued to help financial markets’ confidence over the last several years in spite of very challenging conditions.



As the tightrope walker steps from December 2017 into January 2018, he’s going to notice a disconcerting change in his safety net.


However in 2018 our tightrope walker will have to move onto the next phase of his career where the structural support of the safety net will likely be slowly weakened. Every time he looks down he’ll figuratively see a central banker loosen or take away a supporting rope. As such his skills and confidence are likely to be tested more than in recent years.



Reid is specifically referring to the growth in the size of the big four DM central bank balance sheets, i.e. the Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of Japan and the Bank of England. At the end of 2017, the combined size of the big four’s balance sheets is estimated to reach about $14.9 trillion, an increase of about $1.8 trillion on the end of 2016. That’s about to change radically, as he notes.


Assuming fairly neutral and consensus assumptions, central bank balance sheet growth will fall sharply over the next 12-24 months from the near peak levels currently seen.



The chart below shows that on a rolling twelve-month basis, growth will fall sharply, beginning in 2Q 2018. By the end of 2018, DM estimates that the rolling twelve-month growth will have declined about 75% from its 2017 level to about $450 billion. By August 2019, growth will have declined to zero according to DB’s estimate.



As the report notes, this “represents a changing of the guard for ultra-easy policy”. The problem for Reid’s tightrope walker is that he’s come so far, there’s no turning back, even if he knows the risk of a catastrophe is only going to increase for the best part of the next two years. From Reid’s perspective, the threshold in terms of higher risk will be crossed as we move from Q2 2018 in the second half of next year.


So barring an external shock the ECB will be relatively dormant until late in Q2 when speculation will start to mount about what comes next after the current QE extension to the end of September 2018. DB’s expectation is for a quick and full taper in Q4 and the first policy rate hike in June 2019. As such, as we approach the June meeting - which will probably be the earliest that any announcement will occur - more hawkish speculation will likely start to mount about the future of the program. Indeed by the time we get to H2 2018 we’ll potentially be seeing a very different global QE picture to that we’ve been used to in the recent past. By then the Fed will be well into its gradual, but slowly increasing run down of its balance sheet.



As the report notes, the slowdown in QE purchases in 2017 will likely coincide with significantly different conditions to the most recent example in 2014-15.


While markets went through similar balance sheet wind downs through 2014 and into 2015 - driven predominantly by the Fed and ECB - not only was the stock of global QE lower with less central banks conducting such operations, we also had a situation where the tapering was consistent with a reduction in government issuance.



Fast forward to 2018 and a reduction of purchases across the globe could be occurring at a time when there is a move to increase government spending even if this isn’t yet showing up in the forecasts. The US tax plans haven’t been finalized as we go to print but an unfunded tax cut is our base case which will add to the deficit and eventually to treasury issuance. In the UK the budget - seen just before we went to print - included some loosening of the fiscal purse, as the current administration deal with Brexit risks and a population tired of austerity. Even in Germany, the recent election uncertainty and eventual coalition could include some fiscal stimulus.



So we think the tide is turning away from ultra-loose monetary and relatively tight fiscal even if the official fiscal forecasts from most commentators are yet to include much in the way of easing across the globe.



Reid backs up his forecasts with charts for the three key central banks, firstly the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan. The chart for the Fed shows that its purchases of Treasuries have never exceeded net supply. In contrast, the BoJ has exceeded net supply during the last four or so years of Abenomics, although the ratio has stabilised at around three times.



Turning to the ECB, the change in ECB purchases versus net issuance will be dramatic as 2018 unfolds.


 


Reid argues that.


Interestingly, if we look at the Fed, BoJ and ECB Government bond purchases versus net supply of domestic Government bonds we can see how the ECB’s removal of QE could be very different to that of the Fed relative to when it started tapering. In addition the supply/demand dynamic for European Government bonds has recently been even more extreme than in Japan…as ECB purchases have recently been seven times net issuance at their recent peak.



So in other words we’ve seen the huge PSPP volume far outstrip the relatively negligible net issuance in the Euro area. While the Fed program was clearly huge in absolute terms, relative to supply it was much more modest. It also declined along with Treasury issuance meaning that yields could be sheltered from the tapering impact.



In Europe we could see government bond QE go from seven times net issuance in Q3 2017 to more in line with it by the end of 2018. As the realisation mounts that ECB QE withdrawal is much more significant in relative terms to that seen in the US in 2014 then fixed income markets could become more vulnerable which may in turn create more volatility and more difficult conditions for credit spreads.
Which…unless we are missing something…sounds very bearish for European credit.



Nonetheless, when it comes to the DB team’s central case for credit spreads in 2018, they are relatively benign. Indeed, DB expects a tightening in Q1 2018, followed by a modest widening from Q2 2018 to the end of the year.



As the report notes, team member “Craig” is more bearish than his colleagues and his views seems more in keeping with the general thrust of the report.


Combining the net purchases versus net issuance data for the Fed, ECB and BoJ, Reid notes.


When we combine these three central bank purchases with net issuance historically in Figure 18 we can see just how supportive the technicals have been for government bonds. This is seemingly peaking out at the end of 2017 and with our forecasts for central bank purchases and a continuation of the 2013-2017 reduction in Government bond net issuance we expect this now to reverse. For choice we think fiscal spending will start to pick up which means these net issuance estimates are probably too aggressive on the downside.




Once again, the correct conclusion would seem to be bearish, although DB seems reluctant to go there. We are even more perplexed when DB cites the risk that inflation will surprise on the upside.


Meanwhile we think the risks to inflation are on the upside…will likely mean that crosswinds pick up as we move through Q2 and into H2 – a period where US inflation might start to more consistently beat on the upside (or at least not consistently miss on the downside) and markets start to think about a June ECB meeting where the end of Euro QE is possibly announced.




Returning to his metaphor of the tightrope walker, DB notes the probability of him remaining on his wire will deteriorate as the year progresses.


If we’re correct on inflation it’s going to be difficult for central bankers to justify anything other than the slow and steady removal of the safety net beneath our intrepid tightrope walker. As such his task will get more difficult purely because his confidence must surely weaken with more risks associated with any fall. As such he’s likely to wobble more. So expect volatility to finally start to increase after surprising many by staying as low for as long as it has done. At this stage the tightrope walker may have enough skill to safely navigate across to the next point (end 2018), however the probabilities of such a successful outcome are likely to be getting lower as the year progresses.



Perhaps Reid has been dissuaded from taking a more bearish stance by the ultra-low environment for volatility which he noted had made 2017 so boring. Indeed, he notes the close correlation between major asset volatility levels and credit spreads.



As we noted in our first pass on DB’s “2018 Credit Outlook”


Reid joins countless other strategists opining on the lack of vol in the past year, asking "why has volatility been so low and can it continue?" His answer is that the most likely reason for volatility being so low is a combination of:



  • Synchronised and firm global growth;

  • Inflation that has consistently been in the ‘Goldilocks’ range and not accelerating as much as expected in 2017, and;

  • Global central bank liquidity which in 2017 has still been close to peak levels.


What Reid neglected to mention is that volatility has itself become a tradeable input – making it reflexive in nature - and one which has been shorted to insane levels, both implicitly and explicitly.


The rapid elimination of the central bank security net coupled with rising inflation are transforming the risk profile for Reid’s tightrope walker, as he acknowledges, and one where the chances of a sustained spike in volatility must be commensurately higher. We know from his writings that Reid is a big Liverpool (soccer) fan, as are we. It’s been a frustrating season so far. So often, the build-up play has been excellent while putting the ball in the back of the net has been elusive. We felt like this about DB"s otherwise impressive report.









Thursday, October 26, 2017

Japan Is Booming! (Except It"s Not)

Authored by Jeffrey Snider via Alhambra Investment Partners,


Japan is hot, really hot. Stocks are up to level not seen since 1996 (Nikkei 225). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called snap elections in Parliament to secure a supermajority and it worked. Things seem to be sparkling all over the place, with the arrow pointing up:


“Hopes for a global economic recovery and US shares’ strength are making fund managers generous on Japanese stocks,” said Chihiro Ohta, general manager of investment research at SMBC Nikko Securities.



Only that isn’t real, just like it wasn’t three or seven years ago. Emotions don’t seem to be tracking well with reality, and in Japan it is no different. There isn’t even much of lingering popular belief in QQE to at least give these broad feelings the appearance of substance; global growth is coming because, well, it just has to, right?


Like here, or anywhere for that matter, stocks are up but the economy is not. Belief still clings to what is always over the horizon. You would think given the breathless coverage in the worldwide media that Japan is utterly booming, jumping with so much activity the island can’t contain it all. It just isn’t true, the story being wildly distorted as always to fit the (technocrat friendly) narrative.


Household spending in Japan, for example, has turned slightly positive in the past few months. It sounds like more than it is, less of a positive than in the middle of 2015 when all the same things were being said about the subject by the same people. Like anywhere else, even the Japanese economy is prone to the occasional upturn. What really matters is that those brief moments of positive never come close to making up for the more widespread and sustained negatives.




It’s another relative change that is mistaken, quite often intentionally, for a categorical one. In other words, Japan is experiencing little more than a reprieve from continued contraction rather than any actual turn toward actual growth.


That verdict is given to us by Japan’s labor market. The more positive anyone is about the economic circumstances there, the more likely it is that the labor market shows the opposite. Total hours worked continue to decline despite the rise in relative activity (again, proving its relative not categorical).


Wages that had looked seemed like they were on the rise really were impacted more by base effects and statistical irregularities (the transitory rise, then fall, of the CPI) than anything tangible. Real wages have contracted year-over-year in each of the past three months, and have been zero or negative in ten of the last eleven. And still economists point to Japan’s unemployment rate as if it matters.



But because the media is selling the future of “global growth”, the charade will/can only continue:


A hefty win raises the likelihood that Abe, who took office in December 2012, will secure a third three-year term as LDP leader next September and go on to become Japan’s longest-serving premier. It also means his “Abenomics” growth strategy centered on the hyper-easy monetary policy will likely continue.



It’s the appearance of hyper-easy monetary policy, not actual or effective accommodation. No matter how many times the other is claimed and will be claimed, that doesn’t just make it true. In Japan, like everywhere else in the world, there isn’t the slightest hint that QE, QQE, or QQE with YCC underwrites even a little positive economic difference. Japan’s small upturn has nothing to do with QQE and everything to do with minor (and relative) “reflation” after the “rising dollar.”



At now more than half a quadrillion yen on its books, both sides assets and liabilities, obviously, what is the Bank of Japan’s QQE actually doing? It has been reduced to questionable histrionics, the necessary part of every media story on Japan that makes it seem like authorities are doing something helpful.


I believe instead that Abe’s successful election gambit is somewhat of a parallel to other political processes being played out in places like Austria, Germany, and even to some degree China. The Japanese people have resigned themselves to this economy as it really is, and pay very little attention to QQE or whatever else like it. They have to know by now that it has made no positive contribution, so why not vote on the basis of other matters if the grand economic designs that swept Abe into office the first time in 2012 can’t move the needle after five years.


Abenomics or not Abenomics, there has been no difference. The economy is as bad or worse than it was before, and it doesn’t look like either party will do anything that can change matters. Therefore, increasingly, other issues become the centerpiece for what is really economic dissatisfaction channeled into alternate formats.


Earlier this year, in the face of an increasingly hostile North Korea, Abe set a deadline of 2020 to revise Japan’s constitution, which contains language that bans the country from maintaining armed forces. It is a controversial proposal that strikes at the heart of the country’s post-war identity.



If that post-war identity includes hapless technocratic monetarism, then why not change it if only to be able to change something? Maybe the Japanese do have a limit, and that a quarter-century is more than enough of one feckless scheme after another. The old way of doing things just doesn’t work anymore, a judgment that is being applied all across the world. North Korean or Chinese provocations suddenly matter more now perhaps because the Japanese worry about Japanese strength in economic terms.


It’s almost political contagion, where people in Japan or the UK see others voting for “that’s enough” and want to make the same bold, dissenting statement however they might. You vote for something very big and very different because there is no vote on monetary or economic protest that either political party will give you. It explains quite a lot, including the backlash against the backlash.


The world is treading a dangerous path primarily because the official parts of it won’t admit there is a problem; or, in places like Japan, that they might not have the will and understanding to do anything about it. It’s the worst part of this zig zag, where nothing, even stagnation (depression), ever goes in a straight line. Each of these all-too-brief upturns are always mischaracterized as far more than they ever could be, and so any urgency about addressing the real issue falls by the wayside.


The growing unrest doesn’t, of course, and instead gets funneled into often unproductive directions. We collectively look in the wrong place because the right answers are really hard to see.









Monday, October 23, 2017

USDJPY Inches Higher As Japanese Stocks Set For Longest Winning Streak In History

Yen is weaker and Japanese equity futures notably higher following a landslide election victory for Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe which theoretically ushers in yet more easy monetary policy. USDJPY has jumped above 114.00 in early trading, sending NKY futures up almost 1% in the pre-market.



If this equity rise holds it will mark the 15th consecutive gain for the Japanese market - breaking the 1961 record of 14 straight days to become the longest winning streak in Japanese stock market history.


Nikkei 225 is at its highest since Dec 1996.



Meanwhile, much has been made recently of the decoupling between USDJPY and the Nikkei 225



However, this chart masks a closer relationship between USDJPY and the relative performance of Japanese and US equities.



So there really is no regime shift.


What are the drivers of this persistent negative correlation between the yen and Japanese equities and which flows supported this negative correlation this year?


On Friday, JPMorgan presented three fundamental explanations to justify the link between Japanese equities and the yen.


One typical explanation is that the yen, being a major funding currency for the world, should rise in a risk-off equity environment and vice versa. But this argument is not supported by the fact that there is much lower correlation between the yen and global equities. It is also not supported by the structural break in the correlation between Japanese equities and the yen shown in the chart above. The yen was the most prominent or sole funding currency before the financial crisisof 2007/08. After the financial crisis the yen was joined by the dollar and later by the euro as funding currencies. So if anything the negative correlation between equities and the yen should have been even more negative before the financial crisis. But the opposite happened. The negative correlation only intensified after the financial crisis.


 


A second explanation, with causality running from yen to Japanese equities, is that a weaker yen has a positive impact on corporate profits inducing equity investors to buyJapanese equities and vice versa.


 


A third explanation is that Abenomics was always thought of as a combined trade for overseas investors: buy Japanese equities and sell the yen. And reverse, i.e. sell Japanese equities and buythe yen, when Abenomics wanes.



But JPM notes both of these last two explanations have a problem: why does the yen not go up as foreign investors buyJapanese equities? In principle when foreign investors buy or sell Japanese equities currency-hedged there should be no currency impact. And when foreign investors buy or sell Japanese equities currency unhedged there should be in fact a positive correlation between the yen and Japanese equities. What are the circumstances then under which we have a negative correlation between Japanese equities and the yen?


We previously presented three flow circumstances:


 


1) If a foreign investor (buyer) purchases Japanese equities currency-hedged from another foreign investor (seller) who was long yen already (i.e. the seller owned these Japanese equities currency unhedged before), the net market impact would be an up movein Japanese equities and a down move in yen.


 


2) If a foreign investor (buyer) purchases Japanese equities currency-hedged from a Japanese investor (seller) and this Japanese investor uses the proceeds to purchase foreign equities currency-unhedged, the net impact would also be an up move in Japanese equities and a down move in yen. This flow appears to have taken place since mid-September. Foreign investors were buyers of Japanese equities, at the same time as Japanese investors sold domestic equities and as Japanese investors stepped up their purchases of foreign equities. But since September, the purchases of foreign equities by Japanese investors were smaller in magnitude relative to the purchases of Japanese equities by foreign investors. So the negative impact on theyen from the former flow was more muted relative to the positive impact on Japanese equities from the latter flow.


 



 


3) Another flow example is related to dynamic hedging by existing holders of Japanese equities, Existing foreign holders of Japanese equities could have unwound previous FX hedges in response to equity price declines in recent months, even if they did not sell any Japanese equities themselves. This is because equity investors tend to dynamically adjust their FX hedges to match the size of the hedges to the value of their equity holdings. So as the price of Japanese equities goes down in local currency terms, these foreign investors cut some of their previous FX hedges, pushing the yen up in the process. The opposite flow takes place in periods of Japanese equity appreciation: existing foreign holders of Japanese equities have to increase the size of their FX hedges to match the increased equity values, pushing the yen down in the process.



This dynamic hedging flow suggests that there should be an even stronger correlation between the performance of the yen and the absolute performance of Japanese equities in local currency terms, relative to the correlation between the yen and the relative performance of Japanese vs. US or global equities. But the two charts above show that the opposite happened this year. The correlation between the yen and the relative performance of Japanese vs. US equities has been stronger than the correlation between the performance of the yen and the absolute performance of Japanese equities. This suggests the above flow stemming from dynamic hedging by foreign investors of existing Japanese equity holdings, has likely weakened this year.


So from the above three flow circumstances, it is the second one that appears to offer the best explanation of what happened since September in the Japanese equity/yen space. 


So, following the recent buying, how overweight have foreign investors become in Japanese equities?



So in all, it appears that overweights in Japan have been focused mostly among leveraged overseas investors including CTAs, making Japanese equities vulnerable to an unwind of some of these positions in the near term. Non-leveraged institutional investors or retail investors are rather neutral.


To conclude, JPMorgan finds no reason to believe that the historical negative correlation between Japanese equities and the yen has broken down. The relationship between Japanese equities and the yen has been closely aligned this year if one looks at the relative rather than the absolute performance of Japanese equities.


More recently, since September, the purchases of foreign equities by Japanese investors were smaller in magnitude relative to the purchases of Japanese equities by foreign investors. So the negative impact on the yen from the former flow was more muted relative to the positive impact on Japanese equities from the latter flow. Going forward, overseas leveraged investors present the main vulnerability for Japanese equities, in our view.










Sunday, September 24, 2017

"Japan Has No Illusions That Rates Will Ever Rise": Is This What The Endgame Looks Like

By Victor Shvets of Macquarie Capital


Japan Debt Mountain: does it matter?


For almost 25 years, Japan’s debt burden has been the poster child of what would happen to others if capital is misallocated, bubbles burst and then clearance and required reforms are either delayed or not implemented. Indeed, at more than 5x GDP, Japan is shouldering a greater debt burden than other key jurisdictions. It is also facing severe demographic challenges, while its labour market remains constrained and the state maintains a sway over the private sector. Since WW II, Japan has always been more statist than most other major economies, with Korea and China subsequently following Japan in developing a similar model. The conventional argument has been that Japan’s debt would ultimately crush its economy and severely crimp public sector spending, while the private sector would be unable to adjust, and hence lose competitiveness. Eventually, the private sector might lose confidence and stop repatriating cash and the country would then suffer from massive capital outflows.


Not only were these dire projections wrong for decades, but as the rest of the world joined Japan in secular stagnation and unorthodox monetary policies, it is no longer perceived as an exception but rather as a pointer to the future. Japan’s success in navigating disruption, deep financialization and permanent overcapacity is now studied and imitated. While there are local nuances, Japan shows the way forward. QEs associated with the Fed were invented in Japan more than a decade earlier. The same applies to fiscal stimuli, collapsing velocity of money and strong disinflation. Whatever are the policies, Japan has already tried them. Japan is far more advanced in fully monetizing its debt by utilizing multiple asset classes, from bonds to equities. It also accepts that normalization is not feasible, and unlike the Fed, it has no illusions that rates could ever rise or that immigration and deep labour market reforms are either possible or desirable. When the US is focusing on returning outdated factories, Japan is building for the future, when labour inputs would no longer be the key.


Although Japan’s cultural and labour market constraints reduce its ability to fully commercialize inventions, it has not prevented the country from maintaining its rating as the most complex economy in the world, while keeping leadership in patents and yielding above-average labour and multi-factor productivity. Japan’s stagnant domestic economy is overshadowed by its competitive externally-facing sectors that are becoming complementary rather than directly competing against China. Even financial repression that Japan practised for decades is becoming a global norm, nowhere more so than in Eurozone. We expect BoJ to quietly abandon its inflation targets while maintaining flexibility in asset acquisitions to keep cost of finance close to zero. This would be a recipe for continuing twilight for years to come, with debt burden neither derailing the economy nor financial markets, even as BoJ assets rise beyond 100% of GDP (~45%+ of JGBs).


Assuming that Abenomics is dead and that there is neither desire nor capacity to lift inflationary outcomes, then it would be positive for ¥. Higher ¥ would erode Topix’s ROEs (corporate governance is unlikely to offset lower returns) but it should also highlight the strength of its globally competitive and thematic plays. In our global portfolios we currently have Yaskawa, Fanuc, Mitsubishi Electric, Nintendo, Nidec, Murata, Keyence, Tokyo Electron and Yamaha. Any further ¥ appreciation should also reduce pressure on Korea and China while extending EM reflationary cycle and its investment ‘goldilocks’.


Why is Debt Mountain not crushing Japan?





“We know that advanced economies with stable governments that borrow in their own currency are capable of running up very high levels of debt without crisis.”



       — Paul Krugman


This quote by Paul Krugman neatly encapsulates the main reasons as to why Japan has not been crushed by ever-rising public sector debt. Japan is state with a high degree of credibility and it borrows almost exclusively in its own currency, with debt owned predominantly by its own citizens. Financial crisis is all about perception rather than reality.


However, one issue that Krugman has not emphasized but which is increasingly important is the ability of central banks (CBs) to support and distort the governments’ cost of funds. Given that the CBs are not economic agents, their bids and bond acquisitions are not designed to discover appropriate pricing levels, but rather to support governments’ objectives (usually to simulate economies by lowering cost of capital). In the past, such aggressive interventionist policies were unique and infrequent events (accompanying wars or other major dislocations), but over the last two decades, they have become an increasingly acceptable tool in the governments’ armoury. Japan has been leading from the front for more than two decades, followed by the rest of the world after GFC.


Thus, there are essentially four reasons as to why most bets against Japan failed on a consistent basis:


  1. Japan is a homogeneous society, with relatively egalitarian income and wealth distribution, and hence, pain has been shared fairly evenly, thus preserving economic and societal coherence.

  2. Japan maintained credibility by selectively boosting and adjusting national commitments to elderly and medical care while irregularly pushing up consumption tax. Although some of these measures were counter-productive on a longer-term basis, they have placated global markets.

  3. Japan borrows in its own currency and the bulk of JGB holders are Japanese residents (over 88%). This massively reduces the degree of external vulnerability.

  4. BoJ has been exceptionally aggressive in driving money supply up and cost of capital down. This aggressiveness coincided with the growing global disinflationary trend, which eroded bond yields and significantly reduced the proportion of the government spending that is spent financing interest commitments.

As can be seen below, despite massive rise in the governments’ gross and net debt burden, the proportion of state spending that is dedicated to servicing interest has declined significantly over the last decade and is now below 5% of total expenditure.




The extent to which BoJ has become the key to Japan’s perceived longer-term sustainability can be seen from the explosion of its balance sheet and how its asset base increased at a pace much faster than state requirements. BoJ has by now accumulated almost 45% of the entire JGB’s market (vs 10% only five years ago), and its balance sheet is rapidly closing on 100% of the country’s GDP (vs 37% G4 average). Also, BoJ is not just buying state paper but it has become actively involved in the corporate and ETF (equities) markets. BoJ already controls 75% of all of Japanese ETFs (although only 4% of overall equities) and as much as 15% of the Japanese corporate bonds.




The public sector over the last two decades did not really have an option but to become far more aggressive in transferring excess debt from private sector and onto government books. While this private sector de-leveraging was largely complete by 2005, the combination of GFC as well as subsequent earthquake (2011), continued to suppress private sector desire for more aggressive spending. Private sector sectoral savings even today remain at ~6% of GDP, whilst velocity of money is at best only stabilizing.


If public sector did not step in, the country would have undergone a massive and uncontrolled deflationary bust. Instead, Japan had simply kept its nominal demand intact, despite the private sector sustaining losses (real estate and equities) of equivalent to 100% of Japan’s GDP in ‘90/91 (or ~US$5 trillion). For perspective, consider that the GFC caused initial contraction of only around 1/3 of the US GDP. In other words, bursting of an asset bubble in the ‘90s Japan was at least three times more powerful than the GFC’s impact.



The net outcome of aggressive public sector policies offsetting sluggish and deleveraging private sectors was a ‘tranquil autumn’ of a civilized relative decline.


The Japanese economy is today a fraction of its importance several decades ago. Whereas in the late ‘80s, Japan was responsible for ~10% of global merchandise exports, its share is now below 3.8%. In the same period, Germany’s share eased from 10%-11% in ‘80s to around 8%, while the US’s share is down from 12% to ~9% and France’s share is down from 5% in the ‘80s to ~3%. The same occurred to Japan’s share of global GDP (whether on a nominal or PPP basis). The growth rates have compressed massively, but the country managed to maintain its overall aggregate demand and per capita income intact.



Japan emerged from this traumatic experience, as land of no inflation (indeed mild deflation for most of the time) and steady demand funded by the fiscal stimulus and resilient private sector productivity.


It has become a land where the central bank has been effectively cancelling national debt by acquiring more securities than the government needed to fund its deficits. While this poses many questions (such as ability of life and insurance companies to price their products, in the absence of a viable JGB market), it also implies that Japan is shifting closer to embracing far more extreme (but necessary) policies, such as minimum income guarantees and abandoning any further consumption taxes.


In the world where labour inputs are becoming increasingly less relevant and where robotics, automation, AI and social capital are likely to play an increasingly important role, even the traditional argument of a negative impact of demographics no longer dooms Japan to oblivion and collapse. It also implies that the conventional arguments in favour of large-scale increase in immigration is not only irrelevant but is likely to be faulty on both theoretical and practical grounds. It is likely that the current age of ‘declining return on humans and conventional capital’ will become far more pronounced over the next decade. It so happens that Japan is in the forefront of this evolution.


It is highly unlikely that Japan would ever accept large-scale immigration (whether it applies to high or low skill labour). It is equally unlikely that the Japanese themselves would ever prefer to work and live in foreign jurisdictions. At the same time, the pace of human replacement (whether it is waiters in the restaurants or nurses in hospitals) is accelerating in Japan at a far more robust pace than elsewhere. The unique nature of Japan is also translating into sustainably high levels of private sector productivity while containing income and wealth inequalities. Although Japan is today more unequal than it was in  late 1980s-early 1990s, it still remains one of the most egalitarian societies in the world.


While Japan is yet reluctant to accept the most radical of policies, it is far more advanced in fully monetizing its debt burden and unlike most other countries it no longer requires an ever accelerating pace of financialization (or addition of new debt-driven generations). The objective in Japan is to maintain per capita income rather than generating growth to accommodate a rising population and keeping society intact. The extent to which Japan would be able to achieve this objective would depend critically on Japanese corporates and its overall economy maintaining productivity gains.


* * *


In part 2 tomorrow: "Global lessons from Japan - the future is Red"

Monday, July 3, 2017

Abe "Plunges Into Crisis" After LDP Suffers "Historic Defeat" In Tokyo Elections, USDJPY Slides

On Sunday Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party suffered what Reuters called a "historic defeat" in the Tokyo assembly election, and "plunged into a crisis" after losing to an upstart outfit in an vote that is seen as a harbinger for Japan"s national elections, and signaling trouble ahead for the premier who has suffered from slumping support after a series of political scandals.


"We must recognize this as an historic defeat," former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba was quoted by NHK as saying. "Rather than a victory for Tokyo Citizens First, this is a defeat for the LDP," said Ishiba, who is widely seen as an Abe rival within the ruling party.


"We must accept the results humbly," said Hakubun Shimomura, a close Abe ally and head of the LDP"s Tokyo chapter. "The voters have handed down an extremely severe verdict."


According to Bloomberg, the ruling LDP party was projected to win its lowest number of seats ever in the capital, a crushing blow for Abe, which sent the USDJPY sliding after suddenly the very fate of Abenomics is in question, as past Tokyo elections have been bellwethers for national trends. A 2009 Tokyo poll in which the LDP won just 38 seats was followed by its defeat in a general election that year, although this time no lower house poll need be held until late 2018.



Tokyo Governor and head of Tokyo Citizens First party Yuriko Koike


As Reuters adds, the Tokyo Metropolitan assembly election was a referendum on Governor Yuriko Koike"s year in office, but the dismal showing for Abe"s party is also a stinging rebuke of his 4-1/2-year-old administration. Koike"s Tokyo Citizens First party and its allies were on track for between 73 to 85 seats in the 127-seat assembly, according to NHK TV exit polls. Later vote counts showed the LDP was certain to post its worst-ever result, winning at most 37 seats compared with 57 before the election, NHK said, while Koike"s party and allies were assured a majority.





Koike, a media-savvy ex-defense minister and former LDP member, took office a year ago as the first female governor in the capital, defying the local LDP chapter to run and promising to reform governance of a megacity with a population of 13.7 million and an economy bigger than Holland"s.



Among her allies is the Komeito party, the LDP"s national coalition partner.



"I am excited but at the same time, I am also keenly aware of the weight of my responsibility," Koike told NHK, adding the results had exceeded her expectations.



It was not immediately clear how the LDP"s loss would alter Japan"s political landscape: according to Japanese press, the strong showing by Koike"s party will fuel speculation that she will make a bid for the nation"s top job, though that may not be until after the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. It could also widen cracks between the LDP and the Komeito while damaging prospects for the opposition Democratic Party.


What is more troubling for the Yen and global capital markets, is that Abe"s rivals in his party could be encouraged by the LDP"s dismal performance to challenge him in a leadership race in September 2018, victory in which would set Abe on course to become Japan"s longest-serving leader and bolster his hopes of revising the post-war, pacifist constitution.


Meanwhile, according to Gerry Curtis, professor emeritus at Columbia University, Japan’s political landscape could be set for a shake-up.





"We may discover that Japan is not all that different from Britain, France, and the U.S. in its ability to produce a big political surprise," he said, referring to recent elections in those countries.



The LDP"s thrashing could also make it harder for Abe to pursue his cherished goal of revising the U.S.-drafted constitution"s pacifist Article 9 by 2020, a politically divisive agenda, said Sophia University professor Koichi Nakano.



"His prime motive to stay in power is his desire to revise the constitution, but once his popularity really starts to fall, that becomes very difficult to do," Nakano said.



Having been hit by a wave of favoritism scandals in recent months, Abe"s the most recent troubles center on concern he may have intervened to help Kake Gakuen (Kake Educational Institution), whose director, Kotaro Kake, is a friend, win approval for a veterinary school in a special economic zone. As noted here previously, Abe got in trouble because the government has not granted such an approval in decades due to a perceived glut of veterinarians. Abe and his aides have denied doing Kake any favors.


But potentially more devastating - according to Reuters  - is "the impression among many voters that Abe and his inner circle have grown arrogant." Perhaps it is because instructing your central banker to monetize all your GDP in debt, and boost the stock market takes some serious skills?


Meanwhile, the scapegoating process is being prepared: Abe is expected to reshuffle his cabinet in coming months in an effort to repair his damaged ratings, a step often taken by beleaguered leaders but one that can backfired if novice ministers become embroiled in scandals or commit gaffes. Among those many political insiders expect to be replaced is Defense Minister Tomomi Inada. Inada"s remark during the Tokyo campaign seeking voter support in the name of the Self-Defense Forces, as the military is known, came under heavy fire. By law, the military is required to be politically neutral.


In a kneejerk response, the USD/JPY fell as much as 0.4% to 111.90 in early Asia trading Monday in the wake of the shock loss.



The reason why suddenly Japan"s political process may go under the microscope, is that if indeed the LDP and Abe are in trouble, then the future of the BOJ"s QQE (with Yield Control) are in question. This is a problem because as Deutsche Bank reported late on Friday, "[our model] highlights the relative importance of BoJ purchases to Fed and ECB. For a 100 bn in annualized purchases of each, the BoJ has been associated with a 15 bps decline in term premium, almost twice the impact of either the Fed or the ECB. While the market is rightly concerned about the extent and timing of ECB taper, the BoJ is potentially much more important to the rate outlook as it was in the middle of last year."


But maybe Abe doesn"t even need to be ousted: according to Nobuyuki Nakahara, a former BOJ board member and Abe advisor, Kuroda shouldn’t serve another term as governor of the BOJ "because the central bank will need fresh ideas as it moves toward exiting years of unprecedented monetary easing."





"An exit will surely come up within the next five years and we need someone who can prepare for it," said Nobuyuki Nakahara, a former BOJ board member.



“He will fall into inertia and struggle to come up with bold new ideas. It’s the same in the private sector when a corporate president stays too long," he said.



With everyone expecting a political black swan to emerge out of Europe at the start of the year - only for all concerns to be laid to rest by the summer - could the source of 2017"s true political shock end up being Japan?



Shinzo Abe shouts "Banzai!" with members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
during the annual party convention in Tokyo

Saturday, June 17, 2017

Bond Yields - "You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet"

In Limbo or Playing Limbo?


We often refer to the state of being ‘in limbo’ as stuck on the edge of hell with no resolution… But remember, limbo is also a dance from Trinidad in which people compete to dance lower and lower under a bar until someone eventually collapses. This week in The Big Call we ask, how low can global bond yields go; and what could raise the bar, or will bond yields be stuck at current levels forever?


Bond bull alive and kicking?


The secular trend of declining bond yields has seen prices rise inexorably during a 30-year bull market. Our call from April 7th was to go long TLT on a short-term view – which has returned a decent 3.5% to date. But how long can this return continue in the face of rising leverage and deteriorating demographics? That’s something we considered in the Are You On This Yet? section of The Hack on May 19th…


Drowning in debt


Jawad Mian’s thought-provoking symposium this week, A Dozen Ideas to Get You Thinking Differently, sets up our discussion nicely:





“The US economic return on additional debt has fallen to about 20 cents on the dollar. That means 80 cents is servicing existing debt, which has been borrowed for the purpose of supporting unproductive consumption and jobs. This makes economic growth very sensitive to changes in interest rates.”



The diminishing return of each new unit of debt is making it harder and harder for governments and corporations alike to juice their growth and returns. With debt levels so high, the service costs become punishing. To avoid a default, interest rates must remain structurally lower for longer just to support the present debt. Furthermore, the debt has to grow just to service the exisitng debt. Think about that for a second?


Are higher rates already the death knell for the US economy?





“It would only take a 20% backup in interest rates before the debt service becomes problematic (depending on duration and the amount of outstanding debt). The 10-year Treasury yield nearly doubled from the summer 2016 low, which suggests the US economy is about to slow down, rather sooner than later.”



The economy is slowing, and yet with these debt levels across the world, the growth rate required to get out from under them is essentially mathematically impossible to achieve:



The path of least resistance for central banks becomes structurally lower interest rates, since a widespread debt jubilee is too politically unpopular, for now. That comes later.


Central banks are stuck between a rock and a hard place.


  • how to prevent those low rates blowing up (even bigger) asset bubbles

  • how to keep banks profitable so they can recapitalise organically

  • how to have any levers of monetary policy left during the next major downturn

Across the world central banks are in a bind, and so developed bond markets are sleepwalking toward a Japanese-style scenario of negative bond yields and a deflationary psychology.


*  *  *


Global bonds – The world tour


China


At the government level Chinese debt-to-GDP looks very reasonable at around 43%; but if we add in all the local debt, state-owned enterprises, and other forms of debt we get estimates of more like 250% of GDP, which makes China look rather Japanese. China does, however, have one advantage, which is a high GDP growth rate that can be used to shrink that debt load – but with so much growth generated from debt-fuelled investment rather than consumption, it will be hard structurally to grow the economy whilst weaning it off the debt.


Chinese government bond yields have been on the rise, which may actually reflect positive fundamentals in the economy. As Jim Walker’s Wealthy Nations observed in March,





“The rise in rates is a reflection of success and economic acceleration, not a reflection of economic problems. China will increase interest rates not because the authorities are worried about over-indebtedness and/or the amount of credit being extended.”



Cyclically, then, China seems OK for now – the PBOC has been stepping in with liquidity when needed as they try to steer the economy towards some corrective actions. However, the jury is out on how long they can keep this up.


For more in-depth consideration of Chinese debt dynamics, remember to check out CrossBorder Capital’s “The Financial Silk Road”.


US


The 10-year Treasury currently yields around 2.2%, a very low return by historical standards, especially when debt-to-GDP has ballooned to over 100%. Both metrics are now at their post-war level. Will foreigners question the US’s creditworthiness and abandon their debt?


As long as the USD remains the global reserve currency, demand for dollar debt will be high; and only the US bond market has the depth for this size of capital flows – i.e. many holders of Treasuries buy them for reasons other than risk/reward.


OK – but the world could abandon the dollar… Sure, but what’s the next largest alternative? The euro…


Greece


The Grecian debt crisis is now entering its seventh year of tedium. In that time debt-to-GDP has mushroomed from 126% to 179% – a debt level no nation has ever emerged from without some form of default or devaluation. Yet Greek bond yields have fallen from >30% in 2012 to just under 6% today.


With a succession of bailouts, Greece has trundled along on life support. As the old Soviet joke goes, ‘So long as they pretend to pay us, we will pretend to work’.


But what do people who want euro-denominated collateral do, then?


Germany


The 10-year yields are on the floor – 0.25%! This is due to a flight to quality in the Eurozone: If the EU breaks up, you are best off with bunds because the Germans have greater fiscal rectitude (although debt/GDP is still near 70%), and a new Deutsche Mark would be worth a lot more than a freshly minted drachma.


So what are we learning here? Bond yields – especially government ones – are not really reflecting economic risk/reward anymore. They reflect a belief that central banks will ease into perpetuity – or at the very least a belief in the ‘greater fool theory’.


This isn’t theoretical economics confined to classroom textbooks; we only have to look to Japan to see this train wreck in action.


Japan


Japan has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 250%! Yet the 10-year bond yields just a handful of basis points. What could possibly explain this? Deflation. Decades of deflation have meant that owners of any fixed monetary asset will see its value increase over time. Japan was stuck in a debt-deflation cycle until the recent advent of ‘Abenomics’ – the competitive devaluation and money-printing game that everybody else had been playing.


Either way, Japan has avoided default through extremely low interest rates, extremely high domestic bond holdings, and a highly cohesive society, all in combination with a weak currency and an export-led economy. Is this the future for other developed sovereign bonds?


The BoJ have only a plan A: Buy up all the bonds in issue. And after that? You can be sure that Japan will be at the vanguard of the next economic and monetary experiment. Remember that debt jubilee I mentioned?


Japan Debt to GDP vs Japanese Bond Yields



Source: Bloomberg


Could we see a bond scare?


The reality appears to be, it’s unlikely. Yes, an individual country like Greece can suffer a huge bond scare, but for larger nations with printing presses such as the US and Japan, the most likely outcome is simply more debt and more devaluation. And with plenty of money sloshing around chasing too few assets, bonds will probably continue to be bid.


The only thing that would reliably kill the bond market is higher interest rates from central banks. The trouble is, higher rates would also kill the market for everything else and trigger a depression.


Could an inflation scare occur? Demographics, unproductive debt, and technological advancements put the chance of a sustained period of inflation pretty low, despite (or because of) the best efforts of Central Bankers.



Baby Boomers are compounding the problem.


As we noted in The Hack on April 7th, ‘Baby Boomers Coming of Age’, the backdrop of an ageing demographic and massive pension black holes will structurally cap any rise in interest rates.





‘According to the Federal Reserve, unfunded state and local pension obligations have risen to $1.9 trillion from $292 billion since 2007. Throw in the private sector and that figure is far greater. At the same time pension funds have been pushed up the risk curve as interest rates from fixed income are simply inadequate. Baby Boomers have never been more exposed to equities and are going to start to drawdown their capital for retirement.’



The paradox is this: To fill that black hole and provide fixed income for retirement, we need bond yields above, say, 5%; but with yields above 5% the ability to service the debt mountain collapses and assets are liquidated. Wealth is devastated. Then, all those retirees will be shifting assets from equities into fixed income in the next decade, driving a huge wall of money into a bond market with diminishing yields.



What about cyclical considerations?


We have been stating for some time that the credit cycle is rolling over. Just last week Michael Lewitt noted:





“I no longer expect interest rates to rise significantly from current levels in the current cycle; they are more likely to fall as the economy stays weak and debt continues to build in both the public and private sectors. We could see short-term 25 or 50 basis point spikes in longer rates (10–30 years) based on an errant comment by a central banker or some piece of news, but rates are likely to stay down until the current business cycle, which is very long-in-the-tooth, ends.”



With the Fed raising rates into a slowdown, they will have to backpedal in the near future to soften the economic blow.

Sunday, May 28, 2017

Albert Edwards: "What On Earth Is Going On With US Wages"

When Albert Edwards predicted in late 2016 that a surge in wage inflation was imminent, we were confused by this prediction from the world"s preeminent deflationist: after all, not only had not a single economic indicator validated a tighter labor market despite unemployment just above 4%, but as we have have repeatedly demonstrated what little wage inflation existed, was attributable to managerial-level, supervisory positions while the bulk of job creation remained with minimum-wage jobs, which have continued to see virtually no wage growth. Even Morgan Stanley, a far greater bull than Edwards, one month ago admitted that "wage growth is leveling off, may be slowing."


Which is why we have to give Edwards credit: some 6 months after his initial call, he had the courage to do what is never easy and admit he was wrong, and that contrary to his expectations wages are not going up after all.





Talking about wrong, I have to put my hands up. I have been expecting US wage inflation to roar ahead over the past three months to well above 3%, yet every data release has surprised on the downside. Wage inflation, as measured by average hourly earnings, has actually levelled off at close to 2½% while wage inflation for ‘the workers’ is actually slowing (see chart below)! Strictly speaking, "the workers" are defined (by the BLS) as "those who are not primarily employed to direct, supervise, or plan the work of others. Hey, that"s me!




So with the concession aside, Edwards is left with even more question, starting with "What on earth is going on with US average hourly earnings?"





Three consecutive Employment Reports have seen this key measure of wage inflation surprise by its weakness. I feel especially foolish as I had written that wages were set to accelerate sharply, forcing the Fed to tighten aggressively and thereby driving both bond yields and the dollar higher. Doh! While many commentators last year, including the Fed, expressed surprise that US wage inflation had been so quiescent despite a tight labour market, I thought there was a simple explanation. I believe that nominal wages had not accelerated more rapidly through 2016 primarily because headline CPI inflation had been so subdued, staying in a 0-1% range for most of the last couple of years. Hence nominal wages did not need to accelerate rapidly for workers to be much better off as 2-2½% nominal wage inflation translated into  strong real wage rises of around 1½-2% - the most rapid for years (see circled area in chart below).





As headline CPI inflation surged this past six months, rapid real wage growth turned into real wage stagnation (see chart above). I believed that a tight labour market would prompt an aggressive reaction from "the workers" to maintain the previous 1½-2% rate of real wage inflation they had enjoyed and got used to through 2015 and 1H 2016. Hence I expected nominal wage inflation would roar upwards in 1Q this year. How wrong I was!



There is even more confusion in the data, because Edwards points out another disconnect: while the BLS" measure of hourly earnings has gone nowhere, and real earnings have in fact tumbled, the employment cost index has spiked, "with wage and Salaries jumping from a 0.5% rise in 4Q to rise by 0.8% in 1Q 2017 ? the fastest quarterly rise since 2007. On a yoy basis, this measure of wage inflation still showed a 45 degree upward trajectory into 1Q 2017 (see left-hand chart below). Adding benefits to wages and salaries, total compensation also rose by 2½%."



Then there is the issue of declining productivity, because when calculating productivity and unit labour cost growth, the BLS estimates non-farm businesses saw their workers compensation jump from the 3% average rate seen in 2016 to just shy of 4% yoy in 1Q 2017?. This has implications on corporate profits:





"Together with sluggish 1% productivity growth, this means that unit labour costs are rising by almost 3% yoy, well in advance of the rate by which corporates are able to raise their output prices (see right-hand chart above). The bottom line is that US corporate margins are suffering a savage squeeze and have been for some time. What then do I make of the heady 1Q company reporting round? Not much."



Perhaps in retrospect, between the divergent AHE and ECI data, Edwards was not entirely wrong, as he suggests:





The truth is that the closely watched average hourly earnings measure of wage inflation has not accelerated in response to a surge in headline CPI in the way I had expected. So strictly speaking I have been wrong and as such I must throw myself upon your bountiful mercy. But let me say in my defence that other measures of wage inflation have shown exactly the acceleration I had expected. The fight-back by labour to secure their rightful share of the economic pie is ongoing, but it seems likely that the savage downward trend in the share of labour compensation that had been in place since the 2001 recession seems to have at last been broken (see chart below). The laws of economics have not been abolished after all ? at least not in the US.




Yet while the jury may still be out on US wages between two contradictory data sets from the BLS, when one looks outside the US, things are clear: despite years of QE, there is no wage growth. For evidence, look no further than Japan. Edwards again:





Japan is becoming an economic enigma. Last week saw some truly astonishingly weak wage inflation data ? so weak that it sent the yen sharply lower on expectations that the Bank of Japan might need to step up their already ridiculously outsized QE programme to even higher levels. Wages for March fell by 0.4% yoy, well below both the expected 0.5% gain and February"s 0.4% rise. Even the far less erratic underlying wages (excluding overtime and bonus payments) weakened sharply and declined yoy in March. In real terms, total cash earnings were miserable too, falling by 0.8% from a flat reading in February (see charts below). Certainly on this measure Abenomics has been a total and utter failure.





The idea was simple, QE (or QQE as the Japanese call it) would as an indirect consequence send the yen sharply lower (as it did in 2013/14), which would push up headline CPI inflation (also buoyed by the 2014 VAT hike) and drive wages higher in what was a tight labour market.



And when I say tight, I mean properly tight. This is not the US, where most commentators agree there is likely to be more slack than the low headline unemployment numbers suggest due to the sharp decline in the participation rate since the last recession. By contrast, the Japanese labour market is unambiguously as tight as it ever has been in history (see left-hand chart below). Yet wage inflation remains moribund.





Without any real cost-push wage pressures, and with the initial inflationary impulse on headline and core CPI of the declining yen of 2013-14 receding into a distant memory, core CPI inflation (ex food and energy) has begun to fall once again (for this see right-hand chart above, and note that headline and CPI ex-food are rising moderately only because the yoy impact of the oil price has gone from negative last year to positive this year). So after all the trillions of dollars of QE and huffing and puffing, Abenomics has failed to deliver its much touted exit from the deflationary mire.



And before readers respond with "there is always more QE", the problem is that for both the ECB and BOJ, the answer is increasingly, "there isn"t" as both central banks are just months away from running out of eligible bonds to buy, beyond which point the entire bond market may simply lock up, or the central banks will have to even more actively start buying equities, with both outcomes effectively a nationalization of capital markets. And the last time we checked with the USSR, that strategy did not work out too well...

Thursday, May 25, 2017

Japan's "Womenomics" Is Working Just As Well As Abenomics... Terribly

Via Japan Subculture Research Center,


Japan is getting serious about gender equality - and there were absolutely no bribes paid by Japan to win the right to host the 2020 Olympics - and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima is under control. Decide for yourself which of these three statements is the most untrue.


Womenomics was touted by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as his progressive policy to elevate the status of women in what is still a very sexist and unequal society, where women are far from being empowered. The Global Gender Gap report published last year noted that Mr. Abe and the LDP’s pledge to bridge the gender divide resulted in actually widening the gulf, with Nippon sliding down a few notches to 111th in terms of world gender equality. 



It’s hard to see women in Japan being “empowered” when they can be sexually assaulted with near impunity. The odds that their assailant will be arrested, or prosecuted are low–less than a coin toss. And if he is actually prosecuted–he can sometimes walk free, with no jail time and no criminal record,  by paying damages and saying, “I’m sorry.” It’s a situation that the Abe administration could have changed but neglected to do so, tabling newly revised criminal codes to instead focus on passing a conspiracy bill that the United Nations warns could erode civil liberties.


Of course, some would argue that “womenomics” have never been about elevating the status of women in Japan - it’s always been about keeping Japanese business thriving and hopefully encouraging woman to work - and breed. Of course, pregnancy in the workplace often is greeted with bullying from all sides. Abe’s vision of Womenomics has certainly never been about improving the lives of Japan’s single mothers, 50% of whom live in poverty. In fact, other than talking about “shining women–it’s not clear exactly what he wants for Japan’s future potential birthing machines.*


The current Minister of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, is of course, also a man, and also in charge of improving Japan’s birthrate. Do we need to say more?



Yes, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe and the LDP are gungho about Gender Equality. Meet Katsunobu Kato, his home page will convince you.


Recently, Bloomberg published an interview with Democratic Party leader Renho, in which she pointed out the obvious, Womenomics is all talk and no walk.





“They should be ashamed to use the word ‘Womenomics’,” Democratic Party leader Renho, the 49-year-old mother of twins, said in an interview in Tokyo late Thursday when asked about the term Abe often uses to describe his efforts. “It’s an embarrassment.”



Abe had vowed to eliminate waiting lists for childcare in a bid to draw more women into the workforce to make up for Japan’s shrinking population. He also sought to have women take 30 percent of management positions in all fields by 2020.


On both goals he’s falling well short: Japan was 111th in the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap ranking for 2016, down 10 places on the previous year.





“About 80 percent of those who take childcare leave are women, and if they’re forced to wait for daycare, that means unemployment,” Renho said.



“You either get demoted or you give up on work. What’s womenomics about if women are being forced to make such sad choices?”



For the rest of the article, go to


Abe’s Policies Failing Women, Japan Opposition Chief Says





*Reference to women as “birthing machines” is sarcasm. We know that the LDP also thinks of women as much more than that–as potential nurses for the elderly, expert green tea brewers for the office, and caretakers of the children that they should be giving birth to right now for the greater prosperity of Japan."


Thursday, May 18, 2017

Japan GDP Rises 2.2%; Longest Growth Stretch In 11 Years

In the same quarter in which the US teetered on the verge of contraction (supposedly due to inclement weather despite not one but two seasonal adjustments meant to eliminate "residual seasonality"), Japan grew at the fastest pace in a year and nearly triple that of the US.


On Thursday morning, Japan"s Cabinet Office reported that Japan"s Q1 GDP rose at a 2.2% annualized pace, beating estimates of 1.7% growth, and up from the 1.2% SAAR growth in Q4 of 2016. It was also Japan"s 5th consecutive quarter of positive GDP, the longest stretch of growth going back 11 years. 



On a sequential basis, Japan"s economy grew by 0.5% in Q1, up from 0.3% in Q4, and in line with expectations (which begs a question, how did economists who predicted 0.5% sequential growth get 1.7% annualized, while the actual number was indeed 0.5%, yet when annualized resulted in 2.2%. The answer is probably in non-GAAP rounding).


Broken down by components, domestic demand rose 0.4% in Q4 compared to the previous quarter, when consumption posted a modest decline. Residential investment was the biggest growth component of private demand, rising by 0.7%, while public demand was a more modest 0.1%. Private inventories added 0.1%, while net exports rose 2.1% in the quarter, down modestly from 3.4%, due to the 5% increase in the Yen over the time period. Imports were a 0.2% offset to annualized GDP growth, after growing by 1.4% sequentially.



The number easily beat Goldman"s expectations. This is what the bank said ahead of the report: "We forecast +1.7% qoq annualized real GDP growth in Q1, accelerating from +1.2% in 2016Q4. Steady export growth, recovering consumer spending and inventory accumulation are the main contributors to Q1 growth, while we expect small correction to private capex, which advanced +8.4% qoq annualized in the prior quarter. Positive GDP growth in Q1 would mark a fifth quarter of sequential growth, for the first time in 11 years, confirming the solid state of Japanese economy."


Some other economist reactions via Bloomberg:


  • "Exports have taken the lead in the recovery, and domestic demand wasn’t bad, showing resilience with household spending turning positive," said Masaki Kuwahara, senior economist at Nomura Securities Co., which correctly forecast the 2.2 percent expansion.

  • "Looking ahead, the growth rate will slow a bit, if not turn negative, toward the second half of this year as China’s economic indicators are weakening a bit. I’m expecting exports to slow down, weighing on the overall growth rate,” said Kuwahara.

  • "It’s a pretty impressive number but I don’t think this can continue for a while," said Takashi Shiono, an economist at Credit Suisse Group AG.

  • "Uncertainties are increasing rapidly with the chaos at the White House and a pickup cycle in global production could end soon," said Shiono. "The risk-off sentiment in the market will put pressure on the yen to strengthen and that will weigh on Japan’s economy."

The strong GDP growth may come as disappointment for Japan bulls, however. Already the BOJ has quietly tapered its bond purchases from JPY80 trillion/year to JPY60 trillion, and Kuroda, with less than a year left on his tenure, will be looking for excuses to not only officially taper purchases - here he has no choice as the BOJ has about 1 year left of eligible bonds to monetize - but to potentially give the old rate hike experiment another try, even if the BOJ"s latest minute reluctantly admitted that despite labor shortages the economy has failed to generate the much needed inflation. Today"s strong GDP print just gave Kuroda the excuse he needs to hint at even more monetary tightening, assuming of course the the threat of US presidential impeachment has been postponed indefinitely.