China Beige Book Warns Economic Slowdown Has Begun

When it comes to the global economy, few things matter as much as China, the trajectory of its economy and especially the pace and impulse of its credit creation, which is ironic because virtually all data coming out of China is fabricated and manipulated, and thoroughly untrustworthy, either on purpose or "by accident."

The latest example of the former was highlighted over the weekend, when we discussed that a nationwide Chinese audit found some local governments inflated revenue levels and raised debt illegally, once again making a mockery of China"s credibility on the global stage. As Bloomberg reported ten cities, counties or districts in the Yunnan, Hunan and Jilin provinces, as well as the southwestern city of Chongqing, inflated fiscal revenues by 1.55 billion yuan, the National Audit Office said in a statement on its website dated Dec. 8.

An even more blatant example of the former was highlighted in October ahead of China"s Communist Party Congress, when the local securities watchdog literally "advised" some loss-making companies to avoid publishing quarterly results ahead of the Congress as authorities sought to ensure stock-market stability during the critical gathering of China"s political elite.  As a result, at least 17 Shenzhen-listed companies announced delays to their earnings reports from Oct. 20 to Oct. 24, up from three during the same period last year.

However, now that the Party Congress is long over, China"s recent economic data offer a "warning for 2018" now that Beijing"s leaders are less motivated to prop up fake "growth" for purely optical purposes. That is the opinion of China Beige Book, and its president Leland Miller who said that "Incentives to ensure the economy was growing smartly at the time of the Communist Party Congress do not apply as next year wears on," CBB president Leland Miller and chief economist Derek Scissors said in a report released on Wednesday.

According to a private survey by CBB International, which collects anecdotal accounts similar to those in the Federal Reserve’s Beige Book, Q4 results already show some signs of a transition to slower growth,  The most recent sampling of 3,300 Chinese businesses showed:

• Hiring stopped accelerating due to a strong base of comparison


• Manufacturing orders also stopped accelerating 


• Inventory accumulation "is too fast for comfort"


• Sales-price inflation is weaker than in the second quarter


• Wage gains have stopped accelerating

Come to think of it, the CBB data is not that different from the official Chinese data which showed continued slowdown across most economic verticals:

 

"None of these is genuinely alarming yet, and none would be out of place in a typical quarter," the CBB"s Miller wrote. "But the first results after a CPC are not a typical quarter. If you expect a noticeable slowdown in 2018, the first post-Congress returns support those expectations."

To be sure, even here there is confusion: while at the 19th Party Congress, which marked the start of President Xi Jinping’s second five-year term, top leaders signaled less emphasis on pursuing economic growth at all costs, and greater dedication to deleveraging, during the main economic planning conclave in December which set priorities for 2018, they pledged to focus on "critical battles" against financial risk, pollution and poverty in coming years. Meanwhile, deleveraging - Xi Jinping"s endless crusade - was strangely forgotten. Indeed, as Goldman observed last week, "there was no explicit mention of deleveraging" as "recent policy statements increasingly use the phrase "control of leverage", in our view likely a reflection of increasing realism in policy making." This significant policy reversal prompted the WSJ last week to report that Beijing has effectively given up on its deleveraging pledge.

Leverage or not, the table below - courtesy of Bloomberg - shows CBB’s breakdown of how support for the expansion may erode:

Furthermore, evidence from the retail sector doesn’t support the government’s claims of a consumption boom, CBB said. While some large firms have strong sales and profitability improved this quarter, retail revenue growth finished last among major sectors, Miller and Scissors wrote.

"Retail’s performance is decidedly uninspiring. Revenue, capex, and hiring are inferior to manufacturing, while inventory growth is much higher."

The good news: overall hiring has held up and was generally in line with the prior quarter, with 48% of firms staffing up and 3% cutting workers. "Job growth remained stronger at state firms than private, regardless of company size," CBB’s survey found, although as we will show in a subsequent post, while hiring may remain strong, wages are tumbling in a troubling indication that China"s middle class is set for imminent disappointment and anger.

Meanwhile, inflation in wages, prices, and input costs were also roughly the same as in the prior quarter, and were moderately faster than last year, the report said. Profit growth improved.

That said, despite predictions of gloom as we enter 2018, the world’s second-largest economy proved bears fully wrong this year, exceeding analyst estimates in the first and second quarters, and is now on pace for the first full-year acceleration in growth since 2010, with GDP seen growing at 6.8% this year and 6.5% in 2018. There is a problem: this growth was on the back of a near record credit impulse since the February 2016 Shanghai accord, an impulse which is now over.

Which means that all else equal, and absent another gargantuan credit injection in the coming months, China"s bears are about to have their day in the sun all over again.

Lacy Hunt On The Unintended Consequences Of Federal Reserve Policies

Authored by Mike Shedlock via www.themaven.net/mishtalk,

The Financial Repression Authority interviewed Lacy Hunt, Chief Economist at Hoisington Management on Fed policies.

The interview below first appeared on the FRA website along with a video.

The emphasis in italics is mine.

FRA: Hi, welcome to FRA’s Roundtable Insight. Today, we have Dr. Lacy Hunt. He’s an internationally recognized economist and the Executive V.P. and Chief Economist of Hoisington Investment Management Company, a firm that manages over $4.5 billion USD and specializing in the management of fixed income accounts for large institutional clients. He also served in the past as Senior Economist for the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, where he was a member of the Federal Reserve System Committee on Financial Analysis. Welcome. Dr. Hunt.

Dr. Lacy Hunt: Nice to be with you, Richard.

FRA: Great. I thought we’d have a discussion on a variety of topics relating to the economy and the financial markets. You recently mentioned that you thought this was the worst economic expansion recovery in U.S. history since 1790. Wow. Can you elaborate?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: If you calculate the average growth rate in the expansions since 1790, this is a long-running expansion, but it’s the slowest and in the last 10 years the household sector lagged very, very badly. The rate of growth in real disposable household income per capita is only 0.9 percent per year. And in the last 12 months, we’re up only 0.6 percent per year. So it’s a long-running expansion, but it’s been a poor expansion. There are certainly problems with some of the earlier data, but this appears to be the slowest expansion since the turn of the 18th Century and our households are the main problem for the growth rate lag.

FRA: And do you point a finger for this cause as primarily on the Federal Reserve or do you see structural changes happening to the economy?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: I think that the main element suppressing growth is the heavily leveraged U.S. economy. We have too much public and private debt, and this debt does not generate an income stream for the aggregate economy. As a result of the prolonged indebtedness, which is on the verge of going much higher because of problems in the governmental sector, the economy is now experiencing very poor demographics. We have a baby bust, a household formation bust, and the lowest birth rate since 1937. These demographics are exacerbating the problems because we have too much of the wrong type of debt and thus the velocity of money has been falling since 1997. Velocity this year is only 1.43 percent, which is the lowest since 1949. Furthermore, the debt creates a situation where monetary policy capabilities are asymmetric. In other words, a lot of action is needed to provoke even a muted impact on the economy, whereas the slightest monetary tightening goes a long way in depressing economic activity. So the root cause of this underperformance is extreme indebtedness.

FRA: And what about the Federal Reserve? How has it undermined the economy’s ability to grow?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: The Fed’s most serious mistake was made in the 1990s up until 2006 during which they allowed the private sector to become extremely over-indebted with the wrong type of debt. And, in essence, I think that quantitative easing, through the push for higher stock prices, created more problems than it has solved for the economy. QE caused the corporate executives to switch funds from real capital investments into financial investments through the paying of higher dividends, buying shares of their own companies, and buying back their shares from others. While this type of action does produce a higher stock market; it doesn’t generate a higher standard of living. And so, Federal Reserve policy has not improved the economy, although it certainly has well served components of the economy.

FRA: And due to that do you think that there’s been too much financial investment versus real economy investment in terms of diverting the economic financial resources away from the real economy?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: I think that’s the principal problem. Business debt last year reached a record high relative to GDP. As I said earlier, Fed policies have created a higher stock market but have not generated an improved standard of living. When the Reserve undertook quantitative easing, it was a signal to the corporate executives that the Fed preferred and would protect financial investments. But that meant financial assets were preferred over real side investments. And so QT is intermingling with the growth-depressing effects of too much debt. And the debt levels are getting ready to move substantially higher in our governmental sector. Government debt is already approaching 106 percent of GDP, a record high with the exception of a brief period during World War II. And by 2030, federal debt will be approximately 125 percent of GDP. For a long time, we’ve known about the issues that would inflate the entitlements — such as the prior-mentioned demographic problems — but there is an increasing likelihood that new federal programs with expenditure increases will further accelerate the growth in federal debt. I think there is clear evidence that increases in federal debt at these high levels relative to GDP over any measurable length of time, reduces economic activity. Thus, the multiplier is not a positive but negative figure, or otherwise exactly what economist David Ricardo hypothesized in his 1821 work. I have looked at the relationship between per capita changes in real GDP and government debt per capita and the relationship is negative, not positive. And so, we’re trying to solve an indebtedness problem by taking on more debt. You can get intermittent spurts of economic activity and inflation, but ultimately the debt is a millstone around the economy’s neck.

FRA: So would you say that we have migrated to a sort of financial economy?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: Let me give you a couple of examples. There’s so much liquidity in the financial markets, particularly the stock market, that a lot of the economic news is constructively interpreted even when it’s unconstructive. Virtually the world believes that the United States is experiencing large job gains and the idea that such productivity may be incorrect is hardly considered. But the rate of growth in payroll employment on a 12-month basis peaked at 2.4 percent in early 2015 and for the last 12 months, has sunk to 1.4 percent. What is even more critical — if you look at just the expansions and don’t include the recessions since 1968 – is that the average growth in employment in an expansion year was 1.9 percent. And in the last 12 months, we are half a percentage point under that figure. Yet, given these numbers, there is an erroneous perception that the employment gains are strong. And this view undermines the improvement in the standard of living. And because of the liquidity and the need of some investors to fully participate in the rising stock market, investors tend to overlook other important developments. If we go back to the 12 months ending November of 2015, real average hourly earnings were up about 2.5 percent. And in the latest 12 months, real average hourly earnings gained a miniscule 0.2 percent. The liquidity tends to push the focus away from the more realistic interpretation of the economy for certain types of assets.

However, the weak performance overall and the deceleration in some of the indicators that I just referred to is not unnoticed by the bond market. So, we have a dichotomy in which the stock market is strongly up but the long-term bond yields are down. Now, the short-term yields are up because they are under the control or heavy influence of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is in the process of raising the short-term rates and winding down their portfolio. They sold 20 billion dollars of government agency securities in October and November, pushing up the short-term rates. Erstwhile, the long-term rates — which look at some of the more important economic fundamentals — are actually declining.

Another element not in the public understanding, since the Federal Reserve no longer produces this sort of monetary analysis, is a very sharp slowdown in the money supply’s rate of growth, bank loans, and within important credit aggregates. Last year, the M2 money supply was up 7 percent. In the latest 12 months, it decelerated to less than 4.5 percent. The rate of growth in bank loans and commercial paper, which topped out on a 12- month basis about 9 percent, is now under 4 percent. So the Fed is raising the short-term rates, reducing the monetary base, and causing a tightening in the financial side of the economy. Some investors understand what is happening and yet it’s not in the general psyche because such monetary analysis is increasingly rare.

However, another more public indicator is the very dramatic flattening of the yield curve. And when the yield curve flattens in such a way, first of all, it’s a symptom that monetary restraint is beginning to bite. Now, the slowdown in money supply growth and the bank credit flattening of the yield curve will occur well before there is any noticeable impact on a broad array of economic indicators or long lags in monetary policy. But when the yield curve starts flattening, that intensifies the effect of the monetary tightening because it takes away or, at the very least, greatly reduces the profitability of the banks and all those that act like banks. Banks make a profit by borrowing short and lending long. When those spreads recede, bank profitability is hurt, particularly for the higher, riskier types of bank loans since not enough spread exists to cover the risk premium. So the banks begin to pull back, further intensifying the restraint pressing on economic growth. To the vast majority of investors, we have an economy that is apparently doing well, but in fact there are elements right beneath the surface that strongly suggest to me that the outlook for 2018 is considerably more guarded than conventional wisdom implies.

FRA: And do you see the potential for an inverted yield curve in the near future?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: I’m not sure that we will have to invert because the economy is so heavily indebted and the velocity of money is its lowest since 1949. Now, a number of people have pointed out that we typically invert before a recession and historically such inversions have been the case most of the time — but not always if you go back far enough in time — and you should since this is not a normal economy. For example, money supply growth since 1900 has averaged about 7 percent per annum, whereas, currently, the rate of growth in M2 is about 36 percent below the long-term average, indicating a very weak growth rate. And the velocity of money is lower than all of the years since 1942 — with the exception of 7 years — and the economy has never been this heavily indebted. And so the yield curve could possibly approach inversion, but it may or may not occur or stay there very long because at that stage of the game, the flattening of the yield curve will greatly intensify all the other effects — the reduction in the reserve, monetary, and credit aggregates, as well as the weakness in velocity. And when this reduction becomes apparent, the Federal Reserve will not be able to reverse gears quickly enough to ameliorate the impact produced upon future economic growth.

FRA: So do you still see a secular low in bond yields on the long into the yield curve remaining in the future sometime?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: The lows have not been seen. The path there will remain extremely volatile. We will have episodes in which the long yields rise. My attitude is that the long yields can go up over the short run for any number of causes. While many elements work out of the system in the long end, yields cannot stay up. When yields go up — especially now that the yield curve is flattening — this intensifies monetary restraint, which puts downward pressure on commodities. This puts upward pressure on the value of the dollar and cuts back on the lending operations. Something I think has been somewhat overlooked in general euphoria over the strength of economic indicators, is the that commercial and industrial loans for all of the banks in the United States are now only up one-tenth of one percent in the last 12 months. There are forward-looking elements that have historically been very important for signaling that change is ahead. They don’t tell us the timing — timing is always difficult — but they are flashing signals that should be observed.

FRA: And as this plays out, do you see monetary policy and fiscal policy is changing, like will we get fiscal policy stimulus? Will there be a change in monetary policy and how will that look like?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: Here’s my attitude: the new federal initiatives, whether tax cuts or infrastructure or otherwise will not provide a boost to the economy if they are funded with increases in debt — that’s where we’re at. And by the way, it’s been that way for some time. If you go back to 2009, we had a one-trillion-dollar stimulus package that was said to be inflationary and was going to boost economic growth, but yet we still had this very poor expansion and little inflation except for intermittent bouts here and there, largely from highly-priced inelastic goods. All the while, the inflation rate has trended lower.

For example, when President Reagan cut taxes, government debt was 31 percent of GDP and now that’s 106 percent on its way to 120-125 percent. And so if you go back and if you read Ricardo’s great article in 1821, he was asked whether it made a difference as to whether the Napoleonic wars were financed by taxes or by borrowing. Ricardo said that, theoretically, either way private sector activity was going to be suppressed. Now we have a lot of evidence, including some that I produced, that the government multiplier is negative, not positive, over a three-year period. Thus, the tax cuts may work for a very short while, but not on balance. And if the tax cuts were revenue-neutral and financed by reductions in government expenditures that would be a positive since the evidence shows tax multipliers are more favorable than expenditure multipliers. Such a theoretical proposal would provide greater efficiency for private sector spending and government spending. There’s also evidence that you would lower the cost of capital, but that’s not what we’re talking about is it? We’re talking about a debt-financed tax cut and we’re not talking about a revenue-neutral infrastructure plan, just as we were not talking about a revenue-neutral stimulus package in 2009. We’re talking about the debt-financed variety of tax cuts and at this stage of the game, this will make us more vulnerable, except for a few fleeting instances.

I will say this: when you have a debt-financed infrastructure program or tax cut, there will be pockets within the economy that will benefit, but the aggregate economic performance will not benefit and so fiscal policy, as I see it, is not really going to be helpful. The risk is that the debt buildup will add to the problems. There is extensive academic research indicating that when government debt rises above 90 percent of GDP for more than five years, this trend will reduce the economy’s growth rate by a third. Remember, we’re at 106 percent debt to GDP and there’s evidence these higher levels of debt have a non-linear effect. In other words, we use up growth at a faster pace. And there’s a lot of evidence from the available data that we’re even losing a half of our growth rate from the trend. For example, GDP has risen at 2.1 percent per capita since 1790. The latest 10 years produced a reduction to 1.0 percent. And so we should have lost only seven-tenths or come down at 1.3 over 1 but we didn’t and this is a consequence that we have to deal with. We’re not in a position to ignore the debt levels. Fiscal policy can be talked about, we can debate about it, and we can proclaim its benefits, but I don’t see them in the current environment just as I didn’t see them in 2009. I would change my tune if they were revenue-neutral, but that’s not the issue here.

To me, inflation is a money-price-wage spiral not a wage-price spiral as with the Phillips curve. The way inflations begin is by money supply growth acceleration not being offset by weakness in velocity, which shifts the aggregate demand curve inward. Remember, the aggregate demand curve is equal to money times the velocity by algebraic substitution as evidenced in all the leading textbooks on macroeconomics. So you have declines in the money supply and velocity, which will make the aggregate demand curve shift inward over time. This shift gives you a lower price level and a lower level of real GDP. It doesn’t happen every quarter or even every year, but it’s the basic trend. Thus, monetary policy is in the process not of decelerating money supply growth and by a significant amount. If the Fed adheres to their schedule of quantitative tightening, I calculate M2 will grow by the end of the first quarter – it’s currently running around four and a half percent – and the year over year growth rate will be down to less than 3 percent. And so monetary policy is taking steps to lower the reserve monetary and credit aggregates, and these actions will further flatten the curve because they can press the short rates upward. But I think the long-term investors will understand that the inflationary prospects on a fundamental basis are weakening not strengthening.

FRA: And do you see these trends as being exacerbated on the emerging government pension fund crisis? Could there be more debt used to solve that like for bailouts? Do you see that potentially happening?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: Well the main problem with government debt is that we’re going to have approximately one million folks a year reach age 70 in the next 14 to 15 years and we’ve known that this was coming, but we didn’t prepare for it. We’ve made a lot of promises under Social Security Medicare and the Affordable Care Act and government debt will have to be used to fund the entitlement benefits — I don’t see any other way around it. Another overlooked problem is that the actual federal fiscal situation is much worse than these surface numbers. For example, in the last three years, the budget deficit worsened each year. If you sum the budget deficits for 2015, 2016 and 2017, the sum is 1.2 trillion, but a lot of what was previously called “outlays” have been moved off budget — we call them investments (such as student loans) and there are other examples. The actual increase in federal debt in the last three years is 3.2 trillion. So the budget deficit is actually greatly understating what is happening to the level of federal debt which wasn’t always the case. Furthermore, the deficit was made worse by a 2015 bipartisan deal between Congress and the White House. And while neither party is blameless — they both agreed on the deal — yet it doesn’t change the fact that the federal situation is deteriorating and at a much worse rate than the deficit numbers themselves indicate.

FRA: And what about for state and local jurisdiction locales, in terms of their government pension funds? Could there be federal level bailouts at that level?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: Again, what are they going to bail them out with? You’re going to have to sell Federal Securities. And one of the multipliers on new sales of Federal debt is negative, not positive. Forget what was taught you in your macroeconomic class 30, 20, or even 15 years ago. When I was in graduate school, I was taught that the government multiplier was somewhere between four and five percent. Now, it looks like the multiplier is at best zero and even possibly slightly negative.

FRA: Great insight as always. How can our listeners learn more about your work, Dr. Hunt?

Dr. Lacy Hunt: We put out a quarterly letter as a public service. Write to us at hoisingtonmgt.com and we’ll put your name on the subscription list. We don’t spam you with marketing so please go ahead and subscribe.

FRA: Okay, great. Thank you very much for being on the Program, Dr. Hunt. Thank you.

Dr. Lacy Hunt: My pleasure Richard. Nice to be with you

Economics as Taught

Note Lacy"s comments on what he learned in graduate school. Lacy once told me that he had to "unlearn" nearly everything he was taught in school about economic.

Multiple generations of economists have been trained to believe inflation is a good thing, saving is bad, that there are no consequences for piling up debt.

 

Warren Buffett"s Favorite Indicator Just Flashed a Major Warning

It is clear stocks are in a massive bubble based on their Price to Sale (P/S valuation).

What about the economy?

Warren Buffett once famously stated that his favorite means of valuing stock was the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio.

Below is a chart for this metric. As you can see, the stock market today is as overvalued relative to the economy as it was at the peak of the 1999 Tech Mania.

So stocks are overvalued based on the most reliable corporate data point (revenues) and they are also overvalued relative to the economy. Scratch that, they’re not overvalued… they’re trading at 1999-Tech Bubble insanity levels.

We all remember what came after that...

What"s coming will take time for this to unfold, but as I recently told clients of my Private Wealth Advisory report, we"re currently in "late 2007" for the coming crisis. However, there is one main difference between 1999 and today...

Namely, that the Fed has been INTENTIONALLY creating bubbles for nearly 20 years today... and it"s out of more senior asset classes to use!

Let me explain...

The late ‘90s was the Tech Bubble.

When that burst in the mid-‘00s, the Fed created a bubble in housing.

When that burst in ’08 the Fed created a bubble in US sovereign bonds or Treasuries.

And because these bonds are the bedrock of the US financial system, the “risk-free rate” of return against which ALL risk assets are valued, when the Fed did this it created a bubble in EVERYTHING (hence our coining of the term “The Everything Bubble” and our bestselling book by the same name).

On that note, we are putting together an Executive Summary outlining all of these issues as well as what’s to come when The Everything Bubble bursts.

It will be available exclusively to our clients. If you’d like to have a copy delivered to your inbox when it’s completed, you can join the wait-list here:

https://phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/TEB.html

Best Regards

Graham Summers

Chief Market Strategist

Phoenix Capital Research

One Bank Is Unsure If Any Humans Still Trade Stocks In Japan, Or Have All Moved To Bitcoin

While the wholesale disappearance of retail traders from stock markets is hardly a novel observation, it has taken on a whole new meaning in Japan, where the lack of carbon-based investors has prompted Deutsche Bank to ask if "Japan"s stocks are still traded at all by humans."

As Deutsche strategist Masao Muraki writes, since the US presidential election, Japanese stocks (in this case the TOPIX index) have been almost entirely defined by just three things: US stocks (S&P 500), the implied volatility (VIX), and USDJPY. This is shown in the model correlation chart below.

And while some observers think that foreigners are buying Japanese stocks on hopes for Abenomics following the Lower House election, this aspect is not apparent in the Figure above according to Deutsche. Instead, according to the German bank, it is the 10Yr US yields  that determine relative performance of Japanese and US financial stocks most directly. Additionally, interest rates, forex, and option prices (implied volatility) are defining absolute share prices for Japanese life insurers and banks, as shown in the charts below.

Furthermore, while financial institutions delivered some surprises in earnings announcements and shareholder returns and major developments took place in bank and insurers capital regulations in 2017 too, Deutsche notes that it "cannot find any indications of active change in allocations to life insurers and banks by investors due to these factors."

These observations prompt Deutsche to ask "a basic question", namely "whether the power of price decisions for Japanese stocks (particularly financial stocks) have shifted from people to algorithms or AI." Some additional thoughts:

Shift to passive fund management has accelerated, partially due to the impact of the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rules, and the trading share of active funds, which follow decisions led by human, is declining. With reduced influence, active funds appear to be focusing on sectors with drastic fundamentals changes (such as technology sector). In fact, more than 70% of inquiries from overseas equity investors to our insurance, securities, and other financial sectors team in December were about SBI, which indirectly owns cryptcurrencies. Reduction of active management costs due to MiFID2 might accelerate this activity.

And since Deutsche is clearly correct that increasingly more, if not the vast majority, of trading decisions and execution has shifted from humans to machines, the outcome is concerning, because as the German bank notes, "if the price formation based on model is prolonged, the gap between price and fundamentals will be wider. Thus, stock price correction may occur periodically."

Yet while Japanese equities may no longer be interesting to local humans, the same can not be said for bitcoin, where as the same DB strategist "discovered" two weeks ago, it was mostly "Mr. Watanabe" trading the world"s most popular cryptocurrency:

An 11 December Nikkei report stated that 40% of cryptocurrency trading in Oct-Nov was yen-denominated. Japanese traders have reportedly come to account for nearly half of cryptocurrency trading since China started to shut down cryptocurrency exchanges, and this is said to be widely known among industry insiders (various estimates exist). This report shows that Japanese men in their 30s and 40s who are engaged in leveraged FX trading (or who used to trade but have stopped) are driving the cryptocurrency market.

This in turn prompted us to wonder, tongue-in-cheek, if Bitcoin wasn"t a secretive ploy by the BOJ - which has had a far more permissive approach to bitcoin cryptocurrencies than its central bank peers - to boost Japanese animal spirits, which had been squashed by three decades of chronic deflation and disenchantment with rigged equities. Today, Deutsche Bank poses a similar question when it asks "Will Bitcoin ignite the “speculative spirit” of Japanese people?"

We will be closely monitoring the risk-taking stance of Japanese retail investors in 2018 in light of the management of ¥900trn of the ¥1,800trn as deposits in overall personal financial assets. Japanese retail investors eagerly purchased certain assets at prices with little support from fundamentals during the bubble period in the 1980s and the IT bubble period around 2000. Symbolic choices were NTT shares that listed in February 1987 for the former and Hikari Tsushin shares that listed in 1999 for the latter (Figure 1).

 

 

 

The emergence of “Bitcoin wealthy” might ignite the “speculative spirit” of Japanese people with strong follower aspirations.

Taken to its extreme, encouraging speculation in bitcoin - and in general any asset that is up over 15x YTD - would be a perfect way to rekindle not only animal spirits, but Japan"s reflationary impetus.  One can see why the BOJ could, if not would, be behind such a "wealth creation" mechanism.

Finally, as Deutsche accurately points out, "of course, speculation at prices with flimsy fundamentals support unleashes strong backlash once asset prices weaken. Overly leveraged trades, in particular, are a concern. Cryptocurrency prices plunged on 22 December, and we think this impacted retail investors using margin trades."

Well, not really, because the December 22 plunge is now long forgotten, and the real question one should ask is whether the Bank of Japan had anything to do with the sharp rebound in bitcoin which plunged as low as $10,500 last week before surging back to $16,000 earlier today...

Bubble Watch: The Fed KNOWS We"re in a 1999-Type Mania...

The Fed raised rates another 0.25% the week before last.

This marks the 5th rate hike since the Fed embarked on its policy tightening in December 2015 and the fourth rate hike in the last 12 months. The Fed’s latest statement also indicates it plans on raising rates three more times in 2018.

It is easy to gloss over the significance of this, but the Fed’s actions are indeed unusual; other major Central Banks (the Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank and Bank of England) are all currently running QE programs (the BoJ, ECB and BoE) or openly printing new money to buy stocks outright (the SNB).

What precisely is the Fed doing? Why the urge to tighten when other banks are all printing new money by the billions?

The following quotes from Fed offer us clues.

Fed Monetary Policy Report, June 2017:

“Forward price-to-earnings ratios for equities have increased to a level well above their median of the past three decades,

Fed minutes, July 2017:

"Since the April assessment, vulnerabilities associated with asset valuation pressures had edged up from notable to elevated, as asset prices remained high or climbed further, risk spreads narrowed, and expected and actual volatility remained muted in a range of financial markets."

Janet Yellen response to question from IMF Panel, October 2017:

Market valuations “are at high level in historical terms” when assessed on metrics akin to price-earnings ratios,

Fed Minutes, October 2017:

"In light of elevated asset valuations and low financial market volatility, several participants expressed concerns about a potential buildup of financial imbalances,"

Janet Yellen during Fed presser December 13th, 2017:

Stock valuations are at high end of historical levels.

I want to be clear on the significance of these statements.

The Fed’s primary role is to maintain financial stability. This means that the Fed will always downplay risks in its public statements. Indeed, former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke once stated that Fed policy is “98% talk, 2% action.”

With that in mind, the above quotes are astonishing in their clarity: the Fed is explicitly stating (in Fed terms) that the markets are in a bubble. And the Fed didn’t just do this once, the Fed has been warning about asset valuations/froth in the system for six months straight.

So just how “frothy” are things that the Fed is being so explicit?

Try “1999-levels” frothy.

Perhaps the best means of measuring frothiness in stocks is the Price to Sales (P/S) multiple. Most investors prefer to use Price to Earnings (P/E), but I am wary of that method because earnings can easily be fudged via gimmicks (different methods of depreciation, write-offs, reducing loan loss reserves, tax loopholes, etc.).

Sales, on the other hand, are very hard to fudge. Either money came in the door, or it didn’t. And if a company gets caught fudging its revenues, someone goes to jail.

With that in mind, consider that the S&P 500’s current P/S multiple has surpassed its former all time peak from 1999: a period that is now widely considered to be the single largest stock bubble in history.

Put simply, stocks are extraordinarily overvalued by a reliable measure.

H/T Bill King

However, there is one main difference between 1999 and today...

Namely, that the Fed has been INTENTIONALLY creating bubbles for nearly 20 years today... and it"s out of more senior asset classes to use!

Let me explain...

The late ‘90s was the Tech Bubble.

When that burst in the mid-‘00s, the Fed created a bubble in housing.

When that burst in ’08 the Fed created a bubble in US sovereign bonds or Treasuries.

And because these bonds are the bedrock of the US financial system, the “risk-free rate” of return against which ALL risk assets are valued, when the Fed did this it created a bubble in EVERYTHING (hence our coining of the term “The Everything Bubble” and our bestselling book by the same name).

On that note, we are putting together an Executive Summary outlining all of these issues as well as what’s to come when The Everything Bubble bursts.

It will be available exclusively to our clients. If you’d like to have a copy delivered to your inbox when it’s completed, you can join the wait-list here:

https://phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/TEB.html

Best Regards

Graham Summers

Chief Market Strategist

Phoenix Capital Research

Why We Should Worry About China

Authored by Daniel Lacalle via The Mises Institute,

Many of our readers might remember the late 80s. There were hundreds of movies, songs and books about the inevitable Japanese economic invasion.

The ones of you that did not live that period can see that it did not happen.

Why? Because the Japanese growth miracle was built on a massive debt bubble and, once it burst, the country fell into stagnation for the better part of two decades. It still has not recovered.

China presents many similarities in its economic model. Massive debt, overcapacity and central planned growth targets.

Many economists and investors feel relieved because China is still growing at 6.8%. They should think twice. On one side, that level of growth is clearly overestimated. By any realistic measure of growth, China’s Gross Domestic Product annual increase is significantly lower than the official figures show. Patrick Artus, global chief economist at Natixis Global Asset Management, as well as other economists have noted that there has been a significant decoupling since mid-2014 between the government’s official growth reading and more reliable indicators. On the other hand, even if we agree with the official readings, this growth has been achieved using a worryingly high level of debt.

Chinese growth of 6.5% per annum came with more than 14% annual growth in money supply. Total debt has quadrupled since the financial crisis, and official messages of “measures to curb indebtedness” have shown a different reality. China has added more debt in 2017 than the The European Union, the US, UK, and Japan combined. The IMF estimates debt as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product may rise from 235% to almost 300% by 2022.

This increase in debt would not be a concern if it yielded solid economic returns, but the latest figures show that more than 40%of the Hang Seng Index components are adding debt to repay interests, and China needs now four times more debt to generate the same growth as in 2007. Now bond yields are soaring, which triggered a rise in bond cancellations. Companies postponed or canceled a total of 71 bond issuances worth a combined $13.42 billion in November, according to Reuters. Although bond yields are not at excessive levels, with the Chinese 10-year bond still below 4%, most companies and households cannot absorb a modest rise in yields due to the weak returns and revenues they have. A massive housing bubble has made high-risk debt rise.

Overcapacity has soared, and industries face the impossible task of keeping capacity and jobs as well as deleveraging. And exporting its way out of overcapacity is not easy. In 1992, only two G20 countries had China as one of their top five export destinations, now there are fifteen. However, in 1992 China had a productive capacity deficit, now it has 60% overcapacity, and – as it cannot destroy that excess in a centralized planned economy – it intends to export it. But this is almost impossible to achieve when excess capacity is an endemic problem all over the world.

It is true that Chinese imbalances are mostly local-currency denominated, that household savings rate is healthy and that the high productivity sectors are doing well, but that was the case with Japan in the late 80s as well. And none of these factors offset the large risks created by the housing bubble and excess debt taken by state-owned conglomerates and private businesses. These risks are highly disinflationary and are likely going to impact long-term growth and inflation expectations globally. As China tries to export its way out of the bubble, the impact on prices and trade all over the world should not be underestimated. We should not ignore the financial risks either. Although China’s financial concerns are mostly concentrated in its own system and currency, this does not mean that worldwide spill-over effects can be ruled out.

China is a big risk, and the best outcome for all the world economies is that the government forgets impossible growth targets and focuses on reducing the rising financial imbalances. All of us will prefer a modest Chinese growth-rate rather than an inevitable crisis.

Four Charts Prove The "Economic Recovery" Is Just A Fed-Induced Entitlement Program For The Wealthy

"Economic recovery" in America no longer means what it used to mean.  Historically "economic recovery" was largely characterized by job and wage growth, distributed across the income spectrum, and a rebound in GDP growth to north of ~3%-5%.  These days, the notion of "economic recovery" has been hijacked by the Fed and bastardized in such a way that they celebrate "asset bubbles" rather than real growth in economic output.

Presented as "exhibit A", here is the Fed"s modern-day definition of "economic recovery" (chart per Bloomberg):

Of course, digging a little deeper you quickly realize that the problem is even worse than what the data in the chart above might suggest.  While overall average wage growth has been anemic since 2009, to say the least, it has been almost nonexistent for those on the bottom end of the income spectrum.

Soaring markets helped the top 1 percent of Americans increase their slice of the national wealth to 39 percent in 2016, according to the Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances. The bottom 90 percent of families held a one-third share in 1989; that’s now shrunk to less than one-quarter.

 

The current one has helped millions of people find work; it’s also benefited asset-owners far more than people who trade their labor for a paycheck. Income distribution, already the most unequal in the developed world, is getting worse. And that’s starting to influence everything from America’s spending habits to its elections.

In fact, those in the bottom quintile of wage earners in the U.S. basically haven"t experienced wage growth, on a real basis, since the late 1970"s whereas those in the top quintile have nearly doubled theirs.

Of course, none of this should be particularly surprising to those who are paying attention as the top quintile of earners are the only ones financially positioned to benefit from Yellen"s economic recovery asset bubbles...

Meanwhile, the growing wealth disparity has seemingly put America on a collision course with political chaos as fringe candidates on both the Left and Right increasingly promise to have an "easy" solution for the seemingly inescapeable economic plight of the poorest households. 

Unfortunately, the sad truth just might be that there is no solution, absent some transformational technological advancements, and that the U.S. has just reached the maturity phase of it"s "business cycle"...and while the Fed may try to cover up that fact by repeatedly blowing assets bubbles, per the charts above, they"re only making the problem worse with each successive iteration.

Swedish Housing Bubble Pops As Stockholm Apartment Prices Crash Most Since June 2009

Even though Sweden’s property bubble is not the longest running (that accolade goes to Australia at 55 years), it is probably the world’s biggest with prices up roughly 6-fold since starting its meteoric rise in 1995.

Of course, as we noted last month when the SEB"s housing price indicator, which measures the difference between those who believe prices will rise and those who expect them to drop, took its first substantial tumble, the era of the steadily inflating housing bubble in Stockholm may finally have come to an end.

Now, it seems that the "hard data" is aligning with the "soft data" as Swedish home prices across the Nordic country posted their first decline since the spring of 2012, down 0.2% year-over-year and 2.9% sequentially.  Per Bloomberg:

The property market in the largest Nordic economy is rapidly cooling after years of price increases that were driven largely by housing shortages and ultra-low interest rates. Supply is now outstripping demand and stricter mortgage rules, as well as growing apprehension among households, are driving prices lower. The drop is being led by high-end apartments in Stockholm.

 

According to Maklarstatistik’s number, nationwide apartment prices fell a monthly 3 percent in November, adding to October’s 1 percent drop. House prices fell 1 percent in the month, after being unchanged in October. Apartment prices in greater Stockholm fell 3 percent in the month and were down 4 percent from a year earlier, the first such decline in almost six years.

Worse yet, the slump in Stockholm specifically is even more dramatic with apartment prices down 4.2% sequentially, the steepest since October 2008, and 6.0% year-over-year, the biggest June 2009.

Not surprisingly, the sudden pricing collapse has sparked a bit of a panic supply boost as sellers attempt to beat the bursting of the bubble.  Of course, we"re sure this strategy will work out perfectly, as it always does, because nothing helps correct an over-supplied market like a massive flood of even more supply. 

Greater supply “has resulted in buyers having more to choose from and taking longer before buying,” Hans Flink, head of sales and business development at Maklarstatistik, said in a statement. “The sellers are therefore starting to adjust their prices to the tougher competition, which is pushing prices down somewhat.”

Luckily, Bloomberg was able to find at least one economist who dug up some "rather encouraging" signs amongst the wreckage...

But there may be glimmers of hope. Andreas Wallstrom, an economist at Nordea Bank AB in Stockholm, said data for the last few weeks from property-listings website Booli “are rather encouraging,” as they indicate that prices have leveled out since mid-November and up until the first week of December. Average prices per square meter have even increased somewhat in both Stockholm and in the country as a whole in that period, he said.

 

“Our tentative call for December is that home prices will stay unchanged compared to November,” Wallstrom said. “In all, we forecast relatively stable home prices from here. To see a sustained downturn in prices, it will likely require a change in households’ housing costs. As long as mortgage rates remain low, which we expect, it is difficult to see a marked decline.”

Of course, we remember some Bear Stearns analysts who saw similarly "rather encouraging" signs in the U.S. housing market back in 2008...

Stockman Slams "Bubble Finance And The Era of No-See-Um Recessions"

Authored by David Stockman via Contra Corner blog,

Today"s single most dangerous Wall Street meme is that there is no risk of a stock market crash because there is no recession in sight. But that proposition is dead wrong because it"s a relic of your grandfather"s economy. That is, a reasonably functioning capitalist order in which the stock market priced-out company earnings and the underlying macroeconomic substrate from which they arose.

Back then, Economy drove Finance: You therefore needed a main street contraction to trigger tumbling profits, which, in turn, caused Wall Street to mark-down the NPV (net present value) of future company earnings streams and the stock prices which embodied them.

No longer. After three decades of monetary central planning and heavy-handed falsification of financial asset prices, causation has been reversed.

Finance now drives Economy: Recessions happen when central bank fostered financial bubbles reach an asymptotic peak and then crash under their own weight, triggering desperate restructuring actions in the corporate C-suites designed to prop up stock prices and preserve the collapsing value of executive stock options.

Accordingly, you can"t see a recession coming on Janet Yellen"s dashboard of 19 labor market indicators or any of the other "incoming" macroeconomic data---industrial production, retail sales, housing starts, business investment---- so assiduously tracked by Wall Street economists.

Instead, recessions gestate in the Wall Street gambling parlors and become latent in carry trades, yield curve and credit arbitrages and momentum driven excesses. Eventually, these latencies---central bank fostered bubbles-----erupt suddenly and violently. So doing, they spew intense, unexpected contractionary impulses into the main street economy via the transmission channel of C-suite "restructuring" actions.

Within weeks of a bubble implosion, therefore, a No-See-Um Recession is born and goes rampaging across the economic landscape. But it comes as a shock to economists and especially the Keynesian apparatchiks at the Fed because they are focused on the macroeconomic externals rather than the coiled spring internals of the financial markets.

In this context, it can be said that the Great Recession was the first major business cycle contraction that reflected the new regime of central bank driven Bubble Finance.

What happened was that a garden-variety macroeconomic slowdown which incepted in 2007 went rogue when it was monkey-hammered by the Lehman bankruptcy and the related crash of fundamentally insolvent Wall Street gambling houses thereafter.

This is evident in much of the macroeconomic data, but the snapshot of retail sales below aptly illustrates the case.

From July 2006 through August 2008 (the ninth orange bar in the shaded area) the US economy oscillated along a flatline of weak and inconsistent retail sales growth. Although in its wisdom the NBER dated the recession as incepting in December 2007, the retail sales pattern during the first nine months of the downturn was not appreciably different than during the 17 months just prior.

But in September 2008 retail sales went into free fall----coterminous with the Wall Street meltdown and the desperate Washington interventions via the massive Fed liquidity injections and the TARP bailout.  During that month, retail sales plunged at a 21% annualized rate-----followed by 50% annualized rates of collapse in November and December and nearly a 30% rate of shrinkage in January 2009.

As demonstrated more fully below, those four months were ground zero of the Great Recession. They constituted a macroeconomic air pocket ignited by panic on Wall Street and in the corporate C-suites---exacerbated by the frenzied sky-is-falling machinations of Treasury Secretary Paulson and Ben Bernanke.

Stated differently, the violently collapsing Greenspan mortgage, credit and Wall Street gambling bubbles triggered four to eight months of macroeconomic freefall that no one saw coming. As late as July, the Fed minutes denied that a significant downturn was even likely in 2008, while the Wall Street stock peddlers were insisting that the goldilocks economy was alive and well.

The clueless Keynesian monetary central planners in the Eccles Building had thus fostered the first big No-See-Um Recession, but remained ignorant as to why it suddenly happened; and, consequently, doubled down on Bubble Finance policies that were destined to generate a future replay of the same.

Needless to say, that"s where we are now. The Wall Street casino has again become a coiled spring of excesses, deformations and unsustainabilities---that is, recession latencies waiting to burst.

For instance, there is no other way to describe current razor thin credit spreads in the junk and investment grade sectors alike. Central bank financial repression has fostered a relentless scramble for yield among fund managers that has caused the high yield spread to contract by more than 700 basis points from its post-recession high.

Likewise, the investment grade BBB spread at 1.32% now stands at just 29% of its June 2009 level. And since then the massive explosion of investment grade corporate debt has been concentrated in the BBB tranche of the bond market (one notch above junk), where it now comprises 50% of outstandings compared to just 25% a decade ago.

Needless to say, cheap high yield and BBB debt has had but a single major application since the post-recession recovery of the corporate bond market. To wit, it has funded trillions of financial engineering deals in the form of LBOs and levered recaps in the junk sector and massive stock purchases and dividends in the BBB sector.

So doing, these Fed-fueled financial engineering flows back into the casino have functioned to shrink the stock float and balloon the supply of speculative capital on Wall Street. At length, stock bubbles get aggravated and recession latencies intensified.

When the bond bubble finally implodes, of course, the overwhelmingly largest stock purchaser of the present bubble cycle---LBO shops and financial engineering addicted C-suites---will be forced to the sidelines. The coiled spring of financial engineering will thereupon unwind violently, triggering the next No-See-Um Recession.

And it will be self-reinforcing in a manner that is obvious, but to which the nation"s monetary central planners remain completely oblivious. That is, they continue to pronounce the "all clear" on financial instabilities and signs of incipient financial bubbles based on the alleged improved condition of bank balance sheets---especially the dozen largest mega-banks which account for 80% of deposits.

But the coiled spring this time is not in the mega-banks, but in the trillions of fixed income and high yield mutual funds and ETFs which have arisen to absorb the massive flow of corporate debt. And their liabilities are the ultimate "demand deposit", callable by investors on a moments notice and at the hint of a financial crash.

Nor is the $6.1 trillion corporate bond sector---double the $3.3 trillion outstanding in late 2007----the only coiled spring of recession latency lurking on Wall Street. The massive expansion of the ETF market since 2007 is probably even more potent as a bubble crash accelerant and therefore ignition channel for the coming No-See-Um Recession.

Outstandings have increased by 10X in the last decade and at more than $5 trillion are 3.3X the level  extant on the eve of the financial crisis. Yet in the context of a dramatic market break---whether triggered by a black, orange or red swan---they  will function as pure downside accelerants as fund managers are forced to dump their holdings in order to buy-in and liquidate the torrent of ETF shares which will be on offer.

Then, too, the violent break in September 2008 occurred long before the massive "short vol" play of the present moment had metastasized in the trading pits. Yet today an estimated $1 trillion is invested in risk parity funds, double and triple inverse VIX ETFs and a menagerie of bespoke vol shorts concocted by Wall Street for its hedge fund customers.

Indeed, the current massive short vol trade is the ultimate coiled spring that will aggravate and accelerate the next bubble collapse, and thereby function as the mother of all recession latencies. Yet we are quite certain that our bubble blowing monetary central planners have given no consideration at all to this ticking time-bomb---even as they gum endlessly over the meaning of hairline noise in the BLS" latest (and useless) JOLTS report.

In this context, we do not profess to know the catalyst for the next bubble implosion, but we can readily identify the speed with which the post-Lehman collapse occurred in the stock market, and the manner in which that triggered massive restructuring actions, inventory liquidations and sweeping job cuts by the corporate C-suites.

What we do know, however, is that the financial market internals and their coiled springs of recession latencies are far more widespread and combustible than last time around. So it is worth specifying in more granular detail the recession transmission channel that operated through the corporate C-suites during the on-set of the Great Recession. The fall-winter dislocation of 2008-2009, in fact, is a roadmap for what comes next.

The S&P chart below is indexed to 100 as of September 1, 2008 and represents the eve of the Wall Street meltdown. By October 10, the S&P index was down 30% and by November 20 it closed at 58.7% of its September 1 level.

So in roughly 50 trading days the broad market lost 41% of its capitalization.

Again, that was the heart of the bubble implosion. Thereafter the market gyrated along the flatline until it hit a one-day capitulation low on March 9 at a 47% loss. So fully 90% of the capitulation low occurred during the first 50 days, and it was the speed and violence of this bubble collapse that triggered what amounted to mayhem in the C-suites.

Needless to say, the response of the corporate C-suites was swift and violent. The Challenger survey of monthly corporate layoff announcements accordingly surged during the 4-6 months that the stock market was establishing a bottom 50% below the November 2007 bubble peak.

But as will be further documented below from the BLS payroll employment data, this spree of excess payroll liquidations occurred in a very concentrated pulse and then reverted to low order clean-up until hiring growth resumed about a year after the stock market crash.

Another measure of C-suite liquidation activity is represented by corporate restructuring charges. The latter not only capture severance expense associated with job terminations but also plant and store closures, charge-offs for bad debts and excess/obsolete inventories and numerous other categories of asset write-downs.

But it all shows up on the true bottom line---GAAP net income---which plunged to negative $15 per S&P 500 share in Q4 2008.

As shown below, that represented a negative $34 per share swing from the level of Q4 2007 and more than a 40% drop from Q4 2006. Still, the housecleaning was relatively short lived and confined to the period of maximum C-suite panic over company stock prices and option values.

The panic in the C-suites was aggravated substantially by a household sector buying strike----especially on high price tag durables and automobiles.

In fact, the drop in auto sales was spectacular: After drifting steadily lower earlier in the year, dealer sales took a further sharp plunge after August 2008. Altogether, the dollar value of sales off the dealer lots contracted by a stunning 33% before hitting bottom in March 2009.

Needless to say, the above plunge of dealer sales occurred at a time when their lots were already bulging with excess vehicle inventory. Accordingly, the production cut back at domestic assembly plants was downright brutal----with the seasonally adjusted assembly rate dropping from 9.1 million units in July 2008 to just 3.6 million units at the January 2009 bottom.

Indeed, that staggering 60% drop in six months-----which also sent GM and Chrysler into Chapter 11---represented anything but your grandfather"s economy. This was a collapsing Wall Street bubble ripping through the main street economy with malice aforethought.

The recession transmission channel through the C-suite liquidation process is starkly evident in the business inventory data and the BLS data on payroll employment change. As to the former, the chart below makes clear that business inventories had continued to build through the spring and summer of 2008, reaching a peak level of $1.54 trillion in July.

Eventually, $225 billion of that inventory (15%) was liquidated before restocking commenced in November 2009, but the key point is that more than 60% of the destocking occurred during the concentrated period of stock market collapse between September and March. The C-suite was desperately attempting to lighten the load.

Finally, the payroll data surely leaves nothing to the imagination. Nearly 5.5 million jobs were liquidated during eight months stretching from September 2008 through April 2009. That represented nearly 65% of all job losses during the entire Great Recession.

Stated differently, desperate to appease the Wall Street casino via "restructuring" actions to increase ex-items earnings,  corporate America essentially embarked on a scorched earth policy of shooting jobs first and asking questions later.

In short, there can be little doubt that Finance drives Economy in the world of monetary central planning, and that the only place to look for the next recession is in the coiled springs of Bubble Finance.

Needless to say, you can once again find them metastasizing rapidly from one end of the casino to the other; and you will also find not a single word about them in today"s swan song by our Keynesian School Marm.

Then again, Janet Yellen"s cluelessness is also why Wall Street is telling you that the macroeconomic dashboard shows nary a sign of recession, and that its safe to plunge into the casino at 110X the Russell 2000 and 280X AMZN"s miserly earnings.

Call that misdirection like never before. But also know that another No-See-Um Recession is coming right at you.

 

2 Charts That Might Define The Fed"s Jerome Powell Era

Authored by Daniel Nevins via FFWiley.com,

In September, we proposed a theory of the Fed and suggested that the FOMC will soon worry mostly about financial imbalances without much concern for recession risks. We reached that conclusion by simply weighing the reputational pitfalls faced by the economists on the committee, but now we’ll add more meat to our argument, using financial flows data released last week.

We’ve created two charts, beginning with a look at cumulative, inflation-adjusted asset gains during the last seven business cycles:

According to the way that the Fed defines its policy approach, our first chart stamps a giant “Mission Accomplished” on the unconventional policies of recent years. Recall that policy makers explained their actions with reference to the portfolio balance channel, meaning they were deliberately enticing investors to buy riskier assets than they would otherwise hold. Policy makers hoped to push asset prices higher, and they seem to have succeeded, notwithstanding the usual debates about how much of the price gains should be attributed to central bankers. (See one of our contributions here and a couple of other papers here and here.) But whatever the impetus for assets to rise, it’s obvious that they responded. In fact, judging by the data shown in the chart, policy makers could have checked the higher-asset-prices box long ago, and with a King Size Sharpie.

Consider the measure on the vertical axis, percent of personal income. From the risky asset trough in Q1 2009 through Q3 2017, households accumulated asset gains, in real terms, equivalent to 139% of personal income. (Nominal gains were much greater, but we used the CPI to deduct the amount of purchasing power that households lost on their asset holdings. Also, we defined asset holdings as the four biggest categories that the Fed computes gains for—equities, mutual funds, real estate, and pensions.)

In other words, households are enjoying an investment windfall that amounts to nearly sixteen months of personal income, which is larger than the windfalls accrued in any other business cycle since the Fed began tracking asset gains in 1947. Not only that but the gap continues to widen—as of this writing, we’re likely approaching 145% of personal income and well clear of the previous peak of 128% from the 1991–2001 expansion.

Getting back to policy priorities, the chart seems to tell us that asset prices no longer need boosting. The Fed’s pooh-bahs proved they could boss the investment markets, and they’ve almost certainly moved on to new endeavors.

Bull, bear, or donkey?

But record asset gains are just one of the reasons the Fed’s priorities are likely to be changing. To describe another reason, we’ll first show that policy makers may wield a King Size Sharpie but that it’s not a Permanent Marker:

As you can see, our second chart looks like the first, except that we pinned the tails on the asset price donkeys.

We tacked on the down halves of each cycle, showing that the portfolio balance channel has a reverse mode.

So what should we make of the result that asset price cycles, adjusted for inflation, have ended with busts that reverse a large portion and often the entirety of the prior booms?

According to our beliefs about how investment markets work, the up and down phases of asset cycles are closely connected. Also, monetary stimulus influences both phases at the same time. It helped fuel the giant gains of recent expansions, but it also helped create the imbalances that led to giant losses. And after the accelerated advances of 2016-17, it’s fair to wonder if today’s imbalances are approaching the extremes of 2000 and 2007. Even some FOMC members are gently acknowledging that risk.

But we think the committee members are even more concerned than you would know by just reading their meeting minutes. We expect financial imbalances to become their biggest worry, bigger than the risk of recession, which should matter less and less to the central bankers’ reputations as the business cycle expansion continues to lengthen. In fact, a garden variety recession would barely affect their legacies at all by mid-2019, when the expansion, if still intact, would become the longest ever. By that time, the FOMC’s greatest reputational threat would be another financial market debacle, which would suggest that manipulating asset prices maybe wasn’t such a good idea, after all. In other words, the committee’s reputational calculus will change significantly during Jerome Powell’s first few years as chairperson.

All that said, Powell probably wants a recession-free economy in, say, his first year or two in the position. Moreover, he’ll certainly stress continuity with his predecessors’ policies. But once he becomes comfortable in the job, the Fed’s priorities will look nothing like they did under Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke. Instead of fueling asset gains, Powell’s biggest challenge will be containing imbalances connected to prior gains. He and his peers will aim to avoid pinning another oversized tail on the donkey—or at least to manage the fallout from said tail—and that’s a challenge that could very well define his regime.

Doug Noland: There Will Be No Way Out When This Market Bubble Bursts

Authored by Adam Taggart via PeakProsperity.com,

This week Doug Noland joins the podcast to discuss what he refers to as the "granddaddy of all bubbles".

Noland, a 30-year market analyst and specialist in credit cycles, currently works at McAlvany Wealth Management and is well known for his prior 16-year stint helping manage the Prudent Bear Fund.

He certainly shares our views that prices in nearly every financial asset class have become remarkably distorted due to central bank intervention, first with Greenspan"s actions to backstop the markets in the late-1980"s, and more recently (and more egregiously) with the combined central banking cartel"s massive and sustained liquidity injections in the years following the Great Financial Crisis.

All of which has blown the biggest inter-connected set of asset price bubbles the world has ever seen.

Noland foresees tremendous losses as inevitable, as the central banks lose control of the monstrosity they have created:

This is the granddaddy of all bubbles. We are at the end a long cycle where the bubble has reached the heart of money and credit.

 

There will be no way out. We"re not going to get enough private credit growth to reflate things when this bubble bursts. It"s going to have to come from central bank credit; it"s going to have to come from sovereign debt.

 

When this bubble bursts, it will shock people how far the central banks will have to expand their balance sheet just to accommodate the deleveraging in the system. And they won"t really be able to add new liquidity to the market; they"re just going to allow the transfer of leveraged positions from the leveraged players onto the central bank balance sheets.

 

When you get to that point, when the market sees that transfer occurring, I predict there"s going to be fear of long-term financial instruments. We"ll see rising yields. That"s when things will become problematic.

 

There will be losses. Of this global bubble, I think European debt is about the most conspicuous. Sure, European junk debt is nuts, too. It currently trades at 2%. Why? Because the ECB is buying large amounts of corporate debt. The ECB has kept rates either at 0% or negative. The perception is that the ECB will keep those markets liquid.

 

But look at Italy. It"s rapidly approaching 135% in terms of government debt to GDP. That debt will not get paid back. But yet, the market is willing hold that debt at 1.7%. This is debt that has traded at over a 7% yield back in 2012. But here it is today at 1.7%. I mean, Europe is just grossly mispricing its huge debt market. The excesses that have unfolded in European debt across the board are just staggering.

 

So when we get to that point when the central banks begin aggressively expanding their balance sheets (again) but the bond markets are not happy about it, then the central banks will finally have to decide if they want to continue to inflate or if they"re going to focus on trying to keep market yields down. This will be a very, very difficult situation for central bankers when it unfolds.

Click the play button below to listen to Chris" interview with Doug Noland (54m:31s).