Showing posts with label Atlanta Fed. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Atlanta Fed. Show all posts

Thursday, December 21, 2017

Is the Bond Market About to Call the Fed"s Inflationary Bluff?

Perhaps the single biggest development this year, as far as the markets were concerned, was the Fed admitting on the record that it has no idea what is going on with inflation.


This represents a kind of endgame for the Fed. Since the early ‘80s, the Fed has been actively understating inflation via a variety of gimmicks.


It first removed home prices and replaced them with “owner’s equivalent rent.” Doing that removed any sharp rise in home prices from affecting inflation data, thereby downplaying the official inflation rate.


Then in 1998, the Fed started playing around with “hedonics” (think food and energy prices). The Fed claimed that the goal was to somehow balance the deflationary forces of technology vs. the inflationary forces of hedonics items… but the reality was that this was just another gimmick to understate inflation.


Then, finally in 1999, the Fed introduced the idea of “substitutions.” Here again the Fed claimed it was trying to get an accurate read on inflation (the Fed argues here that if a consumer cannot afford steak anymore, the fact he or she can substitute hamburger indicates his or her quality of life is roughly the same as before).


And once again the goal was to understate inflation.


I realize this is getting a bit complicated, so let’s put this in simple terms…


1)   Since the early ‘80s, the Fed has been employing various gimmicks to hide the real rate of inflation.


2)   Doing this allowed the Fed to overstate GDP growth while understating the true decline in incomes/ quality of life for most Americans.


This game worked for a while, but this year the whole scheme crashed into a wall when the various gimmicks resulted in data that made no sense what-so-ever.


At a time when the NY Fed’s UIG inflation measure and the Atlanta Fed’s “sticky inflation” measure, showed inflation at 2.8% and 2.1% respectively, the Fed’s official inflation measures (CPI and trimmed PCE) were clocking in at 1.7% and 1.4%,


The Fed’s Board of Governors had a choice here:


1)   Admit the official inflation numbers were garbage


Or…


2)   Act surprised by the official rate being so low and claim it’s an anomaly.


The Fed went with #2 in what was one of the most insane Fed statements ever. According to the Fed’s July FOMC statement…


  • Most participants expect inflation to pick up over the next couple years.

  • Many Fed participants think inflation will remain below 2% longer than expected.

  • Many Fed participants believe that inflation measures dropped recently due to “idiosyncratic factors.”

  • A few Fed participants believe the Fed’s framework for forecasting inflation is no longer valid.

  • Some Fed participants noted their increase uncertainty about the outlook for inflation.

Put simply: the Fed admitted that it no longer had a clue what was going on with inflation. It has since maintained this “who knows!” shtick (I note that Fed Chair Janet Yellen, in last week’s conference stated that the Fed’s understanding of inflation is “imperfect.”)


Why does this matter?


As I explain in my bestselling book The Everything Bubble: the Endgame For Central Bank Policy, US sovereign bonds (also called Treasuries) trade based on inflation expectations.


Put simply, when inflation spikes higher, so do Treasury bond yields.


When bond yields rise, bond prices fall.


When bond prices fall, the Bond Bubble bursts.


When the Bond Bubble bursts, the EVERYTHING bubble follows.


Well, guess what? The yield on 10-Year US Treasuries is spiking, having broken above its 20-year trendline.



What"s coming will take time for this to unfold, but as I recently told clients, we"re currently in "late 2007" for the coming crisis. The time to prepare for this is NOW before the carnage hits.


On that note, we are putting together an Executive Summary outlining all of these issues as well as what’s to come when The Everything Bubble bursts.


It will be available exclusively to our clients. If you’d like to have a copy delivered to your inbox when it’s completed, you can join the wait-list here:


https://phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/TEB.html


Best Regards


Graham Summers


Chief Market Strategist


Phoenix Capital Research

Tuesday, September 26, 2017

Watch Live: Hawkish Yellen Says Fed May Have Misjudged Inflation, Labor Market

Update: In her prepared remarks, Yellen crucially said,





“A more important issue from a policy standpoint is that some key assumptions underlying the baseline outlook could be wrong in ways that imply that inflation will remain low for longer than currently projected.”



As Bloomberg explains, she is stating a bit more clearly than before that the FOMC doesn’t have a handle on why inflation is low and acknowledging that it may last longer than they predict.


*  *  *


As we detailed earlier, on the heels of Bostic ("we didn"t blow any bubbles") Brainard ("some barriers to growth are structural") this morning and Kashkari ("no inflation"), Evans ("need more data"), and Dudley ("inflation"s coming soon") yesterday; it is Fed Chair Janet Yellen"s turn to speak this afternoon on "Inflation, Uncertainty and Monetary Policy" as the dollar extends its post-FOMC gains (to 1-month highs).



Since The FOMC, Fed Speakers have been active...





Raphael Bostic, Atlanta Fed president: "I actually don’t think that our policies are too easy in the sense of really facilitating some sort of asset bubble."



Lael Brainard, Fed governor: Benefits of a lengthy U.S. recovery “can only go so far” and some barriers appear to be structural, sees "widening gulf" between large, small cities.



Neel Kashkari, president Minneapolis, FOMC voter in 2017: “I don’t see inflation taking off so I see no need to tap the brakes.”



Charles Evans, president Chicago Fed, voting member: “I think we need to see clear signs of building wage and price pressures before taking the next step in removing accommodation.”



William Dudley, president New York Fed, permanent voter (and most notably considered to be closely aligned with Yellen"s way of thinking): “With a firmer import price trend and the fading of effects from a number of temporary, idiosyncratic factors, I expect inflation will rise and stabilize around the FOMC’s 2 percent objective over the medium term.”



As a reminder, the Fed Chair said that "we don"t fully understand inflation" and added that the "shortfall of inflation this year is more of a mystery," but, while Yellen speaking would normally be must-watch, with only a few days having passed since her post-statement press conference, we wonder just how much flip-flopping is possible. At that appearance, the Fed chief also downplayed the significance of the weak core inflation data as the central bank set the start date for the reduction of its balance sheet and signaled that an additional rate hike this year remained appropriate.


Additionally, though we doubt she will comment on it, Republican Senator Richard Shelby said he doesn’t think President Donald Trump will nominate Yellen for a second term at the helm of the U.S. central bank. Shelby said Tuesday in an interview with Bloomberg Television’s Vonnie Quinnthat he had spoken with the president about the Fed.





“I believe he will appoint somebody else to take her place,” the No. 2 Republican on the Senate Banking Committee said. “But ultimately, that is up to the president.”



Live Feed (from The National Association of Business Economics)


click image for link to Bloomberg"s Live Coverage



Headlines include (via Reuters)


  • YELLEN SEES "CONSIDERABLE" ODDS THAT INFLATION WON"T STABILIZE AT 2-PCT OVER NEXT FEW YEARS

  • FED"S YELLEN SAYS UNCERTAINTIES STRENGTHEN CASE FOR GRADUAL RATE HIKES

  • YELLEN SAYS GRADUAL APPROACH TO RATE HIKES PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF SUBDUED INFLATION, LOW NEUTRAL RATE

  • YELLEN SAYS THERE IS A RISK INFLATION EXPECTATIONS ARE NOT AS WELL-ANCHORED AS THEY APPEAR

  • YELLEN SAYS DATA SUGGESTS LABOR MARKET IS HEALTHY, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL SLACK AND NOT OVERHEATED

  • YELLEN SAYS EVIDENCE ON LABOR MARKET NOT DEFINITIVE, MUST BE "OPEN-MINDED"

  • YELLEN SAYS WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO LEAVE RATES ON HOLD UNTIL INFLATION REACHES 2 PCT

  • YELLEN SAYS FED CAN STILL ACHIEVE 2-PCT INFLATION GOAL EVEN IF IT IS UNDERESTIMATING SLACK OR OVERESTIMATING INFLATION EXPECTATIONS

  • FED"S YELLEN SAYS LOW INFLATION LIKELY DUE TO TRANSITORY FACTORS, SEES MANY UNCERTAINTIES

  • YELLEN SAYS DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON INFLATION COULD PROVE UNEXPECTEDLY PERSISTENT

  • YELLEN SAYS FED SHOULD BE `WARY OF MOVING TOO GRADUALLY"

  • YELLEN SAYS WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO LEAVE RATES ON HOLD UNTIL INFLATION REACHES 2 PCT

Via Bloomberg:


Fed Chair Janet Yellen said FOMC may have misjudged fundamental forces driving inflation and strength of labor market, and policy makers “stand ready to modify our views based on what we learn.”


  • “We will need to stay alert” and adjust monetary policy as information comes in, Yellen said in text of speech Tuesday in Cleveland during annual meeting of National Association for Business Economics 

  • “My colleagues and I must be ready to adjust our assessments of economic conditions and the outlook when new data warrant it”

Downward pressures on inflation “could prove to be unexpectedly persistent”


  • Economic outlook is subject to “considerable uncertainty”

FOMC’s understanding of the forces driving inflation is “imperfect,” policy makers recognize “something more persistent” may be responsible for current undershooting of long-run objective


  • While inflation will most likely stabilize around 2% over the next few years, “odds that it could turn out to be noticeably different are considerable”

  • There’s also risk that inflation expectations “may not be as well anchored as they appear and perhaps are not consistent with our 2 percent goal”

Stabilizing inflation at around 2% “could prove to be more difficult than expected” 





Key assumptions underlying baseline outlook “could be wrong” in ways that imply inflation will remain low for longer than currently projected; for example, labor market conditions may not be as tight as they appear



Under certain conditions, “continuing to revise our assessments in response to incoming data would naturally result in a policy path that is somewhat easier than that now anticipated”





Significant uncertainties strengthen the case for gradual pace of tightening; however, Fed must also be wary of moving too gradually; “it would be imprudent to keep monetary policy on hold until inflation is back to 2 percent”



Actual value of long-run sustainable unemployment rate “could well be noticeably lower” than FOMC currently projects; can’t rule out possibility that some slack still remains in labor market


  • Unemployment rate is probably “correct” in signaling that labor-market conditions have returned to pre-crisis levels; however, that doesn’t necessarily mean that economy is now at full employment

  • Data suggest a generally healthy labor market, although can’t make “any definitive assessment”; policy makers “must remain open minded on this question” and its implications for reaching inflation goal 

Friday, September 15, 2017

New York Fed, Atlanta Fed, & Goldman Slash Q3 GDP Forecasts

As "hard" economic data in America crashes to its weakest since Feb 2009, so The New York Fed has slashed its economic growth forecasts for Q3 and Q4 dramatically.



The drivers of the collapse are hurricane-impacted data from Industrial production and Retail Sales this morning...



For those hoping for a "broken window fallacy" rebound in Q4, forget it!



source: NYFed


And now The Atlanta Fed has joined the downgrade party...





The GDPNow model forecast for real GDP growth (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the third quarter of 2017 is 2.2 percent on September 15, down from 3.0 percent on September 8. The forecasts of real consumer spending growth and real private fixed investment growth fell from 2.7 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively, to 2.0 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively, after this morning"s retail sales release from the U.S. Census Bureau and this morning"s report on industrial production and capacity utilization from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.



From 4% a month ago to just 2.2% now!!



source: AtlantaFed



Putting the recent data in context, here is the "Hard" economic data surprise index.




And then, the cherry on top came from Goldman Sachs which just slashed its hurricane-impacted Q3 GDP forecast from 2.0% (it was 2.8% just one week ago) to 1.6%. To wit:





Industrial production fell sharply in August, but the report explicitly indicated that Hurricane Harvey likely contributed the bulk of the decline. University of Michigan consumer sentiment declined a bit less than expected in the preliminary September report, and the survey’s measure of longer-run inflation expectations moved back up to 2.6%. Taken together, today’s real activity data represents strong evidence that hurricanes have significantly reduced the pace of US growth in the third quarter. Accordingly, we revised down our Q3 GDP tracking estimate by four tenths to +1.6% (qoq ar), on top of the -0.8pp revision we made last week. 



We believe today’s weaker-than-expected retail sales and industrial production data increase the likelihood of a meaningful drag on August economic activity from Hurricane Harvey. And given the possibility of sustained weakness in September due to Hurricane Irma, we now expect an even larger drag on growth in the third quarter. We are reducing our tracking estimate for Q3 GDP by four tenths to +1.6% (qoq ar), on top of the -0.8pp revision we made last week in anticipation of Hurricane effects. We expect some of this weakness to reverse in the fourth quarter as economic activity rebounds in storm-affected regions.



So - NY Fed Staff Nowcast Q3 2017: 1.34% (Prev. 2.1%); Q4 2017 at 1.83% (Prev 2.6%)


Which means that, if NY Fed is correct, and one adds the actual GDPs of 1.2% in Q1 and 3.0% in Q2, full year 2017 GDP Growth wil be just 1.8%! 


Just blame it on the hurricanes.

Sunday, August 13, 2017

A Thought Experiment On Why Wages Are So Weak

By Steven Englander, head of research and strategy at Rafiki Capital Management


I propose a microeconomic rationale for why macro wage performance is so weak, despite tight labor markets. The idea is that we are getting paid less for our job-specific knowledge because technology is making it easier to replace us without major loss of productivity with less skilled workers. The implications for markets:


  • Flattish Phillips curve and low wage inflation continue for an indefinite period

  • Living standards may increase because of lower price relative to wages, not higher wages relative to prices

  • Monetary policy will have to get on with dealing with a low inflation economy -- this means setting aside obsessions about balance sheet reduction and setting up the facility to use fiscal policy as needed when the zero bound is approached

  • It’s relatively positive for equities in innovating sectors

  • Long-term bond yields will be driven by monetary policy fears, not long-term inflation worries

  • Short-term policy rate moved will be capped by the sensitivity of the economy to interest rates which may not be large. Note that this cuts both ways – both tightening and easing may be ineffective.

The thought experiment


My idea is that wages are driven by how scared your boss is that you are going to leave. If replacing you, retraining your successor and waiting for him to climb the experience curve is costly, he will pay a lot to keep you from leaving. If you are a cog in a wheel, then he won’t care much.


Imagine an economy of a bus driver, a taxi driver, a cook, a translator, a baby sitter, a doctor and a foreign exchange strategist.... Conceptually you can measure average job specific content by asking the following question: if you randomly reallocated jobs among these workers how much would productivity fall? For example, if the FX strategist was given the cook’s job and the cook became a doctor and the doctor a taxi driver and so on, what would happen?


Say in Economy A, there is specific knowledge or character traits needed: a bus driver needs the specifics of driving a bus safely, a taxi driver knowledge of the street grid, the translator an excellent command of relevant languages, the baby sitter some proven degree of responsibility, the cook of recipes and technique, the doctor the body of medical knowledge, the FX strategist how to say ‘current account’ and so on. Now imagine the chaos and productivity loss, if the random reallocation occurred and none of the occupants of new jobs had the required skills.


Now, say in Economy B, the bus is programmed to avoid dangerous manoeuvres, all taxi drivers have a GPS (unlike NYC where none seem to), the translator has automated translation at his fingertips, the baby sitter is aware the house and liquor cabinets are cameraed, the cook has a set of packets to mix (or almost equivalently the packets are sent to your home for you to mix), the doctor a diagnostic program and the FX strategist a chatty virtual assistant that can say ‘current account’. If a random job reallocation occurred in this economy the productivity loss would be much less. My conjecture is that wages would be lower
because there would be no need to bid to retain workers if they were readily substitutable, or if the same jobs could be filled with less specialized workers with no major productivity loss.


Wage compression is very likely to be a feature in Economy B relative to Economy A – that is, the premium one receives for job specific knowledge and experience would fall. If you throw in a bit of capital saving technological progress from the sharing economy and economies of scale from the low marginal cost of replicating many IT-based innovations, you could end up with a kind of immiserization of parts of the skilled and semi-skilled working classes.


Evidence is partial, but it is not straight forward to test this speculation. Figure 1 shows wage levels in selected industry groupings. Note that wages in motor vehicles and parts (bright blue) started way above over industries, but is now average for durable goods (red line) and below education and health services (green line) which started way below. Motor vehicles and parts are now way below the average wage in the private sector, having started above 50% higher in the 1990s.



In Figure 2 we index these industries to 100 in 2000. We note that wages in leisure and hospitality (light blue) and education and health (green) have both grown faster than in durables manufacturing (red) and above the average for all private industries. Vert similar patterns emerge if we index to 2011.


So wages have grown slower in high paying industries, faster in low paying industries and the net is the mediocre observed wage growth. What isn’t consistent is Atlanta Fed wage evidence that suggests the quit rate is back to normal for this time of the cycle and the wage premium for quitters is as high as it was in the early 2000s. The other side is that the Atlanta Fed data shows the gap between increases of skilled and unskilled workers as having narrowed.


Macro/market implications


The problem for central banks is that we know little of what triggers such shifts in labor market power, how long they last and what ends them. As long as these shifts persist, the Phillips Curve will look flatter in  two-dimensional Unemployment Rate/Wage Inflation space. A well-specified wage equation that account for such structural changes would have a steeper inflation/unemployment trade off than one without the term but capturing the effects we discuss above is not so easy.


The type of technological progress would imply lower price pressures because the wage weakness would be transmitted in part into prices. (Full disclosure, you have to believe that there is an unmeasured component of actual productivity change here, although it may show up as quality-adjusted labor productivity, rather than standard output per-worker or worker-hour).


These disinflationary pressures may be hard to fight. Combine this with investment that is not overly responsive to interest rates and you have a situation where getting the inflation that you want may be impossible without risking undesirable levels of asset price inflation. It sounds as if the Fed is already there. There is nothing inevitable about this outcome, but it emerges easily if the disinflationary pressures are strong enough and the interest rate responsiveness is low enough.


One policy response is to live with it. Ultra-low inflation countries such as Japan and Switzerland have done just fine by many measures and the zero bound becomes an issue in a recession, not during an extended recovery. By ignoring it you have some ability to rein in asset market exuberance, but you are compromising on inflation and possibly activity targets.


This does not necessarily stop you from raising rates, but you are faced with a dilemma. If raising rates is effective you end up with the downturn you wanted to avoid, if raising rates is ineffective you are fooling
yourself in thinking that the margin versus the zero bound means that you are all clear in the next downturn. Being able to raise policy rates to three percent without tanking the economy very likely means that you can cut them in the next recession, you won’t have much of an impact. Hawks would argue that reducing the risk of a financial market bubble reduces the risk of a recession down the road.


It seems to me that whichever way you turn, fiscal policy has to be taken out of the doghouse. Post election, Fed officials reversed their pre-election love affair with fiscal policy, arguing that the economy does not need it. One might say that if the inflation undershoot turns out to be persistent, fiscal policy will become even more necessary to offset structural pressures. And if you think that high liquidity is contributing to asset market ebullience, then a bit of fiscal stimulus combined with monetary tightening can maintain activity and unwind some of the asset market pressures.


Modest long-term price pressures are probably positive on the fixed income side. Long-term disinflationary pressures and modest investment will keep downward pressure on long-term bond yields even if the Fed tightens at the short end in response to fiscal policy. The use of fiscal likely means being more relaxed about the size of the balance sheet. Debt-to-GDP would have to grow both cyclically and structurally, but debt servicing may not grow very rapidly because of the low inflation and the Fed’s interest income being recycled back to the Treasury. Short-term policy rates may swing around a lot versus stable but relatively low long-term rates.


The central bank could take a hard line and maintain or shrink the balance sheet even as fiscal expansion was put in place. Still, it would hardly help macroeconomic stabilization if government finances were called into question, so willy-nilly it is likely that the balance sheet would absorb some of the debt incurred via fiscal policy.


Caveat emptor – this analysis is pretty long term. In the short to medium term, I expect central banks like the Fed and ECB to try and follow up their rhetoric with liquidity tightening and for this to be reflected in long-term rates. Only if/when it turns out that the tightening is unsustainable will the forces I discuss above come into play.


On the equity side, if you can replace a skilled worker with a less skilled worker that is an attractive proposition. It is not as exciting as booming demand but it still reaches the bottom line. The social consequences are mixed. It is possible that this reduces the returns to certain types of training and education, both specialized and generic, but overall demand for relatively undifferentiated blue-collar labor will go up as will their wages. Improvements in living standards are likely to come via lower prices than higher wages. This is hardly the American dream. However, it is often difficult to put together policies that efficiently offset technological forces to provide distributional equity, and if other jurisdictions are not so focussed on distribution, you can end up with the worst of both worlds. It is possible that workers will drift to occupations where differentiated skills can earn a higher return – so maybe fewer doctors and lawyers but more dancers with the stars.


If you look at any central bank econometric model, the demand side has decades of development, the supply-side and particularly the modelling of technological change is primitive, distribution is virtually  nonexistent and asset market bubbles a problem because they should not exist in the model world. These secondary issues have become first order issues. Unaddressed they mean incomplete policy regimes and surprising and disappointing outcomes.

Friday, August 11, 2017

Goldman Cuts Rate Hike Odds After 5th Consecutive Inflation Miss

The Fed is becoming increasingly trapped: despite the FOMC"s "best intentions" to telegraph that the economy is improving with the unemployment rate at a paltry 4.3% - because otherwise it clearly wouldn"t be hiking, right - CPI has now missed consensus estimates for 5 consecutive months, and what worse, the biggest historical driver of inflation in recent years, shelter and rent inflation, appears to have peaked and is now declining. Worse, wage inflation is nowhere to be found, much as one would expect from a bartender and waiter-led "recovery."



Of course, never one to miss a scapegoat, earlier today Dallas Fed president Robert Kaplan blamed the lack of inflation on technology, saying at an event in Texas that technological disruption is "a new and powerful structural factor that is influencing inflation" and finally noticing that "technology is increasingly replacing people in the jobs market" while "allowing consumers to change shopping habits, and is limiting the pricing power of businesses. That - in addition to global factors - has an impact on inflation."


Predictably there was no discussion of how it is the Fed"s trillions in excess liquidity that has allowed VCs to invest tens if not hundreds of billions in money-losing ventures, which have made this tech-driven deflation possible.


As an aside, while the BLS-reproted CPI continues to deteriorate, the Atlanta Fed reported that its own sticky-price consumer price index —a weighted basket of items that change price relatively slowly—rose 2.6% annualized in July, following a 2.2% increase in June. The 12-month percent change in the index remained at 2.1%. Then again, the Fed is known to avoid any indicator that defies the prevailing groupthink, which now seems to be that inflation is lower than the Fed would like it to be.



So while the Fed ponders how to escape this trap it has created for itself, in which zombie companies refuse to die and where cash burning tech companies push inflation ever lower, at least until rates rise enough to crush the VC party once and for all, here is Goldman which moments ago once again cut its forecast for a rate hike possibility in 2017.





The consumer price index rose 0.11% in July in both the headline and the core, missing expectations for the fifth consecutive month. The primary sources of weakness were lodging away from home and new vehicle prices, and we suspect the former will rebound in coming months. Nonetheless, we now estimate that the core PCE price index rose just 0.08% month-over-month in July, or 1.40% from a year earlier, down from +1.5% in June. Accordingly, we now place the subjective odds of a third hike this year at 55% (vs. 60% previously).



The details:


  1. The consumer price index (CPI) rose 0.11% month-over-month in both the headline and the core (excluding food and energy), below expectations for the fifth consecutive month. Food prices rebounded (+0.2%) but energy prices edged down (-0.1%), providing offsetting impacts for the headline CPI, where the year-over-year rate moved up a tenth to +1.7% (vs. consensus of +1.8%). Relative to our expectations, the sources of weakness in core inflation this month were lodging away from home (-4.2% mom) and new car (-0.5%) prices, which together reduced month-over-month core inflation by -0.07pp. The lodging decline was the largest on record (back to the 1960s) and appears at odds with continued firmness in the PPI and industry measures. Despite the overall weakness, month-over-month inflation was generally firm in the large and persistent housing and medical care categories, with increases in medical services (+0.3%), medical commodities (+1.0%), and owners’ equivalent rent (+0.27% vs. +0.28% in June) prices, despite the sequential deceleration in rent of primary residence (+0.24% from +0.35% in June).

  2. Based on details in the PPI and CPI reports, we estimate that the core PCE price index rose just 0.08% month-over-month in July, or 1.398% from a year earlier (vs. +1.505% in June). Additionally, we expect that the headline PCE price index rose 0.08% in July, or +1.392% from a year earlier.

  3. Despite encouraging component detail, the overall CPI report was clearly disappointing. We lowered our Fed probabilities accordingly, with subjective odds for a third hike this year at 55% (vs. 60% previously). In terms of timing, we place the odds of the next hike at less than 5% for September (vs. 5% previously), less than 5% for November (vs. 5% previously), and 55% cumulatively by December (vs. 60% previously).

At the current rate of economic disappointments, that 55% will hit zero in about 4-6 weeks.

Saturday, July 22, 2017

This Recovery Isn't All That Resilient, Here's Why

Authored by Danielle DiMartino Booth via Bloomberg.com,


When adjusted for inflation, credit card usage has grown faster than incomes for 18 months...



Are Federal Reserve stress tests leading economic indicators? That certainly seems to be the case. Just ask Capital One Financial Corp.


As of the first quarter, credit card loss provisions at Capital One were above 5 percent, a six-year high. The company recorded some improvement for the second quarter, yet Fed stress tests of the bank’s overall loan portfolio in a deep downturn show losses topping 12 percent. That explains Capital One’s “conditional” passing score, a black eye that prompted a reduced share buyback plan and no increase in its dividend.


Most economists today applaud the resilience of the current recovery, which has stretched into its eighth year, the third-longest in postwar history. Resilience and rising household defaults, though, don’t tend to go hand in hand.


Pressures have been building in the background for some time. When adjusted for inflation, credit card usage has grown faster than incomes for 18 months. According to Fed data, that time frame coincides with the upturn in revolving credit, a proxy for credit card debt.


In November 2015, outstanding revolving credit crossed above the $900-billion threshold for the first time since December 2009. By May of this year, annual growth was clocking 8.7 percent. Meanwhile, credit card balances hit $1.02 trillion, the highest level in almost eight years.


Whether by choice or force, the aftermath of the financial crisis prompted households to ratchet back their usage of credit cards. As the recovery got underway, frugality prevailed, punctuated by an increase in debit card purchases. It is thus notable that Bank of America data find debit card usage has weakened in recent years as households grew more comfortable rebuilding their credit card balances.



"Confidence" is the term most associated with the rising credit card debt. But it’s fair to ask why confident households would choose to pay so dearly for the privilege. At 15.83 percent, the average rate on credit card balances is at a record high.


It is more likely that households are increasingly tapping their credit cards to cover the cost of necessities, that they are less confident and more anxious about their future finances.


The latest University of Michigan consumer confidence data suggest anxiety is indeed setting in. At 80.2, the expectations component is at the lowest since October and running below the 2016 average of 81.8.


According to the University of Michigan:





The data indicate that hopes for a prolonged period of three percent GDP growth sparked by Trump’s victory have largely vanished, aside from a temporary snap back expected in Q2. The declines recorded are now consistent with just above two percent GDP growth in 2017.



The retail sales report for June corroborates the forecast for continued muted economic growth. In constructing gross domestic product, statisticians net out auto, gasoline and building materials purchases from retail sales to arrive at a "control group." At 2.4 percent, the annual growth rate of the control group has fallen to the lowest since January 2014.


The renewed weakness in consumption prompted the economists at Bank of America Merrill Lynch to reduce their forecast for second-quarter GDP to 1.9 percent. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast is a bit higher, at 2.4 percent, but that’s a far cry from the robust 4.3 percent rate anticipated on May 1.


In her recent congressional testimony, Fed Chair Janet Yellen expressed continued optimism for a strong second-quarter rebound in GDP growth. If the Atlanta Fed’s forecast pans out, first half growth will stumble in at a 1.9 percent rate, hardly reflective of accelerating economic activity.


Even the ebullient homebuilders have begun to concede that there could be more than just a supply shortage at the root of the slowing housing market. Pending home sales have fallen for three straight months and are now 1.7 percent below their year-ago level.


The National Association of Realtors acknowledged that “weaker financial and economic confidence could also be playing a role in the slowdown in contract activity.” The NAR added that they had “found that fewer renters think it’s a good time to buy a home, and respondents overall are less confident about the economy and their financial situation than earlier this year.”


With rental inflation running 3.9 percent above its year ago rate and homes priced out of their budgets, renters are effectively trapped in a budgetary vise. Housing costs consume about a third of households’ average budgets and largely dictate consumers’ wherewithal to finance the discretionary purchases that make the consumption-driven U.S. economy hum.


Suffice it to say, when the costs of other necessities such as health care, the food you put on the table, your car payment and mobile-phone bills are also running high, it’s difficult to make ends meet. In a survey conducted by Survata and released in late June, 49 percent of households said they were living paycheck-to-paycheck; six in 10 reported that their rainy-day funds could not cover six months of living expenses.


What’s a household to do under such circumstances? It would appear they’ve had to rely on credit cards. The eventual price tag for the economy remains to be seen and won’t be known until the next recession has come and gone. As for how high the bill will be in the end, its likely Capital One already has that answer.

Sunday, July 16, 2017

A Bearish Citi Warns "Bigger Forces Are At Play", Pointing To Its 'Chart Of The Week'

Over the next three weeks, the investing world will shift its attention away from the endless chatter of central bankers and concerns about the state of the economy, and instead focus on second quarter earning season, which launched on Friday with results from the three biggest US banks which showed that chronically low volatility is anything but good for trading revenues (as Jamie Dimon made all too clear in a bizarre Friday rant). As previewed last week, and is the norm, we get most of the US numbers first, followed by Europe and then Japan.



And yet, despite expectations for a Q2 S&P500 EPS increase of roughly 7% Y/Y, suggesting solid economic growth, Citi warns that "we may be approaching a cyclical peak." The biggest concern is that recent economic data, especially the "hard" variety, has been anything but good.


In Citi"s chart of the week, the bank shows the fall in the US Hard Data
Surprise Index which on Friday tumbled to a fresh two-year low. The fall to such low levels occurred
due to the near one standard deviation miss in June retail sales. In
contrast, US soft data surprises are staging somewhat of a recovery at
the moment having bounced off recent lows of -56 to -6. This increase
was largely due to positive surprises from both ISM surveys.



In addition to the broader Citi Economic Surprise Index, which is now at mid-2015 levels, the Atlanta Fed Nowcast is also beginning to turn over once again (RHS top).



For now, as Citi"s Jeremy Hale notes, forward expectations of earnings for current year and next year in the US are holding up reasonably well compared to previous years (Figure 4, top LHS), however the real question is what happens in Q3/Q4, because as BofA"s Michael Hartnett said earlier this week "the most dangerous moment for markets will be when rising rates combine in three or four months’ time with an inflection point in corporate profits. In anticipation of this, we would use the next couple of months to buy volatility, and within fixed income slowly reduce exposure to IG, HY, and EM bonds."


Another concern has emerged. As Citi adds, looking at the driver of these earnings expectations, the commodity rally over the past 12 months has caused analysts to revise higher expectations of forward earnings to relevant sectors, so one would expect oil & gas and basic materials to have large increases in EPS projections. However, given that crude oil continues to make lower highs and lower lows since the start of the year, with increasing non-OPEC production and concerns about the ability of OPEC cuts to sustainably increase the oil price, it’s possible that we begin to see downgrades in these expectations if oil continues to trend lower.



But even if one assumes that somehow future earnings are not dinged as a result of recent oil price weakness, Citi points to something else entirely: the collapse in correlations between earnings and price return since the financial crisis...



... and warns that there are "bigger forces at play" when it comes to future asset prices. Or rather one force: central banks, and specifically "the advent of QE and the ‘easy money’ that has dominated asset markets in this cycle."





The gradual reduction of these purchases and movement to less easy policy from developed market Central Banks potentially leaves asset markets in somewhat of quandary. Our credit colleague Matt King presents a chart which particularly resonates with us, showing asset purchases on a 12 month rolling window vs. risk asset momentum (Figure 5, bottom RHS).




The fit, as Hale admits, "is rather incredible, and ultimately what these charts clearly illustrate is just how important unconventional monetary policies have been for markets in recent years. As such we agree that the removal of CB liquidity, especially if occurring at the same time across the main Central Banks, cannot be ignored."





For risk assets, we are cognizant of recent market experience. In 2015, UST real 10y yields jumped 80bp running into the first Fed hike in December. With a significant lag, equities ended up correcting about 14-15%. In contrast, when real yields rose a similar 80bp in the second half of last year, equities barely noticed (Figure 6 LHS).



One difference is in the data which was weakening sharply in the first episode even before real yields rose (a Fed policy error?). But in the 2016 event, data was strengthening, the global recovery broadening and EPS recovering.




Which brings us back to the chart of the week, and the steep decline in the "hard" data : while until now conventional wisdom has generally assumed that the US economy is broadly rebounding, with conventional wisdom assuming a replay of the 2016 event, Citi cautions that "the fall in the Citi US data change index currently is interesting." One can insert a different word here.



Where does the above leave Citi?





Taking all of this into account, we harbor growing concerns for equity markets and entered into a cross-asset trade, where we positioned for equity market downside, funded via selling volatility in oil markets.



To which Janet Yellen had a response: she pulled at 180 and turned dovish this week, sending global stocks to all time highs, followed by even worse economic data in the US, which in turns sent the S&P to a new all time high as animal spirits got reignited...



... or perhaps it was just more people like Citi, shorting the market then being forced to immediately cover once their narrow stop losses were triggered. As JPM"s Prime Broker Service showed last week, the amount of short covering just hit a YTD high.



Although, if that is indeed the catalyst for the latest burst of the "Icarus Rally" higher, it probably won"t last. As of this week, the short interest in the SP& is back to level seen just before the last financial crisis...



... which means that what few bears remained in this market have now been flushed.

Tuesday, July 11, 2017

Why Wages Are So Weak - A Thought Experiment

Authored by Steven Englander via Rafiki Capital Management,


A thought experiment on why wages are so weak


I propose a microeconomic rationale for why macro wage performance is so weak, despite tight labor markets. The idea is that we are getting paid less for our job-specific knowledge because technology is making it easier to replace us without major loss of productivity with less skilled workers. The implications for markets:


  • Flattish Phillips curve and low wage inflation continue for an indefinite period

  • Living standards may increase because of lower price relative to wages, not higher wages relative to prices

  • Monetary policy will have to get on with dealing with a low inflation economy -- this means setting aside obsessions about balance sheet reduction and setting up the facility to use fiscal policy as needed when the zero bound is approached

  • It’s relatively positive for equities in innovating sectors

  • Long-term bond yields will be driven by monetary policy fears, not long-term inflation worries

  • Short-term policy rate moved will be capped by the sensitivity of the economy to interest rates which may not be large. Note that this cuts both ways –both tightening and easing may be ineffective.

The thought experiment


My idea is that wages are driven by how scared your boss is that you are going to leave. If replacing you, retraining your successor and waiting for him to climb the experience curve is costly, he will pay a lot to keep you from leaving. If you are a cog in a wheel, then he won’t care much.


Imagine an economy of a bus driver, a taxi driver, a cook, a translator, a baby sitter, a doctor and a foreign exchange strategist. Conceptually you can measure average job specific content by asking the following question: if you randomly reallocated jobs among these workers how much would productivity fall? For example, if the FX strategist was given the cook’s job and the cook became a doctor and the doctor a taxi driver and so on, what would happen? 





Say in Economy A, there is specific knowledge or character traits needed: a bus driver needs the specifics of driving a bus safely, a taxi driver knowledge of the street grid, the translator an excellent command of relevant languages, the baby sitter some proven degree of responsibility, the cook of recipes and technique, the doctor the body of medical knowledge, the FX strategist how to say ‘current account’ and so on. Now imagine the chaos and productivity loss, if the random reallocation occurred and none of the occupants of new jobs had the required skills.



Now, say in Economy B, the bus is programmed to avoid dangerous manoeuvres, all taxi drivers have a GPS (unlike NYC where none seem to), the translator has automated translation at his fingertips, the baby sitter is aware the house and liquor cabinets are cameraed, the cook has a set of packets to mix (or almost equivalently the packets are sent to your home for you to mix), the doctor a diagnostic program and the FX strategist a chatty virtual assistant that can say ‘current account’. If a random job reallocation occurred in this economy the productivity loss would be much less. My conjecture is that wages would be lower because there would be no need to bid to retain workers if they were readily substitutable, or if the same jobs could be filled with less specialized workers with no major productivity loss. 



Wage compression is very likely to be a feature in Economy B relative to Economy A – that is, the premium one receives for job specific knowledge and experience would fall. If you throw in a bit of capital saving technological progress from the sharing economy and economies of scale from the low marginal cost of replicating many IT-based innovations, you could end up with a kind of immiserization of parts of the skilled and semi-skilled working classes.


Evidence is partial, but it is not straight forward to test this speculation. Figure 1 shows wage levels in selected industry groupings. Note that wages in motor vehicles and parts (bright blue) started way above over industries, but is now average for durable goods (red line) and below education and health services (green line) which started way below. Motor vehicles and parts are now way below the average wage in the private sector, having started above 50% higher in the 1990s.




In Figure 2 we index these industries to 100 in 2000. We note that wages in leisure and hospitality (light blue) and education and health (green) have both grown faster than in durables manufacturing (red) and above the average for all private industries. Very similar patterns emerge if we index to 2011. So wages have grown slower in high paying industries, faster in low paying industries and the net is the mediocre observed wage growth. What isn’t consistent is Atlanta Fed wage evidence that suggests the quit rate is back to normal for this time of the cycle and the wage premium for quitters is as high as it was in the early 2000s. The other side is that the Atlanta Fed data shows the gap between increases of skilled and unskilled workers as having narrowed.


Macro/market implications


The problem for central banks is that we know little of what triggers such shifts in labor market power, how long they last and what ends them.  As long as these shifts persist, the Phillips Curve will look flatter in two-dimensional Unemployment Rate/Wage Inflation space. A well-specified wage equation that account for such structural changes would have a steeper inflation/unemployment trade off than one without the term but capturing the effects we discuss above is not so easy. 


The type of technological progress would imply lower price pressures because the wage weakness would be transmitted in part into prices. (Full disclosure, you have to believe that there is an unmeasured component of actual productivity change here, although it may show up as quality-adjusted labor productivity, rather than standard output per-worker or worker-hour). 


These disinflationary pressures may be hard to fight. Combine this with investment that is not overly responsive to interest rates and you have a situation where getting the inflation that you want may be impossible without risking undesirable levels of asset price inflation. It sounds as if the Fed is already there. There is nothing inevitable about this outcome, but it emerges easily if the disinflationary pressures are strong enough and the interest rate responsiveness is low enough.


One policy response is to live with it. Ultra-low inflation countries such as Japan and Switzerland have done just fine by many measures and the zero bound becomes an issue in a recession, not during an extended recovery. By ignoring it you have some ability to rein in asset market exuberance, but you are compromising on inflation and possibly activity targets.


This does not necessarily stop you from raising rates, but you are faced with a dilemma. If raising rates is effective you end up with the downturn you wanted to avoid, if raising rates is ineffective you are fooling yourself in thinking that the margin versus the zero bound means that you are all clear in the next downturn. Being able to raise policy rates to three percent without tanking the economy very likely means that you can cut them in the next recession, you won’t have much of an impact. Hawks would argue that reducing the risk of a financial market bubble reduces the risk of a recession down the road. 


It seems to me that whichever way you turn, fiscal policy has to be taken out of the doghouse. Post election, Fed officials reversed their pre-election love affair with fiscal policy, arguing that the economy does not need it. One might say that if the inflation undershoot turns out to be persistent, fiscal policy will become even more necessary to offset structural pressures. And if you think that high liquidity is contributing to asset market ebullience, then a bit of fiscal stimulus combined with monetary tightening can maintain activity and unwind some of the asset market pressures. 


Modest long-term price pressures are probably positive on the fixed income side. Long-term disinflationary pressures and modest investment will keep downward pressure on long-term bond yields even if the Fed tightens at the short end in response to fiscal policy. The use of fiscal likely means being more relaxed about the size of the balance sheet. Debt-to-GDP would have to grow both cyclically and structurally, but debt servicing may not grow very rapidly because of the low inflation and the Fed’s interest income being recycled back to the Treasury.  Short-term policy rates may swing around a lot versus stable but relatively low long-term rates. 


The central bank could take a hard line and maintain or shrink the balance sheet even as fiscal expansion was put in place. Still, it would hardly help macroeconomic stabilization if government finances were called into question, so willy-nilly it is likely that the balance sheet would absorb some of the debt incurred via fiscal policy. Caveat emptor – this analysis is pretty long term. In the short to medium term, I expect central banks like the Fed and ECB to try and follow up their rhetoric with liquidity tightening and for this to be reflected in long-term rates. Only if/when it turns out that the tightening is unsustainable will the forces I discuss above come into play.


On the equity side, if you can replace a skilled worker with a less skilled worker that is an attractive proposition. It is not as exciting as booming demand but it still reaches the bottom line. 


The social consequences are mixed. It is possible that this reduces the returns to certain types of training and education, both specialized and generic, but overall demand for relatively undifferentiated blue-collar labor will go up as will their wages. Improvements in living standards are likely to come via lower prices than higher wages. This is hardly the American dream. However, it is often difficult to put together policies that efficiently offset technological forces to provide distributional equity, and if other jurisdictions are not so focussed on distribution, you can end up with the worst of both worlds.   It is possible that workers will drift to occupations where differentiated skills can earn a higher return – so maybe fewer doctors and lawyers but more dancers with the stars.


If you look at any central bank econometric model, the demand side has decades of development, the supply-side and particularly the modelling of technological change is primitive, distribution is virtually nonexistent and asset market bubbles a problem because they should not exist in the model world.  These secondary issues have become first order issues. Unaddressed they mean incomplete policy regimes and surprising and disappointing outcomes.

Saturday, June 17, 2017

"The Next Leg Is Clearly Lower" - Global Excess Liquidity Collapses

First it was Citi"s Hans Lorenzen warning about the threat to growth and global risk assets as a result of the upcoming slowdown in global central bank balance sheet growth. Then, yesterday, it was Matt King"s turn to caution that "the Fed’s hawkishness this week adds to the likelihood that in markets a significant un-balancing (or perhaps that should be re-balancing?) is coming."



That said, with both the ECB and BOJ injecting hundreds of billions each month - even as they are set to run ouf of "haven assets" in the coming year, there is still time before the global central bank balance sheet "tipping point" is reached and assets roll over...



... although last week we flagged a more immediate problem for credit, and thus liquidity, in the US when we showed that even though the US is reportedly growing at a comfortable rate (the Atlanta Fed"s nowcast has Q2 GDP rising 2.9%) loan growth in the US is just weeks away from contracting for the first time since the financial crisis. Such inversions have traditionally taken place when the US economy was already in, or about to enter a recession.



As a reminder, whether endogenous or exogenous, liquidity has to be created somehow - either though loan creation by commercial banks, or reserve creation by central banks - for growth to persist and to keep asset prices elevated. The moment the process slows down, halts or reverts, is when "equilibrium phase shifts", i.e., recessions, depressions, or market crashes occur (more on that in a subsequent topic).


So continuing these observations, overnight it was Deutsche Bank"s turn to warn about the deterioration in credit creation, or as DB"s Dominik Konstam calls it, "excess liquidity" (a term first introduced by JPM back in 2013) which as he writes "continues to weaken in the US" and as a result "output momentum" or simply stated "growth" is still weakening. In an analysis conducted by the DB credit strategist, summarized by the six charts at the bottom, he finds evidence of "further softening in PMI data" and notes that "we continue to view softer inflation as a preferable remedy for weak excess liquidity rather than deeper declines in output growth." Or tumbling stock prices, perhaps? He summarizes this mix "in the spirit of a “falling price boom” where weaker inflation supports real growth as purchasing power is restored", although at the same time this transitory  deflationary impulse leads to the threat of an even greater build up of unsustainable debt, as has been the case for the past 8 years.


Here is Konstam"s explanation on what the slowdown in "excess liquidity" means for the world economy and markets:





We have updated our yield momentum measure to highlight that as output momentum rolls over, even if yields remain unchanged here, it will still take a few months to see yield momentum falling back to zero with the very near term suggesting yield momentum is too high. We see this as consistent with our bias that at best yields remain broadly unchanged but at worse, near term, there is downside potential. This relies on the analysis that shows output momentum turning points are closely tied to shifts in yield momentum (here we are using 5y5y G3 yields versus a year ago). In sum the latest data for our excess liquidity framework does not lead us to change our view that yields can quite easily trade below 2 percent in 10s for the US and closer to 2 ½ percent for 5y5y OIS.



Finally, showing the critical role of "excess liquidity", in this context through loan creation (or the lack thereof), Deutsche Bank presents the following six charts, showing their impact on everything from global momentum, to inflation, to sentiment surveys such as PMIs. What is clear is the the next leg in both regional and global economies is clearly lower.


Friday, June 16, 2017

NY Fed Crashes Trump's Party, Slashes Q2 GDP Forecast

A day after President Trump proclaimed Q2 GDP "numbers are going to be shockingly good," The New York Fed has slashed its forecast for America"s growth to just 1.86%.


Wednesday...





"I think this quarter"s GDP numbers are going to be shockingly good given all the facts we"re seeing"



Thursday...





“I think some very good numbers are going to be announced, by the way, in the very near future, as to GDP,”



Friday...


Thanks to the collapse in housing data this morning, The New York Fed has slashed its growth expectations for Q2 GDP to just 1.86% (from 3% in March)...



NOTE - the factors weakening the forecast are "hard" data points (red squares) while the surveys are adding to GDP.



It is hardly surprising that both The Atlanta Fed (which cut its guess from 3.2% to a series low 2.878%) and New York Fed are cutting their expectations as US macro data disappoints gravely...



Given the plunge in US Macro data, we wonder if President Trump meant the GDP numbers are going to be "shocking."

Monday, June 12, 2017

Goldman: The Fed Will Hike This Week, But Here Are "The Two Most Interesting Questions"

On Wedensday the FOMC will hike rates by another 25 bps - an event which the Fed Funds market prices in with near virtual certainty, while Goldman calls the rate increase "extremely likely" - and only a "tail" event like an extremely weak CPI report on Wednesday morning, hours ahead of the Fed announcement, has any chance of preventing  this outcome. So with the next rate hike virtually inevitable, questions are focused on not only the Fed"s exit strategy for balance sheet normalization and what the "dots" or funds rate path will look like, but how the Fed squares rising rates with the recent string of inflation misses.


As Goldman"s Jan Hatzius writes, data since the March meeting has sharpened the dilemma that both sides of the mandate are sending increasingly different signals about the urgency of further tightening. "The unemployment rate has fallen 0.4pp since the March meeting and our current activity indicator and real GDP estimates signal that above-trend output growth will produce further labor market improvement. But the year-over-year core PCE inflation is now 0.2pp lower than at the March meeting."


While conceding that a hike is guaranteed, Goldman notes that two issues should make this meeting particularly interesting.


  • First, will Fed officials alter their policy views in response to the increasingly different signals that both sides of the mandate are sending about the urgency of further tightening?

  • Second, will the press conference provide some clarity on what the next tightening step following the June hike will be?

As a result of the weaker than expected inflationary prints, Goldman believes the recent data do not call for a major change in the Fed’s policy outlook. While Hatzius expects the FOMC to lower its estimate of the structural unemployment rate by a tenth next week, even with that assumption, the new data have broadly offsetting implications for the policy outlook in standard Taylor rules. Highlighting recent Fed communications, Goldman believes the Fed will follow "a balanced approach in dealing with the dilemma."


It also means that the statement will likely characterize economic activity as "picking up but recognize that inflation slowed since earlier this year." On the other side, Goldman sees a signal of heightened inflation concern as the main dovish risk and an upgrade of the balance of risks as the main hawkish risk.


Previewing the Fed"s Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), expect a modest downgrade to GDP growth for this year, coupled with declines in the unemployment rate to 4.3% this year and 4.2% next year. At the same time, projections for core PCE inflation are likely to fall to 1.8% this year and probably 1.9% in 2018. Reflecting the offsetting data news, expect the “dot plot” to show relatively stable funds rate projections.


On to Yellen"s press conference, which should provide some clarity on whether the next tightening step after June will be balance sheet normalization or a third funds rate hike. Goldman, as well as much of the street, expects balance sheet adjustment to start in September and the Fed hiking cycle to resume in December. With respect to the balance sheet, the Fed will initially cap the amounts of securities that can run off in any given month of $10bn for UST and $5 billion for MBS, that rise over four quarters to caps of $40 billion and $20 billion, respectively.


* * *


Some more details. Here is Goldman on the current economic situation, and how it will be (mis)read by the Fed.





Another rate increase from the FOMC next week is now extremely likely. Only an extremely weak CPI report on Wednesday morning or another tail event would prevent the committee from hiking. The committee probably also still expects a total of three hikes and the start of balance sheet adjustment in 2017.  


But two issues should make this meeting particularly interesting.


  • First, will Fed officials alter their policy views in response to the increasingly different signals that both sides of the mandate are sending about the urgency of further tightening? We expect both lower unemployment and inflation paths in the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) but relatively stable funds rate projections as the labor market and inflation data surprises, in the words of San Francisco Fed President John Williams, roughly “wash out”.

  • Second, will the press conference provide some clarity on what the next tightening step following the June hike will be? We expect a detailed balance sheet announcement in September and a third rate hike in December but the reverse order is also plausible.

We believe both labor market and growth data in hand make a strong case for a rate increase next week and to remain upbeat about the outlook. Both our current activity indicator —down from 4.0% in February to 3.0% in May— and real GDP estimates—up from 1.2% in Q1 to our 2.3% Q2 tracking estimate—signal above-trend output growth (Exhibit 1, left panel). The medium-term growth outlook is also decent despite the lower odds of significant fiscal easing. The more important reason why growth should stay firm is the easing in financial conditions. Our FCI is at the easiest level since early 2015 and has  eased by 50bp since the March FOMC meeting. As the right panel of Exhibit 1 shows, the expected effect on GDP growth from changes in financial conditions for 2018H1 is now more than 0.3pp higher than at the March meeting.





Spare capacity continues to diminish, and the unemployment rate has fallen 0.4pp since the March meeting to a 16-year low of 4.3% (Exhibit 2, left panel). While nonfarm payroll growth has recently softened a bit, the average monthly gain of 162k year-to-date is still double our 85k estimate of the “breakeven” rate needed to keep the unemployment rate unchanged. While slack measures have declined more than expected, weak inflation data in April and especially March pushed the year-over-year pace of core PCE inflation 0.2pp lower than at the March Meeting (Exhibit 2, right panel). Both a Taylor rule framework and recent Fed communications suggest that the new data have broadly offsetting implications for the policy outlook.





Exhibit 3 translates the labor market and inflation surprises into changes in the appropriate funds rate via a standard Taylor rule framework. The original Taylor rule implies that a 0.2pp decline in inflation lowers the appropriate funds rate by 30bp while a 0.4pp reduction in the unemployment rate raises the appropriate funds rate by 40bp. In a modified “Taylor 1999” rule, the impact of employment is doubled  relative to the original version. This means that the impact of a 0.4pp reduction in unemployment rises from 40bp to 80bp. The left panel of Exhibit 3 thus suggests a 10-50bps higher appropriate funds rate.





But the decline in the unemployment rate may overstate the surprise if some decline was expected. Similarly, the decline in inflation can understate the surprise if some firming was expected. The middle panel of Exhibit 3 therefore compares actual unemployment and inflation moves to our expectations as of the March meeting and has less hawkish implications than the left panel. Finally, a lower estimate of the structural unemployment rate also reduces the decline in the unemployment rate gap. On net, we estimate the new data—combined with a 0.1pp downgrade of the structural rate—would have an exactly neutral effect in the Taylor 1999 rule that Chair Yellen has discussed repeatedly.



What has the Fed communicated in recent week.





Recent Fed communication suggests that the committee will also consider surprises on both sides of the mandate as roughly offsetting. As Exhibit 4 shows, several Fed officials have emphasized that there is now little labor market slack left. The inflation language in the May minutes was quite balanced as ”most participants viewed the recent softer inflation data as primarily reflecting transitory factors, but a few expressed concern that progress toward the Committee’s objective may have slowed.”





Since the May meeting, inflation for April has been weak for core CPI (0.9% annualized) but roughly in line for core PCE (1.8% annualized). The April inflation reports and recent comments by some Fed officials including Chicago Fed President Evans suggest that additional signs of heightened inflation vigilance are a dovish risk relative to our expectations. Governor Powell said that “there are good reasons to expect that inflation will resume its gradual rise but it is important to demonstrate a strong commitment to achieving our symmetric 2 percent objective” while Philadelphia Fed president Harker said that “we’re still on track for inflation” and that he is “looking at the trend.”



In light of these developments we expect to the committee to make three key changes to its post-meeting statement next week. First, we expect the committee to replace “consumer prices declined in March” by “inflation slowed since earlier this year” reflecting the core CPI miss in April. Second, we expect the statement to upgrade the growth assessment with verbiage along the lines of economic activity “appears  to have picked up” and to note that household spending “appears to be accelerating”. Third, we expect the committee to tacitly signal balance sheet run-off later this year by adding the qualifier “for the time being” to the description of its existing reinvestment policy.



A signal of heightened inflation concerns is the key dovish risk. The committee may, for instance, drop the “somewhat” from “inflation continued to run somewhat below 2 percent”. In terms of hawkish risks, an upgrade of the balance of risks is possible through the removal of “roughly”, reflecting improved domestic and international growth. We also expect Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kaskhkari to dissent as he recently described the move of inflation in “the wrong direction” as “concerning”.



What about the revised Summary of Economic Projections





The June FOMC meeting will include the quarterly update to the SEP. We expect significant changes to the unemployment and inflation projections but relatively stable funds rate forecasts, reflecting offsetting job market and inflation news.



1. Slightly lower GDP growth: Assuming our Q2 GDP tracking 1. estimate of 2.3%, GDP growth will average 1.7% annualized over the first half of 2017, so it would take a 2.4% growth rate in H2 to meet the policymakers March SEP estimate of 2.1%. We expect the 2017 median to fall to 2.0%, with risk tilted to the upside. We forecast that the median estimates for GDP growth in 2018-2019 and in the longer-run will remain unchanged.



2. Lower unemployment rate. The unemployment rate fell 0.4pp since the March meeting when the median unemployment rate projection was 4.5% for the forecasting horizon. We expect the median to fall to 4.3% in 2017, 4.2% in 2018 (with risks of 4.3%) and 4.3% in 2019. The estimate of the structural unemployment rate is quite likely to fall further from 4.7% to 4.6% in response to large declines in the actual rate and recent news on prices and wages. The decline in NAIRU would limit somewhat the projected employment overshoot but is a close call.



3. Lower core PCE inflation. We expect the 2017 median core PCE projection to fall to 1.8% and perhaps 1.7%. To reach 1.8% by year-end, monthly core PCE inflation would need to accelerate to an annualized rate of at least 1.9%. We believe the 2018 forecast also drops a tenth to 1.9% as some members now likely feel a bit less confident about the inflation outlook.



 



4. Relatively stable median dots. We expect most participants, especially those in the center of the committee, to stick to their March dots reflecting offsetting inflation and unemployment moves. We also believe that the committee probably still expects a total of three hikes in 2017. The retirement of Tarullo lowers the numbers of participants to 16 from 17 in March and is likely to move up the median 2018 dot from to 3 to 3-1/2 hikes next year. As the FOMC is extremely likely to hike for the second time this year next week, we expect that the 2017 one-hikers will shift to projecting 2 hikes in total for this year. We also assume that the new Atlanta Fed President Bostic votes like his predecessor Lockhart and that the new Richmond Fed President Mullinix lowers the Richmond Fed dots a bit.




Finally, how will the Fed "renornalize" its Balance Sheet.





We expect to get some more clarity next week on balance sheet runoff at the press conference and possibly also with an augmented Policy Normalization Principles and Plan. We continue to look for normalization to be announced in September. Here we update our projections for balance sheet runoff:



1. Start Date: We expect a detailed announcement in September  but would not be surprised if it came in December as guidance has been mixed. The May minutes suggest a start in September as an announcement at the December meeting would leave little time to “begin reducing the Federal Reserve’s Securities this year”. But guidance on the start of runoff by Governor Brainard after the funds rate gets midway to its long-run value of 3.0% and by New York Fed President Dudley “sometime later this year or next year” supports December. We think that announcing the start of balance sheet adjustment in September and keeping open the option of foregoing the third 2017 hike is the more prudent course of action given the mixed recent data and the potential for fiscal turmoil in Washington in Q3 related to the need for a debt ceiling hike and an extension of spending authority. We think the detailed announcement in September will be followed by the actual start of runoff of assets in October.



2. Process for phasing out reinvestment: The May minutes signaled that the committee will preannounce a schedule of gradually increasing caps to limit the amounts of securities that can run off in any given month. Our assumption is that that the initial caps are $10 billion a month for UST and $5 billion a month for MBS. The caps would rise each quarter by $10 billion and $5 billion to $40 billion and $20 billion respectively. Exhibit 7 shows that caps allow for a gradual runoff and deal with the variability associated with MBS prepayment and the irregular monthly schedule of maturing assets. The caps will remain in place after the phase-in but then only bind in roughly a third of the months for Treasuries until mid-2020 when the balance sheet reaches its projected terminal size.



3. Terminal size: We expect the Fed to maintain a balance sheet that 3. is relatively large by historical standards given several advantages of a large balance sheet related to monetary policy implementation and regulatory needs. Our calculations suggest that a monetary policy implementation through a floor system implies a terminal size of roughly 15.5% of GDP. While support from the New York Fed for the large balance scenario makes this outcome quite likely, there is no urgency yet in deciding on the size and on the composition of the terminal balance sheet.





Goldman"s conclusion:





A third consecutive quarterly rate increase next week is now extremely likely, in our view. Only an extremely weak CPI report on Wednesday morning or another tail event would prevent the committee from hiking. The data news since March has sharpened the dual mandate dilemma policymakers are facing. Our own view is that the inflation and unemployment surprises have been roughly offsetting but that the range of outcomes has widened somewhat. While the inflation outlook is uncertain, the dilemma will most likely resolve itself as inflation gradually accelerates. We therefore expect policymakers to remain focused on tightening mostly with the funds rate but also soon with the balance sheet tool.



And while we agree with Goldman in theory, one thing the bank has omitted in principle is that according to the Fed"s own commercial loan data, the US economy may be just 4-6 weeks away from posting its first negative C&I loan print since the financial crisis: a virtually failsafe indication of an imminent (or concurrent) recession.



Which means that, as we explained yesterday, the Fed is about to hike in not only a disinflationary phase of the economic cycle (which is largely a function of the slowdown in the Chinese commoity bubble, and the collapse in the Chinese credit impulse), but also into what may be an outright recession in the US. If so, look for the yield curve to do what it has always done in the past after the Fed hikes rates: flatten, then flatten some more, than go horizontal, and eventually invert.


Thursday, May 25, 2017

The Genesis Of The Bubble's Bubble - "It's Financial Civil War, How Much You Bleed Is Up To You"

Authored by Richard Rosso via RealInvestmentAdvice.com,


The financial services industry is headed for the greatest debate in recent history.


Regardless of what occurs from here –a continued stock market bullish trend or reversion to long-term averages which chronicles back to 2000 levels, the confines of discussion, the heated verbal and written volleys tossed deep from the roots of philosophical differences will forge a permanent rift between the steadfast buy-and-hold brethren and the stewards who manage risk by preserving capital (the dreaded group with a market escape plan), through the forthcoming bear cycle.


The stakes are higher than I can recall.


Future generations: Those we are depending on to lift the globe from the depths of a demographic malaise, groups nowhere near as ostentatious as Baby Boomers; generations that savor experience over product and have been wary of the risk in stocks, are beginning to relent and take notice of this bull market trajectory.


How they experience the ride in stocks and what occurs from here will shape their investment philosophy. I fear Millennials to Gen Y are going to get fooled, taken out. Smacked in the face.


Betrayed.


The buy-and-hold side, ‘the setters and forgetters,’ which I’ll explain, appear to be winning this battle so far and that’s part of the reason for my concern and ironically, a matter-of-fact bullishness.


For now and the near future it’ll be hunky dory. You see, I think we are in the midst of witnessing the greatest market bull stampede since 1995 through 1999. I believe it’ll eventually make the tech bubble explosion sound and feel like a 5-year old throwing down in joy, a bang pop noise maker on hot cement through a humid-heavy July 4th.


However, this is just my humble opinion.


I hold the utmost respect for the market as it’s designed to fool me as much as possible and at every gyration. I’m open-minded and with the assistance of our no-spin, in-house data crunching at Real Investment Advice, I remain more eagle, or eye witness, as opposed to a ‘bull’ or ‘bear.’ And I observe here, the beginning of the “bubble’s bubble.”


The break out of a long-term sideways market cycle which began in 2013, stalled in early January 2015 when the S&P 500 closed at 2058. On November 9, 2016, it stood at 2163. Watching paint dry through the summer of ’16 would have been more exciting than the market action. It was torturous. I described it to Lance Roberts at the time as suspended animation.


Then the presidential election happened and the rest is history…


I’m hesitant to refer to the current market as a bubble. I refer to it as the boom that leads to a bubble. See, my definition, perception, differs from market soothsayers. It isn’t in a textbook. It emerges from my boyhood summer activities on a New York street. The greatest bubbles I recall were the largest ones, most magnificent, right before they burst in a soapy, rainbow mess, stung my eyes like slimy razors, and forced me to lament through a wince:





“Wow – that was freakin’ incredible!”



The current Shiller Price-Earnings Ratio stands at 29X; the tech-wreck Shiller was a hair short of 45X in December 1999. My definition of bubble begins at the apex of the ‘pop’ of the previous high. From there, I believe only if or when we exceed that limit, that the market should be deemed the “bubble’s bubble.”


For now, I’m going to outline the factors or input that is breathing sustainability into this phenomenon.


Don’t misunderstand: My belief is when this market adjusts, there’s going to be stinging eyes from tears spilled over brokerage statements and the mutter of “I got suckered again,” over and over.


You see, every bubble differs in composition. The boom-bust cycle feedback loop we’re traveling now isn’t fueled by an industry or sector. It’s greater in scope. The wind in the proverbial sails is a confluence of factors fueled by post-election animal spirits and a lower-than-longer interest rate environment which is the prime food source or hive for the bull.


Poor demographics, below-average productivity which keeps the Federal Reserve and yield curve captive in a flat wasteland of inertia, a new generation of financial professionals who never experienced a bear market, an overwhelming number of passive preachers who believe indexing (without regard to risk management), is some form of financial nirvana, a brokerage industry under pressure to comply with a looming Department of Labor fiduciary standard slated implementation on June 9, stirred with the hope of corporate tax reform ‘sometime in the future, (it’ll be big)’, boils a seductive porridge the bubble’s bubble can’t get enough of.


Regardless of the possible repeal or modification of the DOL ruling under the current presidential administration, investors are demanding a greater standard of care from those who assist them.


Big box financial retailers are desperately scrambling to create procedures designed to reduce possible liabilities that come from taking on fiduciary responsibilities. The last thing on their minds is to “do what’s in the highest best care of the client.” The paramount concern is to work with their cadre of lawyers to minimize business risk for themselves. The investment risk you absorb will remain of little concern except for how thinly they determine your ‘risk profile.’ As long as your responses to risk queries are recorded, you’re screwed.


A method I know is growing popular with several financial behemoths is to take the portfolio decisions out of the hands of otherwise knowledgeable employees and place them with a group in a centralized location thus creating a homogenized, factory assembly-line process allegedly for closer monitoring.


Strangely, and perhaps insidiously, I wholeheartedly believe the intention is to build closer ties to the firm thus severing the relationship with the adviser, who is always deemed a flight risk. This method also frees up frontline professionals to sell more packaged asset-allocation product or you got it, feed the profit-margin beast.


The next bubble pop may be a game changer for the industry again and motivate financial professionals who do a magnificent job of selling products or outsourcing money management which ostensibly distances themselves from ground zero of an imminent explosion (hey, it’s the market, not me), to possibly re-think their careers. Take on a fiduciary calling.


Perhaps a bubble or at the least, a severe bear market is required to cleanse the system, drain the swamp, by migrating miscreants to more fitting livelihoods like pushing phone service deals at T-Mobile or taking roles as activities directors for Carnival Cruise Lines. We’re due.



The best activities director on a cruise ship: Julie from The Love Boat.


It’s a romantic notion. A nice thought. Meh, it keeps me motivated to consistently provide what I consider ‘full circle’ financial guidance, the complete story, pros & cons, and planning for risk markets that we strive for at Real Investment Advice.




While we await comeuppance, let’s review what stirs inside the bubble’s bubble.


The ‘passive’ revolution we’re witnessing is to provide a portfolio solution which is based on the demand for the products, regardless of how expensive the products may be.


To be clear, I’m an advocate for index investments and lower internal portfolio costs. I was one of the first financial professionals at my former employer to use market cap weighted exchange-traded funds in client portfolios to replace mutual funds.


My beef is how indexing is perceived by unsuspecting investors as safe and insidiously branded or allowed to be positioned by the buy-and-hold faction, as the ultimate never-sell strategy.


Not because it’s best for the investor; well, that’s a convenient half-truth. Mostly, it’s optimum for the adviser under pressure who can offer a pretty asset allocation solution in a package and move on to the next notch on the sales belt.


The front-line consultant of a publicly-traded big box financial retailer is under never-ending intense pressure to increase margins for shareholders. The performance of the stock price is the priority. I was provided this wisdom, which I have never forgotten, from a former regional manager at Charles Schwab – “It’s shareholders first; then follows the rest of us, including clients.”


If passive is what clients want, passive is what they shall receive, but in a manner that can be delivered and scalable by a financial retailer in a CYA/fiduciary manner. It’s time efficient to get cash fully invested in an asset allocation at once; buy full in to the story that it’s time in the market not timing the market, regardless of current valuations         or expected returns, especially as corrections appear more as distant memory than reality. READ: The Deck is Stacked: Putting Risk and Reward into Perspective.


Here’s how I see it as the bull rages on:


The asset allocator factory box designers are diligent at work, creating neat, easy-breezy investment packages positioned as products or “solutions,” thus forging a path perhaps we haven’t walked so passionately before.


The demand for these attractive boxes filled with a colorful palate of panacea in the form of passive investments, may drive valuations higher than we’ve seen, even greater than the tech bubble, which will leave investment veterans perplexed.


Market this sausage to a new breed of adviser who perceives passive as safe, has rarely witnessed a correction or bear market working in the trenches with clients, and serve it up on the finest wrapper Wall Street marketing has to offer, and God help us.


Why?


The investment vs. valuation connection is aggressively being severed. Asset-allocation solutions are being positioned to ‘pros’ as simple, third-party adjuncts to an overall financial planning experience. The intoxicating promise of ease and low cost which places what you pay in the form of valuations in a clean-up spot, or makes it an afterthought (if that), is incredibly alluring. Buy it up now, let it grow, harvest later. Simple.


After all, stock valuations are as easy to comprehend as nebulae millions of light years away.


So why bother?


Just buy the box. Open in 20 years. Hopefully, just hopefully, there’s something in there to show for it.


The demand for the product of stocks to market and maintain aggregate static asset allocation programs overrides the price paid for that product.


One of the best blogs I’ve read about “earningless” bull markets and the overall demand for stocks comes from www.philosophicaleconomics.com in a piece penned The Single Greatest Predictor of Future Stock Market Returns.


At this juncture, a lack of viable alternatives, the massive growth of robotic allocations of passive investments packaged and sold, and the aversion of the corporate sector to issue new equity has created a demand for stocks similar to the demand for a product, like an IPhone. Regardless of price, if the IPhone is in demand, you’ll stand on line for days to get it. It doesn’t need to make sense, don’t try to rationalize it.


From the blog post:


Ultimately, the price of equity is determined in the same way that the price of everything is determined–via the forces of supply and demand.  For any given stock (or for the space of stocks in aggregate), price is always and everywhere produced by the coming together of those that don’t own the stock and want to allocate their wealth into it, and those that do own the stock and want to allocate their wealth out of it.  


It’s all up to the allocators–they decide how much of their wealth they are going to allocate into stocks, how much exposure they are going to take on.  Their preferences–or rather, their efforts to put those preferences in place, by buying and selling–set the price.  Valuation is a byproduct of this process, not a rule that it has to follow.  





Buy-and-hold is painted as the informed, responsible, pro-American thing to do with a portfolio.  But, in terms of financial stability, it can actually be a very destructive behavior.  Consider the classic buy-and-hold allocation recommendation: 60% to stocks, 40% to bonds (or cash). What rule says that there has to be a sufficient supply of equity, at a “fair” or “reasonable” valuation, for everyone to be able to allocate their portfolios in this ratio?  There is no rule. 



If everyone were to jump on the buy-and-hold bandwagon, and decide to allocate 60/40, but equities were not already 60% of total financial assets, then they would necessarily become 60% of total financial assets.  The excess bidding would not stop until they reached that level.  It doesn’t matter that the associated price increase would cause the P/E ratio to rise to an obscenely high value.  The supply-demand dynamic would force it to go there.  



If aggregate demand for stocks continues, then valuations will be an afterthought. However, there is a risk to this rosy scenario. Currently, household equity percentages among individual investors stand at their highest level in two years at 67.6% per the March AAII Asset Allocation Survey. Prior bull cycles have seen equity allocations exceed 70%. Granted. Yet, consumer sentiment or the ‘feel good factor’ is at thresholds we haven’t crossed since 2004. Confusing.


Keep in mind, stocks don’t need to correct exclusively in price, they can in time. In other words, the higher valuations our team calculates for stocks can even out over the next few years ostensibly pulling down the long-term averages of stocks to 2%, maybe less.


And the reward for stock risk flies in the face of Warren Buffett’s commentary that “bonds are lousy investments.” Let’s see – 2% with 100% probability of recovering my principal at the end of a period or 2% return with a tremendous chance of loss at the roulette wheel. Hmm…


The demand for risk assets is going to require several conditions to remain consistent. I’ll cover what I consider the most important.


Which gets me to:


Passive investing is exploding in popularity. I’m concerned about the true reasons why.


From a recent article in the L.A. Times:





When money flows into conventional index funds, they must buy the stocks in their index regardless of the underlying companies’ financial health or outlook.


“Of course it distorts things,” said Rob Arnott, who has pioneered a fundamentals-based form of indexing at Research Affiliates in Newport Beach. “Price discovery,” the term for research that gets to the heart of a stock’s relative value, “is diminished as fewer and fewer investors care about the fundamentals,” Arnott said.



The migration to passive investments is indeed exploding. Currently, 42% of all U.S. stock funds are in passive vehicles.


One reason is indeed lower costs. Indexing is definitely a bargain TYPE of investment (more on this coming), when compared to many actively-managed funds.  Low internal fees is a positive for investors.


Unfortunately, I believe the overwhelming reason for the massive popularity of passive investments is performance or outperformance when compared to their actively-managed colleagues; the market momentum we’ve been experiencing since 2009 fueled by strong tailwinds of prolonged low rates, multiple quantitative easing programs, corporate share buybacks, and companies that operate lean and mean (it’s always a recession in corporate America when it comes to employee headcount), have forged accelerants to market increases.


However, cycles do change. Yet, nothing about that fact from passive preachers. Zero about bearing the full brunt of stock market risk. Nada about the math of loss.



Which gets me to:


Passive investing is not safe. Not by a long shot. To clarify: Passive is an investment type. It is NOT an investing process nor a manner to which RISK is managed.


The clearest thought I can conjure up about passive investments and bear markets is I have the finest potential to lose money at low internal costs. Never forget – Once wealth is allocated to stocks, it’s active. On occasion, radioactive. Plain and simple. Index positions must be risk managed. They bear the full risk of markets. The highs and the lows. There’s no escape-risk-free card for you.


The passive preachers make it sound like once you’re indexing there’s no need to manage risk. Diversification is supposedly the only means to do so, but beware. How you define diversification differs from how your broker does. READ: Never Look at Diversification the Same Way Again.


The granddaddy of indexing Jack Bogle of Vanguard readily tells the media that stocks are ‘overpriced.’ Future returns will be below average. In the next breath, he’ll suggest go all in because there’s nothing else you can do. If anything, that’s a pretty dangerous passive attitude to have considering the wealth carnage from math of loss, which again, is a topic that is never discussed.


Go for it. Select your own index or exchange-traded funds or work with a fiduciary to create an asset allocation plan. Regardless, a rules-based approach to rebalance overheated asset classes or exit stocks surgically through market derails as identified in Lance Roberts’ weekly newsletter, should be part of the process. That’s a full-circle approach to investing – The buy, the hold and the other four-letter word – Sell.


I’d keep the “sell” word on the “down low” with your passive friends. Go slow. Perhaps you can enlighten them. Help them redefine how passive should be perceived in the real world.


The current economic conditions handcuff the Fed and holds captive an upside move in rates which in turn, makes the bubble’s bubble a closer reality.


I’m no Lance Roberts however, I do believe stocks and bonds do vie for capital attention. Not based on an interest rate vs. equity earnings yield comparison, mind you. That’s just an ingenious Enron-like mathematical travail financial analysts devised to lead your portfolio into a high-risk, low-return trap and appear intelligent doing it. READ: Do Low Rates Justify Higher Valuations?


I am referring to the enduring nature of TINA, or “There Is No Alternative,” to stocks when the hefty lid on bond yields is considered. Warren Buffett on CNBC a few weeks ago called bonds “a lousy investment.” Why? Because who wants to extend their financial neck for a U.S. Treasury Note paying 2% plus for a decade?


No doubt interest rates can remain low for extremely long spans. Several prolonged periods are mind boggling to comprehend as outlined in this chart from Lance Roberts.


Some wines are shorter to age.



From the 1981 peak to 2003, yields of prime corporate and long duration government bonds declined by a thousand basis points.


Intermediate and long-term interest rates are a function of economic growth and inflation. As economic activity heats up, so does the demand for credit. As wages increase, so does the ability of a household to meet or take on additional monthly debt obligations. Unfortunately, wage growth has been stubbornly stagnant for 17 years.


Sentier Research, a powerhouse of information which reflects the financial state of the American household, offers a monthly data for household incomes.



Adjusted for inflation which is most important, median household real income peaked at the beginning of the Great Recession. Sadly, inflation-adjusted income is still .7% below the beginning of the year 2000.


Inflation has been trending at roughly 2%; GDP growth which was disappointing for Q1 2017 is due for a big pick up in Q2 per the Atlanta’s Fed GDP Now’s forecasting model which is estimating as of May 16, a 4.1% annual rate. We’ll be monitoring at Real Investment Advice as this model is updated six or seven times a month with at least one update following seven economic data revisions from the BEA.




The Real Investment Advice estimate for GDP growth isn’t as optimistic as the Atlanta Fed’s. In addition, we have witnessed how the GDPNow forecast gets revised lower repeatedly as economic data is released.


In the United States, we have experienced a prolonged period of below-average economic growth since 2000 that may endure through 2022, when a positive demographic cycle emerges. Read: The Long View – Rates, GDP & Challenges.


Structural headwinds will keep longer duration yields subdued and the Fed handcuffed to raise short-term rates as quickly as they prefer. I’ve been a broken record with this commentary since I began to study Japan’s economy in 2009.


The book “The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession,” by economist Richard Koo, enlightened me to the similarities between the U.S. and Japan. The aftermath of deep recessions where household balance sheets are damaged combined with poor demographics, is a lethal structural blow to economic prosperity.


Overly accommodative central bank policies attempt to accelerate (they’re far from successful) or at the least, don’t stand in the way of recovery, which comes down to, for the U.S., a continued period of low interest rates.


The environment is perfect, as long as economic conditions just trudge along and the Fed is stuck, for the TINA monster to feed. Blame it on the demographics of an aging population, not enough young people forming households, excess debt, or poor savings rates. Pick your position. The backdrop is perfect for stocks to continue higher with sights near of the bubble’s bubble.


The continued positive momentum for stocks is a poor reason to let your guard down. On the contrary. More than ever as an investor, one must remain vigilant to take profits and rebalance. Stay humble. Understand the territory your wealth travels today can fall into a sink hole real fast.


Every long-term market cycle forges a unique path. Who knows how this one will crescendo.  For now, I am sticking with the bubble’s bubble theory as I still observe too many Main Street investors who have some form of “spidey-sense” or talk doom when markets take in a short breath, which tells me after toiling in this industry since 1989, that the wall of worry that stocks climb, albeit aging like the nation’s infrastructure, is still intact.


However, when it crumbles, you can’t afford to get crushed.


I’m first and foremost a financial life planner, not a market analyst. However, when partnering with a client to create a retirement income distribution strategy, I fear now more than any other period since 2000, that sequence of return risk or a prolonged period of poor or zero portfolio returns, is a strong possibility in the future. After all, whether it’s through price or time, risk assets revert. It’s never different. As life goes, so do markets ebb and flow.


Oh, and the battle between the buy-and-holders and the risk managers?


It’ll be our financial civil war to fight; as an investor, whether choose to be or not, you will be pulled in unfortunately, by proxy. You see, your wealth will be on the line, the weapons chosen.


Yet again, we will fight.


You will bleed.


How much is up to you.