Showing posts with label Chicago Fed. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chicago Fed. Show all posts

Friday, December 8, 2017

Albert Edwards: "Here"s Why The Current Situation Is Even Worse Than The 2008 Crisis"

Back in May, we first reported that Goldman became the first bank to dare to ask if the Fed has lost control of the market, if in slightly more polite terms of course. This is how Jan Hatzius phrased it: "Despite two rate hikes and indications of impending balance sheet runoff, financial conditions have continued to loosen in recent months. Our financial conditions index is now about 50bp below its November 2016 average and near the easiest levels of the past two years." Several months later, after the third rate hike, Goldman found that once again, paradoxically, financial conditions eased further, and the market rose even more in direct opposition of what Fed rate hikes are supposed to do!


Fast forward to this weekend, when we reported that that lovely word which describes the new normal so well - "paradox" - made a repeat appearance, this time in the last quarterly report by the Bank of International Settlement, which for the nth time issued an alert on the state of the stock market, an alert which will be summarily ignored by everyone until after the crash, and reminded everyone what happened the last time financial conditions eased instead of tightening when the Fed hiked rates (spoiler alert: biggest crash in modern history). This is what the BIS" chief economist Claudio Borio said (among other things)"








Hence a paradox. Even as the Fed has proceeded with its tightening, overall financial conditions have eased. For instance, a standard indicator of such conditions, which combines information from various asset classes, points to an overall easing regardless of the precise date at which the tightening is assumed to have started. Indeed, that indicator touched a 24-year low. If financial conditions are the main transmission channel for tighter policy, has policy in effect been tightened at all?  (We can see from the BIS chart below how, unlike the last 12-month period, the Chicago Fed Financial Conditions Index did actually tighten in the May 2004-May 2005 period, and especially in the January 1994-January 1995 period.)










“In fact, this paradoxical outcome is not entirely new… it is reminiscent of the Fed policy tightening in the 2000s - the phase that spawned the now famous "Greenspan conundrum". Then, overall financial conditions hardly budged, and in some respects eased, as the Federal Reserve progressively raised rates. The experience contrasted sharply with previous tightenings, not least the one in 1994. At that time, long-term rates soared, the yield curve steepened, asset prices fell, corporate spreads widened, and EMs came under pressure. 


 


Today"s experience is reminiscent of the repeated reassurance of the 2000s" "measured pace", except that the adjustment has been, if anything, even more telegraphed. If gradualism comforts market participants that tighter policy will not derail the economy or upset asset markets, its predictability compresses risk premia. This can foster higher leverage  and risk-taking. By the same token, any sense that central banks will not remain on the sidelines should market tensions arise simply reinforces those incentives. Against this backdrop, easier financial conditions look less surprising.



Today, it was SocGen"s grumpy "permarealist" Albert Edwards" turn to focus on this peculiar "paradox" in which the more the Fed tightens, the higher markets rise in the process "poisoning the market."


Picking up on what Bank of America showed yesterday, namely that central banks broke both volatility and the market itself some time in 2013/2014...



... in his latest "weekly" note (published about 3 weeks after the last one), Edwards writes that "so scared (or is that scarred) were central bankers after the summer 2013 taper tantrum, they have now gone out of their way to reassure financial markets. Thus recent tightenings of monetary policy, whether by the Fed, ECB or Bank of England, were all perceived by markets as "dovish" tightening - and hence led to even more buoyant financial markets. Policymakers are so scared the financial bubbles they created might burst that today what might be good for the economy is subservient to the needs of Wall Street."


He then brings up our favorite new normal word - "paradox" of course - and lays out the problem on the chart below, stating that "the current situation is even worse than in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. At least back then rate hikes did not lead to easing financial conditions the way they do now! The Fed"?s desire to soothe the nerves of the financial markets has made a mockery of their tightening cycle."



Naturally, Edwards was just getting started, and the furious rant continues:








You don?t have to be a genius to reach the conclusion that central banks? dovish tightening really means there has been no tightening of monetary policy at all for Wall Street. But for Main Street, interest rate hikes do have an economic impact that will ultimately end in recession, and like an increasingly stretched elastic band this tension will eventually snap with disastrous financial market consequences. Many clients we meet have similarly apocalyptic views to our own but remain fully invested. They cannot see an immediate trigger for the financial Armageddon that they accept is heading slowly our way.



And yet, despite central bankers" best intentions to kill the free and efficient market, this time something may be changing, and may soon unleash that "shock" event that is so critical for the market to determine just what the new strike price of the Fed put is as BofA explained: that something is China.


Making the "China" case, Edwards refers to a post we published recently, and cautions that "investors are convinced that China?"s policymakers remain firmly in control of economic events." Here"s why that is no longer the case.








But Gordon Johnson of Axiom Capital notes it may be that the China credit multiplier, after years of diminishing returns, is finally exhausted. He writes, “given what we’ve seen this year – ie 101.7% new credit issuance growth YTD through Oct. 2017 (see chart below) – it seems the level of credit necessary to stimulate growth in China could prove elusive at this point. We don’t recall any economist’s forecasts exiting 2016 pointing to China’s new credit issuance more than doubling Y/Y in 2017, yet that’s exactly what’s happened. Had this been our base case, we would have expected all economic indicators in China to be moving substantially higher at this point in the cycle.”




Edwards then goes full circle to reach the same conclusion we have referenced so many times: the next crash will come out of China, and it will be at Beijing"s doing:








On this view if China?s policymakers are now pressing hard on the policy brakes after their politically expedient puffing up of the economy, a soft landing might prove more elusive than almost any investor currently assumes. Could this yet be the trigger that blindsides investors?



It could, especially since it was -ironically enough - China which in early 2016 halted what then appeared to be a global risk crash:








... it was this February?s Shanghai G20 deal that marked the point when global investors totally removed China from their watch list of things to be concerned about. That G20 meeting saw an agreement not to engage in further competitive devaluation and helped reverse the period of sustained dollar strength that had been exacerbating the renmnibi""s problems (weaker US economic data in the face of huge dollar bullishness also helped reverse the dollar?s prior relentless rise). Hence investors are very relaxed about China at exactly the point they should not be.



Which is why it would be so delightfully ironic once the next global crash originates out of China, the same country that saved the world with its gargantuan credit creation first in 2008/2009 and the second time in 2016/2017. Ironic, or perhaps the right word is paradox...









Tuesday, October 17, 2017

One of the Two Most Powerful Fed Officials Just Issued an Inflation Decree

The Fed is no longer even trying to hide the fact that it WANTS inflation.


In the last month, the Fed has attempted to feign ignorance about the true nature of inflation. Fed Chair Janet Yellen even went so far as to claim the Fed doesn’t “fully understand” inflation during a Q&A session in September.


The Fed “understands” inflation just fine, it just chooses to feign ignorance so it can maintain a “gosh, we didn’t know!” attitude about the coming inflationary storm.


Enter Chicago Fed President Charles Evans.


Evans, along with NY Fed President William Dudley, is the real “power behind the throne” for the Federal Reserve. Like Dudley, Evans is in charge of a branch of the Fed that is associated with one of the major financial centers of the US. In other words, he is a Fed President with close ties to the financial firms that call the shots for the US financial system.


This allows Evans to speak more bluntly than most Fed President. And when he talks, you know he is doing so with the full backing of the Chicago financial elite.


With that in mind, consider Evans’ recent statement on inflation.


Fed"s Evans: An increase in U.S. inflation is a priority


Chicago Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Evans said on Friday that the U.S. central bank’s priority must be to get inflation back to its 2 percent target…


“The first order thing for policy right now is to get inflation up to our objective,” Evans said at a financial literacy event in Green Bay, Wisconsin.


            Source: Reuters


As we’ve already noted, the Fed is well aware that inflation is already well above its 2% target. But with the US financial system sporting some $60 trillion in debt total (including all sectors of the economy) the Fed has no choice but to keep "papering over" these debts. Small wonder then that even the Fed"s own "sticky inflation" measure has been rising steadily since 2010 and is already clocking in well over 2%.



Put simply, BIG INFLATION is the THE BIG MONEY trend today. And smart investors will use it to generate literal fortunes.


We just published a Special Investment Report concerning FIVE secret investments you can use to make inflation pay you as it rips through the financial system in the months ahead.


The report is titled Survive the Inflationary Storm. And it explains in very simply terms how to make inflation PAY YOU.


We are making just 100 copies available to the public.


To pick up yours, swing by:


https://www.phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/inflationstorm.html


Best Regards


Graham Summers


Chief Market Strategist


Phoenix Capital Research

Tuesday, September 26, 2017

Watch Live: Hawkish Yellen Says Fed May Have Misjudged Inflation, Labor Market

Update: In her prepared remarks, Yellen crucially said,





“A more important issue from a policy standpoint is that some key assumptions underlying the baseline outlook could be wrong in ways that imply that inflation will remain low for longer than currently projected.”



As Bloomberg explains, she is stating a bit more clearly than before that the FOMC doesn’t have a handle on why inflation is low and acknowledging that it may last longer than they predict.


*  *  *


As we detailed earlier, on the heels of Bostic ("we didn"t blow any bubbles") Brainard ("some barriers to growth are structural") this morning and Kashkari ("no inflation"), Evans ("need more data"), and Dudley ("inflation"s coming soon") yesterday; it is Fed Chair Janet Yellen"s turn to speak this afternoon on "Inflation, Uncertainty and Monetary Policy" as the dollar extends its post-FOMC gains (to 1-month highs).



Since The FOMC, Fed Speakers have been active...





Raphael Bostic, Atlanta Fed president: "I actually don’t think that our policies are too easy in the sense of really facilitating some sort of asset bubble."



Lael Brainard, Fed governor: Benefits of a lengthy U.S. recovery “can only go so far” and some barriers appear to be structural, sees "widening gulf" between large, small cities.



Neel Kashkari, president Minneapolis, FOMC voter in 2017: “I don’t see inflation taking off so I see no need to tap the brakes.”



Charles Evans, president Chicago Fed, voting member: “I think we need to see clear signs of building wage and price pressures before taking the next step in removing accommodation.”



William Dudley, president New York Fed, permanent voter (and most notably considered to be closely aligned with Yellen"s way of thinking): “With a firmer import price trend and the fading of effects from a number of temporary, idiosyncratic factors, I expect inflation will rise and stabilize around the FOMC’s 2 percent objective over the medium term.”



As a reminder, the Fed Chair said that "we don"t fully understand inflation" and added that the "shortfall of inflation this year is more of a mystery," but, while Yellen speaking would normally be must-watch, with only a few days having passed since her post-statement press conference, we wonder just how much flip-flopping is possible. At that appearance, the Fed chief also downplayed the significance of the weak core inflation data as the central bank set the start date for the reduction of its balance sheet and signaled that an additional rate hike this year remained appropriate.


Additionally, though we doubt she will comment on it, Republican Senator Richard Shelby said he doesn’t think President Donald Trump will nominate Yellen for a second term at the helm of the U.S. central bank. Shelby said Tuesday in an interview with Bloomberg Television’s Vonnie Quinnthat he had spoken with the president about the Fed.





“I believe he will appoint somebody else to take her place,” the No. 2 Republican on the Senate Banking Committee said. “But ultimately, that is up to the president.”



Live Feed (from The National Association of Business Economics)


click image for link to Bloomberg"s Live Coverage



Headlines include (via Reuters)


  • YELLEN SEES "CONSIDERABLE" ODDS THAT INFLATION WON"T STABILIZE AT 2-PCT OVER NEXT FEW YEARS

  • FED"S YELLEN SAYS UNCERTAINTIES STRENGTHEN CASE FOR GRADUAL RATE HIKES

  • YELLEN SAYS GRADUAL APPROACH TO RATE HIKES PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF SUBDUED INFLATION, LOW NEUTRAL RATE

  • YELLEN SAYS THERE IS A RISK INFLATION EXPECTATIONS ARE NOT AS WELL-ANCHORED AS THEY APPEAR

  • YELLEN SAYS DATA SUGGESTS LABOR MARKET IS HEALTHY, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL SLACK AND NOT OVERHEATED

  • YELLEN SAYS EVIDENCE ON LABOR MARKET NOT DEFINITIVE, MUST BE "OPEN-MINDED"

  • YELLEN SAYS WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO LEAVE RATES ON HOLD UNTIL INFLATION REACHES 2 PCT

  • YELLEN SAYS FED CAN STILL ACHIEVE 2-PCT INFLATION GOAL EVEN IF IT IS UNDERESTIMATING SLACK OR OVERESTIMATING INFLATION EXPECTATIONS

  • FED"S YELLEN SAYS LOW INFLATION LIKELY DUE TO TRANSITORY FACTORS, SEES MANY UNCERTAINTIES

  • YELLEN SAYS DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON INFLATION COULD PROVE UNEXPECTEDLY PERSISTENT

  • YELLEN SAYS FED SHOULD BE `WARY OF MOVING TOO GRADUALLY"

  • YELLEN SAYS WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO LEAVE RATES ON HOLD UNTIL INFLATION REACHES 2 PCT

Via Bloomberg:


Fed Chair Janet Yellen said FOMC may have misjudged fundamental forces driving inflation and strength of labor market, and policy makers “stand ready to modify our views based on what we learn.”


  • “We will need to stay alert” and adjust monetary policy as information comes in, Yellen said in text of speech Tuesday in Cleveland during annual meeting of National Association for Business Economics 

  • “My colleagues and I must be ready to adjust our assessments of economic conditions and the outlook when new data warrant it”

Downward pressures on inflation “could prove to be unexpectedly persistent”


  • Economic outlook is subject to “considerable uncertainty”

FOMC’s understanding of the forces driving inflation is “imperfect,” policy makers recognize “something more persistent” may be responsible for current undershooting of long-run objective


  • While inflation will most likely stabilize around 2% over the next few years, “odds that it could turn out to be noticeably different are considerable”

  • There’s also risk that inflation expectations “may not be as well anchored as they appear and perhaps are not consistent with our 2 percent goal”

Stabilizing inflation at around 2% “could prove to be more difficult than expected” 





Key assumptions underlying baseline outlook “could be wrong” in ways that imply inflation will remain low for longer than currently projected; for example, labor market conditions may not be as tight as they appear



Under certain conditions, “continuing to revise our assessments in response to incoming data would naturally result in a policy path that is somewhat easier than that now anticipated”





Significant uncertainties strengthen the case for gradual pace of tightening; however, Fed must also be wary of moving too gradually; “it would be imprudent to keep monetary policy on hold until inflation is back to 2 percent”



Actual value of long-run sustainable unemployment rate “could well be noticeably lower” than FOMC currently projects; can’t rule out possibility that some slack still remains in labor market


  • Unemployment rate is probably “correct” in signaling that labor-market conditions have returned to pre-crisis levels; however, that doesn’t necessarily mean that economy is now at full employment

  • Data suggest a generally healthy labor market, although can’t make “any definitive assessment”; policy makers “must remain open minded on this question” and its implications for reaching inflation goal 

Friday, September 22, 2017

Stupidity Well Anchored: Exposing The Absurdity Of Inflation Expectations

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk.com,


The amount of sheer nonsense written about inflation expectations is staggering.


Let’s take a look at some recent articles before making a mockery of them with a single picture.


Expectations Problem


On July 17, 2017, Rich Miller writing for Bloomberg proclaimed The Fed Has an Inflation Expectations Problem.





Expectations matter because they shape how households and companies act and thus can go a long way in determining where inflation actually ends up. Consumers accustomed to meager inflation will resist paying up for goods and services.



“Lower inflation expectations make it all the more difficult for the central bank to achieve its inflation objective,” Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Fed, said in remarks posted on the bank’s website on July 14.



Key Element


The Business Insider says The Fed is missing a key sign of economic weakness coming from American consumers.





Andrew Levin, a career Fed economist who was a special adviser to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, told Business Insider he was worried by a noticeable decline in inflation expectations, both as reflected in consumer surveys and bond-market rates.



“The reality is that the longer-term inflation expectations of consumers and investors have shifted downward by about a half percentage point. Thus, even with the economy moving towards full employment, it’s not surprising that core PCE inflation remains about a half percentage point below the Fed’s inflation target,” he said, referring to a closely watched reading indicator that excludes food and energy costs.



“If the FOMC continues to ignore the downward drift in inflation expectations and simply proceeds with its intended path of policy tightening, actual inflation is likely to keep falling short of the Fed’s target and might well decline even further,” he said.



Janet Yellen On Wednesday


In a brief speech following yesterday’s FOMC announcement Janet Yellen made these statements.





Turning to inflation, the 12-month change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures was 1.4 percent in July, down noticeably from earlier in the year.



For quite some time, inflation has been running below the committee’s 2 percent longer-run objective.



One-off reductions earlier this year in certain categories of prices such as wireless telephone services are currently holding down inflation, but these effects should be transitory.



Such developments are not uncommon, and as long as inflation expectations remain reasonably well anchored, are not of great concern from a policy perspective because their effects fade away.



Complete Nonsense


One can find thousands of such references, all of them idiotic.


Let’s prove that with a single picture and a few comments.


CPI Percentage Weights



The idea behind inflation expectations is that if consumers think prices will go down, they will hold off purchases and the economy will collapse.


The corollary is that is consumers think inflation will rise, they will rush out and buy things causing the economy to overheat.


With that backdrop, let’s have a Q&A. I believe the answers are obvious in all cases.


Inflation Expectations Q&A


Q: If consumers think the price of food will drop, will they stop eating out?
Q: If consumers think the price of food will drop, will they stop eating at home?
Q: If consumers think the price of natural gas will drop, will they stop heating their homes and stop cooking to wait for the event.
Q: If consumers think the price of gas will drop, will they stop driving or not fill up their car if it is running on empty?
Q: If consumers think the price of gas will rise, can they do anything about it other than fill up their tank more frequently?
Q: If consumers think the price of rent will drop, will they hold off renting until that happens?
Q: If consumers think the price of rent will rise, will they rent two apartments to take advantage?
Q: If consumers think the price of plane tickets, taxis, and bus tickets will drop, will they hold off taking the plane the train or the bus?
Q: If consumers think the price of plane tickets, taxis, and bus tickets will rise, will they rush out and buy multiple tickets driving the prices even higher up?
Q: If people need an operation, will they hold off if they think prices might drop next month?
Q: If people need an operation, will they have two operations if they expect the price will go up?


All of the above questions represent inelastic items. Those constitute 80.254% of the CPI. Commodities other than food and energy constitute the remaining 19.746% of the CPI. Let’s hone in on that portion with additional Q&A.


Q. If someone needs a refrigerator, toaster, stove or a toilet because it broke, will they wait two months if for some reason they think prices will decline?
Q. If someone does not need a refrigerator, toaster, stove or a toilet will they buy one anyway if they think prices will jump?
Q. The prices of TVs and electronics drop consistently. Better deals are always around the corner. Does that stop people from buying TVs and electronics?
Q. If people thought the price of TVs was about to jump, would they buy multiple TVs to take advantage?


For sure, some people will wait for year-end clearances to buy cars, but most don’t. And if a car breaks down, consumers will fix it immediately, they will not wait for specials.


Stupidity Well Anchored


The only thing that’s “well anchored” is the stupidity of the belief that inflation expectations matter.


Asset Irony


People will rush to buy stocks in a bubble if they think prices will rise. They will hold off buying stocks if they expect prices will go down.


People will buy houses to rent or fix up if they think home prices will rise. They will hold off housing speculation if they expect prices will drop.


The very things where expectations do matter are the very things the Fed and mainstream media ignore.


No Reliable Measures


“There is no single highly reliable measure” of longer-run inflation expectations, Fed Governor Lael Brainard told The Economic Club of New York on Sept. 5.


Lovely. She’s also correct. Yet, she proposes to know what to do about it! How idiotic is that?


Economic Challenge to Keynesians


Of all the widely believed but patently false economic beliefs is the absurd notion that falling consumer prices are bad for the economy and something must be done about them.


I have commented on this many times and have been vindicated not only by sound economic theory but also by actual historical examples.


  1. My article Deflation Bonanza! (And the Fool’s Mission to Stop It) has a good synopsis.

  2. My Challenge to Keynesians “Prove Rising Prices Provide an Overall Economic Benefit” has gone unanswered.

There is no answer because history and logic both show that concerns over consumer price deflation are seriously misplaced.


BIS Deflation Study


The BIS did a historical study and found routine deflation was not any problem at all.





“Deflation may actually boost output. Lower prices increase real incomes and wealth. And they may also make export goods more competitive,” stated the study.



It’s asset bubble deflation that is damaging. When asset bubbles burst, debt deflation results.


Central banks’ seriously misguided attempts to defeat routine consumer price deflation is what fuels the destructive asset bubbles that eventually collapse.


For a discussion of the BIS study, please see Historical Perspective on CPI Deflations: How Damaging are They?


Finally, and as a measure of insurance against the Fed’s clueless tactics, please consider How Much Gold Should the Common Man Own?

Wednesday, September 6, 2017

A Look Inside The "Basket" Holding The "Market's Big Puzzle"

In a front page article, the WSJ takes aim at the "biggest market puzzle" of our times: the bizarre disconnect between growth and inflation, where on one hand government reports of strong, coordinated, global economic growth and tumbling unemployment (at least in the US and Japan) are offset by the complete lack of concurrent reflation. Some examples:


  • The U.S. economy grew 3% in Q2, but in July CPI was up only 1.7% from the prior year;

  • Eurozone inflation, similarly, remains stuck at 1.5% despite the bloc’s accelerated recovery.

  • Japan’s economy grew 4% in the same quarter - its longest expansion streak since 2006 - yet inflation has failed to move above zero, where it has been stuck for the past two decades.

Aside from the now widely accepted reality that the Phillips curve is now broken... 



... and the all too real possibility that either growth or inflation is being measured - and reported - incorrectly, whether accidentally or for political or market manipulation purposes, this disconnect suggests that something is very wrong with conventional economic theory: after all "when growth is strong, people demand more products and companies need to offer better pay to hire more workers, and so prices go up." And, as the WSJ points out, if this relationship is indeed broken, "the consequences are vast for economic policy-making and financial markets."


“There’s no question this is a very fundamental challenge to our knowledge and our policy making,” said Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.


It would also imply that the past 8 years of monetary policy has been based on a fallacy, as the growth-inflation relationship is the fulcrum of central banking: Central banks set an inflation target—usually around 2%—and then lower interest rates to help prices adjust whenever demand falters. If there is risk that excessive spending pushes inflation over the target, they raise rates to cool growth. Instead, what central banks have been doing, in addition to losing control over broad economic inflation, has been to spur asset price inflation, or as Bank of America put it, bubbles, and not just bubbles but "bubbly" bubbles...




... in the process destroying the entire capital allocation model that has defined so-called "efficient" markets since the advent of Finance 101.


The good news is that, despite broken markets overflowing with trillions in central bank liquidity, until now and for much of the post-crisis period, bonds and stocks have been going in the same direction. This year, the S&P 500 is up almost 10% while 10-year Treasury prices have gained 6%, pushing the benchmark U.S. bond yield down near 2%, a level typically associated more with financial distress than with improving growth. Of course, with everyone making money, nobody bothers to ask why.


Well, not everyone: some questions have emerged in recent weeks. Yesterday, Fed governor Lael Brainard said that “one simple explanation may be the experience of persistently low inflation”: Because inflation has been low and often falling for much of the past decade, households and firms now expect low inflation in the future as well.





Paul Donovan, chief economist at UBS Wealth Management, believes the bond market is giving the wrong signal about inflation. “Bond markets are rigged,” he said, by extraordinary demand for safe debt, created by an aging population, regulation and central-bank buying.



Other reasons for the chronic lack of inflation is a structural change in the labor market, coupled with the impact of globalization, the decline of labor unions and the rise of big multinationals holding down consumer prices in efforts to grab market share. Here we go back to the collapse of the Phillips curve:





Unemployment across the developed world has fallen to where it was before 2008, so in theory companies should be offering more generous pay raises to attract workers and increasing prices to offset the cost. Neither is happening. A partial explanation is that workers can’t demand pay raises. In its annual report in June, the Bank for International Settlements found a “positive and significant” link between wages and the strength of unions. Unionization has dropped by half over four decades.



This is certainly a factor, as we showed at the start of January 2015, when we demonstrated the startling difference in unionized vs non-unionized wage growth.



Then there is the hottest topic of our times: globalization:





Enrique Martínez-García, economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, published research in July showing that globalization is part of why inflation has been low and unresponsive to growth. Companies can outsource production or import if the wage bill starts getting too high, rather than raise prices. China has flooded international markets with cheaper goods, ultimately pushing down prices.



Subsequent BIS data confirmed that it is indeed globalization that has kept prices low: in the U.S., 10% of the change in labor costs between 2006 and 2016 was determined by the price of labor abroad, compared with 2% between 1995 and 2005. For the world overall, it is 22%, up from 11%.


Others blame tech disruption and "superstar firms":





“Inflation is not a leading indicator” of growth any more, said Didier Borowski, head of macroeconomic research at Amundi, Europe’s largest asset manager. He said “much more competition at the global level” is leading producers to price more aggressively. Indeed, the focus of many analysts is now on the market power of so-called “superstar firms,” especially technology giants such as Alphabet Inc. or Amazon.com Inc., rather than on traditional supply-and-demand explanations.



“When Amazon enters a market, it drives prices down,” said Jason Helfstein, a tech-sector analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. Chicago Fed President Charles Evans referred to Amazon’s purchase of Whole Foods Market Inc. as an example of “disruptive technology” that keeps inflation down.



What is unspoken here is the explicit role of the Fed to not only keep zombie companies alive courtesy of ultra cheap sources of funding, thus exacerbating deflation, but also boosting deflation-centric business models, such as all those to emerge from Silicon Valley over the past decade, in which massive losses are forgiven if they mean market share gains, while undercutting the competition on prices.


In any case, as the WSJ notes, what makes the conundrum difficult to solve is that inflation hovered around policy makers’ targets for more than two decades until 2008, after shooting up in the 1970s. "Central banks were then credited for subduing inflation by raising rates and cooling the economy, but many investors now doubt they can effect similar magic in reverse."


Or maybe all of the above is wrong, and inflation is there, it is just not being measured accurately.


Indeed, a far simpler explanation behind the "lack of inflation" puzzle, especially since for most Americans not only are prices not declining, or "steady", but rise with every passing month, especially for staples such as rent, food and education. is that what is really taking place is that inflation is most certainly present, it is just not being captured by the current CPI or PCE baskets.


In fact, some may be surprised to learn, that at this moment, services represent 75% of the measured inflation inputs that go into he Fed"s favorite inflationary metric, the PCE.


So instead of redoing policy based on the wrong diagnosis, it may be time to re-evaluate what Americans really spend most of their money on, which as of this moment is - at least according to the government - the following:


Friday, July 7, 2017

June Payrolls Preview: With The Fed On Autopilot, You Can Skip This One

After a poor March jobs report, followed by an April scorcher, then another debacle in May, the June payrolls report due at 8:30am will be... very much irrelevant, because as Citi pointed out earlier, the Fed is now data-independent and will keep hiking until financial conditions finally tighten (read: stocks drop). In other words, with the Fed on autopilot, feel free to skip this one - it hardly matters. For what it"s worth, here are the consensus expectations for tomorrow"s report:


  • June Nonfarm Payrolls Exp. 179K vs May 138K

  • Unemployment Rate Exp. 4.3% vs May 4.3%

  • Average Hourly Earnings M/M Exp. 0.3%, vs May 0.2%; Y/Y Exp. 2.60%, vs May 2.50%

Courtesy of RanSquawk, here is a detailed breakdown of expectations:


HEADLINE NFP: Analysts expect 179k nonfarm payrolls will be added to the US economy in June, against 138k added in May. Headline payroll growth has eased: The three-month rolling-average of the headline is running at a 121k clip, the slowest since July 2012, suggesting the pace of slack erosion is easing.


  • Analysts at Barclays, who are more-or-less in line with the consensus view, write “factors influencing our forecast include initial claims, which continue to point to low rates of job separation, and the timing of the survey week in May.” The bank says claims have been pointing toward stronger payroll growth for some time too, but add that “in the other direction are calendar-day effects that we believe held back reported employment last month.”

JOBLESS RATE: The unemployment rate is seen steady at 4.3%; the FOMC has forecast that the jobless rate will end-2017 at that level, while it recently cut its projection of NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) to between 4.5-4.8%; in June 2016, that estimate stood at between 4.7-5.0%. Given that the jobless rate is beneath the NAIRU estimate, many are once again focusing on the U6 measure of unemployment, which was running at 8.4% in May.


WAGE GROWTH: Given that the labor market supposedly is tight, and the path of monetary policy is contingent on the progress of inflation, attention will be on the gauges of wage growth. The consensus view looks for average hourly earnings Y/Y to decrease to 2.6% from 2.5%, but the M/M measure is seen rising by 0.1ppts to 0.3% due to calendar effects.


  • Analysts at CitiFX suggest that the USD is most sensitive to surprises on wages. But the bank notes that “a strong wage print would still not allay concerns on inflation where shelter, healthcare and apparel have represented a bigger drag than expected,” but add “a stronger wage print would strengthen conviction however that slack has been exhausted and potential growth is falling.”

  • The market pricing of interest rate hikes is more pessimistic than the FOMC’s projections, with the former pricing in three hikes through 2019 versus the Fed’s forecast looking for seven. One theory explaining this discrepancy is that the Fed’s longer-term projection of the Federal Fund rate around 3% is too optimistic, and a lack of growth in the medium term may mean that the peak in the cycle is lower than its projection. Another part of this is that with weak inflationary pressures, there isn’t much reason for rates to jump higher. Accordingly, inflation data, as gauged by PCE, core PCE, CPI and wage growth, will be key in shaping expectations of inflation, and thus the trajectory of Fed policy.

* * *


Goldman"s summary:





We estimate nonfarm payrolls rose 180k in June, following a 138k increase in May and compared to three- and six-month moving averages of 121k and 161k, respectively. Labor market fundamentals were mixed in June. While business employment surveys remained at strong levels and the Conference Board’s labor market differential rose to a new cycle high, initial jobless claims drifted higher and continuing claims increased for five consecutive weeks. In terms of one-off effects, we expect payroll growth to benefit from the arrival of students and recent graduates into the labor force, following a pronounced drop in youth participation rates in May likely caused by the timing of the survey week. While this would suggest scope for reacceleration in payroll growth, it would also suggest upward pressure on the unemployment rate, as students begin their summer job searches. While we expect the unemployment rate to remain stable at 4.3%, we note potential upside risks accordingly.



On wages, Goldman is optimistic this time, mostly due to a favorable calendar effects;





We estimate average hourly earnings increased 0.3% month over month and 2.6% year over year in June, reflecting the interaction of firming wage growth with somewhat favorable calendar effects. We view the risks to the year-over-year number as skewed to the upside. The June payroll period ended on the 17th, which in our model is associated with somewhat above-average wage growth, and we are constructive on wage growth more generally, exemplified by the acceleration in the employment cost index to a cycle-high pace in Q1.



Factors arguing for a stronger report:


  • Youth Employment Rebound. We believe some of the May weakness in both payrolls and labor force participation reflected the timing of student summer hiring. Details of the household survey show that job growth and participation were particularly weak among young people: despite representing less than 15% of the workforce, 16-24-year-olds drove three fifths of the overall drop in household employment (-158k of -252k, mom sa) and three quarters of the drop in the labor force (-306k of -419k). As a result, the unemployment rate among this segment declined sharply to its lowest level in nearly 50 years (-0.6pp to 8.8%). In contrast, unemployment rates were stable among respondents 25 years and older. We suspect the relatively early May survey week may have contributed here. As shown in Exhibit 1, the size of the youth labor force is relatively volatile and mean-reverting, and sharp moves in May tend to reverse in June (correlation of -0.60 in May/June since 1990). The same relationship holds for youth monthly employment growth in those months (correlation of -0.49). The unwinding of these effects suggests scope for accelerating job growth (in both the household and establishment survey) and potentially upward pressure on the unemployment rate (reflecting a possible rebound in labor force participation).

Exhibit 1: Youth Labor Force Entry Should Put Upward Pressure on Payrolls


  • Manufacturing sector surveys. Employment components of manufacturing sector surveys were generally encouraging on net in June. The ISM manufacturing employment component improved for a second month (+3.7pt to 57.2), and both the Dallas Fed and Kansas City Fed employment subindices also moved higher. However, the Philly Fed, NY Fed, Richmond Fed, Chicago Fed and Markit PMI employment components all fell in June. Our overall manufacturing employment tracker edged higher by 0.3pt to 56.0. Manufacturing payroll employment edged down 1k in May, its first outright decline in seven months, and has increased 12k on average over the last six months.

  • Service sector surveys. Service-sector employment surveys have been mixed in June but remained at generally high levels, with the ISM non-manufacturing survey falling to 55.8 in June (from a one year high of 57.8 in May). Our overall non-manufacturing employment tracker increased 0.7pt to 54.8 in June, with gains in the Philly Fed and Dallas Fed employment subindices but deterioration in the New York Fed and Richmond Fed measures. Encouragingly, the key labor market subcomponent of the Consumer Confidence report strengthened 3.1pt to 14.8, a 16-year high. Service sector payroll employment grew 131k in May and has increased 122k on average over the last six months.

Factors arguing for a weaker report:


  • Jobless claims. Initial claims for unemployment insurance benefits rebounded somewhat, averaging 243k during the five weeks between the May and June payroll survey periods, up from a cycle low of 241k on average during the prior-month period. Additionally, continuing claims rose by 21k from survey week to survey week and have now risen for five consecutive weeks.

  • Continued retail weakness. Retail employment growth has fallen from its historical trend of 15-20k per month to -20k on average over the past four months. We believe the structural shift of retail sales from brick and mortar stores toward less labor-intensive e-commerce firms will continue to weigh on payrolls growth in that industry, with the impact on the order of 10k per month relative to its previous trend. This drag on retail employment has appeared particularly pronounced recently, and we note the possibility that weak brick and mortar sales trends this year may be accelerating the pace of this structural shift.

Neutral Factors:


  • ADP. The payroll processing firm ADP reported a 158k increase in private payroll employment in June – below consensus expectations and its slowest pace of the year. However, we believe that some of the sequential softness in the report likely reflected weakness in the financial and economic indicators also used in the ADP model, making it difficult to tease out the underlying signal regarding the pace of job growth. Exhibit 2 shows the relationship between ADP surprises (vs. consensus based on first-reported ADP) and non-farm payrolls surprises, which appears rather limited outside of large surprises.

Exhibit 2: Limited Relationship between ADP and Payrolls, but Don’t Completely Ignore Large ADP Surprises


  • Labor supply constraints. We view the labor market as close to full employment, and as slack diminishes further, this should exert both upward pressure on wages and downward pressure on job growth. However, labor supply constraints historically appear less binding in June, perhaps reflecting the entry of students and recent graduates into the labor force. As shown in Exhibit 3, in years with relatively tight labor markets, payroll growth tends to slow during the spring but then reaccelerate in June/July. One potential driver of this June reacceleration is that firms may hire more graduates and students on summer vacation if they had difficulty filling positions earlier in the year.

Exhibit 3: Labor Supply Constraints Are Historically Less Binding in June


  • Job availability. The Conference Board’s Help Wanted Online (HWOL) report showed a 1.0% pullback in June online job postings following May’s 4.2% increase. However, we continue to place limited weight on this indicator at the moment, in light of research by Fed economists that suggests the HWOL ad count has been depressed by higher prices for online job ads.

  • Job cuts. Announced layoffs reported by Challenger, Gray & Christmas after our seasonal adjustment declined modestly (-5k to 35k), near the middle of its recent range. On a year-over-year basis, announced job cuts declined by 8k.

  • Seasonals. Since 2010, June payroll growth has surprised positively relative to consensus in four of the seven instances with an average surprise of +14k. We don’t view this as compelling evidence of a systematic bias in June.

* * *


Other Labor Market Considerations:


CLAIMS: On a four-week moving average basis, initial jobless claims are at 243k going into June’s employment situation report; though that is technically a touch higher than the 239.75k four-week moving average heading into May’s employment report, it is essentially flat, and stable. Continuing claims have, however, edged up on the four-week moving average basis to 1.944mln from 1.918mln before the previous NFP report.


ADP: The ADP reported 158k payrolls were added to the US economy in June; analysts had expected a print of 185k versus the prior (downwardly revised) 230k. However, the report is “very likely to understate the official payroll number,” write analysts at Pantheon Macroeconomics. Pantheon explains that “ADP"s number is generated from a model which includes lagged official payroll numbers, so the soft May number, 147K for private payrolls, has pulled down today"s ADP”. It adds that May"s official number was hit be a seasonal adjustment issues, which likely won"t reverse in full in June, but definitely will not be repeated. “Payrolls should therefore revert to the trend implied by a host of survey data, at least.”


JOB CUTS: US employers announced intentions to trim payrolls by 31,105 jobs in June, Challenger reported, which is the lowest monthly total in 2017, 6% lower than May’s number, and 19% lower than June 2016. The consultancy also reported that job cuts had declined 28% in the first half of the year. “The pace of job cutting is significantly slower compared to the first half of last year,” Challenger said, adding “in a tight labour market, it’s no surprise companies are holding on to their existing workforces. Companies are also waiting to see how proposed regulations from the Trump administration may impact business going forward.”


BUSINESS SURVEYS: The non-manufacturing ISM report indicated a slight easing in labour market conditions, with the employment sub-index falling by 2 points to 55.8, though the measure has been in expansion (above 50) for 40 consecutive months. Markit, another survey compiler, noted that in its own services PMI, employment growth remained strong in June, with the pace of job creation at the fastest since February. The manufacturing ISM, meanwhile, reported an acceleration in labour market conditions, with the employment sub-index rising by 3.7 points to 57.2 to print the ninth straight month in expansion.

Tuesday, June 27, 2017

Bitcoin Bloodbath Leads Tech Stock Tumble; Gold Gouged As Credit Curve Crushed To New Lows

hmmm....




We started the day with a gold flash-crash...




Then Durable Goods data and The Chicago Fed"s National Activity Index both tumbled and massively missed expectations -smashing the Citi Macro Surprise Index to its weakest since August 2011...




Then Nasdaq (led by FANGs) tumbled at the cash open after levitating overnight  - oddly reactive to the tumble in Bitcoin...




Bitcoin was clubbed like a baby seal - down over 15% - the biggest drop since Jan 2015...




On the day, only Nasdaq closed red...markets closed weak (NOTE, the European close saw a buying panic reappear in Nasdaq briefly)




FANG Stocks fell most since the day after the tech-wreck closing NOT "off the lows"...




VIX was smashed back to a 9 handle...But as the chart below shows, it didn"t help push stocks back up...




Treasury yields all fell on the day - even the short-end was bid in a very strong auction. The drop started on the dismal data early...




The Treasury yield curve slumped flatter once again with 2s10s dropping to a 78bps handle - lowest since Aug 2016




2s30s tumbled again to 134bps - the flattest since the last recession begain...




The Dollar Index roller-coastered to end the day slightly higher...




Yen was sold hard today (and Yuan weakened)...




Both Gold and Silver flash-crashed overnight but rallied on the weak US data...




On the bright side, WTI Crude saw a modest bounce today... testing below $3 briefly...




We note that while Bitcoin was battered today, it found support at its exponential trendline off March lows...




All 20 of the largest cryptocurrencies were deep in the red...




Finally, we note that at least one corner of the equity market might be getting nervous about the S&P 500 Index hovering near all-time highs. Options contracts that pay off with a drop in the benchmark gauge outnumber those betting on a gain by a rate of more than 2-to-1, the most since January 2016, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.



Since the start of the bull market, the S&P 500 has lost 0.3 percent in the 10 days following put-to-call ratios at or above the current level, compared with a 0.6 percent gain in all 10-day stretches during that period.

Monday, June 12, 2017

Goldman: The Fed Will Hike This Week, But Here Are "The Two Most Interesting Questions"

On Wedensday the FOMC will hike rates by another 25 bps - an event which the Fed Funds market prices in with near virtual certainty, while Goldman calls the rate increase "extremely likely" - and only a "tail" event like an extremely weak CPI report on Wednesday morning, hours ahead of the Fed announcement, has any chance of preventing  this outcome. So with the next rate hike virtually inevitable, questions are focused on not only the Fed"s exit strategy for balance sheet normalization and what the "dots" or funds rate path will look like, but how the Fed squares rising rates with the recent string of inflation misses.


As Goldman"s Jan Hatzius writes, data since the March meeting has sharpened the dilemma that both sides of the mandate are sending increasingly different signals about the urgency of further tightening. "The unemployment rate has fallen 0.4pp since the March meeting and our current activity indicator and real GDP estimates signal that above-trend output growth will produce further labor market improvement. But the year-over-year core PCE inflation is now 0.2pp lower than at the March meeting."


While conceding that a hike is guaranteed, Goldman notes that two issues should make this meeting particularly interesting.


  • First, will Fed officials alter their policy views in response to the increasingly different signals that both sides of the mandate are sending about the urgency of further tightening?

  • Second, will the press conference provide some clarity on what the next tightening step following the June hike will be?

As a result of the weaker than expected inflationary prints, Goldman believes the recent data do not call for a major change in the Fed’s policy outlook. While Hatzius expects the FOMC to lower its estimate of the structural unemployment rate by a tenth next week, even with that assumption, the new data have broadly offsetting implications for the policy outlook in standard Taylor rules. Highlighting recent Fed communications, Goldman believes the Fed will follow "a balanced approach in dealing with the dilemma."


It also means that the statement will likely characterize economic activity as "picking up but recognize that inflation slowed since earlier this year." On the other side, Goldman sees a signal of heightened inflation concern as the main dovish risk and an upgrade of the balance of risks as the main hawkish risk.


Previewing the Fed"s Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), expect a modest downgrade to GDP growth for this year, coupled with declines in the unemployment rate to 4.3% this year and 4.2% next year. At the same time, projections for core PCE inflation are likely to fall to 1.8% this year and probably 1.9% in 2018. Reflecting the offsetting data news, expect the “dot plot” to show relatively stable funds rate projections.


On to Yellen"s press conference, which should provide some clarity on whether the next tightening step after June will be balance sheet normalization or a third funds rate hike. Goldman, as well as much of the street, expects balance sheet adjustment to start in September and the Fed hiking cycle to resume in December. With respect to the balance sheet, the Fed will initially cap the amounts of securities that can run off in any given month of $10bn for UST and $5 billion for MBS, that rise over four quarters to caps of $40 billion and $20 billion, respectively.


* * *


Some more details. Here is Goldman on the current economic situation, and how it will be (mis)read by the Fed.





Another rate increase from the FOMC next week is now extremely likely. Only an extremely weak CPI report on Wednesday morning or another tail event would prevent the committee from hiking. The committee probably also still expects a total of three hikes and the start of balance sheet adjustment in 2017.  


But two issues should make this meeting particularly interesting.


  • First, will Fed officials alter their policy views in response to the increasingly different signals that both sides of the mandate are sending about the urgency of further tightening? We expect both lower unemployment and inflation paths in the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) but relatively stable funds rate projections as the labor market and inflation data surprises, in the words of San Francisco Fed President John Williams, roughly “wash out”.

  • Second, will the press conference provide some clarity on what the next tightening step following the June hike will be? We expect a detailed balance sheet announcement in September and a third rate hike in December but the reverse order is also plausible.

We believe both labor market and growth data in hand make a strong case for a rate increase next week and to remain upbeat about the outlook. Both our current activity indicator —down from 4.0% in February to 3.0% in May— and real GDP estimates—up from 1.2% in Q1 to our 2.3% Q2 tracking estimate—signal above-trend output growth (Exhibit 1, left panel). The medium-term growth outlook is also decent despite the lower odds of significant fiscal easing. The more important reason why growth should stay firm is the easing in financial conditions. Our FCI is at the easiest level since early 2015 and has  eased by 50bp since the March FOMC meeting. As the right panel of Exhibit 1 shows, the expected effect on GDP growth from changes in financial conditions for 2018H1 is now more than 0.3pp higher than at the March meeting.





Spare capacity continues to diminish, and the unemployment rate has fallen 0.4pp since the March meeting to a 16-year low of 4.3% (Exhibit 2, left panel). While nonfarm payroll growth has recently softened a bit, the average monthly gain of 162k year-to-date is still double our 85k estimate of the “breakeven” rate needed to keep the unemployment rate unchanged. While slack measures have declined more than expected, weak inflation data in April and especially March pushed the year-over-year pace of core PCE inflation 0.2pp lower than at the March Meeting (Exhibit 2, right panel). Both a Taylor rule framework and recent Fed communications suggest that the new data have broadly offsetting implications for the policy outlook.





Exhibit 3 translates the labor market and inflation surprises into changes in the appropriate funds rate via a standard Taylor rule framework. The original Taylor rule implies that a 0.2pp decline in inflation lowers the appropriate funds rate by 30bp while a 0.4pp reduction in the unemployment rate raises the appropriate funds rate by 40bp. In a modified “Taylor 1999” rule, the impact of employment is doubled  relative to the original version. This means that the impact of a 0.4pp reduction in unemployment rises from 40bp to 80bp. The left panel of Exhibit 3 thus suggests a 10-50bps higher appropriate funds rate.





But the decline in the unemployment rate may overstate the surprise if some decline was expected. Similarly, the decline in inflation can understate the surprise if some firming was expected. The middle panel of Exhibit 3 therefore compares actual unemployment and inflation moves to our expectations as of the March meeting and has less hawkish implications than the left panel. Finally, a lower estimate of the structural unemployment rate also reduces the decline in the unemployment rate gap. On net, we estimate the new data—combined with a 0.1pp downgrade of the structural rate—would have an exactly neutral effect in the Taylor 1999 rule that Chair Yellen has discussed repeatedly.



What has the Fed communicated in recent week.





Recent Fed communication suggests that the committee will also consider surprises on both sides of the mandate as roughly offsetting. As Exhibit 4 shows, several Fed officials have emphasized that there is now little labor market slack left. The inflation language in the May minutes was quite balanced as ”most participants viewed the recent softer inflation data as primarily reflecting transitory factors, but a few expressed concern that progress toward the Committee’s objective may have slowed.”





Since the May meeting, inflation for April has been weak for core CPI (0.9% annualized) but roughly in line for core PCE (1.8% annualized). The April inflation reports and recent comments by some Fed officials including Chicago Fed President Evans suggest that additional signs of heightened inflation vigilance are a dovish risk relative to our expectations. Governor Powell said that “there are good reasons to expect that inflation will resume its gradual rise but it is important to demonstrate a strong commitment to achieving our symmetric 2 percent objective” while Philadelphia Fed president Harker said that “we’re still on track for inflation” and that he is “looking at the trend.”



In light of these developments we expect to the committee to make three key changes to its post-meeting statement next week. First, we expect the committee to replace “consumer prices declined in March” by “inflation slowed since earlier this year” reflecting the core CPI miss in April. Second, we expect the statement to upgrade the growth assessment with verbiage along the lines of economic activity “appears  to have picked up” and to note that household spending “appears to be accelerating”. Third, we expect the committee to tacitly signal balance sheet run-off later this year by adding the qualifier “for the time being” to the description of its existing reinvestment policy.



A signal of heightened inflation concerns is the key dovish risk. The committee may, for instance, drop the “somewhat” from “inflation continued to run somewhat below 2 percent”. In terms of hawkish risks, an upgrade of the balance of risks is possible through the removal of “roughly”, reflecting improved domestic and international growth. We also expect Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kaskhkari to dissent as he recently described the move of inflation in “the wrong direction” as “concerning”.



What about the revised Summary of Economic Projections





The June FOMC meeting will include the quarterly update to the SEP. We expect significant changes to the unemployment and inflation projections but relatively stable funds rate forecasts, reflecting offsetting job market and inflation news.



1. Slightly lower GDP growth: Assuming our Q2 GDP tracking 1. estimate of 2.3%, GDP growth will average 1.7% annualized over the first half of 2017, so it would take a 2.4% growth rate in H2 to meet the policymakers March SEP estimate of 2.1%. We expect the 2017 median to fall to 2.0%, with risk tilted to the upside. We forecast that the median estimates for GDP growth in 2018-2019 and in the longer-run will remain unchanged.



2. Lower unemployment rate. The unemployment rate fell 0.4pp since the March meeting when the median unemployment rate projection was 4.5% for the forecasting horizon. We expect the median to fall to 4.3% in 2017, 4.2% in 2018 (with risks of 4.3%) and 4.3% in 2019. The estimate of the structural unemployment rate is quite likely to fall further from 4.7% to 4.6% in response to large declines in the actual rate and recent news on prices and wages. The decline in NAIRU would limit somewhat the projected employment overshoot but is a close call.



3. Lower core PCE inflation. We expect the 2017 median core PCE projection to fall to 1.8% and perhaps 1.7%. To reach 1.8% by year-end, monthly core PCE inflation would need to accelerate to an annualized rate of at least 1.9%. We believe the 2018 forecast also drops a tenth to 1.9% as some members now likely feel a bit less confident about the inflation outlook.



 



4. Relatively stable median dots. We expect most participants, especially those in the center of the committee, to stick to their March dots reflecting offsetting inflation and unemployment moves. We also believe that the committee probably still expects a total of three hikes in 2017. The retirement of Tarullo lowers the numbers of participants to 16 from 17 in March and is likely to move up the median 2018 dot from to 3 to 3-1/2 hikes next year. As the FOMC is extremely likely to hike for the second time this year next week, we expect that the 2017 one-hikers will shift to projecting 2 hikes in total for this year. We also assume that the new Atlanta Fed President Bostic votes like his predecessor Lockhart and that the new Richmond Fed President Mullinix lowers the Richmond Fed dots a bit.




Finally, how will the Fed "renornalize" its Balance Sheet.





We expect to get some more clarity next week on balance sheet runoff at the press conference and possibly also with an augmented Policy Normalization Principles and Plan. We continue to look for normalization to be announced in September. Here we update our projections for balance sheet runoff:



1. Start Date: We expect a detailed announcement in September  but would not be surprised if it came in December as guidance has been mixed. The May minutes suggest a start in September as an announcement at the December meeting would leave little time to “begin reducing the Federal Reserve’s Securities this year”. But guidance on the start of runoff by Governor Brainard after the funds rate gets midway to its long-run value of 3.0% and by New York Fed President Dudley “sometime later this year or next year” supports December. We think that announcing the start of balance sheet adjustment in September and keeping open the option of foregoing the third 2017 hike is the more prudent course of action given the mixed recent data and the potential for fiscal turmoil in Washington in Q3 related to the need for a debt ceiling hike and an extension of spending authority. We think the detailed announcement in September will be followed by the actual start of runoff of assets in October.



2. Process for phasing out reinvestment: The May minutes signaled that the committee will preannounce a schedule of gradually increasing caps to limit the amounts of securities that can run off in any given month. Our assumption is that that the initial caps are $10 billion a month for UST and $5 billion a month for MBS. The caps would rise each quarter by $10 billion and $5 billion to $40 billion and $20 billion respectively. Exhibit 7 shows that caps allow for a gradual runoff and deal with the variability associated with MBS prepayment and the irregular monthly schedule of maturing assets. The caps will remain in place after the phase-in but then only bind in roughly a third of the months for Treasuries until mid-2020 when the balance sheet reaches its projected terminal size.



3. Terminal size: We expect the Fed to maintain a balance sheet that 3. is relatively large by historical standards given several advantages of a large balance sheet related to monetary policy implementation and regulatory needs. Our calculations suggest that a monetary policy implementation through a floor system implies a terminal size of roughly 15.5% of GDP. While support from the New York Fed for the large balance scenario makes this outcome quite likely, there is no urgency yet in deciding on the size and on the composition of the terminal balance sheet.





Goldman"s conclusion:





A third consecutive quarterly rate increase next week is now extremely likely, in our view. Only an extremely weak CPI report on Wednesday morning or another tail event would prevent the committee from hiking. The data news since March has sharpened the dual mandate dilemma policymakers are facing. Our own view is that the inflation and unemployment surprises have been roughly offsetting but that the range of outcomes has widened somewhat. While the inflation outlook is uncertain, the dilemma will most likely resolve itself as inflation gradually accelerates. We therefore expect policymakers to remain focused on tightening mostly with the funds rate but also soon with the balance sheet tool.



And while we agree with Goldman in theory, one thing the bank has omitted in principle is that according to the Fed"s own commercial loan data, the US economy may be just 4-6 weeks away from posting its first negative C&I loan print since the financial crisis: a virtually failsafe indication of an imminent (or concurrent) recession.



Which means that, as we explained yesterday, the Fed is about to hike in not only a disinflationary phase of the economic cycle (which is largely a function of the slowdown in the Chinese commoity bubble, and the collapse in the Chinese credit impulse), but also into what may be an outright recession in the US. If so, look for the yield curve to do what it has always done in the past after the Fed hikes rates: flatten, then flatten some more, than go horizontal, and eventually invert.


Monday, May 22, 2017

Commodities Bust Hits Farm Lenders, Delinquencies Surge 225%

Submitted by Wolf Richter via WolfStreet.com,


Just as the deflating Farmland bubble leaves its marks.


When it comes to agricultural debt, the numbers aren’t huge enough to take down the global financial system. But this shows how much pain the commodities rout is producing in the farm belt just when the farmland asset bubble that took three decades to create is deflating, and what specialized lenders and the agricultural enterprises they serve – some of them quite large – are currently struggling with in terms of delinquencies.


This is what delinquencies on loans for agricultural production – not including loans for farmland, which we’ll get to in a moment – look like:




From Q4 2014 to Q1 2017, delinquencies have soared by 225% to $1.4 billion, according to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, which just released its report on delinquencies and charge-offs at all banks. This is the highest amount since Q1 2011, as delinquencies were falling after the Financial Crisis. That amount was first breached in Q4 2009.


The delinquency rate rose to 1.5%, the highest since Q3 2012. On the way up, going into the Financial Crisis, delinquencies breached that rate in Q1 2009.



These were the loans associated with agricultural production. In terms of loans associated with farmland, delinquencies have soared by 80% from Q3 2015 to Q1 2017, reaching $2.15 billion:



Farmland values have surged for three decades but are now in decline in many parts of the US. For example in the district of the Federal Reserve of Chicago (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin), prices soared since 1986, in some years skyrocketing well into the double-digits, including 22% in 2011, and nearly tripling since 2004. It was the Great Farmland Bubble that had become favorite playground for hedge funds. But starting in 2014, prices have headed south.


This chart from the Chicago Fed’s AgLetter shows farmland prices in its district in two forms, adjusted for inflation (green line) and not adjusted for inflation (blue line):



Adjusted for inflation, farmland prices in the district fell 9.5% over the past three years. The exception is Wisconsin:


  • Illinois -11%

  • Indiana -7%

  • Michigan -12%

  • Iowa (since their 2012 peak) -15%

  • Wisconsin +4%

The Chicago Fed adds this about the deflating farmland asset bubble, in inflation-adjusted terms:





Even after three annual declines, the index of inflation-adjusted farmland values for the District was nearly 60% higher in 2016 than its previous peak in 1979.



Does it mean to say that there is a lot more air to deflate out of the farmland bubble and a lot more pain to come and that this is just the beginning? Or is it saying that this is no big deal?


These falling farmland prices are making the debt much more precarious. So on a nationwide basis, the delinquency rate of farmland loans, according the Fed’s Board of Governors, jumped from 1.46% in Q3 2015 to 2.0% in Q1 2017.


In terms of magnitude of the dollars involved, agricultural and farmland loans pale compared to consumer or commercial loans. So the problems in the farm belt won’t cause the next Global Financial Crisis, and it progresses on its own terms. But it is putting strain on agricultural lenders, growers, and their communities.


Another asset bubble, a global one, is quietly but persistently experiencing a downturn that parallels and in some aspects already exceeds the one during the Financial Crisis. What the slow crash of classic cars says about the future of other asset classes. Read…  This Is How an Asset Bubble Gets Unwound these Days

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

Dr.Copper Needs To Go Back To School

Comparing different time series to spot divergences (and thus investment opportunities) is a staple of macro trading; but as Bloomberg"s Cameron "macroman" Crise explains, implicit in the use of the technique, of course, is confidence in one’s ability to know which variables are independent and which are dependent.


An example of such an overlay is a comparison of the U.S. 10-year yield and the copper/gold ratio. Based on the relationship of the last few months, it looks like yields should be about 20 bps lower.



Intuitively, this makes sense. Not only does copper reflect input costs and thus inflation, but it is also a famously accurate indicator of the economic cycle -- hence the sobriquet “Dr. Copper.”


The problem is - as Crise details below - in these days of rampant commodity speculation in China, however, can we really trust copper to give us an accurate read on the U.S. economic cycle?


I looked at monthly changes in copper and the Chicago Fed National Activity Indicator 3-month average, a useful proxy for economic activity. While historically there has been a positive correlation between the two series, over the last year and a half or so it has actually been negative.



The relationship looks the same when comparing copper to quarterly GDP growth. Historically there has been a positive correlation; more recently, however, it has turned a little negative.



While it seems likely that price action in industrial commodities is telling us something, it doesn’t appear to have much to do with the U.S. economic cycle. As such, trading bonds based on divergences with the copper price would appear to be a dubious proposition.


Perhaps Dr. Copper needs to go back to school and defend his PhD thesis to the market?


Although it does seem that Dr.Copper has caught the same "animal spirits" hope-hype that the market has...