Showing posts with label BOJ. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BOJ. Show all posts

Saturday, December 23, 2017

This Is The Core Problem Facing Every Investor Today

Authored by Ben Hunt via Epsilon Theory blog,


The Three-Body Problem



As much as I dislike the chickens on our farm, I love my bees. Do they sting? Of course they sting. The swarm is a wild animal. But after a few painful years I’m no longer a ham-handed goofball with my hives, and a morning spent in sync with this amazing animal is never a bad morning. Not only are bees low maintenance, not only do they pay a wonderful rent, but they demonstrate a genius and an optimism — there’s just no other word for it — that makes me feel more creative and alive.


The Connecticut winters are tough, though. I do what I can to support the bees, which is mostly just building a wind break with bales of straw, making sure that the hive stays ventilated enough to prevent water vapor condensation, and preventing mice from taking up residence. That and avoiding original sins like poor hive placement or collecting too much rent. But ultimately it’s a battle between the animal and Mother Nature. It’s up to them to survive. Or not.


Honeybees don’t hibernate (bumblebees do, but hive colony bees don’t), and they can’t fly south for the winter. To survive a Northern winter, bees change the composition of the swarm by shrinking the overall population, caulking the hive, getting rid of the deadweight males (i.e., ALL of the males), and laying just enough eggs to preserve a minimal survivable population through the winter and into spring. They cluster together in the center of the hive, keeping the queen in the center, shivering their wings to create kinetic energy, occasionally sending out suicide squads to retrieve honey stores from the outer combs. They lower their metabolism by creating a cloud of carbon dioxide in the hive. Yes, a carbon dioxide cloud.


All of this preparation takes time. To survive winter, the swarm starts to change its behaviors — from brood patterns to pollen collection to comb creation — not when the weather starts getting cold, but in the middle of summer when the dog days of August are still in front of us. And not just on some random date, but on a completely predictable day.


In 2018 my bees will begin to prepare for winter on Friday, June 22nd.


Why? Because bees can measure the angle of the sun’s rays. They can remember this from one day to the next. When today’s midday sun is ever so slightly lower in the sky than yesterday’s midday sun, a bee will know it. And the entire colony will begin to change.



Bees recognize the freakin’ summer solstice with as much accuracy as any human civilization ever did.


See? Genius. But we’re just getting started.


When bees act on their awareness of the summer solstice, they are trading a derivative. And they expertly manage the basis risk of that trade.


Huh? Time out, Ben. What are you talking about?


A derivative, in the broadest sense of the word, is something that’s related to something else you care about (the “underlying”), but for whatever reason you choose to interact with the derivative-something rather than the underlying-something. For humans, you might care about the stock price of company XYZ, so that’s the underlying, but you think something momentous is going to happen to the company three months from now, so you interact with a derivative on the stock, in this case a three-month option contract. For bees, the thing they truly care about is how cold it gets, so from their perspective the temperature is the underlying and the sunlight angles are the derivative thing that they analyze and interact with. In truth, of course, it’s the tilt of the Earth’s axis and the resultant sunlight angles that cause seasonality and temperature changes, so a curmudgeonly reader might accurately say that actually, it’s the temperature that’s the derivative here, but I trust we’re all open-minded enough to take a bee’s eye view of the world for the duration of this note.


Why do bees take their behavioral cues from sunlight angles rather than temperature change directly? Because the algorithm for predicting seasonality — IF (maximum incident angle of sunlight today < maximum incident angle of sunlight yesterday), THEN (prepare for winter) — is enormously simpler, more predictive, more timely, and less volatile than any sort of temperature time-series analysis, or at least any temperature time-series analysis available to bees and pre-weather satellite humans. The genius (and fatal flaw) of bees and humans is their ability to create complex social systems on the basis of simple algorithms like this. Modern computing systems of the Big Data sort have a very different type of genius.


Hold that thought.


But first let’s make sure we understand what basis risk means, and why it’s The Most Important Thing to understand when you’re dealing with derivatives. “Basis” is the relationship between the derivative and the underlying, and so basis risk is how bad things could get if the relationship between derivative and underlying isn’t as tight as you thought it was. For bees, basis risk takes the form of cold weather coming sooner or later than normal. Shrinking the colony like clockwork based on the summer solstice works great if the first big freeze comes in November, not so well if you get a big snow in mid-October.


The key to managing basis risk is to keep your risk antennae (literally antennae when it comes to bees) focused on how well the derivative thing is tracking with the underlying thing. You need to watch the correlation. So to manage their basis risk, bees are also sensitive to temperature (the underlying) and all of the other derivative things related to changing temperature, like flower bloom patterns or prevailing winds. Nothing will totally override the summer solstice trade (even tropical bees make some small colony adjustments based on seasonality), but bees are adaptive investors, able to accelerate their winter preparation if cold weather comes early or delay it if cold weather comes late. Efficient management of basis risk is a balancing act between sticking with the original trade and adapting your behavior to changing correlations (you don’t want to mistake an Indian Summer for spring!), but that’s the beauty of evolution — billions of bee colonies over millions of years have lived and died and reproduced to naturally select the combination of hard-wired nervous system algorithms that allows honeybee species to thrive across a wide range of ecosystems and a wide range of seasonal weather variations.


But it’s only a range. Bees can’t live in as wide a range of ecosystems and weather variations as, say, ants. I doubt there’s a bee colony on Earth that can survive six months straight of sub-50 degree weather. If you’re a bee colony and you’ve moved that far north and that’s the magnitude of your downside basis risk, it really doesn’t matter how amazing you are in your solar declination calculations … you’re not going to make it. Maybe you get lucky for a couple of years, but if it’s possible that you could have four or five months of harshly cold weather, then sooner or later that severe basis risk catches up with you. This is a basis risk that you can’t insure against, that you can’t hedge against with extra preparation or precaution. It’s an unmanageable basis risk. For most of North America, though, even pretty far up into Canada, cold weather is a manageable basis risk, particularly if you’ve got a beekeeper able to lend a helping hand. Sometimes the bees will get a bad roll of the weather dice and you’ll lose a hive to basis risk, but it doesn’t threaten the species.



Species risk comes into play when you get a major climactic event that lasts for a long time in terms of a colony’s lifespan but not long at all in terms of evolution, genetic mutation, and natural selection. Like, say, what if spring no longer followed winter? What if it snowed in August and flowers bloomed in January? What if winter disappeared for a decade? What if it lasted that long? What if your weather basis risk was unknowable, as in Game of Thrones? Even a short Westerosi winter of a couple of years would kill every bee colony on the continent, which is why I don’t think I’ve ever seen a bee hive on Game of Thrones. [Hmm … I’ve just been informed by Grand Maester Guinn that “one of the Baratheon vassal houses of the Reach is House Beesbury, with a family seat of Honeyholt and a family motto of Beware Our Sting.” Sigh. You see what I have to put up with? Okay, we’ll stipulate that Dornish latitudes are safe. But The North is no place for bees when winter comes!]


This is basis uncertainty, where you’re not even sure that any basis exists at all, as opposed to mere basis risk. Basis uncertainty is an unknowable basis risk, which is much more damaging to species development than the occasional bout of severe basis risk.


[Long parenthetical: understanding the distinction between risk and uncertainty is crucial in every aspect of life. A risky decision is when you have a pretty good sense of the odds and the pay-offs. It lends itself to statistical analysis and econometrics, particularly if it’s a decision you will have the opportunity to make multiple times. An uncertain decision is when you don’t have a good sense of odds and pay-offs. Here, statistical analysis may very well kill you, particularly if you’re not going to get many cracks at the game, or if you don’t know how many times you’ll get to make a choice. You need game theory to make sense of decisions made under uncertainty.]


Basis uncertainty is the core problem facing every investor today.


It’s not just that we endure large basis risks here in the Hollow Market, unmanageable for many. It’s not just that all of our old signposts and moorings for navigating markets aren’t working very well. It’s not just difficult to identify predictive/derivative patterns in today’s markets. There is a non-trivial chance that structural changes in our social worlds of politics and markets have made it impossible to identify predictive/derivative patterns. THIS is basis uncertainty, and it’s as problematic for humans facing markets that don’t make sense as it is for bees facing weather patterns that don’t make sense.


Well, that’s just crazy talk, Ben. What do you mean that it might be impossible to identify predictive/derivative patterns? What do you mean that basis might not exist at all? Of course there’s a pattern to markets and everything else. Of course spring follows winter.


Nope. This is the Three-Body Problem.


Or rather, the Three-Body Problem is a famous example of a system which has no derivative pattern with any predictive power, no applicable algorithm that a human (or a bee) could discover to adapt successfully and turn basis uncertainty into basis risk. In the lingo, there is no “general closed-form solution” to the Three-Body Problem. (It’s also the title of the best science fiction book I’ve read in the past 20 years, by Cixin Liu. Truly a masterpiece. Life and perspective-changing, in fact, both in its depiction of China and its depiction of the game theory of civilization.)


What is the “problem”? Imagine three massive objects in space … stars, planets, something like that. They’re in the same system, meaning that they can’t entirely escape each other’s gravitational pull. You know the position, mass, speed, and direction of travel for each of the objects. You know how gravity works, so you know precisely how each object is acting on the other two objects. Now predict for me, using a formula, where the objects will be at some point in the future.



Answer: you can’t. In 1887, Henri Poincaré proved that the motion of the three objects, with the exception of a few special starting cases, is non-repeating. This is a chaotic system, meaning that the historical pattern of object positions has ZERO predictive power in figuring out where these objects will be in the future. There is no algorithm that a human can possibly discover to solve this problem. It does not exist.


To visualize the Three-Body Problem, here’s a simulation of the orbits of green, blue, and red objects with random starting conditions, each exerting a gravitational pull on the others. What Poincaré proved is that there is no formula where you can plug in the initial information and get the right answer for where any of the objects will be at any future point in time. No human can predict the future of this system.



But a computer can. Not by using an algorithm, which is how biological brains — human and bee alike — evolved to make sense of the world, but by brute force calculations. Remember, you know everything about these three objects … none of the physics here is a mystery. If you can do the calculation quickly enough, you can compute where all three objects will be one second from now. And one second from then. And one second from then. And so on and so on. With enough processing power (and this can require a LOT of processing power) you can calculate where the three objects will be 100 years from now, even though it is impossible to solve for this outcome.


It’s a hard concept to wrap your head around, this difference between calculating the future and predicting the future, but it will change the way you see the world. And your place in it.  


Now here’s an observation that I can’t emphasize strongly enough, although I’ll try:


THIS IS NOT HOW WE USE COMPUTERS IN OUR INVESTING STRATEGIES TODAY


The way that computers can calculate an answer to the Three-Body Problem is straightforward — they can be programmed with the physics rules for how one object influences another object, so they can simulate where each object will go next. There is ZERO examination of where the objects have been in the past. This is entirely forward looking.


The way that computers can NOT calculate an answer to the Three-Body Problem is by examining the historical data of where the objects have been. In a chaotic system, it doesn’t matter how hard or how fast or how deeply you look at the historical data. There is NO predictive pattern, NO secret algorithm hiding in the data. And yet this is exactly what we all have our computers doing … examining historical data to look for patterns that will give us the magic algorithm for predicting what’s next! The only thing that the past gives you in a chaotic system is inertia, which can look like a pattern or an algorithm for some period of time, depending on how all the objects are aligned. But it’s a mirage. It will not last. Examining the past of a chaotic system can give you lots of little answers, like sparks off a bonfire, none lasting more than a few seconds. And certainly if you’re efficient with your inertia-identifying spark-capturing effort, you can make some money using computers this way. But this examination of the past through naïve induction will never give you The Answer. Because The Answer does not exist in the past. The Answer — which is another word for algorithm, which is another word for “general closed-end solution” — doesn’t exist at all in a chaotic Three-Body System.


But we can approximate The Answer. We can calculate the future in small computational chunks even if we can’t predict the future in one big algorithmic swoop, but only if we can program the computer with the “physics” of how “gravity” works in social systems like markets. What’s our financial world equivalent of a theory of gravity? I think it’s a theory of narrative. This, to me, is a more interesting research program than identifying small inertias or capturing brief sparks. But it’s not where our computing resources are being allocated, because there’s no money in it. Yet.


Exploring a theory of narrative, what I’ve called the Narrative Machine, is basic research. Like all basic research, it’s not immediately remunerative and thus is difficult to fund. But that’s not the biggest obstacle. No, the biggest obstacle to basic research in computational finance is that humans are hard-wired to look for algorithms and have a really hard time imagining that it’s even possible to pursue a non-anthropomorphic (how about that for a $10 word) research design that doesn’t pore through historical data looking for predictive algorithms at every turn. We can’t help ourselves!


What if I told you that algorithms and derivatives are as much at the heart of how humans prepare for their financial future as they are for bees preparing for their seasonal future? What if I told you that the dominant strategies for human discretionary investing are, without exception, algorithms and derivatives? And what if I told you that these algorithms and derivatives were perhaps “evolved” under a “benign” configuration of the Three-Body Problem that not only might never repeat, but in fact is certain to never repeat because it is a chaotic system?


I’ll give you two examples of influential investment algorithms/derivatives. There are many more.


GOOD COMPANIES => GOOD STOCKS


GOOD COUNTRIES => GOOD GOVERNMENT BONDS


These are the central tenets of stock-picking and sovereign bond-picking, respectively. In both cases, goodness (like beauty) is in the eye of the beholder, so I’m not saying that there is some single standard for what makes a “good” company or what makes a “good” set of macroeconomic policies. What I’m saying is that everyone reading this note (including me!) believes that there is a direct relationship between the quality of a company or an economy (however you define quality) and the future price of whatever stocks or bonds are connected to that company or economy. What I’m saying is that everyone reading this note believes that tracking the measurable quality of a company or an economy (the derivative) according to some standardized and repeatable process (the algorithm) will, over time, have a predictive correlation with the future price of the related stock and bond securities (the underlying).


What stocks do we want to own? Why, the stocks of high quality companies, of course … companies with stellar management teams, fortress balance sheets, and wonderful products or services that everyone wants to buy. Ditto for government bonds and currencies and broad market indices and the like. Maybe it will take some time for this faith in Quality to pay off, but we all believe that it WILL pay off. It’s only natural, right? As natural as spring following winter. As natural as flowers blooming in May and snow falling in December. Maybe the flowers will bloom a few weeks late and maybe the snows will fall a few weeks early, but that’s just basis risk, and we can manage for that.


But what if spring doesn’t follow winter anymore?


Look, I’m not asking us to abandon our faith in Quality. One of the key corrolaries of the Three-Body Problem is that we don’t have to reject our belief that Objects 1 and 2 exist. We don’t have to deny our faith that the Quality-of-Companies is an actual thing and that it has a big gravitational pull on the price of stocks. We don’t have to deny our faith that the Quality-of-Governments is an actual thing and that it has a big gravitational pull on the price of government bonds.



What we have to accept is that there is an Object 3 that has moved into a position such that its gravity absolutely swamps the impact of Objects 1 and 2. This Object 3, of course, is extraordinary monetary policy, specifically the purchase of $20 TRILLION worth of financial assets by the Big 4 central banks — the Fed, the ECB, the BOJ, and the PBOC.


$20 trillion is a lot of mass. $20 trillion is a lot of gravity.


Here’s the impact of all that gravity on the Quality-of-Companies derivative investment strategy.


The green line below is the S&P 500 index. The white line below is a Quality Index sponsored by Deutsche Bank. They look at 1,000 global large cap companies and evaluate them for return on equity, return on invested capital, and accounting accruals … quantifiable proxies for the most common ways that investors think about quality. Because the goal is to isolate the Quality factor, the index is long in equal amounts the top 20% of measured  companies and short the bottom 20% (so market neutral), and has equal amounts invested long and short in the component sectors of the market (so sector neutral). The chart begins on March 9, 2009, when the Fed launched its first QE program.



Over the past eight and a half years, Quality has been absolutely useless as an investment derivative. You’ve made a grand total of not quite 3% on your investment, while the S&P 500 is up almost 300%.


This is not a typo.


Have the Quality stocks in your portfolio gone up over the past eight and a half years? Sure, but it’s not because of the Quality-ness of the companies. It’s because ALL stocks have gone up ever since Object 3, the balance sheets of central banks, started exerting its massive gravity on everything BUT Quality. That’s not an accident, by the way. Central banks don’t care about rewarding “good” companies. In fact, if they care about anything on this dimension, they care about keeping “bad” companies from going under.


This is what it looks like when spring does not follow winter.


And here’s the impact of all that gravity on the Quality-of-Countries derivative investment strategy.


The gold line below is the spread (difference) between Portugal’s 10-year bond yield and the U.S. 10-year bond yield, and the blue line is the spread between Italy’s 10-year note yield and the U.S. equivalent. In “normal” times, a country with a weaker set of macroeconomic characteristics (high levels of national debt, say, or maybe low productivity) will have to offer investors a higher rate of interest to borrow their money than a country with a stronger set of macroeconomic characteristics. So in the summer of 2012, when Portugal and Italy were both looking like deadbeat countries, they had to pay investors a much higher rate of interest than the U.S. did to attract the investment … about 9% more (this is per year, mind you) for Portugal and 4% more for Italy. Those are enormous spreads in the world of sovereign debt!


This chart begins in the summer of 2012, when the ECB announced its intentions to prop up the European sovereign debt market directly. Since that announcement — even though both Portugal and Italy have higher debt-to-GDP ratios today than in 2012 — the spread versus U.S. interest rates has done nothing but decline. Driven by the commitment of the ECB to “do whatever it takes” and to be not only a last-resort buyer but also a first-in-line buyer of Portuguese and Italian debt, it now costs LESS for these countries to borrow money for 10 years than the U.S.



This is nuts. It’s an understandable nuts when you consider that the German 10-year bond yield is currently about 30 basis points, and was actually negative (meaning that you had to pay the German government for the privilege of lending them money for the next 10 years) for about six months in 2016. Meaning that at least with Italian and Portuguese debt you’re being paid something (a little less than 2% per year). It’s an understandable nuts when you consider that the Swiss 10-year bond still sports a negative interest rate and has been negative for the past two and a half years. There’s about $10 trillion worth of negative yielding sovereign bonds out there today, something that is IMPOSSIBLE under a [good country => good bond] derivative algorithm. No country is that good! But it’s entirely possible under the immense gravitational force of massive central bank asset purchases.


Here’s the kicker. Below is the spread between Greek 10-year sovereign bonds and U.S. 10-year notes. In 2012 you were paid 24% more to lend money to Greece. Per year! Today you are paid less than 2% more to lend money to Greece rather than the United States. For ten years. To Greece.



Again, I’m not saying that the Quality derivative doesn’t exist as a real thing or that it isn’t an important factor in the history of successful stock-picking or bond-picking. What I’m saying is that the Quality derivative hasn’t mattered for eight and a half years with stocks and five years with sovereign debt. What I’m saying is that it might not matter for another eighty years. Or it might matter again in eight months. A Three-Body System is a chaotic system. As the boilerplate says, past performance is not a guarantee of future results. In fact, the only thing I can promise you is that past performance will NEVER give you a predictive algorithm for future results in a chaotic system.


This is basis uncertainty. This is the biggest concern that every investor should have, that the signals (derivatives) and processes (algorithms) that we ALL use to make sense of the investing world are no longer connected to security prices.


… Okay, Ben, you’ve exhausted me. It’s a weird and strange way of looking at the world, but let’s go with it for a minute. What’s the pay-off here? What do we DO in a chaotic system? What does that even mean, to say that we are investors in a chaotic system?


Four suggestions.


First, I think we should adopt a philosophy of what I’ve called profound agnosticism when it comes to investing, where we don’t just embrace the notion that no one has a crystal ball in this system, but we actually get kinda annoyed with those who insist they do. I think that risk balancing strategies make a ton of sense in a chaotic system, so that we think first about budgeting our risk agnostically across geographies and asset classes and sectors, and secondarily think about budgeting our dollars.


Second, and relatedly, I think we should adopt a classic game theory strategy for dealing with uncertain systems — minimax regret. The idea is simple, but the implications profound: instead of seeking to maximize returns, we seek to minimize our maximum regret. Keep in mind that our maximum regret may not be ruinous loss! I know plenty of people whose maximum regret is not keeping up with the Joneses. In fact, from a business model perspective, that’s more common than not. Or if you’ve bought into Bitcoin north of $15,000 per coin, I think you know what I’m talking about, too. The point being that we need to be painfully honest with ourselves about our sources of regret and target our investments accordingly. If we can be this honest with ourselves, it’s a VERY powerful strategy.


Third, I think we should reconsider our approach to computer-directed investment strategies. Using computers in an anthropomorphic way, where we treat them like a smarter, faster human, set loose in a vast field of historical data to search for patterns and algorithms … it’s a snipe hunt. Or at least I think we’ve squeezed just about all the juice out of this inductive orange that we’re likely to get. With the massive processing power at our fingertips today, not to mention the orders-of-magnitude-greater processing power that quantum computing will bring to bear in the future, there’s much bigger game afoot with computational approaches that take a more deductive, forward-looking strategy.


Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, I think we need to accept that we’re never going to fully understand the reality of a chaotic system, but that it’s never been more important to try. The brains of both bees and humans are hard-wired for algorithms. Both species see patterns even when patterns don’t exist, and both species tend to do poorly in environments where derivative signals are plagued by basis uncertainty rather than mere basis risk. Every bee in the world will follow its hard-wired algorithms even unto death. And most humans will, too. But humans have the capacity to think beyond their biological and cultural programming … if they work at it.


Where do we lose good people? When they convince themselves that they’ve found The Answer — either in the form of a charismatic person or, more dangerously still, a charismatic idea — in a chaotic system where no Answer exists. A chaotic system like markets, yes, but also a chaotic system like politics.


The Answer is, by nature, totalitarian. Why? Because it’s a general closed-form solution. That’s the technical definition of The Answer, and that’s the practical definition of totalitarian thought. We’re hard-wired to want the all-encompassing algorithm, which is why it’s so difficult to resist. But if we care about liberty. If we care about justice. If we care about liberty and justice for all … we have to resist The Answer.


Because we’ve lost enough good people.


As wise as serpents, as harmless as doves …









Monday, December 11, 2017

A Gift From The Oldies

By Chris at www.CapitalistExploits.at




I bumped into a friendly bloke at my local gym last week. Jim is his name.



Jim tells me he just started because, and I quote, "my doctor says I"m going to die unless I do something".



Now, I assure you it doesn"t take a doctor to figure this out.


One glance in Jim"s direction and you can tell that underneath all that weight there"s a big struggling heart in there... just ready to explode. He was surprisingly frank and tells me it"s so bad that he can only do little bits of exercise because if he pushes it too hard, there is a very serious risk that his ticker just says, "You know what... f*ck it," and gives up.



Jim"s 52, which is really a ripe old age and about normal life expectancy — if we lived in the 1700"s. But we don"t.


I feel for Jim, told him so, and naturally we all hope that he can bring himself back from the brink. But the fact is many people aren"t like Jim. As mentioned in a previous article on pensions, they"re living longer and stronger.








Years ago it seemed that when you hit 65 you’d retire, receive a gold watch, and proceed to spend your pension money on a rocking chair and pot plants. Ten years later you’d be in a box and, since pot plants are cheap, the cost of keeping you alive wasn’t prohibitive.


 



Not anymore. Today things are different. My wife belongs to a running club and there are a bunch of octogenarians there who put us both to shame. Nope, today you retire and spend your pension on kickboxing classes and second wives, with no plan of dying anytime soon.




Now, this second group (our kickboxing oldies) pose a grave problem.



You see, unlike Jim, these folks, who’ve spent their life exercising, go on and on and on.



70 is spring chicken young for them, and many make it well into their 80"s and 90"s when inevitably they need nappies, nursing care, accommodation, and mushy food to eat. And then finally machines on wheels need to be wheeled in and they end up with tubes in their noses. Don"t laugh. We"re all going to get there, unless we"re fortunate enough to just drop dead quick and fast. The point is this all costs a boatload of money.


Now, I"m aware that this topic isn"t rosy Friday red or shampoo advert fresh and clean, but there are some serious implications that I think you"ll thank me for so hear me out.


Demographics and Pensions



Demographics is an elephant in the room we shouldn"t ignore. It"s stomped around, defecated in the corner, and is now proceeding to knock over all the furniture. Ignore it at your peril. Rather, there are a number of ways to invest.



Let"s explore a few...



Old people (Mabel and Bob) pay for their retirements with pensions, and those pensions are held in pooled accounts at the DTC and managed by folks with pointy shoes and Tom Ford suits.



And because old Mabel and Bob are closer to the box than younger folks, the pointy shoed gents are extremely risk averse (as they should be), and this is where it gets exciting because you know what?



They"re presently engaged in the worst possible leveraged speculation you can think of.



Nope, it"s not Bitcoin.



First, to understand the insanity we have to take a step back and examine how these pointy shoed gents think.


They like fixed income because it"s far less volatile and ostensibly less risky than equities.


They hate small caps and frankly can"t invest in them due to their size, and they have a disdain for commodity markets. That volatility thing again...



In fact, volatility is like a barometer in their world by which everything else is measured.



The problem is with central banks shatbit crazy interest rate policies none of them have been able to make any money in a yield starved world and so they"re, wait for it, selling volatility.


Either through tailor made products from the investment banks or by buying any number of the low volatility ETPs out there.





Volatility isn"t even an asset.



In fact, the VIX is an index of volatility on 1 month to expiry ATM puts and calls on stocks in the S&P 500.


But now the geniuses on Wall Street have figured that they can actually package this animal, which as you can see, is a derivative of a derivative, and treat it like a bond. Fun, heh?


In all fairness, hats off to the asset managers who"ve had the balls to do this. They believed in the central banks" liquidity machine, and they backed their belief and for that they deserve to be paid. I sure wouldn"t have been able to do it.



Now, I"m not some miserable jealous git here to tell you that armageddon is coming and I"ve the answers.


God knows there"s enough of that nonsense in the financial publishing blogosphere for you to get your fill elsewhere. What we do know, however, is that this entire game: the selling of vol, the passive indexing — all of it is predicated on one thing. The central banks keeping rates low and pumping liquidity into the market. It"s why BTFD has become a meme.


The problem that I have with it, other than the distortions made, is that when so many are on one side of the boat like right now and that boat has many moving pieces, then I begin to wonder.



I"m reminded that markets change at the margin, where the slightest hiccup can act like a spark to light the fire of volatility, and these poor suckers who"ve managed to earn steady incomes selling puts find out what "unlimited risk" actually looks like as they"re forced to cover in a market that"s gapping the other way.


I"ve thought about this a lot and, in fact, we recently published how we are going "long vol" for members. And no, it"s not buying puts on VIX because that is, in my humble opinion... how do I say this politely, like begging to be stabbed in the eyes. repeatedly.



In any event that"s just one angle to this market. Here"s another.


Redemptions



I would be remiss in mentioning that as retirees retire, these pension funds will be drawn down.



It"s what Mabel and Bob do to pay for their mushy food, viagra, and bingo nights.


Now, I"m sure you"re all sharp enough to figure out what can happen to the assets these guys have been buying when they have to go from flat out full throttle, to stall, to reverse.



How big is this problem?


Well, for some context global institutional pension fund assets in 22 major markets stood at US$36.4 trillion at year end 2016, amounting to 62% of global GDP.


That is a staggeringly large amount of money.


Pension funds are big cumbersome dumb money. And they"re all allocated in equally dumb indexes, passive strategies, and bonds. So what happens when pensioners draw down on their funds?



You tell me...



Talking of staggeringly large amounts of money, the passive bubble grows bigger as I write this because this beast is fuelled not just by our pointy shoed friends but by Joe Sixpack himself.



Bloomberg just ran a piece:


BlackRock and Vanguard Are Less Than a Decade Away From Managing $20 Trillion


Two towers of power are dominating the future of investing.

Dominating indeed. Here"s how come the pointy shoed crowd can afford Tom Ford suits.


The article goes on to say:







Investors from individuals to large institutions such as pension and hedge funds have flocked to this duo, won over in part by their low-cost funds and breadth of offerings. The proliferation of exchange-traded funds is also supercharging these firms and will likely continue to do so.



Sometimes when everyone is zigging and you zag, you just get run over. But think about it...


We don"t need to go the other way. All we need to do is look where others are no longer.


These behemoths don"t do battle in the little unloved sectors or with stocks that don"t make it into an index. They can"t because they"re too big.


This means that there are a lot of orphans out there and here"s the good news. If it"s not in an index, passives aren"t buying it. And if passives aren"t buying it, it"s only active money that"s even looking at it.



Which brings me to the double helping of good news.



Here"s your competition in active with the accompanying passive.



Right now, it"s a mosh pit food fight to grab and create the next index or ETF so that more capital can be attracted, earning more fees, buying more suits.


This is all well and good.



Markets do what markets do, and I"m not here to grumble about it. I"m here to make money. And indeed if I was in the passive business, I"d be enjoying the steady stream of fees and hoping like hell the market keeps going up.



QE more? Yes, please.



But I"m not.



I"m a humble squirrel searching for nuts in the forest. And gosh, with all this moshing going on it"s wonderful how few other squirrels there are about. The same Bloomberg article makes a good point on this.








While bigger may be better for the fund giants, passive funds may be blurring the inherent value of securities, implied in a company’s earnings or cash flow.



Nah. You think?


Stocks in the index funds no longer trade on fundamentals but rather on asset flows, which sucks the oxygen out of the small guys who don"t make it into the indexes where brain dead passive money is playing.



It means we can gladly play in a sandpit with all the toys and there are very few we have to share them with.


The Cracks Have Already Appeared



Nothing lasts forever, and as I argued when discussing the impact of the incoming strong men on the global economy, there are 3 critical points worth thinking about:


  1. Political cohesion and stability can no longer be relied upon as politics becomes inward looking with everything from trade deals to central bank swap lines being renegotiated or cancelled altogether.

  2. Global coordinated central bank action. The era of global coordinated monetary policy which we’ve been experiencing since the GFC, especially with the three largest players (ECB, FED and BOJ), will be looked back upon with nostalgia by the current clutch of central bankers who muddy the halls of power. Policy will increasingly be driven with greater sensitivity to nationalist rather than international concerns, which brings me to…

  3. Liquidity in the financial system which has stemmed from easing monetary policy is already contracting. In a world where derivatives traverse borders, connecting financial systems like never before, a liquidity crisis presents enormous tail risk in a leveraged world.


Invest accordingly, and thank you for reading.



- Chris



“If you can’t take a small loss, sooner or later you will take the mother of all losses.” — Ed Seykota


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Liked this article? Then you"ll probably like my other missives on


this topic as well. Go here to access them (free, of course).


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Friday, October 27, 2017

The $2 Trillion Hole: "In 2019, Central Bank Liquidity Finally Turns Negative"

In all the euphoria over yesterday"s "dovish taper" by the ECB, markets appear to have forgotten one thing: the great Central Bank liquidity tide, which generated over $2 trillion in central bank purchasing power in 2017 alone - and which as Bank of America said last month is the only reason why stocks are at record highs, is now on its way out.


This was a point first made by Deutsche Bank"s Alan Ruskin two weeks ago, who looked at the collapse in global vol, and concluded that "as we look at what could shake the panoply of low vol forces, it is the thaw in Central Bank policy as they retreat from emergency measures that is potentially most intriguing/worrying. We are likely to be nearing a low point for major market bond and equity vol, and if the catalyst is policy it will likely come from positive volatility QE ‘flow effect’ being more powerful than the vol depressant ‘stock effect’. To twist a phrase from another well know Chicago economist: Vol may not always and everywhere be a monetary phenomena – but this is the first place to look for economic catalysts over the coming year."


He showed this great receding tide of liquidity in the following chart projecting central bank "flows" over the next two years, and which showed that "by the end of next year, the combined expansion of all the major Central Bank balance sheets will have collapsed from a 12 month growth rate of $2 trillion per annum to zero."



Shortly after, Fasanara Capital"s Francesco Filia used this core observation in his own bearish forecast, when he wrote that "the undoing of loose monetary policies (NIRP, ZIRP), and the transitioning from "Peak Quantitative Easing" to Quantitative Tightening, will create a liquidity withdrawal of over $1 trillion in 2018 alone. The reaction of the passive community will determine the speed of the adjustment in the pricing for both safe and risk assets."



Fast forward to today, when Bank of America"s Barnaby Martin is the latest analyst to pick up on this theme of great liquidity withdrawal.


Looking at (and past) the ECB"s announcement, Martin writes that "as expected, Mario Draghi took a knife to the ECB"s quantitative easing programme yesterday. From January 2018, monthly asset purchases will decline from €60bn to €30bn, and continue for another 9m (and remain open ended). The ECB now joins an array of central banks across the globe that are either shrinking their balance sheets or heavily scaling back bond buying."


So far so good, and in itself, this structural tightening when coupled with the open-ended nature of the ECB"s taper was ultimately perceived as very dovish for markets, sending not only the EUR plunging over 200 pips in the past 2 days, but sending Eurozone yields jumping, as the ECB telegraphed it was very much uncertain when, and if, it would truly be able to untangle itself from QE, especially since the ECB still can increase the 33% limit on bond purchases if needed be after 2018 to return back to a quantitative easing paradigm, one which may well include the direct purchase of equities and ETFs, as in the case of the SNB and BOJ.


Furthermore, as Martin adds, heading into the ECB decision "the market had a warm reception for yesterday"s big QE cut: 5yr bund yields declined 5bp, European equities finished the day up 1.3% and iTraxx credit spreads ended 2bp tighter. In fact, we think markets were very relaxed heading into yesterday"s landmark decision. Chart 2 shows that European rates volatility reached an all-time low of 33.2 towards the end of last week. Such was the market"s comfort with the notion that Draghi would offset the drop in QE with heavy doses of forward guidance…and he indeed delivered lots on this front yesterday"



However, as Ruskin and Filia warn, Martin underscores that it is the bigger point that is ignored by markets, namely that it is all about the "flow" of central bank purchases. And in this context, the BofA strategist warns that it will take just over a year before the global liquidity tide not only reaches zero, but turns negative... some time in early 2019.








Chart 1 shows year-over-year changes in global asset purchases by central banks (we also include China FX reserves here). Given this year"s slowdown in ECB and BoJ QE (the latter, in particular, is striking in USD terms), we are well past the peak in global asset buying by central banks. But with the Fed now embarking on balance sheet shrinkage, the start of 2019 should mark the point where year-over-year asset purchases finally turn negative - a trend change that will come after four straight years of expansion.




Still, despite virtually every strategist on Wall Street being familiar with this chart, few if any want to believe it. In fact, the favorable reception to what is fundamental a tightening shift by the ECB poses what Martin notes, is a the big risk to corporate bond markets, "for as long as the ECB"s message on rates is dovish, the incessant inflow story into European credit is unlikely to die. And big inflows mean "overwhelming" credit technicals would persist for the foreseeable future (see chart 3 below). Thus, credit bubbles become a legitimate risk down the line."


To be sure, there is just one event that could end this hypnotized paralysis: inflation, which however stubbornly refuses to emerge, which is why "the market seems to have dismissed the idea that inflation could surprise to the upside" However, "should it rise quicker than expected, we sense the dovish rhetoric from central banks would quickly change. And we believe that this may be all that"s needed to snuff out the great "reach for yield" trade that is currently gripping European corporate bonds."


And therein lies the rub: will inflation finally appear and prevent the world"s biggest asset bubble from becoming even bigger, or - as Eric Peters warned two weeks ago - will the "Nightmare Scenario" for the Fed emerge, and even as asset prices rise ever higher, inflation remains dormant:








If we don’t see a sustained cyclical jump in wages, then yields won’t go up. And if yields don’t go up, then the asset price ascent will accelerate... Which will lead us into a 2018 that looks like what we had expected out of 2017; a war against inequality, a battle for Main Street at the expense of Wall Street, an Occupy Silicon Valley movement. Then you’ll have this nightmare for the next Federal Reserve chief, because they’ll have to pop a bubble.



In conclusion, we go back to the person who first observed the dramatic shift in central bank flow, Citi"s Matt King, who had this to say:








To us, QE flows (i.e. marginal net purchases) rather than the stock of central bank holdings are the more important driver of asset prices. As we noted recently, if all major European investor types are already net selling or at least not buying € FI securities at prevailing market prices, then why should they stop or even start buying when the safety is withdrawn? Unless you have an emphatic answer, then with ECB QE falling by at least €500bn next year, according to our economists, and the Fed reducing its holdings of securities by almost $500bn at the same time, it would perhaps be best to tread cautiously.










Thursday, October 5, 2017

"There Are No Bears Left... None... Not A Soul"

By Kevin Muir via The Macro Tourist blog,


Think back six months. Do you remember all the warnings from the legendary hedge fund managers about the impending stock market doom?


Paul Tudor Jones, Scott Minerd, Larry Fink, Seth Klarman, the list is long but distinguished. At the time I penned It’s too easy to write bearish pieces. Even in late summer, gurus like Gundlach were bragging about the 400% he would make on his S&P 500 put purchases - Billionaire Bears. Given the atmosphere, I knew posts about the coming collapse would be greeted with tons of words of encouragement. Yet if I wrote something about the stock market continuing higher, crickets… Or worse yet, remarks about my cluelessness regarding the problems in the global financial system.


I didn’t think stocks were going higher because everything was roses, no in fact just the opposite. Stocks were being pushed higher because everything was so FUBAR’d. Central Bank balance sheet expansion was pushing risk assets higher, and for the longest time, everyone wanted to fade it.



Fast forward to today. Even the most ardent bears have given up and embraced the idea Central Bank buying will push stocks higher. Investors that were previously doom and gloomers are now speaking of blow off-tops. I can hear the capitulation in their voices. No more brave predictions of the coming collapse. Instead, meeker forecasts of a high volume runaway euphoria. There are no bears left. None. Not a soul.


The bears have been replaced by gloating bulls that are openly bragging about how high the S&P 500 futures will gap up Sunday night. They are mocking the bears with taunts of how much money will they lose fighting the rally. They joke about buying the dip, which increasingly is becoming more and more nothing more than a couple of downticks.


I might not know much, but I know the Market Gods do not take kindly to that sort of behaviour. What was that quote from Bernard Baruch? “The main purpose of the stock market is to make fools of as many men as possible.”


Ask yourself what would embarrass most investors right now? Would it be a continuing rally? Not a chance. Given the white flag waving by the bears, and the over-enthusiasm of the bulls, there is little doubt in my mind that a stock market decline is what would hurt most. That wasn’t the case six months ago. Heck, it wasn’t even the case two months ago. But that’s where we are today.


I could try to dig up some sentiment numbers, but the reality is I don’t need to. The mood is plainly obvious. Investors are as bullish as they have ever been since the Great Financial Crisis. Sure, you might argue that it was much more frothy in 1999. But who cares? Do you really want to be buying based on the greater fool theory? Ask Chuck Prince how that turned out.


It’s hard standing alone and fighting the crowd. If it was easy, everyone would do it.


I have written about the new reality of how markets are now full of A Series of Rolling Mini-Bubbles, but a sharp Seeking Alpha writer by the name of Ian Bezek has done a better job than me of identifying the latest madness. In his post, An ETF Levitates: This is Not Normal, Alex points out that the IWC nano-cap ETF has been up 26 of the past 28 days.



This is the new reality. A series of rolling mini-bubbles. But you want to know the hardest part? Just when it looks best, is the time to fade it.


I can already hear you saying to yourself, that’s a big leap. Selling it because it looks good? Well, in case you don’t believe me about the series of rolling mini-bubbles (remember, the keyword is mini), how about this for a reason?


Almost everyone has now embraced the idea that Central Banks will push asset prices to the moon. It’s like they just realized that with the balance sheet expansion of the ECB, BoJ and the SNB (Swiss National Bank), the monetary stimulus has been higher than any time except for the initial days of the crisis.



One thing before I continue. For these Central Bank balance sheet charts, I have frozen the currency adjustments in time. If I let them float, then the balance sheet size will move around as the US dollar rises or falls. Since we are interested in how much the Central Banks are expanding or shrinking their balance sheets, this would lead to a distorted monthly change.


Let’s zoom in and have a look at this a little bit more closely.



It’s a little bit amusing that market pundits are now shouting about the inevitability of Central Bank buying. The reality is that from mid-2013 to 2017, the pace at which their balance sheets have been expanding has been ferocious.


The ironic part? All these pundits have figured it out just as the pace has started to slow. Look at the last six months. Slowest six month period in the last few years. And guess what? It will be negative soon enough. The ECB will taper, the Fed will shrink, and if financial assets keep screaming at this pace, even the BoJ and the SNB might be forced to slow down their purchases.


So yeah, knock yourself out buying stocks because Central Banks are printing like mad. Instead of examining what they did, I am more interested in what they will do. And to me, it looks like this game is nearly over.


Nothing sums up better the crazy rush into stocks than the recent headlines.




Remember the last time the Economist came out with a bold cover like that?



So let’s sum it up.





We have the bears capitulating and accepting the inevitability of the Central Bank buying pushing up asset prices, at the very moment magazine covers are shouting about the “bull market in everything.”



We have nano-cap ETF’s rising more in a period of a month than they have ever done before.



I have former bears telling me how we need to have a blow-off top before the true bear market can start.



As far as I can tell, there is absolutely no one who thinks this market will head lower over the next month or two. Well, sold to them.



Given the dirt cheap options they are all selling to gather extra premium (it’s free money after all - stocks never go down), I think taking the other side of their trade via long put positions is a great risk reward. I know this trade is lonely. Jeez, as I write this, a little bit of me wonders if I have gone insane.


But I take comfort in the words of a famous speculator, Jesse Livermore - “The obvious rarely happens, the unexpected constantly occurs.”


Then again, Livermore killed himself in the cloakroom of the Sherry Netherland Hotel. He left a note that he was tired of fighting. Good thing Jesse isn’t around to see this bull market.

Friday, June 16, 2017

Matt King Is Back With A Dire Warning: "A Significant Un-balancing Is Coming"

Earlier this week we discussed a chart from Citi"s Hanz Lorenzen, which we said may be the "scariest chart for central banks" and showed the projected collapse in central bank "impulse" in coming years as a result of balance sheet contraction, and which - if history is any indication - would drag down not only future inflation but also risk assets. As Citi put it "the principal transmission channel to the real economy has been... lifting asset prices" to which our response was that this has required continuous CB balance sheet growth, and with the Fed, ECB and BOJ all poised to "renormalize" over the next year, the global monetary impulse is set to turn negative in the coming year.



Today, after a nearly three month absence, our favorite market strategist, Citi"s Matt King is back with a note which confirms our suspicions.


In "Markets un-balanced" he warns that "the Fed’s planned balance-sheet reduction, coupled with ECB tapering, seems likely to destabilize markets sufficiently that we think they will be unable to complete it." And yet there is a paradox: since by definition central-bbanker intervention has broken the market, and thus its discounting abilities, King warns that the repricing may not take place until it is too late to step back: "our models suggest markets are unlikely to react until the reductions in purchases are actually implemented. This is in stark contrast to the widespread presumption of immediate and full discounting."


Here we can only ask rhetorically that if only believes that markets are indeed "broken" by central bank intervention, why would anyone assume that their key function - discounting - is still viable.


Here is King with his take, previewed here earlier in the week, on the biggest threat facing the market:





As we’ve noted in the past, in recent years asset price moves have displayed a high degree of correlation with central bank liquidity additions. Central bank buying has reduced the net amount of securities (in DM) the market needs to absorb, both this year and last, to near zero; we think this has played a critical role in propping up valuations at elevated levels.



Next year looks very different. We project that the private sector will have to absorb c.$1tn of securities – the highest number since 2012. The main driver for this is our anticipated reduction in ECB purchases from €780bn this year to €150bn in 2018. The faster pace of Fed balance sheet reduction we can now expect cements our impression that next year will see a big shift away from the current status quo. Assuming that Fed balance sheet reduction begins in September, the US market will have to absorb a further $450bn of supply in addition to the gap left by the ECB



His overarching question is one we have asked on various occasions: if balance sheet reduction is potentially so disruptive, why are the central banks so intent on it? He provides the following answers:


  1. First, the ECB has a particular problem in that it must either taper or abandon the capital key, otherwise it runs out of bonds to buy owing to its (admittedly selfimposed) 33% issuer-and-issue limit.

  2. Second, central banks generally seem to be in denial about the magnitude of the effect their purchases are having on markets. They acknowledge the general rise in asset prices, but fail to appreciate the sheer extent to which investors have become obsessed with “the technicals" and are buying despite a lack of belief in fundamentals or valuations.

  3. Third, central banks tend to presume their impact is concentrated locally; we think it works globally.

  4. Fourth, central banks tend to assume that it is the stock of QE that is stimulative, when all our models suggest that it is the flow (or even the change in the flow).

  5. Fifth, central banks still cling to the textbook model in which the market discounts all available information ahead of time, meaning that by the time they actually come to do their reduction, provided they’ve telegraphed it beforehand, the effect is already priced in. Unfortunately they seem to have neglected the textbook footnote that states that markets function this way only when they are deep and liquid. That might have been a reasonable description of pre-crisis markets; it seems a deeply unreasonable assumption for post-crisis markets in which leverage is constrained and one set of buyers have come along and absorbed virtually all of the world’s net new issuance.

  6. Sixth, most central bank studies of the effects of QE have concentrated on assessing its impact on government bond yields. We think this is hard to measure. On the one hand, central bank purchases clearly push prices up and yields down. On the other, if the purchases raise inflation expectations (as they are supposed to do), they push prices down and yields up. We think it is much easier to see the effects in equities and credit – via the very ‘portfolio balance’ effect which the central banks were aiming for – but few people look for it there.

Which brings us to the two charts in question:





As such, rather than theorize, we just plot global central bank purchases against changes in credit spreads and equities. We find an effect that is strong, global, and contemporaneous. Asset prices have rarely been able to pre-empt future changes in the pace of purchases, even when these have been announced in advance, over the last seven years. We think this is unsurprising when one set of buyers is so completely distorting the market.




Finally, here is King on what can tip over the current stable market regime into one of selling:





Our metric of the increase in central bank security holdings globally has fallen from the peak last year (Figure 5), but it is still running at a level that in the past has been consistent with stable to slightly appreciating risk assets (Figure 6). So, as we argued last week, a faster-than-expected pace of Fed balance sheet reduction won’t necessarily disrupt the current benign market paradigm for the time being. Over time, though, we struggle to see how the market will be able to adapt to the scaling back of support from the Fed and the ECB without a significant adjustment in valuations. If the effect is as large as it has been historically, the implied market disruption is sufficiently large that we think they will need to rethink their plans.



So for now, we see credit (and risk assets more broadly) caught between two equilibria. On the one hand, there is the reigning paradigm of the central banks compressing risk premia near current levels, with a shortage of investable assets fuelling a widespread and potentially self-reinforcing reach-for-yield regardless of the underlying fundamentals. On the other, spreads are forced to confront the scaling back in central bank support, widening rather rapidly to pre-CSPP levels. The asymmetric risk/reward in € credit leaves it particularly vulnerable: even with the low volatilility in recent months, spread breakevens against realised vol remain near historic lows.



What might flip us from the first to the second? As far as European credit is concerned, ECB communication is likely to remain the most significant driver. Notwithstanding Constancio’s comment this week that a decision on tapering will have to be taken by “autumn, but certainly before the end of the year”, there’s still little to suggest that the ongoing debate between the hawks and doves in the Governing Council is shifting in the hawks’ direction. But, given how tight spreads are to fundamentals and, even more importantly, the ultimate trajectory of central bank support, we remain confident that the next major move for credit will be towards wider spreads.



But, given the uncertainty over timing, positioning for the spread widening we anticipate without giving up too much carry in the meantime is critical. In our latest outlook presentation, we argue that the best hope for doing this is to increase exposure to market segments where beta is priced most cheaply, while reducing elsewhere. With the ECB reducing purchases only next year and the Fed set to get off to a slow start, it seems possible recent market strength persists a while longer. And yet the Fed’s hawkishness this week to our minds adds to the likelihood that in markets a significant un-balancing (or perhaps that should be re-balancing?) is coming.



To all the central bankers out there, who hope that the market won"t notice what they are doing once they start doing it, good luck.

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

Is This The Scariest Chart For Central Banks?

Reminding us of what McKinsey reported over a year ago, namely that the world never deleveraged after the financial crisis, Citi"s Hans Lorenzen released a fascinating presentation today discussing the "invincible" stock rally, and pointing out its Achilles heel, which happens to be the thing that made it possible in the first place: central banks.


As the first charts below show, the permissive factor that allowed the world to "emerge" from the financial crisis and the global recession, was a surge in debt, which on a consolidated basis is above 360% of GDP in all five select developed regions. The chart on the right shows that while private sector releveraging has been slow, it has been drowned out by a historic surge in public sector debt.



What made this coordinated global releveraging possible? Central banks of course, who have bought over $10 trillion in public (and recently private) sector debt in the past decade, and between the world"s six largest central banks they now collectively own securities amounting to 40% of the world"s GDP.



However, it is this same unprecedented central bank balance sheet expansion that is now the biggest threat to not only the global recovery and ongoing attempts to stimulate the much needed reflation (if only to inflate away the world"s debt load), but also to capital markets around the globe.


Which bring us to what may be the scariest chart for central bankers: Citi"s forecast of what happens to the global central bank "impulse", or annual change, over the next two years and - as Lorenzen shows - its correlation to inflation expectations via real 5Y5Y forwards. The chart cleary shows the recent contraction in global central bank assets (including Chinese FX reserves) which took place as deflation fears swept the globe and as global stocks tumbled in late 2015 and early 2016. More importantly, the chart projects when the next such contraction is expected to take place...



The chart also shows that when it comes to the S&P, the Fed"s
balance sheet is all that mattered for years until recently both the BOJ and ECB
picked up the torch and spread the "liquidity load" making the recent all time highs in the market possible, even as
the Fed"s balance sheet has been flat and the Fed has been cautiously tightening.



As Citi puts its best: "the principal transmission channel to the real economy has been... lifting asset prices." That however has required continuous CB balance sheet growth, and with the Fed, ECB and BOJ all poised to "renormalize" over the next year, the global monetary impulse is set to turn negative in the coming year.


Meanwhile, as financial markets scramble to maximize every last ounce of what central bank impulse remains, we get such bubbles as London real estate, bitcoin and vintage cars, or as Citi puts it: "the wealth effect is stretching farther and farther afield."



One final chart: how does it all end, and what is the "key risk" to financial stability? Here, unlike the ECB, Citi"s opinion is just a little different, and echose what we have said since the beginning:





"Monetary policy has left the allocation into risky assets stretched at very high prices in a modest recovery with major structural issues still unresolved. The efficacy of existing policy tools in the future seems greatly diminished."




Citi"s conclusion: the "Achilles heel is the potential unravelling of distortions built up by monetary policy itself." It hardly needs an explanation.

Monday, May 8, 2017

Macron&#039;s "Victory For The World" Sparks $300 Million Panic-Dump In Gold Futures

Two words - "priced in."


Despite what Hillary Clinton proclaimed "a victory for the world"...



Macron"s win in the French presidential election has left capital markets with a whole lot of nothing...


EURUSD managed to run a few stops above 1.10 but went nowhere...



EURJPY (which has been higher beta throughout the turmoil) did vacillate a little but the size of the move is very modest...




S&P futures opened with a spike but are rapidly fading back...to unchanged




But there is one market that saw a sizable move (and heavy volume - standard $300 million notional dump into extremely thin markets).




But that is bouncing back too.



So - all in all, a big anti-climax. But of course with SNB and BOJ buying to come, who knows where we open at 930am ET tomorrow...

Tuesday, January 24, 2017

80% Of Central Banks Plan To Buy More Stocks

Regular readers remember how, when we first reported around the time of our launch eight years ago that central banks buy stocks, intervene and prop up markets, and generally manipulate equities in order to maintain confidence in a collapsing system, and avoid a liquidation panic and bank runs, it was branded "fake news" by the established financial "kommentariat." What a difference eight years makes, because today none other than the WSJ writes that "by keeping interest rates low and in some cases negative, central banks have prompted some of the most conservative investors to join the hunt for higher returns: Other central banks."


To be sure, nothing that the WSJ reports is news to our readers, who have known for years how central banks overtly, in the case of the BOJ, PBOC and SNB most prominently, and covertly, as the infamous "leave no trace behind" symbiosis between the NY Fed and Citadel, however we find it particularly enjoyable every time the financial paper of record reports what until only a few years ago was considered "conspiracy theory", and wonder what other current "fake news" will be gospel in 2020.


Meanwhile, for those few who are still unfamiliar, this is how central banks who create fiat money out of thin air and for whom "acquisition cost" is a meaningless term, are increasingly nationalizing the equity capital markets. As the WSJ puts it "these central banks care relatively little about whether such investments make profits or losses—though they can matter politically—because they can always print more of their currency. So risk is less important, analysts say." And since risk was no longer part of the equation, leaving only return, central banks started buying stocks.





“When yields started to get really low and closer to zero in 2014, we decided to start equity investments,” said Jarno Ilves, head of investments at the Bank of Finland, who said he plans to increase his allocation to stocks.



But if you think the farce is bad now, wait until next year. According to a recent study by Invesco on central- bank investment which polled 18 reserve managers, some 80% and 43% of respondents to questions on asset allocation said they planned to invest more in stocks and corporate debt, respectively. Low government-bond returns were behind the moves to diversify, said 12 out of 15 respondents, while three declined to answer.




So between central banks outbidding each other to buy "risky" assets with "money" that is constantly created at no cost, very soon all other private investors will be crowded out but not before every stock is trading at valuations that even CNBC guests won"t be able to justify.


The good news is that instead of focusing on Ultra High Net Worth clients, a desperate for revenue Wall Street can just advise central banks on which stocks to buy.





The shift has significant implications for markets and the global economy, analysts say. Many central banks are hiring outside managers to handle the nontraditional assets in their portfolios, presenting an opportunity to a financial industry struggling with stagnant revenue growth.



“We see more and more appetite by central banks for riskier strategies,” said Jean-Jacques Barberis, ‎who manages central-bank money for Amundi, Europe’s largest asset manager.



The bad news, is that as more people realize that a free "market" now only exists in textbooks, and that Soviet-style central planning is the only game in town, confident in price formation will evaporate, in turn pushing even more market participants out of the quote-unquote market, until only central banks are left bidding on each other"s otherwise worthless stock certificates.





At the same time, efforts to invest reserve funds more broadly mean that more markets will be subject to what some critics describe as central-bank distortion, as large and often price-insensitive buyers run the risk of driving up prices and reducing prospective returns for other market participants.



For virtually all central banks, however, the grotesque central planning shift of the past decade means that instead of engaging in monetary policy, the world"s central banks are now activist hedge funds, who are focused first and foremost on "investment management":





The South African Reserve Bank’s growing piggy bank drove it to switch “from being a liquidity manager to focusing on investment management,” said Daniel Mminele, its deputy governor.



In the third quarter of 2016, global foreign-exchange reserves totaled $11 trillion, according to the International Monetary Fund, up from $1.4 trillion at the end of 1995.



But in the world of central bank hedge funds, no other bank comes even remotely close to the (publically-traded) Swiss National Bank, which has taken risky investing to a whole new level.





In 2013, the SNB opened a branch in Singapore to manage its Asia-Pacific assets, which as of 2015 include emerging-market equities and Chinese government bonds. It was a necessity, since the SNB now manages a mammoth 645 billion franc ($643 billion) in foreign reserves, a pile that grew as the bank tried to push down the value of its currency in a bid to fight deflation and help exporters.



In 2009, equities only made up 7% of the SNB’s reserves, four years after it started buying them. Now they are 20%, including investments of $1.7 billion in Apple Inc., $1.08 billion in Exxon Mobil Corp., and $1.2 billion in Microsoft Corp., according to third-quarter Securities and Exchange Commission filings.



Having bought hundreds of billions in equities carries risks even for central banks, if only on paper: in 2015, the SNB booked a loss of 23.3 billion francs, when officials stopped maintaining a ceiling on the value of their currency. As the currency jumped by as much as 22% against the euro, the value of their foreign assets fell. Last year, it offset those losses with a 24 billion-franc profit, as its equity investments paid off.


Others did not fare quite as well: "the Czech National Bank started buying stocks in June 2008 just before the financial crisis. The subsequent stock market crash wiped out a third of its equity investment that year, then roughly 2.5% of its total reserves."


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By now it is common knowledge that central banks openly intervene in markets, the most vivid and recent example of which is the BOJ, which as of this moment owns two-thirds of all Japanes ETFs...



... and at the current rate of expansion, within a few years the world"s monetary authorities who are tasked with "financial stability", will have acquired a majority of the world"s equity tranche, effectively nationalizing it. We bring it up in light of recent ridiculous allegations that "Russia hacked the US elections" - we wonder, will the liberal press blame the USSR after it dawns upon the world"s intrepid press that while it was busy comparing the Obama and Trump crowds, the world"s greatest wealth transfer was taking place right below everyone"s nose.