Showing posts with label Greenspan put. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greenspan put. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 13, 2017

The Fed is Arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic (the Iceberg Comes in 2018).

The Fed concludes its final FOMC meeting of the year today.


The entire financial world expects the Fed to raise rates a final time. This will mark the fifth rate hike since December 2015, and the fourth of the last 12 months.


Throughout this time period, the Fed has routinely stated that it is confused as to why inflation is “too low.”


Inflation is not too low. The method the Fed uses to measure inflation is intentionally incorrect. As a result, the official inflation numbers reflect whatever the Fed wants, as opposed to reality.


Alan Greenspan devised this entire gimmick back in the 1990s. At that point, the amount of debt in the US financial had already become a systemic issue.



So Greenspan opted to “paper over” this fact via inflation… hoping that by aggressively devaluing the US Dollar he could keep this game going.


The only problem as far as the Fed was concerned was that the inflation numbers would reveal the Fed’s strategy. So Greenspan started tinkering with how the Fed measured inflation, removing various components (food and energy) and tweaking things so the Fed would no longer measure the cost of maintaining the same quality of life.


Greenspan hoped understating inflation publicly he would give him the cover he needed to pursue an aggressive devaluation of the US Dollar. The flip side of this was that the Fed would begin intentionally creating asset bubbles by maintaining loose monetary policy ad infinitum.



The late ‘90s was the Tech Bubble.


When that burst in the mid-‘00s, the Fed created a bubble in housing.


When that burst in ’08 the Fed created a bubble in US sovereign bonds or Treasuries.


And because these bonds are the bedrock of the US financial system, the “risk-free rate” of return against which ALL risk assets are valued, when the Fed did this it created a bubble in EVERYTHING.


That bubble is now beginning to burst. And ironically it is inflation (which the Fed claims is too low) that will do it.


It will take time for this to unfold, but as I recently told clients, we"re currently in "late 2007" for the coming crisis.


The time to prepare for this is NOW before the carnage hits.


On that note, we are putting together an Executive Summary outlining all of these issues as well as what’s to come when The Everything Bubble bursts.


It will be available exclusively to our clients. If you’d like to have a copy delivered to your inbox when it’s completed, you can join the wait-list here:


https://phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/TEB.html


Best Regards


Graham Summers


Chief Market Strategist


Phoenix Capital Research

Thursday, November 23, 2017

The Mother Of All Irrational Exuberance

Authored by David Stockman via Contra Corner blog,


You could almost understand the irrational exuberance of 1999-2000. That"s because everything was seemingly coming up roses, meaning that cap rates arguably had rational room to rise.



But eventually the mania lost all touch with reality; it succumbed to an upwelling of madness that at length made even Alan Greenspan look like a complete fool, as we document below.


So doing, the great tech bubble and crash of 2000 marked a crucial turning point in modern financial history: It reflected the fact that the normal mechanisms of honest price discovery in the stock market had been disabled by heavy-handed central bankers and that the natural balancing and disciplining mechanisms of two-way markets had been destroyed.


Accordingly, the stock market had become a ward of the central bank and a casino-like gambling house, which could no longer self-correct. Now it would relentlessly rise on pure speculative momentum---- until it reached an asymptotic top, and would then collapse in a fiery crash on its own weight.


That"s what subsequently happened in April 2000 when the hottest precincts of the stock market---the NASDAQ 100 stocks----began a perilous 80% dive; and it"s also what happened in the broader markets-----including the S&P 500---in 2008-2009, when a thundering 60% plunge unfolded in a hardly a year"s time.


So with the market raging in self-fueling momentum at the 2600 mark on the S&P 500, we reflect back to the great dotcom crash for vivid reminders of what happens next. That earlier meltdown is especially pertinent because in many ways today"s stock market mania is far less justified than the one back then.


Moreover, the dotcom version was also the first great central bank fueled bubble of modern times---a creature that market participants understandably did not fully grasp. Yet to its everlasting blame, the Fed"s subsequent experiments in reflationary bailouts of the casino gamblers has only caused Wall Street"s muscle memory to atrophy further.


Indeed, after 30 years of Greenspan-style Bubble Finance and two devastating crashes, Wall Street is even more credulous today than it was on the eve of the tech crash. Back then, in fact, there was a considerable phalanx of Wall Street old-timers who warned about the dotcom insanity. Now almost no one sees this one coming.



 


Indeed, today"s nutty forecast by Goldman Sachs that the S&P 500 will hit 3,100 by the end of 2020 makes Greenspan"s earlier bubble blindness look clairvoyant by comparison.


In hindsight, Alan Greenspan did see it coming early on--- when he broached the "irrational exuberance" topic in passing during a speech in December 1996. Unfortunately, he has mostly been dinged for being allegedly way too early in making the call.


In fact, we don"t think he was making much of a call at all---he"s was just musing out loud with no intention of reining-in the then rampaging bull. What he actually did was to conduct several gumming fests at subsequent Fed meetings and then diffidently raised interest rates a single time by a pinprick 25 basis point in April 1997.


After that the Maestro (so-called) apparently forgot all about "irrational exuberance" even as that very thing soon began infecting the entire warp and woof of the financial system.


In fact, Greenspan"s fatuous amnesia became so pronounced that by the very eve of the dotcom crash in April 2000, he proved himself blind as a bat when it comes to central bank created bubbles.


Said the Maestro to a Senate committee on April 8 when asked whether an interest rate increase might prick the stock market bubble:


That presupposes I know there is a bubble....I don"t think we can know there is a bubble until after the fact. To assume we know it currently presupposes we have the capacity to forecast an imminent decline in (stock) prices".



At least he got the latter part right. After the NASDAQ had risen from 835 in December 1996 to 4585 on March 28, 2000---or to an out-of-this-world 5.5X gain in 40 months----Greenspan wasn"t even sure he was seeing a bubble!


Accordingly, he apparently didn"t have that capacity to predict an imminent decline---although the 51% crash to 2250 by the end of the year would seem to have been exactly that.


Indeed, after unloading the above tommyrot at the tippy-top of the NASDAQ-100 bubble, Greenspan proved himself a clueless, pitiable fool when this giant bubble deflated by 81% over the next two years.


In fact, the index ended up in September 2002 almost exactly where it had been when Greenspan spoke the words "irrational exuberance" and then moved along with the Fed"s printing press at full speed---claiming there was nothing to see.



Still, back then you could almost have made a (lame) excuse for the Fed chairman"s bubble blindness. The Maestro was operating in the early days of monetary central planning and wealth effects management, and its potent capacity to unleash rampant speculation in the financial system was not yet fully understood----even if the underlying monetary theory defied all the canons of sound finance.


Moreover, in addition to rampant bubbles in the financial market, the Fed"s money pumping during the 1990s did also seem to be producing some seemingly robust real world effects on main street and in the booming new tech part of the economy.


And, in turn, these positive macroeconomic developments were unfolding in a global political/strategic environment that had suddenly become more benign that at any time since June 1914.


Indeed, the outside world fairly buzzed with positive developments. These included the fact that the internet/tech revolution still exuded adolescent vigor, the government"s fiscal accounts were nearing balance for the first time in two decades, the vast market of China was convincingly rising from its Maoist slumber and the Committee To Save the World (Greenspan, Summers and Rubin) had just rescued Wall Street with alacrity from the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) meltdown.


Likewise, Europe was launching the single currency and expanding the single market. In place of the Soviet Union, which had disappeared from the pages of history in 1991, Russia, its breakaway republics and the former Warsaw Pact (captive) nations were all bursting out of their statist chains and experimenting with home grown capitalism and reaching out to the west via rising trade and capital flows.


In the US, the combination of the end of the cold war and the internet revolution contributed a doubly whammy to growth and prosperity. When defense spending fell from 7% of GDP on the eve of the Soviet collapse to under 4% by the year 2000, substantial domestic resources were released for private investment and a resulting substantial productivity uplift.


In fact, real private nonresidential investment grew at 7.3% per year from the 1990 pre-recession peak through 2000. That was more than double the still respectable 3.4% rate recorded between 1967 and 1990; and causes the anemic 1.4% real growth of fixed investment between the pre-crisis peak (2007) and 2016 to pale into insignificance.



Notwithstanding all of these positives, however, the great bull stock market of the late 1990s ended-up getting way ahead of itself. That was especially the case during the next 18 months after the Fed"s heavy-handed and somewhat panicked bailout of LTCM in September 1998 had confirmed to the newly energized casino gamblers that the Greenspan Put was most definitely operative.


In the Great Deformation we tracked 12 of the highest-flying big cap stocks ("Delirious Dozen") during the period between Greenspan"s December 1996 speech and the April 2000 dotcom bust. During this 40-month period, the combined market cap of these 12 leading momo stocks---including Microsoft, Cisco, Dell, Intel, Juniper Networks, Lucent, AIG, GE  and four others---soared from $600 billion to $3.8 trillion.


That eruption did indeed give the notion of trees which grow to the sky an altogether new definition. To wit, the total market cap of the Delirious Dozen grew by 75% per annum for nearly 4 years running; and the future outlook was claimed to be even more fantastic.


For instance, as of mid-2000 Intel was valued at $500 billion and traded at 53X its $9.4 billion of LTM earnings. Yet it was argued that this nosebleed multiple was more than warranted because the company had grown its net income from $1 billion to $9.4 billion during the previous decade, and that there was nothing but blue sky ahead.


Here"s the thing, however. Intel was and is a great company that, in fact, has never stopped growing.


But during the 17 years since mid-2000, its net income growth rate has sharply slowed to just 1.79% per annum; and its $12.7 billion of LTM net income for September 2017 is valued at only 15.7X or $210 billion.


In short, at the peak of the tech bubble Intel"s market cap had vastly outrun its long run-earnings capacity. Even today it has only earned back 40% of its bubble peak valuation.


Likewise, Cisco was valued at $500 billion in July 200 and sported a 185X PE multiple on its $2.7 billion of LTM net income. And it, too, has continued to grow, posting LTM net income of $9.7 billion for September 2017.


Yet today"s earnings are accorded only a 19X multiple after 17 years of 2.4% per annum growth; Cisco"s current $181 billion market cap, in fact, sits at just 36% of its bubble peak.


Even the mighty Mr. Softie has experienced pretty much the same fate. Back in mid-2000, it posted $8.3 billion of LTM net income and was valued at $600 billion or 72X. Today its net income has tripled to $23.1 billion, but its PE multiple has receded to just 29X.


Stated differently, Microsoft"s net income has grown at 6.1% per annum since the company vastly outran it true value back in early 2000. Accordingly, its market cap gained just 0.4% per annum during the last 17 years. That is, it has taken one of the greatest tech companies of all time upwards of two decades to earn back its peak dotcom era bubble valuation.


And when it comes to the industrial and financial conglomerate empire that Jack (Welch) built, the story is even more dramatic. GE"s mid-2000 market cap of $500 billion stands at just $155 billion today; and its PE multiple of 60X has shrunk to just 22X.


In short, that was irrational exuberance back then, and it did not take long for the vast quantities of bottled air in the market cap of the Delirious Dozen to come rushing out. By the bottom in September 2002, four of these companies had vanished into bankruptcy and the market cap of the survivors had imploded to just $1.1 trillion.


That"s a fact and you can look it up in the papers. In less than 30 months, $2.7 trillion of market cap had literally ionized.  And these were the leading companies of the era.


None of them, it might be noted, were valued at 280X shrinking net income, as is Amazon today; or at infinite PE multiples like much of the biotech sector and momo hobby horses like Tesla.


More importantly, the promising macro-economic situation at the turn of the century has given way to a world precariously balanced on $225 trillion of debt and the tottering $40 trillion Red Ponzi of China.


Likewise, the benign geo-strategic environment of that era has long since disappeared into the madness of RussiaGate, endless wars in the middle east and Africa and the incendiary confrontation between the Fat Boy and the Donald on the Korean peninsula.


Finally, after 30 years of rampant monetary expansion the central banks of the world have been forced to reverse direction and begin to normalize interest rates and balance sheets.


And that now incepting and unprecedented experiment in massive demonetization of public debts is coming at a time when----after 8 years of business cycle expansion---the US, Japan and most of Europe are running monumental "full-employment" budget deficits.


Even then, these reckless fiscal policies are happening in the teeth of a demographically driven tsunami of pension, medical and welfare spending.


For the period just ended, the S&P 500 companies earned $107 per share on an LTM basis---or just 2% more than the $105 per share posted back in September 2014; and also only modestly more than the $85 per share recorded way back at the June 2007 pre-crisis peak.


Stated differently, on a trend basis S&P 500 companies have grown their earnings at 2.33% per annum over the last decade. How that merits a 24.3X PE multiple on today"s 2600 index price is hard to fathom---let alone Goldman"s 3100 target for 2020.


Indeed, just to retain today"s absurd PE multiple would require $130 per share of GAAP earnings by 2020 at the Goldman target price.


That"s right. By the end of 2020 we would be implicitly in the longest business expansion in recorded history at 140 months (compared to 118 months in the 1990s),


Furthermore, the term structure of interest rates will be 200-300 basis points higher according to the Fed"s current policies, while the US treasury will be running $1 trillion plus annual deficits and experiencing recurring debt ceiling and financial crises.


Even then you would need 7% annual earnings growth to hold onto today"s 24.2X PE multiple at the Goldman S&P 500 target.


As we said, relative to today"s casino madness and the Goldman fairy tale hockey stick, Alan Greenspan circa April 2000 looks like a model of sobriety by comparison.


So if that was Irrational Exuberance back in April 2000, what we have now is surely the mother thereof.









Saturday, July 15, 2017

All Conundrums Matter

Authored by Jeffrey Snider via Alhambra Investment Partners,


Since we are this week hypocritically obsessing over monetary policy, particularly the federal funds rate end of it, it’s as good a time as any to review the full history of 21st century “conundrum.” Janet Yellen’s Fed has run itself afoul of the bond market, just as Alan Greenspan’s Fed did in the middle 2000’s. But that latter example wasn’t truly the first conundrum for monetary policy. There remain a great many questions (in the mainstream, anyway) about the dot-coms.


If we define conundrum more broadly as I believe more appropriate, then it’s not just about UST yields long or short. It is instead the lack of (monetary) effect through federal funds rate management. In the early 2000’s this was apparent in a whole range of factors – starting with the stock market.



It had become conventional trading wisdom that, under Alan Greenspan, you don’t fight the Fed. He was the “maestro” who at his whim sat enormous monetary power. This idea of the so-called Greenspan put was born sometime in 1998 after the LTCM debacle, a fiasco that nonetheless seemed to validate the premise.


The dot-com bust, however, pushed stocks very sharply lower over an unusually lengthy period of time, taking almost three years to fully complete. During that time, the Fed was not at all idle (as you can plainly see above). In less than a year, Greenspan had reduced the federal funds target from 6.50% down all the way to 1.75%. While the rationalization for its actions was largely economic in nature, there can be no denying that under a discretionary policy regime the FOMC heavily considered the stock market.


That was supposed to be massive “stimulus” and “accommodation”, that which no stock investor should or could ignore. And yet, it clearly had no effect. The dot-com bust went on further despite what in mainstream tradition was a change to tremendously “loose” policy. Greenspan had unleashed the might of his put, and stocks tanked anyway.


But it wasn’t just the stock market that failed to be accommodated. Though the dot-com recession that began in 2001 was the mildest on record, an outcome which many were and are quick to give Greenspan credit for, the economic problem persisted instead through the first years of the recovery. In other words, the issue wasn’t its depth, but the lack of growth that followed what would otherwise have been a minor footnote in economic history.



In terms of GDP, the recession itself was just two negative quarters spread out over the final three of 2001 (and they were non-consecutive, proving that the “technical” definition of recession isn’t one). GDP jumped to nearly 4% in the first quarter of 2002, setting up expectations for a traditional V-shaped recovery, but by the end of that year was down near zero again – as stocks kept falling.



The real weakness of this first “conundrum”, however, is revealed in the labor market. It was, as had become by 2004 a campaign issue in the Presidential election that year, the second major “jobless recovery” to affect a member of the Bush family running for the White House. It’s the economy stupid somehow still resonated despite everything in the 1990’s. The final two “rate cuts” the FOMC voted (the penultimate one for 50 bps in late 2002; and the final for the last 25 bps in June 2003 to get down to a then-record low of 1%) make some orthodox sense in this context though they were executed long after the official recession end.


The Fed by that time openly worried about both stocks as well as the failure of recovery to ignite – even though by all convention “stimulus” was abundant, even enormous. The word “deflation” was used several times over the course of internal policy discussions, including the last one in June 2003, as it was brought up in the mainstream on a few occasions.


It has been Federal Reserve tradition to greatly fear a stock crash, and here was one that was as undeniable as it was lengthy. Owing to how the Crash of 1929 was viewed, stocks were given monetary importance that in this circumstance produced a puzzle. Why didn’t the Greenspan put work on stocks, while at the same time why didn’t the stock crash lead to a far greater economic calamity?


An enterprising believer in Greenspan might surmise that the federal funds “stimulus” was actually quite powerful, and that it merely counterbalanced in the real economy the building negative forces of the stock crash; a monetary standoff of sorts. The two opposing sides were largely canceled out until the natural progression of the business cycle took over. Good luck, as it was described by the economists who would later coin the phrase the Great “Moderation.”


A simpler and more consistent explanation follows the labor trail, and ends up with eurodollars.



The primary reason for the jobless recovery was very simple – Ross Perot’s 1992 prediction had come to pass. On the surface, there was no reason whatsoever that US manufacturing would respond so harshly to what was, particularly for consumers, such a mild contraction. And yet, the level of manufacturing jobs in the US during this very crucial period, what otherwise would have been a more natural recovery, utterly collapsed. Between the peak in July 2000 and the FOMC’s last “rate cut” in June 2003, an astounding 16% of all manufacturing jobs disappeared.


And they would not stop being destroyed for years thereafter. This decimation of manufacturing would continue on until the depths of the Great “Recession”, and would be recorded by a number of economic accounts including domestic factory orders.



Americans didn’t stop buying goods, or services for that matter, they instead stopped buying, at the margins, American goods. As would become common, throughout the period following the dot-com recession US import volumes would explode.


It was eventually and officially included in the second “conundrum” of the middle 2000’s, as well as lead to the ridiculous “global savings glut” hypothesis that “saw” these eurodollars while trying so very hard to deny their existence.



In order for offshoring to occur, foreign producers needed investment in order to be able to produce. They already had the necessary (cheap) labor, what was lacking since Ross Perot was the finance and global monetary flexibility that could put it all together. The maturation of the eurodollar system in the late 1990’s, particularly after the repeal of Glass-Steagall that finally allowed depository institutions to get their balance sheets into the shadows, was the final ingredient setting the US manufacturing up for this domestic conflagration. The dot-coms were merely the spark.


And if the eurodollar system was rapidly growing through all of this, as we know that it was, that would further explain why the stock bust never created the economic catastrophe of depression. In 1929, stocks were intimately related and intertwined with money through the NYC call market and correspondence system. In 1999, that just wasn’t the case, as eurodollars were a parallel monetary system all its own, disconnected from the price or collateral nature of stocks.


Eurodollars supplied money to the real economy here and elsewhere so that the stock bust would be of limited downside in effective monetary terms, but ironically that the upside would also be limited at least in this country as it greased the wheels of US manufacturing destruction. From the perspective of various EM economies by contrast, the dot-com recovery was instead so many “miracles.” Judged instead by the whole global economy, there was no inconsistency in money that was, after all, itself global.  


The Fed was largely a bystander in all of it, confused as always though at least for the first time Greenspan was openly contradicted, and by everything.



Any legitimate questions or doubts were soon forgotten, though, as the housing mania subsumed all attention – and was again attributed to monetary policy rather than the by-then exploding, parabolic eurodollar. Though Greenspan was by this time slightly tarnished by reputation, he was still held in high regard, at least until his final act produced the second conundrum disconnecting monetary policy more completely (in the opposite direction than the first) from actual and effective global money conditions.




The final failure of eurodollars in 2007 proved the categorical differences between money and Federal Reserve policy for good, but by then nobody much cared about the first instance(s) of Fed failure; there were, and sadly remain, bigger problems to be concerned about.


It is, however, all connected; the monetary history (including eurodollars) of the 21st century comes out very different than the monetary policy (eurodollars don’t matter) history of the same period. The latter leads to drug addicts and Baby Boomers as an eventual excuse for how QE and ZIRP performed about as well as monetary policy in 2001, 2002, and 2003. The former leads us to answers.

Monday, May 22, 2017

Markets Face A Brutal "Margin Call" If Trump Loses Any More Credibility, Deutsche Warns

It took the Fed several long years to discover just how reflexive and circular the relationship it had established with the stock market had become. The Fed"s Catch-22 was first observed back in September 2013, when as the Fed was still debating whether to taper or not caught in a vicious cycle where any hint it would ultimately end QE would be met with a prompt selloff, Deutsche Bank explained how it had found itself in such a reflexive mess:





Another theme arising from their decision to hold fire was their worry that financial conditions had tightened over the past few weeks. If this is the case then the path of tapering is going to be tough because every time the market thinks they are going to taper, yields will likely rise and conditions will tighten. However the Fed"s guidance is becoming confused enough now that you couldn"t rule out another change of emphasis, especially as the composition of the Fed will change notably over the next few months. So markets are underpinned by liquidity for now but it’s a fluid situation and it strikes me that the Fed do not have a clear direction at the moment which makes them difficult to second guess.



Three years later, the Fed found itself in the same bind, eager to hike rates but very much unwilling to suffer the risk asset consequences this would entail, i.e., worried about a market selloff. And, as we discussed last October, in the Fed"s Minutes, for the first time we observed a Fed that appeared to have become self-aware, and had grasped just how reflexive the nature of its "communication strategy" with the market has been all along. To wit:



Over half a year later, we again go back to Deutsche Bank in general, and its most whimsical and metaphysical of strategists, Aleksandar Kocic, who first highlighted the reflexive nature of the Fed four years ago (and who recently has been more vocal on political topics such as the failure of globalization as the culprit behind Trump"s victory, and the backlash against populism), and who over the weekend extended the familiar circular frame established between the Fed and the market by one key player, layering in the the US presidency as a critical participant in the "communication channel" the Fed had established with the market. In other words, the "Fed put", which Yellen et al financed "option by selling an (out of the money) option on their credibility" was being supplanted by a "Trump put."


There are several major problems associated with that.


As Kocic warns, the introduction of this particular "irrational" actor into a long-running, game-theoretical setup which has become quite familiar to both the market and the Fed  - as Kocic puts it "the Fed could tailor its exit in an optimal way, while the market could voice its view at each step of that process so that both sides are happy at the end. Because of that, it was not in the market’s interest to challenge Fed’s credibility" - would jeopardize the fluid equilibrium between the Fed and the stock market.


Furthermore, "in contrast with the Fed whose communications with the markets reduced volatility, the new political transparency, as communicated through presidential tweets and political discourse, has been generally volatility increasing." Said simply, blame Trump if volatility explodes in the near future, at least according to Deutsche.


Finally, there is the issue of the market being shocked by a brutal "margin call", as the pre-implied political "consensus", similar to that between the Fed and markets, fractures resulting in a marketwide "margin call", which would be most disruptive for equities while pushing VIX higher, creating a destructive feedback loop in which crashing confidence in the "Trump put" translates into a further market selloff, which in turn further impairs confidence in not only the Trump, but also Fed put, in the process potentially unwinding years and years of artificial market levels as not only Trump, but the Fed also lose their credibility.


For the sake of completeness and coherence - because nobody can do Kocic justice by expounding on his thoughts, and it is best to leave to Kocic to say what Kocic meant to say - here is his full essay from this weekend.





Approaching a margin call: Politics and policy behind the fourth wall



For a good part of the last 5-6 years, the Fed had made a point of establishing an open channel of communication with the markets. We have viewed this phase of market introspection as a maneuver equivalent to the removal of the fourth wall in the theatrical context: The audience (in this case the markets) is no longer a passive spectator, but assumes an active role in shaping the script (policy). In consulting the markets, the Fed has retained an option to be flexible and act in the market’s interest without disturbing it. They have financed that option by selling an (out of the money) option on their credibility. This is a tradeoff that worked for everyone. The Fed could tailor its exit in an optimal way, while the market could voice its view at each step of that process so that both sides are happy at the end. Because of that, it was not in the market’s interest to challenge Fed’s credibility.



With the arrival of the new President, there appears to be some coordination between politics and monetary policy in their communication channels. The Fed communications with the markets gave way to presidential tweets, press briefings and general media appearances, which took center stage as another form of shaping the narrative jointly with a wider audience. So, while the Fed’s fourth wall had to be reinstated, another fourth wall came down. It makes perfect sense for the two communication channels not to coexist at the same time -- removing two walls at the same time would have produced two parallel narratives resulting in a significant “cognitive draft” and potential loss of coherence of the resulting script.



The two communication modes of removal of the fourth wall, while on the surface similar, have (at least) one notable difference. When expressed in options language, the Trump put has the same decomposition as the Bernanke put during the QE period. Effectively, this is a supply of equity vol to the market financed by “selling puts” on President’s credibility. However, in contrast with the Fed whose communications with the markets reduced volatility, the new political transparency, as communicated through presidential tweets and political discourse, has been generally volatility increasing. This communication caused volatility is the main difference between politics and policy. Originally, the market has been willing to accept this volatility because the promises at the end look attractive (tax cuts, deregulation, fiscal spending,…). But, this volatility presents the key risk for the President’s brand. The collateral asset behind president’s “credibility put” is his ability to pass the promised reforms, which is conditioned on his ability to form consensus within the party, the House and the Congress. Excessive volatility erodes the value of this collateral and increases the risk of a “margin call”.



This was highlighted by the last week’s events: The latest political developments outlined the lines of fractures in the political consensus and the market’s reassessing of the probability of a “margin call”. As a consequence, volatility sellers were caught off guard as gamma rebounded. The awareness of this possibility alone is likely to provide a lower bound for vol – as long as political uncertainty prevails, vol is  unlikely to be pushed to new lows. As the Trump trade took the center stage by the end of the last year, the highest level of uncertainty was perceived to be in the FX channel and the lowest in the risk assets, with rates market somewhere between the two. In itself, the political “margin call” would be unwind of this mode and, as such, most disruptive for equities pushing VIX significantly higher, as it means withdrawal of convexity from that market, and somewhat less supportive for rates and FX vol.



To all this we can only add, that it would be doubly (if not triply) ironic that Trump - who less than a year ago accused Yellen of blowing a "huge market bubble" - then a few months ago changed his tune, and started grading his presidency by every uptick in the S&P while praising Yellen and low rates, were to be left holding the bag as the president who unleashed the biggest market crash of all time, in the process wiping out the Fed, whose "market put" is now all in, as is its reserve currency-defining credibility.


Actually scratch that, the correct word we are looking for is not "ironic"... it is "planned."

Wednesday, March 15, 2017

Here Are The Five Main Things To Watch At Today's Fed Meeting

While it is now virtually assured (odds are 95% according to the CME) that the Fed will announce a 25 bps rate hike today following an unprecedented attempt to reprice the Fed Funds market over the past month by Fed speakers - recall that as recently as three weeks ago, nobody expected a March move by the FOMC - what traders and analysts will be focused on today are hints for the future of the Fed"s rate hike moves. Indeed, the Fed"s "dot plot" will come under intense scrutiny after the BLS earlier today confirmed that the Fed may be well behind the curve when it comes to rising prices, after headline CPI printed at a blistering 2.7%, the highest rate in 5 years, with even the tamer core inflation rising 2.2%, above the Fed"s target of 2.0%.




A comarable reading by real-world prices as calculated by PriceStats showed that inflation in the US is now soaring at an annual rate of 3.6%, nearly double the Fed"s core target.



As such, the focus will fall upon the dot-plot and Yellen presser - in particular any updates that indicate a steeper rate hike path and whether the long-run policy rate target rises above 3%. According to many analysts the key variable for the market"s tone over the next few weeks will be not so much what the average 2018 dot is, but whether and where the Fed puts its median "long-term" dot: at, or above 3%. Given the Fed waited a year between hikes when moving away from the ZIRP era, this decision is seen as an indicator for whether a new era is upon us, one in which three or four hikes per year is the new norm. A further reason why the Fed is eager to hike rates is so it has "wiggle room" on interest rates for when stock markets inevitably see a correction and in advance of the next economic recession.


Recent data releases continue to support the path forward towards "normalization" and the accompanying statement is expected to validate the uptrend in the domestic economy, as the strength of US consumer spending and employment has led many to believe that the economy can absorb several hikes this year. The Fed, ironically, has the new Trump administration to thank for this environment - as the proposed fiscal stimulus, tax cuts and laxer regulations create slack elsewhere in the economy, and have boosted "animal spirits", smoothing the Fed"s path for tightening.


While some have speculated that much of what has been proposed by the new government will not come to pass, but the Fed cannot run the risk of getting too far behind the curve. As noted above, most inflation metrics are now running at or above the Fed"s mandated 2% Y/Y, bar the favoured PCE adjusted and core - given stocks near ATHs, and house prices nearing pre-2007 levels, the Fed will be aware that falling too far behind the curve may force them to steepen the hike path suddenly, potentially causing a crash for both stock and housing markets.


Therefore, the Fed is unlikely to indicate a steeper path in the immediate term, and instead the focus will be on the longer term forecasts, in particular if the long-run policy rate target rises above 3%.


Much like in the Funds Rate, the Fed will seek wriggle room with its bloated balance sheet and the current unprecedented level of $4.5Trillion (Including $2Tn MBS) would be compounded considerably if interest rates were near the longer term projection level (around 3%). For example, the interest paid to banks by the Fed on excess reserves in 2014 was USD 6.7Bn, with interest rates at 3.0% this would be more like USD 85Bn a very different, potentially politically sensitive, issue. In recent weeks we have seen that talk of balance sheet reduction has led to curve steepening, this was highlighted by Fed"s Bullard who noted that current reinvestment policy has placed upward pressure on the short end and placed downward pressure on other portions of the curve. The Jan/Feb minutes showed that the Fed agreed to begin discussion vis-à-vis balance sheet reduction at this meeting, therefore if there is no further clarity in the accompanying statement, expect it to be a key issue at the Yellen presser.


Another potential topic is the recent sharp drop in the price of oil, and whether the Fed will view this as a dovish signal - driven by weak demand - or see through it and attribute it to ongoing supply imbalances.


With that said, here are five main things to look for in today"s statement and Yellen press conference:


  • Rate Increase

It would now be a significant shock if the US central bank did not lift the target range for the federal funds rate by another quarter point from the current 0.5 per cent to 0.75%. The chances of a move were seen by markets at around 95% going into the meeting. So the issue for investors is judging whether the next move could come as soon as June and whether there is the possibility of four increases this year, rather than the three predicted in December. Either way, the Fed is still likely to characterise its rate-raising plans as “gradual”.


  • The Fed"s Views On The Economy

The post-meeting statement will reaffirm the continued strengthening of the jobs market and moderate growth in the overall economy. It may acknowledge that the headline measure of inflation tracked by the COM is now at 1.9% year on year, just a notch below the Fed’s target, although core inflation still remains a little further behind. A key question is whether there will be any further change to language on the risks of positive or negative developments hitting the economy. Right now, the risks are seen as ”roughly balanced”, pointing to a fair degree of sangfroid.


  • Fed Forecasts

The Fed will update growth, inflation and unemployment forecasts last released in November. Crucially, it will also produce a dot-plot showing individual policymakers’ predictions for the federal funds rate. As of December the median prediction was for three increases in 2017, but if four or more officials lift their outlooks to four increases it would be enough to shift the median up a notch. Janet Yellen, the Fed chair, signalled in her most recent speech that she was comfortable with the three-increase forecast released in December. In a tweak to gratify central banking aficionados, the Fed has said it will add so-called fan charts to its economic projections illustrating the uncertainty around those forecasts. These will appear with minutes to this week’s meeting released on April 5.


  • The Fate Of The Fed"s Balance Sheet

The Fed’s balance sheet has swollen to $4.5tn via its crisis-era interventions, which included purchases of vast quantities of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities. Officials have started openly discussing the possibility of reducing the size of its holdings. The Fed seems likely to retain existing language in its statement pledging to keep reinvesting the proceeds of maturing securities in its portfolio until normalisation of rates is “well under way”. However, Yellen is likely to face questions in a post-meeting press conference starting at 2.30pm EDT about when and how the Fed could start shrinking its balance sheet. How she handles those questions is very market sensitive. The Fed in 2013 managed to discombobulate financial markets with a miscued signal regarding its balance sheet strategy.


  • The Impact of Trump

The unspoken elephant in the room is what Trump"s fiscal policies could do to both the Fed"s forecasts. The problem is that there is still very little clarity on either composition, timing or implementation. As such, the FOMC is flying blind when it comes to Trump"s fiscal policies which many have speculated could quicken inflation as a result of the modest slack in the economy, forcing the Fed to tighten financial conditions even more, and pushing short-term rates even higher, faster to keep inflation in check. This too is a topic that will be certainly touched upon during the Yellen press conference.


* * *


Market Reaction


Given a hike is essentially fully priced, language accompanying the decision will be under the spotlight, as participants will be attempting to gauge just how much of a "bullish hike" this is. Most analysts expect the Fed to reiterate its commitment to "gradual rate hikes". As such, the median Fed Fund Rate projections are likely to remain the same in the shorter term, with the longer term under intense scrutiny. If it is held at 3% this could be viewed as dovish (more so, if one or more of the shorter term projections is moved slightly lower) — If raised above 3% this could be seen as a hawkish hike (more so, if one or more of the shorter term projections is moved slightly higher).


If the Fed move, it will be only the third hike away from ZIRP, but will break with a precedent of waiting a year between hikes. Many analysts have speculated that if participants begin to believe that three or four hikes a year is the new norm it could puncture the current euphoria in US stocks. The more bullish the hike - the more the "three or four hikes a year" narrative will take hold, meaning a more pronounced move away from stocks - although how quickly this will happen is open to a great deal of speculation, as hikes in recent times have been indicative of economic optimism and potentially bullish for stocks. Furthermore, rates at 0.75-1.0% is still well below the March Y/Y change in core PCE, meaning the inflation adjusted Fund Rate will remain negative whatever occurs at this meeting. So it could be a while yet before higher rates affect the bullish sentiment in stocks.


It is most likely that at this meeting a neutral position will be taken in regards to the balance sheet, i.e. that reducing the balance sheet has been discussed but more consideration is needed. A hawkish view from Yellen could be along the lines of "shrinking the balance sheet may be deliberated later this year" — potentially causing the curve to steepen. A dovish tone would be "will not be under consideration until next year" — likely meaning a flatter curve.


In relation to fiscal stimulus, Yellen has said "We are not basing our judgments about current interest rates on speculation" and although other Fed members have given the new fiscal atmosphere greater recognition, Yellen is unlikely to veer from comments made before the Senate Committee in February. A stand-pat approach where this is concerned is very much expected (given it is yet to materialize in law, let alone in the economy) however, if she pushes the line of fed policy independence" it may well be viewed as hawkish.

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

Alan Greenspan: Ron Paul Was Right About The Gold Standard

As John Rubino eloquently puts it, "when the history of these times is written, former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan will be one of the major villains, but also one of the greatest mysteries. This is so because he has, in effect, been three different people." Greenspan started his public life brilliantly, as a libertarian thinker who said some compelling and accurate things about gold and its role in the world. An example from 1966: "This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists" tirades against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists" antagonism toward the gold standard."


Yet everything changed a few decades later when Greenspan was put in charge of the Federal Reserve in the late 1980s, instead of applying the above wisdom, for example by limiting the bank"s interference in the private sector and letting market forces determine winners and losers, he did a full 180, intervening in every crisis, creating new currency with abandon, and generally behaving like his old ideological enemies, the Keynesians. Predictably, debt soared during his long tenure.



Along the way he was also instrumental in preventing regulation of credit default swaps and other derivatives that nearly blew up the system in 2008. His view of those instruments:





The reason that growth has continued despite adversity, or perhaps because of it, is that these new financial instruments are an increasingly important vehicle for unbundling risks. These instruments enhance the ability to differentiate risk and allocate it to those investors most able and willing to take it. This unbundling improves the ability of the market to engender a set of product and asset prices far more calibrated to the value preferences of consumers than was possible before derivative markets were developed. The product and asset price signals enable entrepreneurs to finely allocate real capital facilities to produce those goods and services most valued by consumers, a process that has undoubtedly improved national productivity growth and standards of living.



In the aftermath of the dot com crisis Greenspan cut interest rates to near-zero in the early 2000s, igniting the housing bubble, which neither he nor anyone else at the Fed was able to detect along the way. He even made it into the dictionary, as the "Greenspan put" became the term for government bailing out its Wall Street benefactors. From this the leveraged speculating community learned that no risk was too egregious and no profit too large, because government - that is, the Fed - had eliminated all the worst-case scenarios. Put another way, under Greenspan profit was privatized but loss was socialized.


Then, another metamorphosis took place: after Greenspan retired from the Fed in 2006 he began morphing back into his old libertarian self. A cynic might detect a desire to avoid the consequences of his past actions, while a neurologist might suspect senility. But either way the transformation has been breathtaking.


Consider Greenspan"s latest public address. In an extended interview published in the World Gold Council’s Gold Investor February issue, Greenspan repeated his now standard warning about the risk of coming stagflation, which would send the price of gold higher: "The risk of inflation is beginning to rise...Significant increases in inflation will ultimately increase the price of gold." As such, "investment in gold now is insurance. It’s not for short-term gain, but for long-term protection.”


Going back to his libertarian roots, it was the idea of returning to a gold standard that Greenspan focused on: a gold standard that he said would help mitigate risks of an “unstable fiscal system” like the one we have today.


“Today, going back on to the gold standard would be perceived as an act of desperation. But if the gold standard were in place today, we would not have reached the situation in which we now find ourselves,” he said.“[T]here is a widespread view that the 19th Century gold standard didn’t work. I think that’s like wearing the wrong size shoes and saying the shoes are uncomfortable! It wasn’t the gold standard that failed; it was politics.”


And the punchline: “We would never have reached this position of extreme indebtedness were we on the gold standard, because the gold standard is a way of ensuring that fiscal policy never gets out of line.” 


To be sure, this is something we discussed exactly two years ago, when we showed a chart showing the sudden end of prosperity for the "bottom 90%" of US earners at the time Nixon ended the US Gold Standard in August 1971, unleashing what ultimately would be the "Great Moderation", an unprecedented increase in US debt, and the stagnation of real incomes and net worth for all but the "top 1% of earners."



As we said then, in retrospect it is no wonder "why the 1% hates the gold standard" and added that the chart above, "should also clarify just why to the "1%", including their protectors in the "developed market" central banking system, their tenured economist lackeys, their purchased politicians and their captured media outlets, the topic of a return to a gold standard is the biggest threat conceivable."


As for Greenspan"s repeated attempts to undo the past by admitting his mistakes, the jury is out. As Rubino concludes, "one of the nice things about the information age is that public figures leave long paper trails and can"t therefore easily escape their pasts. Greenspan"s past, being perhaps the best documented of any central banker in history, will haunt him forever."


That said, at least Greenspan is going out a gold bug.


* * *


Below are the key excerpts from his Gold Investor interview:


Q. In recent months, concerns about stagflation have been rising. Do you believe that these concerns are legitimate?





We have been through a protracted period of stagnant productivity growth, particularly in the developed world, driven largely by the aging of the ‘baby boom’ generation. Social benefits (entitlements in the US) are crowding out gross domestic savings, the primary source for funding investment, dollar for dollar. The decline in gross domestic savings as a share of GDP has suppressed gross nonresidential capital investment. It is the lessened investment that has suppressed the growth in output per hour globally.



Output per hour has been growing at approximately ½% annually in the US and other developed countries over the past five years, compared with an earlier growth rate closer to 2%. That is a huge difference, which is reflected proportionately in the gross domestic product and in people’s standard of living.



As productivity growth slows down, the whole economic system slows down. That has provoked despair and a consequent rise in economic populism from Brexit to Trump. Populism is not a philosophy or a concept, like socialism or capitalism, for example. Rather it is a cry of pain, where people are saying: Do something. Help!



At the same time, the risk of inflation is beginning to rise. In the United States, the unemployment rate is below 5%, which has put upward pressure on wages and unit costs generally. Demand is picking up, as manifested by the recent marked, broad increase in the money supply, which is stoking inflationary pressures. To date, wage increases have largely been absorbed by employers, but, if costs are moving up, prices ultimately have to follow suit. If you impose inflation on stagnation, you get stagflation.



* * *


Q. As inflation pressures grow, do you anticipate a renewed interest in gold?





Significant increases in inflation will ultimately increase the price of gold. Investment in gold now is insurance. It’s not for short-term gain, but for long-term protection.



I view gold as the primary global currency. It is the only currency, along with silver, that does not require a counterparty signature. Gold, however, has always been far more valuable per ounce than silver. No one refuses gold as payment to discharge an obligation. Credit instruments and fiat currency depend on the credit worthiness of a counterparty. Gold, along with silver, is one of the only currencies that has an intrinsic value. It has always been that way. No one questions its value, and it has always been a valuable commodity, first coined in Asia Minor in 600 BC.



* * *


Q. Although gold is not an official currency, it plays an important role in the monetary system. What role do you think gold should play in the new geopolitical environment?





The gold standard was operating at its peak in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period of extraordinary global prosperity, characterised by firming productivity growth and very little inflation.



But today, there is a widespread view that the 19th century gold standard didn’t work. I think that’s like wearing the wrong size shoes and saying the shoes are uncomfortable! It wasn’t the gold standard that failed; it was politics. World War I disabled the fixed exchange rate parities and no country wanted to be exposed to the humiliation of having a lesser exchange rate against the US dollar than it enjoyed in 1913.



Britain, for example, chose to return to the gold standard in 1925 at the same exchange rate it had in 1913 relative to the US dollar (US$4.86 per pound sterling). That was a monumental error by Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. It induced a severe deflation for Britain in the late 1920s, and the Bank of England had to default in 1931. It wasn’t the gold standard that wasn’t functioning; it was these pre-war parities that didn’t work. All wanted to return to pre-war exchange rate parities, which, given the different degree of war and economic destruction from country to country, rendered this desire, in general, wholly unrealistic.



Today, going back on to the gold standard would be perceived as an act of desperation. But if the gold standard were in place today we would not have reached the situation in which we now find ourselves. We cannot afford to spend on infrastructure in the way that we should. The US sorely needs it, and it would pay for itself eventually in the form of a better economic environment (infrastructure). But few of such benefits would be reflected in private cash flow to repay debt. Much such infrastructure would have to be funded with government debt. We are already in danger of seeing the ratio of federal debt to GDP edging toward triple digits. We would never have reached this position of extreme indebtedness were we on the gold standard, because the gold standard is a way of ensuring that fiscal policy never gets out of line.



* * *


Finally, buried at the very end of the interview was perhaps the most interesting statement by Greenspan : the former Fed Chair"s implicit admission that Ron Paul was right all along:


Q. Against a background of ultra-low and negative interest rates, many reserve managers have been large buyers of gold. In your view, what role does gold play as a reserve asset?





When I was Chair of the Federal Reserve I used to testify before US Congressman Ron Paul, who was a very strong advocate of gold. We had some interesting discussions. I told him that US monetary policy tried to follow signals that a gold standard would have created. That is sound monetary policy even with a fiat currency. In that regard, I told him that even if we had gone back to the gold standard, policy would not have changed all that much.



For those unfamiliar, here is Ron Paul "s explanation of his plan for monetary freedom and a return to a gold standard.



Full Greenspan interview below
(link)