Showing posts with label Drawdown. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Drawdown. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 29, 2017

Goldman: The Last Time This Happened Was Just Months Before The Start Of The Great Depression

Ah Goldman, never change.


One week after Goldman"s chief equity strategist David Kostin predicted a three-year bull market of "rational exuberance", lifting his 2018 S&P price target from 2,500 to 2,850 rising to 3,100 in 2020, and stating that should the exuberance turn "irrational", the S&P could rise as high as 5,300 by the end of 2020, another Goldman strategist, Christian Mueller-Glissmann, has decided it may be a good idea to play bad cop and cover all bases.


And so, in a report released on Tuesday "The Balanced Bear - Part 1: Low(er) returns and latent drawdown risk" this now bearish Goldmanite warns that in the medium-term, the two likely scenarios are either i) a "slow pain" deflation scenario of low yields and high valuations "which persist as macro is stable but there are less windfall gains from rising valuations and less carry - as a result, returns are likely to be lower across assets", or ii) a "fast pain" drawdown scenario in which there is "either a material negative growth or inflation/rate shock, or a combination of both, which drives a drawdown in 60/40 portfolios."


For those confused, don"t worry - you read it right. While on one hand Goldman is predicting nothing but blue skies for the "medium-term" of the next three years, predicting no recession and double digit equity upside, at the very same time, the very same Goldman is also forecasting either a "slow" or "fast" pain scenario, which while different, share one thing in common (as the name implies): "pain."


No surprise, Goldman talking out of both sides of its mouth, the only question being while the client-facing "research" is obviously crap and meant to get clients to do the opposite of what Goldman"s prop traders are doing, it remains debatable on what side Goldman"s prop is axed. Is the bank pulling a CDO and shorting everything it sells to its clients, or has the bank assured further S&P upside, even as valuations no "longer make sense" to quote, well, Goldman?


We don"t know the answer, nor do we care. For those who do, here is Mueller-Glissmann summary:








We think a period of low(er) returns (scenario 1) is more likely than a full-fledged bear market in 60/40 portfolios (scenario 2), at least in the near term. But there will likely be a balancing act with slowing growth and rising inflation. And at current low yield levels and with the ‘beginning of the end of QE’, bonds might be less effective hedges for equities and are likely a larger drag on balanced portfolios. And rising inflation could move the central bank put ‘more out of the money’, requiring a larger ‘growth shock’ for central banks to ease policy. Also current easing options are more limited for central banks as rates are still low and QE purchases have only just been reduced.


 


And once the balanced bear comes, it might be larger and faster. Duration risk in bond markets is much higher this cycle and vol of vol in equities has increased since the mid-80s. While we think investors should lower duration and run higher equity allocations in scenario 1, they should consider hedging at least the risk of smaller equity drawdowns in the near term. We like shorter-dated S&P 500 put spreads. In part 2, we intend to explore different strategies to enhance balanced portfolio returns while managing drawdown risk in case of a bear market.



Ultimately, like every other forecast to come out of Goldman, it"s garbage: want bullish, read Kostin; want bearish - either a little or lot - stick to Glissman. Just remember to use your friendly, Goldman salesperson who will gladly collect the trade commission whatever you do.


That said, there was one useful data point in the 26 page pdf: a chart showing that not only are we nearing the longest 60/40 bull market without a 10% return drawdown, but that the last time we were here was sometime in the late 1920s... and the Great Depression would follow in just a few months.


As Goldman observes: "we are closing in on the longest 60/40 bull market in history - there has been no 10% drawdown in real terms since 2009. A passive long-only balanced portfolio has delivered attractive risk-adjusted returns since the 90s. A favourable ‘Goldilocks’ macro backdrop, supported by the ‘Great Moderation’ and the central bank put, has boosted returns in both equities and bonds. However, after the recent ‘bull market in everything’, valuations across assets are as expensive as they have been this century, which reduces the potential for returns and diversification in balanced portfolios.


Some more statistics:








We are nearing the longest bull market for balanced equity/bond portfolios in over a century - a simple 60/40 portfolio (60% S&P 500, 40% US 10-year bonds) has not had a drawdown of more than 10% since the GFC trough (8.7 years) and has delivered a 143% return (11% p.a.) since then.



And when was the last time a balance portfolio had such a tremendous return? Goldman answers again:








"The longest run has been during  the Roaring 20s, ending with the Great Depression. The second longest run was the post-war ‘Golden age’ in the 50s - the 90s Boom has been in third place but is now fourth, after the current run.



In other words, one would have to go back to some time in early 1929 to be looking at the kind of returns that a balanced "60/40" portfolio is generating today.  In fact, the current period of staggering returns without a 10% total drawdown is now 8.7 years. How long was the comparable period in the 1928s? 9.1 years. Which means that if history is any guide, the second great depression is just around the corner.










Thursday, August 17, 2017

"The Best Of Times" - Stocks Surge To 2nd Longest Dip-less Streak In History

The S&P 500 has not seen a drawdown of more than 3% since the election last November. As PensionPartners" Charlie Bilello notes, this is the second longest run in history...



The Dow has hit 31 all-time highs in 2017 and has done so with no more than a 3% pullback.




Additionally, Bilello notes this is the fourth longest streak in US history without a 5% drop...




It’s been more than a year since the S&P 500 has suffered a 5% pullback...




"The best of times" indeed...


How To Hedge A Near-Term Market Shock: Here Are The Best Trades

As we showed earlier today, last Thursday"s unexpected, historic VIX explosion, driven by a surge of geopolitical worries about North Korea, and subsequent collapse was remarkable in both how fast and furious it was both on the way up and then, on the way down.As Bank of America said "both the spike in vol and the speed of its retracement were almost unmatched."



The move was also unprecedented in the sheer volume of VIX-related products - futures, options and ETFs - that participated in the surge higher as thousands of vol sellers suddenly scrambled to cover their positions (even if they were ultimately replaced with a new set of vol sellers). As BofA calculated, "volume in VIX-linked products reached an all-time high" with volume in VIX call and put options reaching a $250M
vega. VIX futures also had a record volume day with $850M while VIX ETP volumes hit $830M.


 



In retrospect, the biggest surprise about last week"s move - especially considering the loud warnings by famous Wall Street names such as Jeff Gundlach and Howard Marks predicted such a move - is how many people were taken by surprise by it. Or maybe they were not surprised, but just did not want or know how to hedge.


As Bank of America"s Benjamin Bowler writes, "most people ignore extreme risk as it’s simply too hard to price." One possible reason is because deciding whether to hedge tail risks is difficult not only because of the challenge of estimating the probability of a “rare event”, but it’s also compounded by the difficulty of gauging the size of the shock, if the event occurs. This is likely why a majority of cross-asset volatilities remain near historical lows despite the threat of a nuclear conflict becoming most acute perhaps since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, according to Bank of America.


And yet, if the events from last week demonstrated something, it is that just when there appears to be virtually no risk, is when the likelihood of a historic surge in volatility is greatest, as many experienced first hand last Thursday. Hence the need to hedge.


But what?  And using which product?


Because, as Bowler also shows when it comes to discounting the probability of the next severe market shock, virtually every derviative product has a different perspective. As the strategist notes, "the decision about whether it’s rationale to hedge is really a matter of looking at the price of tail insurance embedded into option markets and asking if the probabilities they assign are “fair” or not." As he further writes, when it comes to predicting what the next "severe tail event" could look like, "we find that not only are some markets like Gold pricing in a very low probability of Korean risk escalation, there are significant differences across assets in terms of what they imply about potential risks."


The chart below shows how historical worst 3M drawdowns since 2006 are priced by 3M 25- delta options across asset classes; hedges that are most underpricing their historical drawdowns are at the top and those most overpricing their tails are at the bottom. What the chart shows is that gold call options still imply less than a 1 in 100 chance of a severe tail event over the next month, despite being among the most reactive assets to rising Korean tensions last week. With record low Gold vol slaved to record low real rates vol, this represents a loose anchor which likely won’t hold in any significant geopolitical risk escalation. In contrast to gold, Nikkei is at the other end of the spectrum with options assigning over a 5% chance of a near term tail-event.



Looking at 3M 25-delta options, however, may not be the best measure of the price of “rare event” risk priced into options.


As BofA suggests, "to get a better understanding of this implied risk for six assets – Gold, S&P 500, NKY (Japan equity), KOSPI2 (Korean equity), UKX (UK equity) and SX5E (European equity) – we estimate what options are pricing into their extreme tails using the following methodology:"


  • For each asset across its entire sample history, we identify the ten largest “vol-adjusted” drawdowns within 1-month periods. The reason for normalizing by volatility is that we have shown that while nominal asset drawdowns can significantly vary historically, vol-adjusted drawdowns are more evenly distributed. In other words, the probability of a 1-day drop in the S&P 500 equivalent in magnitude to the 1987 US stock market crash (-21%) is virtually zero at today’s low vol levels. So for each historical drawdown, we adjust for the prevailing vol level and assume we were to see a similar “sigma-drawdown” today.

  • We then compute the probability that options are assigning to markets falling to (i) their 10th worst historical drawdown and (ii) the average of their 10 worst drawdowns in each asset (as shown in Chart 10).

BofA"s analysis confirms that Gold is indeed pricing in the smallest probability of a “tail event”. The implication also is that should a "tail event" occur, the return from a gold-based hedge would be the one with the highest return.  Here are the details:


  • As implied from Gold (GLD ETF) options, the probability that Gold rallies over the next month by 10.3% (equivalent to the 10th largest vol-adjusted rally in Gold’s history) is 1.7%. The probability that Gold rallies by 14.6% (equivalent to the average of the 10 largest vol-adjusted rallies) is a mere 0.7%. This suggests GLD calls are implying less than a 1 in 100 chance (1 out of 143) of its average historical tail event occurring in the next month.

  • At the other end of the spectrum is NKY, where options imply the probability that Japanese equities fall by 8.2% (10th largest drawdown) over the next month is 6.1% and the probability they fall by 10.4% (average of 10 largest drawdowns) is 5.1% (1 in 20 chance).

In other words, just between gold and Nikkei options, the "priced in" probability of a crash is either ~1% in the case of gold, or 5% in the case of the Japanese Nikkei.



What about S&P 500 puts? As the chart above shows, they are currently pricing in the second-highest level of  tail risk after NKY, following the strong rise in S&P skew last week. The probability that US equities fall by 7% (10th largest drawdown) over the next month is 4.5% and the probability they fall by 8.65% (average of 10 largest drawdowns) is 3.1%.


* * *


Why is gold such a great hedge to future volatility? One possible explanation for the relative attractiveness of gold-based hedges hinges on gold’s optionality being historically depressed. This has primarily been driven by realized volatility which has been steadily declining since the gold rally in Q1-16 and is now at multi-year lows (Chart 11). An important force behind gold’s declining volatility is real rates volatility.  Indeed, real rates have a traditional relationship with gold through the channel of rational investment decisions, whereby investors measure the relative attractiveness of gold by how much they can earn elsewhere. As interest rates rise, so does the opportunity cost of holding a non-interest bearing asset such as gold.


While the relationship is not linear as not all real rate environments are created equal, and other important factors – such as the USD – impact underlying price dynamics, never before has this relationship has been so strong (see Chart 12). Importantly, real rates volatility itself has fallen to levels unseen since the start of the 2000s. This in turn has caused gold volatility to fall to ultra-low levels as correlation between gold/rates volatilities recently climbed to multi-year highs (see Chart 13).



* * *


What are the conclusion? BofA"s analysis reveals that for those "hedging" an imminent market crash (over the next month) should be aware that the payout ratios of “tail options” is highest for Gold, and lowest for NKY and SPX.


So, for those who believe the above implied probabilities are too low relative to the potential geopolitical risks at hand, buying far out of the money “tail options” may be the best trade. While there is more art than science to deciding on precise strikes and maturities, however, Table 2 below illustrates payout ratios for these six markets assuming 1M options are struck at the 10th worst vol-adjusted drawdown, but that markets fall to the average of their 10 worst drawdowns. In other words, if we get a shock that is worse than the 10th worst historical event but equal to the average of the 10 worst, what is the payout relative to cost of the tail insurance purchased today?



As shown in the table above, deep out of the money GLD calls would offer 56 to 1 payout ratios with this methodology, far more than any other asset, followed by UKX (35 to 1), SX5E (25 to 1), KOSPI2 (9 to 1), SPX (6 to 1), and NKY (5 to 1).


Finally, some parting words from BofA:





We see the escalation of ongoing geopolitical tensions as a very plausible candidate for propelling both rates and gold volatility higher as investors flee to Treasuries and gold (both perceived as ‘safe haven’ assets). Indeed our rates strategists recently recommended accumulating US rate volatility in anticipation of a potential political risk-induced risk-off in September.


Monday, January 30, 2017

If the Markets Are So Great, Why Are Finance Sites Struggling to Attract Readers?

As markets continue to break record highs, the echelon of premier finance sites in America continues to undergo deleterious drawdowns in their traffic. Anyone who operates a finance site knows that lack of volatility is the death knell for traffic. People aren"t interested in reading about stocks, generally speaking, when markets are effervescently gliding towards new highs. They are, in fact, keenly interested in horrible news and/or rapidly declining equity prices.


According to data provided by Alexa.com, sites solely focused on finance have struggled, mightily, especially in recent months. Part of it has to do with boring markets -- but another working theory is the recent news cycle dominated by politics.


cnbc bloomberg Thestreet marketwatch Fool SeekingAlpha iBankCoinzerohedge


And a look at an ETF representative of the VIX index.
vxx
Notice a correlation?


One my favorite market tells is the correlation between traffic spikes and market bottoms. Here is a look at the traffic at iBankCoin from July of 2015 to March of 2016. Markets bottomed, from a calamitous drop of more than 10%, which was the worst start to a new year on record, on February the 8th, 2016.


Traffic


In short, we"re gonna need a market crash in order to reverse the insipid digital trends in finance




Content originally generated at iBankCoin.com