Showing posts with label hack. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hack. Show all posts

Friday, January 26, 2018

“Biggest Theft In Crypto History”: Over $400MM Stolen From Japanese Crypto Exchange

This article was originally published by Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge


hack


Earlier today we reported that cryptocurrencies tumbled overnight after one of the most popular – if unlicensed – Japanese exchanges, Coincheck, halted withdrawals of funds and cryptos amid broad confusion as to what prompted the halt. Additionally, Coincheck said it had stopped deposits into NEM coins, a hint that something was very wrong with what until last night was the 10th-largest cryptocurrency by market value, and which tumbled nearly 20% overnight, dragging the rest of the sector lower as news of the Coincheck fiasco spread.



Speculation was rife: “Coincheck is a very well-known exchange in Japan,” said Hiroyuki Komiya, Chief Executive Officer of Tokyo-based Blockchain Technology Consulting. “We’ve seen several outages at various crypto exchanges recently, so the extent and seriousness of Coincheck’s halt isn’t yet clear. We’re all very eagerly awaiting to hear more detail on what’s happening.”


We didn’t have long to wait: shortly after the halt, theories started to emerge as to what may have happened, with some speculating that the exchange may have been hacked after noticing that a massive ($110 million) transfer from Coincheck’s Ripple wallet:




And then, the worst case scenario was confirmed by Coincheck itself told financial authorities that it had lost 500 million NEM cryptocurrency coins in today’s cyberheist, which at the current exchange rate amounts to roughly $400 million, according to Nikkei.


NEM Foundation president Lon Wong also confirmed Coincheck was hacked, calling the stolen funds “the biggest theft in the history of the world”, as quoted by CryptoNews. According to Wong, the hack had nothing to do with NEM and the blame lies exclusively with Coincheck:


“As far as NEM is concerned, tech is intact. We are not forking. Also, we would advise all exchanges to make use of our multi-signature smart contract which is among the best in the landscape. Coincheck didn’t use them and that’s why they could have been hacked. They were very relaxed with their security measures,” Wong said.


“This is the biggest theft in the history of the world,” he added.


The hack, at recent NEMUSD exchange rates, would make it even bigger than Mt. Gox – which lost a total of $350 million in 2 hacks, one in 2011 and 2014 – by $50 million.


As noted above, Coincheck was one of the few crypto exchanges not registered with Japan’s Financial Services Authority – a regulator responsible for overseeing exchanges in the country – unlike the other prominent cryptocurrency exchanges, such as bitFlyer and Quoine. Furthermore, according to MineCC, CoinCheck used hot wallets not cold wallets, which are not secure.


Which may explain why local regulators are only now looking into what happened:



  • JAPAN FSA SAYS LOOKING INTO FACTS OF COINCHECK CASE


While little additional information was available as of this moment, Coincheck added that the hacked NEM was sent illicitly outside exchange, at which point the trail was lost however “no other issues found with other currencies on exchange.” Of course, the historic, nearly half a billion dollar hack is a big enough “issue.”


The Japanese exchange also said that it was “working hard to secure client assets”, and that it doesn’t know how many total coins were lost, adding that it was not clear if NEM losses were internal or external.


And while memories of the historic Mt.Gox hack suddenly rush front and center, Coincheck said that it plans to start trading of unaffected currencies. In retrospect that may not be a good idea.


Paradoxically, cryptocurrencies have risen as the Coincheck hack news spread amid expectations the thieves will convert their stolen NEM coins into another cryptocurrency.

Sunday, July 2, 2017

Here’s How a DELIBERATE Cyberattack Could Happen To Us

The Petya Ransomware attack hit globally, but one country, in particular, was devastated by it. The Ukrainian infrastructure was brought down by the attack, where the epicenter occurred, and now, experts are suggesting that it may have been deliberate and state-sponsored.


This is not the first time Ukraine has been under siege by cyberattack. In fact, the battle has been nearly constant for quite some time.



 As for whether that state sponsor was Russia, “It’s difficult to imagine anyone else would want to do this,” Boyarchuk says.


Boyarchuk points to the timing of the attack, just before Ukraine’s Constitution Day, which celebrates the country’s post-Soviet independence…


More technical clues support that theory, some Ukrainian security researchers say. Kiev-based Information Systems Security Partners, which has acted as a first responder for several recent waves of cyberattacks on Ukrainian companies and government agencies, says it has found evidence that sophisticated hackers quietly infiltrated the networks of at least some Ukrainian targets two to three months before they triggered the ransomware that paralyzed those organizations. (source)



Security specialist Matthieu Suiche said in a blog post that it wasn’t a “ransomware” attack intended to make money, and is instead a “wiper” sent to eradicate data.



The fact of pretending to be a ransomware while being in fact a nation state attack — especially since WannaCry proved that widely spread ransomware aren’t financially profitable — is in our opinion a very subtle way from the attacker to control the narrative of the attack. (source)



Forensic analyst Oleksii Yasinsky told Wired that the intent was not money, even though this presented as a ransomware attack.




Rather than just encrypting infected hard drives and demanding $300 in Bitcoin for the decryption key, in some cases it simply wiped machines on the same network, deleting a victim computer’s deep-seated master boot record, which tells it how to load its operating system. Yasinsky argues that this behavior indicates the attackers weren’t, in fact, trying to extort payments from those victims but instead wanted to cause maximum disruption. (source)



They wanted to cause maximum disruption. Now, isn’t that just about the scariest thought ever?


What if the US was hit by a similar cyberattack?


Let’s go a little further down this rabbit hole and imagine such an attack happening in the United States. Because, really, is it that far-fetched? In fact, is it possible that this is a dry run for a massive attack on the American infrastructure? Maybe they want to see what happens when they take down the essential systems of a modern country on a smaller scale first, in order to maximize the effects on a larger target.


Scary, but possible.


Everything we do revolves around computers these days.


Businesses keep their records there. Systems are automated there. It goes on and on. And with this particular virus, one expert said, “There IS NO KILL SWITCH.” It’s virtually unstoppable once it gets into a system and it eradicates everything.


You know how I’m always encouraging you to watch survival movies and read survival fiction to enhance your prepared mindset? Let’s use this real life scenario and wargame the situation based on the systems that were damaged in Ukraine and think this through.


Banking would be disrupted.


Many banks in Ukraine were hit by the attack, which means that people suddenly had no access to their money. Their credit and debit cards wouldn’t work and the ATMs were down.


In the United States, most folks use credit or debit as they go throughout their days. Gas pumps are set up to pay at the pump with your bank card. We think nothing of swiping our card at the grocery store or at lunch. We know we have money in there, and it’s less risky than carrying cash, in most folk’s minds.


But what if suddenly you couldn’t use your credit cards and debit cards? What if the ATM machines went dark and you couldn’t get any cash from them?


Imagine this happened when you were traveling on business, miles from home with a half empty gas tank. You wouldn’t be able to get a hotel room, get more fuel, get food – nothing at all unless you had cash on hand – and even if you DID have enough cash, there’d be other problems as you’ll see below.


You should always have enough cash and supplies on hand to manage for quite a while if commerce were to cease.


Gas stations would close.


In Ukraine, getting fuel was difficult.


Of course, it makes sense that getting gasoline would be pretty tricky. Most gas stations are set up as pay-at-the-pump, and if you have cash, you have to go inside, pay, and they reset the pump to allow you the allotted amount of fuel…on a computer.


As well, the gas pumps themselves are digital in just about every place I’ve been in the past few years. Unless you manage to find some anomaly of a gas station where everything is still manual, the fuel you had would be all you’d have until things reverted to normal.


Even if you could buy stuff, there might not be stuff to buy.


It wouldn’t take more than a day or two for the transport trucks to stop running, since the fuel wouldn’t be readily available. Since our stores use “just-in-time” inventory restocking, pickings would be thin within a week.


Here’s a breakdown of what would happen – and how fast it would happen – if the trucks stopped running.


Like I said, be prepped for this.


Business would be disrupted.


In Ukraine, the banks are offline, which means payment systems are also offline.


Most businesses link to banks to be able to take payments by debit or credit. Most people no longer carry around pockets full of cash, and even if they did, some businesses aren’t entirely equipped to take cash payments.


When I worked at a car dealership service department, half a lifetime ago, I recall getting the day off because we were utterly at a standstill when our systems went down. The technicians couldn’t do any kind of electronic repair (and let’s face it, these days, there’s a computer in your car controlling just about every aspect of its function), the advisers couldn’t invoice, no one could check to see if a job was covered under warranty…I’m sure that many other businesses are equally dependent.


Most retail businesses rely on the ability to scan items for the price and to track SKU numbers for inventory purposes. Their cash registers are inextricably linked to computers for both payment options, pricing, and inventory options. Commerce could grind immediately to a halt, which means, what you have on hand would be all you had until things were resolved. You could forget about getting goods or services.


With the banking systems inoperable, other systems would soon go down too.


Think about our day-to-day business. Most of us have things on autopay, like our mortgages, car payments, and other monthly recurring bills.


If the banking systems are completely shut down, then our automatic payments would also cease to work. This means that the businesses relying on those payments would immediately have a shortfall, something that could have long-term ramifications if the issue lasted for more than a few days. Once things came back online, there would be massive confusion and congestion as people tried to straighten out payments that didn’t go through.


Chaos.


Transportation could shut down.


In Ukraine, both the major airport in the capital and the national railway system were shut down.


An attack like this could hit travelers the hardest. Imagine being at an airport to catch a connecting flight, and then discovering all flights had been canceled. If the computer systems were all down, you wouldn’t be able to rent a car to drive the rest of the way, and you wouldn’t be able to get a hotel room without cash, and you wouldn’t be able to buy any food unless you had cash on hand for that.


Commuters who rely on transit like trains to get back and forth to work would be stranded and without ATM access, most would be without any options. This is why you must always have a Plan B to get home when you’re traveling, along with the appropriate gear and footwear to walk if necessary.


The grid would fail.


In Ukraine, the power grid went down across a broad swath of the country.


In an event like this, it isn’t out of the ordinary for the power to go out. Our grid is extremely susceptible to a malware attack and something called “cascading failure.”



…malware can induce what’s often referred to as a cascading failure. This is what caused the massive blackout that occurred in the Northeastern US and Canada back in 2003. An overgrown tree branch in Ohio touched a power line, which caused that section of the grid to overload and shut down. The electricity had to be transferred to other power lines, which in turn also became overloaded. This chain reaction continued until 55 million people were without power. (source)



This can begin to have broad ramifications very quickly:


  • Most homes are reliant on the grid for heat or cooling.

  • No lights.

  • No hot water.

  • Food in the refrigerator or freezer would begin to spoil.

All the basics of a long-term power outage would apply, multiplied by all of the other things going wrong at the same time. Always be ready for a two-week power outage at the bare minimum.


Water could become contaminated.


Without the systems that keep municipal water supplies treated and distributed, it wouldn’t take long for the water from the taps to become contaminated and unsafe to drink – if it still flowed at all. Buying water at the store would be difficult, if not impossible, for all the reasons mentioned above, and even if you could buy it, the supplies would run out very quickly as others realized the tap water was unsafe to consume.


Always be prepared with water storage, a plan to acquire more water, and a way to purify water.


Dangerous infrastructure systems could be at risk.


The Chernobyl nuclear plant lost its ability to monitor radiation with the usual computerized systems.


Because Chernobyl hasn’t already had enough issues. The plant is still not fully decommissioned after the horrible disaster in the 80s, and some people are still working there monitoring for radiation leaks. All systems have had to revert to manual ones due to the cyberattack.


The United States has 99 nuclear reactors in 30 states.  99 Chernobyls waiting to happen?



Here’s How a DELIBERATE Cyberattack Could Happen To Us | power-reactors-operating | Science & Technology Special Interests


Photo Credit: USNRC



 Hospitals could be affected.


In the US, two hospitals in Pennsylvania were forced to cancel surgeries due to the Petya cyberattack.


During a widespread attack in the United States, there is potential for our medical system to be severely affected. Without access to patient records, terrible mistakes could occur. Many patient monitoring systems are computerized. Some life support machinery is tied into the grid. And what happens if the grid-down situation outlasts the fuel for the generators?


In a situation like that, there wouldn’t be much medical help available for incidents that occur during the disaster. You must keep some first aid and longer-term care supplies on hand, as well as informational guides to help you deal with health issues and emergencies as they arise. Know how to back this up with natural remedies in the event the situation outlasts your commercial supplies.


With all of this, unrest would erupt fairly quickly.


If the situation only lasted for a few days, society certainly wouldn’t break down. But if it stretched into weeks and more people began running out of the basics, we’d begin to see unrest on a massive scale. Think about it – what wouldn’t YOU do to take care of your hungry children?  Add to this the now-refugees stranded in airports and other travel centers across the country, with no supplies and no way to get home. It wouldn’t take long for the need to outstrip any governmental efforts to supply aid.


Long before such a thing ever occurs, you should protect yourself by keeping your mouth shut. No one needs to know that you’re stocked to the rafters and ready for a situation like this. Secondly, you need to be prepared to protect your home and family should things go sideways. Here’s an article I wrote about why preppers must be armed and ready for unrest.


Are you prepped for something like this?


Prepping is prepping is prepping.


This, like any other disaster, assumes certain things.


  • The grid could go down.

  • Emergency services and first responders may not be there.

  • What you have on hand is what you have with which to survive,

  • If you’re away from home, the trip back could be difficult.

Have you thought this through?


An attack like this could have very longterm effects because, as I mentioned above, once it gets into a system, it’s unstoppable. It wipes clean all the date, the information stored, the functions. It would take a long time to come back from that.


What are some other things that could be affected by a massive cyberattack on the US? How would you prepare for something like this? Share your thoughts in the comments section below.




Tuesday, May 2, 2017

If You Made a ’10 Concerts I Went to, One Is a Lie’ Post, We Have News for You

(ANTIMEDIA) On Sunday, the New York Times asked its readers if they took part in the latest viral meme — the “10 Concerts I’ve Been To, One is a Lie” post — that swept across Facebook last week.





But the piece wasn’t about the meme itself. It was about the potential threat to personal privacy and security that participating in such games poses.



“It’s all fun and games until someone’s password security question gets hacked,” the article opens.







Speaking about social media, Michael Kaiser, executive director of the National Cyber Security Alliance, says the real danger in taking part in such online games is broad — it’s in all the various types of general information that people voluntarily reveal about their personal lives and their upbringing.


“You are expressing things about you, maybe in more subtle ways than you might think,” he told the Times.


That doesn’t mean you should never participate, says Kaiser, only that you should always be aware of the kind of information you’re sharing.







“People always have to have their eyes wide open when they’re on the internet,” he said. “It’s the way of the world.”


Mark Testoni, who advises exercising “vigilance bordering on a little paranoia” when participating in games like “10 Concerts,”  is chief executive at SAP National Security Services.


“We need to understand how we interact can disclose not only specific details but patterns of behavior and often our location, among other things,” Testoni said in an email.


And if cyber security isn’t of particular concern to you, the Times reminded readers Sunday that there are other things to consider, such as the fact that uploading details of your life to social media telegraphs “information about a user’s age, musical tastes and even religious affiliation — all of which would be desirable to marketers hoping to target ads.”


Creative Commons / Anti-Media / Report a typo






Saturday, March 25, 2017

The Evidence That Russia Hacked the DNC Is Collapsing




(ANTIWAR Op-Ed) The allegation – now accepted as incontrovertible fact by the “mainstream” media – that the Russian intelligence services hacked the Democratic National Committee (and John Podesta’s emails) in an effort to help Donald Trump get elected recently suffered a blow from which it may not recover.


Crowdstrike is the cybersecurity company hired by the DNC to determine who hacked their accounts: it took them a single day to determine the identity of the culprits – it was, they said, two groups of hackers which they named “Fancy Bear” and “Cozy Bear,” affiliated respectively with the GRU, which is Russian military intelligence, and the FSB, the Russian security service.





How did they know this?




We"re revolutionizing the news industry, but we need your help! Click here to get started.




These alleged “hacker groups” are not associated with any known individuals in any way connected to Russian intelligence: instead, they are identified by the tools they use, the times they do their dirty work, the nature of the targets, and other characteristics based on the history of past intrusions.







Yet as Jeffrey Carr and other cyberwarfare experts have pointed out, this methodology is fatally flawed. “It’s important to know that the process of attributing an attack by a cybersecurity company has nothing to do with the scientific method,” writes Carr:


“Claims of attribution aren’t testable or repeatable because the hypothesis is never proven right or wrong. Neither are claims of attribution admissible in any criminal case, so those who make the claim don’t have to abide by any rules of evidence (i.e., hearsay, relevance, admissibility).”


Likening attribution claims of hacking incidents by cybersecurity companies to intelligence assessments, Carr notes that, unlike government agencies such the CIA, these companies are never held to account for their misses:


“When it comes to cybersecurity estimates of attribution, no one holds the company that makes the claim accountable because there’s no way to prove whether the assignment of attribution is true or false unless (1) there is a criminal conviction, (2) the hacker is caught in the act, or (3) a government employee leaked the evidence.”


This lack of accountability may be changing, however, because Crowdstrike’s case for attributing the hacking of the DNC to the Russians is falling apart at the seams like a cheap sweater.


To begin with, Crowdstrike initially gauged its certainty as to the identity of the hackers with “medium confidence.” However, a later development, announced in late December and touted by the Washington Post, boosted this to “high confidence.” The reason for this newfound near-certainty was their discovery that “Fancy Bear” had also infected an application used by the Ukrainian military to target separatist artillery in the Ukrainian civil war. As the Post reported:


“While CrowdStrike, which was hired by the DNC to investigate the intrusions and whose findings are described in a new report, had always suspected that one of the two hacker groups that struck the DNC was the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, it had only medium confidence.


“Now, said CrowdStrike co-founder Dmitri Alperovitch, ‘we have high confidence’ it was a unit of the GRU. CrowdStrike had dubbed that unit ‘Fancy Bear.’”


Crowdstrike published an analysis that claimed a malware program supposedly unique to Fancy Bear, X-Agent, had infected a Ukrainian targeting application and, using GPS to geo-locate Ukrainian positions, had turned the application against the Ukrainians, resulting in huge losses:


“Between July and August 2014, Russian-backed forces launched some of the most-decisive attacks against Ukrainian forces, resulting in significant loss of life, weaponry and territory.


“Ukrainian artillery forces have lost over 50% of their weapons in the two years of conflict and over 80% of D-30 howitzers, the highest percentage of loss of any other artillery pieces in Ukraine’s arsenal.”


Alperovitch told the PBS News Hour that “Ukraine’s artillery men were targeted by the same hackers, that we call Fancy Bear, that targeted DNC, but this time they were targeting cell phones to try to understand their location so that the Russian artillery forces can actually target them in the open battle. It was the same variant of the same malicious code that we had seen at the DNC.”


He told NBC News that this proved the DNC hacker “wasn’t a 400-pound guy in his bed,” as Trump had opined during the first presidential debate – it was the Russians.


The only problem with this analysis is that is isn’t true. It turns out that Crowdstrike’s estimate of Ukrainian losses was based on a blog post by a pro-Russian blogger eager to tout Ukrainian losses: the Ukrainians denied it. Furthermore, the hacking attribution was based on the hackers’ use of a malware program called X-Agent, supposedly unique to Fancy Bear. Since the target was the Ukrainian military, Crowdstrike extrapolated from this that the hackers were working for the Russians.


All somewhat plausible, except for two things: To begin with, as Jeffrey Carr pointed out in December, and now others are beginning to realize, X-Agent isn’t unique to Fancy Bear. Citing the findings of ESET, another cybersecurity company, he wrote:


“Unlike Crowdstrike, ESET doesn’t assign APT28/Fancy Bear/Sednit to a Russian Intelligence Service or anyone else for a very simple reason. Once malware is deployed, it is no longer under the control of the hacker who deployed it or the developer who created it. It can be reverse-engineered, copied, modified, shared and redeployed again and again by anyone. In other words  –  malware deployed is malware enjoyed!


“In fact, the source code for X-Agent, which was used in the DNC, Bundestag, and TV5Monde attacks, was obtained by ESET as part of their investigation!


“During our investigations, we were able to retrieve the complete Xagent source code for the Linux operating system….”


“If ESET could do it, so can others. It is both foolish and baseless to claim, as Crowdstrike does, that X-Agent is used solely by the Russian government when the source code is there for anyone to find and use at will.”


Secondly, the estimate Crowdstrike used to verify the Ukrainian losses was supposedly based on data from the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). But now IISS is disavowing and debunking their claims:


“[T]he International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) told [Voice of America] that CrowdStrike erroneously used IISS data as proof of the intrusion. IISS disavowed any connection to the CrowdStrike report. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense also has claimed combat losses and hacking never happened….


“’The CrowdStrike report uses our data, but the inferences and analysis drawn from that data belong solely to the report’s authors,” the IISS said. “The inference they make that reductions in Ukrainian D-30 artillery holdings between 2013 and 2016 were primarily the result of combat losses is not a conclusion that we have ever suggested ourselves, nor one we believe to be accurate.’


“One of the IISS researchers who produced the data said that while the think tank had dramatically lowered its estimates of Ukrainian artillery assets and howitzers in 2013, it did so as part of a ‘reassessment” and reallocation of units to airborne forces.’


“’No, we have never attributed this reduction to combat losses,” the IISS researcher said, explaining that most of the reallocation occurred prior to the two-year period that CrowdStrike cites in its report.


“’The vast majority of the reduction actually occurs … before Crimea/Donbass,’ he added, referring to the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine.”


The definitive “evidence” cited by Alperovitch is now effectively debunked: indeed, it was debunked by Carr late last year, but that was ignored in the media’s rush to “prove” the Russians hacked the DNC in order to further Trump’s presidential ambitions. The exposure by the Voice of America of Crowdstrike’s falsification of Ukrainian battlefield losses – the supposedly solid “proof” of attributing the hack to the GRU – is the final nail in Crowdstrike’s coffin. They didn’t bother to verify their analysis of IISS’s data with IISS – they simply took as gospel the allegations of a pro-Russian blogger. They didn’t contact the Ukrainian military, either: instead, their confirmation bias dictated that they shaped the “facts” to fit their predetermined conclusion.


Now why do you suppose that is? Why were they married so early – after a single day – to the conclusion that it was the Russians who were behind the hacking of the DNC?


Crowdstrike founder Alperovitch is a Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council, and head honcho of its “Cyber Statecraft Initiative” – of which his role in promoting the “Putin did it” scenario is a Exhibit A. James Carden, writing in The Nation, makes the trenchant point that “The connection between Alperovitch and the Atlantic Council has gone largely unremarked upon, but it is relevant given that the Atlantic Council – which is funded in part by the US State Department, NATO, the governments of Latvia and Lithuania, the Ukrainian World Congress, and the Ukrainian oligarch Victor Pinchuk – has been among the loudest voices calling for a new Cold War with Russia.” Adam Johnson, writing on the FAIR blog, adds to our knowledge by noting that the Council’s budget is also supplemented by “a consortium of Western corporations (Qualcomm, Coca-Cola, The Blackstone Group), including weapons manufacturers (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman) and oil companies (ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, BP).”


Johnson also notes that CrowdStrike currently has a $150,000 / year, no-bid contract with the FBI for “systems analysis.”


Nice work if you can get it.


This last little tidbit gives us some insight into what is perhaps the most curious aspect of the Russian-hackers-campaign-for-Trump story: the FBI’s complete dependence on Crowdstrike’s analysis. Amazingly, the FBI did no independent forensic work on the DNC servers before Crowdstrike got its hot little hands on them: indeed, the DNC denied the FBI access to the servers, and, as far as anyone knows, the FBI never examined them. BuzzFeed quotes an anonymous “intelligence official” as saying “Crowdstrike is pretty good. There’s no reason to believe that anything they have concluded is not accurate.”


There is now.


Alperovitch is scheduled to testify before the House Intelligence Committee, and one wonders if our clueless – and technically challenged – Republican members of Congress will question him about the debunking of Crowdstrike’s rush to judgment. I tend to doubt it, since the Russia-did-it meme is now the Accepted Narrative and no dissent is permitted – to challenge it would make them “Putin apologists”! (Although maybe Trey Gowdy, the only GOPer on that panel who seems to have any brains, may surprise me.)


As I’ve been saying for months, there is no evidence that the Russians hacked the DNC: none, zilch, nada. Yet this false narrative is the entire basis of a campaign launched by the Democrats, hailed by the Trump-hating media, and fully endorsed by the FBI and the CIA, the purpose of which is to “prove” that Trump is “Putin’s puppet,” as Hillary Clinton put it. Now the investigative powers of the federal government are being deployed to confirm that the Trump campaign “colluded” with the Kremlin in an act the evidence for which is collapsing.


This whole affair is a vicious fraud. If there is any justice in this world – and there may not be – the perpetrators should be charged, tried, and jailed.


Opinion by  / Republished with permission / AntiWar.com / Report a typo

Wednesday, March 8, 2017

2014 meeting notes suggest C.I.A. wants control of your vehicle




(INTELLIHUB) — Leaked C.I.A. meeting notes suggest that the agency’s Embedded Development Branch was trying to acquire the capability to control vehicles remotely by accessing and altering their firmware as early as 2014.


Of the 19 “potential mission areas for EDB” listed in the document, one was listed “Vehicle Systems (e.g. VSEP)” and another “firmware.”


Related: Report concludes cars can be hacked


Related: Michael Hastings told lawyers hours before his death, ‘the F.B.I. is investigating me’


H/T: Tabertronic/Twitter


Featured Image: Sam Greenhalgh/Flickr

©2017. INTELLIHUB.COM. All Rights Reserved.






Comment Policy: Threats of violence, foul language, bullying, and spam will not be tolerated and may be flagged.


Friday, March 3, 2017

Breaking: Mike Pence Used Personal Email for State Business — and Was Hacked

(ANTIMEDIA) A private email account Vice President Mike Pence used for official state business during his tenure as governor of Indiana was hacked last year, the IndyStar is reporting exclusively.







“Vice President Mike Pence routinely used a private email account to conduct public business as governor of Indiana, at times discussing sensitive matters and homeland security issues.




We"re revolutionizing the news industry, but we need your help! Click here to get started.




“Emails released to IndyStar in response to a public records request show Pence communicated via his personal AOL account with top advisers on topics ranging from security gates at the governor’s residence to the state’s response to terror attacks across the globe. In one email, Pence’s top state homeland security adviser relayed an update from the FBI regarding the arrests of several men on federal terror-related charges.”





Using a private email service for official government business is worrisome because of both security and transparency concerns. In fact, as IndyStar has reported, Pence’s AOL email account was hacked in the summer of 2016.


According to IndyStar:


“Cybersecurity experts say Pence’s emails were likely just as insecure as [Hillary] Clinton’s. While there has been speculation about whether Clinton’s emails were hacked, Pence’s account was actually compromised last summer by a scammer who sent an email to his contacts claiming Pence and his wife were stranded in the Philippines and in urgent need of money.”







Transparency advocates also worry that private email accounts are used by government officials to hide information from constituents and FOIA requests.


This breaking news story will be updated if more details become available.


Creative Commons / Anti-Media / Report a typo

Monday, December 19, 2016

Fact-checking the wrong way, featuring PolitiFact



Fact-checking the wrong way, featuring PolitiFact



Let PolitiFact help show you the right way to fact check by avoiding its mistakes.


by politifactbias


Fake and skewed news do present a problem for society. Having the best possible information allows us to potentially make the best possible decisions. Bad information hampers good decision-making. And the state of public discourse, including the state of the mainstream media, makes it valuable for the average person to develop fact-checking skills.


We found a December 11, 2016 fact check from PolitiFact that will help us learn better how to interpret claims and make use of expert sources.


The interpretation problem


PolitiFact believed it was fact-checking Republican Reince Priebus’ claim that there was no report available saying Russia tried to interfere with the 2016 presidential election:



Was Priebus saying there was no “specific report” saying Russia tried to “muddy” the election? Here’s how PolitiFact viewed it:



“Let’s clear this up. Do you believe — does the president-elect believe that Russia was trying to muddy up and get involved in the election in 2016?” Meet the Press host Chuck Todd asked on Dec. 11, 2016.



“No. 1, you don’t know it. I don’t know it,” Priebus said. “There’s been no conclusive or specific report to say otherwise.”



That’s wrong. There is a specific report.



It was made public on Oct. 7, 2016, in the form of a joint statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. At the time, the website WikiLeaks was releasing a steady flow of emails stolen from the Democratic National Committee and top Hillary Clinton adviser John Podesta.



“The U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations,” the statement said. “These thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process.”



Based on the context of Priebus’ appearance on “Meet the Press,” we think PolitiFact botched its interpretation. NBC’s Chuck Todd went back and forth with Priebus for a number of minutes on the nature of the evidence supporting the charge of Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The main topic was recent news reports suggesting Russia interfered with the U.S. election to help Republican candidate Donald Trump. Todd’s question after “Let’s clear this up” had little chance of clearing up that point. Priebus would not act unreasonably by interpreting Todd’s question to refer to interference intended to help the Republican Party.


But the bigger interpretation problem centers on the word “specific.” Given the discussion between Todd and Priebus around the epistemological basis for the Russian hacking angle, including “You don’t know it and I don’t know it” in the immediate context, both the “conclusive” and the “specific” definitions of the word address the nature of the evidence.


“Conclusive” means incontrovertible, not merely featuring a conclusion. “Specific” means including a specific evidence or evidences, and therefore would refer to a report showing evidences, not merely a particular (second definition as opposed to the first) report.



In short, PolitiFact made a poor effort at interpreting Priebus in the most sensible way. Giving conservatives short shrift in the interpretation department occurs routinely at PolitiFact.



Was the report PolitiFact cited incontrovertible? PolitiFact offered no argument to that effect.



Did the report give a clear and detailed description of Russia’s attempt to influence the 2016 election? Again, PolitiFact offered no argument to that effect.



PolitiFact’s “fact-checking” in this case amounted to playing games with the definitions of words.



Read more here.



Another voice on the DNC hacking issue, Judge Andrew Napolitano:


Obama’s Blaming Russia But Judge Napolitano Source Said DNC Hack Was Done By NSA


Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Maybe All Those “Smart” Gadgets And Appliances From China Aren’t Such A Smart Idea (VIDEO)

smart-internet-of-things


You know all of those cool, sci-fi gadgets that people are beginning to get that are connected to the internet in their homes?  The voice controlled thermostats, the wireless printers and cameras, the home security systems, the food scale that sends the calories to your phone app, those “smart” appliances that text you to pick up milk, and the DVRS that can be programmed via your phone from work?


Apparently, those things may not be so smart after all because they played a big role in the cyber attack that took place last Friday. Security analysts believe that Friday’s attack on popular websites such as Reddit, Twitter, Netflix, and Spotify was the first one carried out by hackers who used the “Internet of Things.”


Here’s how the Internet of Things works:



Who else thinks that this is how Skynet got started? Maybe it’s just me.


The attack was on one service, Dyn.


The massive attack took down the internet across the country. The website Downdetector provided a map that shows how much of the US was affected:


outage


The attack was on one company, and everything else fell over like a row of dominoes.


All of the companies involved use Dyn, a cloud-based Internet performance management company.


Dyn was the target of the attack, and that, in turn, affected other companies.


Dyn is sort of like a phone book that directs users to the internet address of the website. On Friday a distributed denial of service attack, (DDoS) affected Dyn by sending thousands of messages at the same time, which overwhelmed the service.


Security company Flashpoint said it had confirmed that the attack used “botnets” infected with the “Mirai” malware. From their site:



Flashpoint has confirmed that some of the infrastructure responsible for the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against Dyn DNS were botnets compromised by Mirai malware. Mirai botnets were previously used in DDoS attacks against security researcher Brian Krebs’ blog “Krebs On Security” and French internet service and hosting provider OVH. Mirai malware targets Internet of Things (IoT) devices like routers, digital video records (DVRs), and webcams/security cameras, enslaving vast numbers of these devices into a botnet, which is then used to conduct DDoS attacks. Flashpoint has confirmed that at least some of the devices used in the Dyn DNS attacks are DVRs, further matching the technical indicators and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with previous known Mirai botnet attacks.


While Flashpoint has confirmed that Mirai botnets were used in the October 21, 2016 attack against Dyn, they were separate and distinct botnets from those used to execute the DDoS attacks against “Krebs on Security” and OVH. Earlier this month, “Anna_Senpai,” the hacker operating the large Mirai botnet used in the Krebs DDoS, released Mira’s source code online. Since this release, copycat hackers have used the malware to create botnets of their own in order to launch DDoS attacks.


It is unknown if the attacks against Dyn DNS are linked to the DDoS attacks against Krebs, OVH, or other previous attacks. Given the proliferation of the Mirai malware, the relationship between the ongoing Dyn DDoS attacks, previous attacks, and “Anna_Senpai” is unclear.



Coincidentally, many of the  vulnerable “smart” devices are made in China.


Many of the devices involved come from Chinese manufacturers, with easy-to-guess usernames and passwords that cannot be changed by the user – a vulnerability which the malware exploits. According to the BBC:



“Mirai scours the Web for IoT (Internet of Things) devices protected by little more than factory-default usernames and passwords,” explained cybersecurity expert Brian Krebs, “and then enlists the devices in attacks that hurl junk traffic at an online target until it can no longer accommodate legitimate visitors or users.”


The owner of the device would generally have no way of knowing that it had been compromised to use in an attack, he wrote.


Mr Krebs is intimately familiar with this type of incident, after his website was targeted by a similar assault in September, in one of the biggest web attacks ever seen…That attack began around 8 p.m. ET on Sept. 20, and initial reports put it at approximately 665 Gigabits of traffic per second. Additional analysis on the attack traffic suggests the assault was closer to 620 Gbps in size, but in any case this is many orders of magnitude more traffic than is typically needed to knock most sites offline. (source)



I’m sure those easy passwords and vulnerabilities aren’t deliberate. China would never sneak Trojan horses into the USA, would they?


Article first appeared at DaisyLuther.com


Print Friendly