Showing posts with label Bureau of Economic Analysis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bureau of Economic Analysis. Show all posts

Thursday, December 14, 2017

Tax Cut! Yardeni Research Calculates Effective Corporate Tax Rate Already Fallen To 13%

In March 2017, The Institution on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) released its latest report examining the corporate tax filings for Fortune 500 companies. It looked at 258 of the companies which had been "consistently profitable" from 2008 to 2015. The report concluded that these companies were collectively paying far less than the statutory 35% federal corporate tax rate – in fact the average effective tax rate was 21.2%. According to the ITEP report.


Many profitable corporations are finding ways to zero out their corporate taxes.  Of the 258 profitable Fortune 500 companies in our sample:


  • 18 paid ZERO in taxes over the full eight-year period.

  • 100 paid zero—or less—in at least one profitable year during the eight-year period, 58 of those companies had multiple zero-tax years.

  • 24 companies zeroed out their taxes in at least four of the eight years. 

  • 48 companies paid a rate between 0 and 10 percent over eight years.


In general, it found that utility, oil, gas and pipeline companies tend to pay low tax rates. Only about a quarter of the companies paid a tax rate of at least 30% and about 60% of those companies were in two sectors, retail and health care.
 
The report found that the 258 corporations enjoyed tax breaks of $526 billion during the eight years 2008-15. More than half of this total, $286 billion, went to just 25 companies.



If you thought that was bad, you’re in for a shock because analysis by Yardeni Research suggests that the situation could already be even worse…and Congress hasn’t even passed the tax reform bill. According to CNBC.


U.S. companies on balance already are paying well below the 20 percent tax level targeted in the Republican reform plan, according to an analysis by Yardeni Research. In fact, the typical effective tax rate - the amount paid minus deductions - could be as low as 13 percent over the past years, Yardeni concluded when looking at a cleaner number of how much the government is really collecting. That"s well below other estimates that sought to clarify the impact of the tax reform proposal that would take the current nominal rate from 35 percent to 20 percent. Multiple firms have concluded the benefits will tilt to specific sectors and provide a limited aggregate windfall.



Delving in to the data, Yardeni uses the example of the Q3 2017 GDP release from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data shows that corporations paid $472.9 billion in taxes during the past four quarter on pre-tax profits of $2281.4 billion. This implied an effective tax rate of 20.7%, which was obviously very close to the effective tax rate calculated by ITEP.


However, Yardeni wasn’t done. Noting that corporate tax revenues collected by the IRS are consistently less than corporate taxes included in the GDP measure of corporate profits. Using the Treasury’s data of corporate tax collected in the four quarters through Q3 2017 - $297 billion and 37% lower than the $472.9 billion in the GDP measure – Yardeni concluded.


The shocking result is that the effective corporate tax rate based on actual tax collections was only 13.0% during Q3, and has been mostly well below 20.0% since the start of the previous decade. What gives? I’m not sure, but I am inclined to follow the money, which tends to support the story told by the IRS data. If so, then Congress may be about to cut a tax that doesn’t need cutting. Or else, the congressional plan is actually reform aiming to stop US companies from using overseas tax dodges by giving them a lower statutory rate at home. We may not be able to see the devil in the details of the bill until it is actually enacted.



Here are Yardeni’s ugly findings in chart form…

…although, as CNBC reports him saying.


"The bottom line is that getting to the bottom line when it comes to matters of taxation is a very taxing exercise"










Tuesday, December 5, 2017

Dalio Confirms GOP Tax Plan "Good For Business", Bad For Democratic States

Confirming what many have suggested, the billionaire founder of the world"s largest hedge fund, warns in his latest letter to watch out for the effects of tax reform on migration, the fiscal conditions of affected states and cities, and an increased polarity in America.



Birdgewater"s Ray Dalio writes (via LinkedIn),


While we have talked a lot about the effects of growing wealth and opportunity disparities in America, we haven’t talked enough about the tax migration that is taking place because of growing differences in state and local tax rates. This tax migration issue is especially important to focus on now because of the expected elimination (under the new tax legislation) of the deductibility of state and local taxes (SALT) against federal income taxes.


The dynamic that I’m referring to is the inevitable and self-reinforcing process in which those high SALT locations that a) have big disparities in income and fiscal shortfalls and b) can neither cut their financial supports to the “have-nots” (because their conditions are already unacceptably low) nor raise taxes on the “haves” (because they will move due to tax rates) suffer from tax migration.


Of course, those low SALT locations with the opposite circumstances benefit from this migration.


The dynamic works as follows. As state and local tax rates and debts rise because there are shortfalls that can’t be narrowed, it is financially smart for high income taxpayers to escape these taxes and debt burdens by moving to lower tax and less indebted locations, so they do. As they do, property values decline, further raising the costs of staying in the high SALT location. In other words, the financial cost of being in one of those high tax locations equals the tax rate difference plus the property value decline, which can be substantial. Also, the reduced population of higher income and higher spending folks leads to reduced spending in these locations, which further depresses the high SALT economies. Also, the fiscal conditions of these locations suffer. Because both the remaining high income and low income folks are increasingly stressed and tend to blame the other, tensions rise, which makes these environments even more inhospitable, which further contributes to high income earners’ emigration. Realizing this, other locations increasingly appeal to the “haves” by offering tax incentives and creating environments in which they are more comfortable living with other “haves.” For these reasons, this “hollowing out” dynamic is self-reinforcing. Of course, the reverse is true in states that attack these rich tax migrants. This dynamic causes even greater polarity. Because the rich and the poor typically have different values, which are also reflected in different laws and different politics, it probably will make the polarity greater and conflicts even more intractable.


It appears to us that the expected new tax law that eliminates the state and local deductions against one’s federal income taxes will significantly contribute to this dynamic. Consider the fact that this change in SALT deductibility is one of the largest increased sources of revenue in the tax bill, accounting for nearly $1 trillion in new taxes over the next 10 years. In other words, it is expected that those people who stay in high tax states will pay nearly $1 trillion more to stay there. Of course, these changed rates will prompt more people in high SALT locations to consider moving. To the extent they do move, it would increasingly lead to more prosperous states that are occupied by, and cater to, more rich people and more depressed states that are occupied by, and cater to, more poor people, and increased polarity between them.


While we are talking about the tax migration, we see such location cost arbitrage motivated migrations happen all the time, so we should be well acquainted with them. For example, in New York City we saw migration from the Upper East Side to Downtown and then to Brooklyn brought about by cost arbitrages. Every area in the world has this sort of cost and desirability motivated migration going on constantly. Cost differences drive migrations that change the characters and costs of neighborhoods and happen in self-reinforcing ways until the cost differences change to make the newly hot neighborhoods expensive and other areas relatively cheap, so the immigration shifts to emigration.


Estimating the Impact of Cutting the SALT Deductions


We played around with the numbers to get a feel for the directions and the impacts of this, and we show our scratch pad estimates below. We will first show our very rough estimates of the impact of ending deductibility on state tax revenues and migration patterns. 


First, to summarize, we estimate that:



  • Ending SALT deductibility will result in a sizable increase in the effective tax rate faced by high earners in high tax states (3-5% for most making over $500,000), notable outbound migration of high income filers (we estimate 1-2.5% will leave for most states we looked at), and a hit to state tax revenues (around 1%). In our opinion, these numbers understate the impacts, especially for the highest taxpayers (who pay the most taxes), because it is the nominal level of dollars of increased taxes that matters more than percentages, and we don’t fully account for all the second- and third-order consequences previously mentioned. In terms of economic impact, we estimate that it is the present value of all future year tax differences (and other costs such as declining real estate values) that is the best gauge of the cost of staying, and these are very big numbers. As I just noted, the effects on property values and living conditions are not properly considered in our estimates. Already, without the SALT deductibility changes, some higher SALT states are experiencing notable outbound migration (shown further below), which is straining tax revenues and risks the strengthening of a downward spiral where states adjust by cutting spending/raising taxes, which encourages even more people to leave.




  • Still, the table below conveys a rough picture of where the vulnerabilities lie. It shows a) the existing marginal tax rate, b) the effective tax rate with the deduction, c) the effective increase in the tax rate due to the elimination of the deduction, d) that increase relative to the US average and e) relative to states they are likely to emigrate to (e.g., their neighbors), f) the estimated medium-term size of the migration as a percent of the high earning population,* g) the estimated number of high earners leaving, h) the lost tax revenue to the state, and i) that lost tax revenue relative to the total tax revenue of the state. To be clear, these are VERY IMPRECISE ESTIMATES. 




We looked at a number of factors to come up with our rough estimates, so we will show you some. 


While the previous table looks at the impact of migration on state budgets, below we show a simpler cut: our rough estimates of how relative incomes between states will change when people in high tax states get a greater tax increase than people in low tax states. The chart on the left shows the absolute levels in real per capita earnings by state versus the national average before and after the tax change. These numbers are adjusted by what the Bureau of Economic Analysis believes about relative price levels between states (trying to get at some measure of competitiveness). The chart on the right shows the net shift that occurs with the tax change. As you can see, states with both higher than average incomes and higher than average taxes (especially New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and California) are most vulnerable by this measure.



The vulnerability of a state to tax emigration is also affected by tax revenue being concentrated in the hands of those high income earners who are most affected by the changes. This concentration is shown below for the states with the highest income taxes. 



For these states, the high earning taxpayers are a very small proportion of the population—from 0.5% of households in Vermont to 1.7% in DC and Connecticut. That means that it would take only a tiny percentage of the population to move to have a devastating effect on the state’s finances. Clearly, all of these states are very vulnerable.



The next two tables show the states where people have been leaving fastest from and going fastest to, and a number of influences on these movements, such as economic conditions and the tax burden. 



As you can see, everything points toward states like New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, California, and Illinois being the most vulnerable, and states like Florida, Texas, Nevada, Washington, and Arizona benefiting the most from this shift.


Our look at these states’ finances and their muni bond markets will follow in the next few days. 


P.S.


As for the effects of the budget changes, below we show where the money is expected to come from and where it is expected to go.



So, our big picture perspective is that, on the margin, the tax law changes are going to be significant and bad for high SALT locations and good for low SALT locations, and are going to be good for businesses and business owners (and hopefully those who the money trickles down to), so those businesses in low SALT states will get a double whammy benefit.









Saturday, October 7, 2017

Mapping The Most (And Least) Valuable States In America

Everyone knows location is the most important part of real estate. You can’t change where your house is (all things being equal). You have to consider school districts, crime rates, commute times—the list goes on and on. It can be much simpler when you’re considering buying a home to compare apples to apples so you can see how the real estate market differs according to location.


So HowMuch.net created a new visualization showing land and housing prices at a glance.



Source: HowMuch.net


The blue dots represent the value of an acre of land, and the red circles indicate the median value of a home. The bigger the blue dot and the larger the red circle, the more expensive it is to become a property owner. Small circles and dots likewise indicate a very low cost of purchasing property. The home values are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2015 American Consumer Survey, and the numbers behind the land values come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.


As HowMuch.net notes, several things stand out in our illustration.


An acre of land is much more valuable in the Northeast compared to any other part of the country. This is partly because the Eastern seaboard is a very densely populated area with several large cities, most notably New York. It is also a historical artifact that Europeans settled New England first and then moved west, meaning that New York and Massachusetts have some of the oldest modern structures anywhere in the U.S. In other words, Eastern cities are a lot older than Midwestern cities, so there isn’t a lot of farmland for suburban expansion anymore. We should also mention that in terms of geographic size, these are some of the smallest states in the country. Matter of fact, the three states where the cost of an acre of land is greater than the median price of a house are all located on the East Coast, and they happen to be some of the smallest states in the Union (Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey).


Median home values (the red circles) are a different and more complicated story. California has the most expensive houses by far ($449,100). Oregon and Washington boast similarly high housing valuations as well ($264,100 and $284,000, respectively). It is also expensive to buy a home on the East Coast with six out of the top ten states with the most expensive median home values.


But there’s a noticeable dip in both housing and land prices in southern and midwestern states. Prices slowly rise the further you move from east to west. This highlights unique economic developments over the last several years, including the boom in oil exploration in North Dakota and the growth of Western cities thanks to young people,like Denver. Snowbirds also tend to move to Florida and Arizona after they retire, which also pushes up housing prices in those places.


Top 5 Most Expensive States to Buy a Home 


  1. California - Value per acre: $39,092; Median Home Value: $449,100

  2. Massachusetts - Value per acre: $102,214;  Median Home Value: $352,100

  3. New Jersey - Value per acre: $196,410; Median Home Value: $322,600

  4. Maryland - Value per acre: $75,429; Median Home Value: $299,800

  5. New York - Value per acre: 41,314; Median Home Value: $293,500

Top 5 Cheapest States to Buy a Home


  1. West Virginia - Value per acre: $10,537; Median Home Value: $112,100

  2. Mississippi - Value per acre: $5,565; Median Home Value: 112,700

  3. Arkansas - Value per acre: $6,739; Median Home Value: $120,700

  4. Oklahoma - Value per acre: $7,364; Median Home Value: $126,800

  5. Kentucky - Value per acre: $7,209; Median Home Value: $130,000

All this shows that the laws of supply and demand are alive and well in the real estate market. You can easily find cheap acres of land where they are plentiful and un-useful (sorry, Nevada), but owning property is a lot more expensive in smaller places crowded with lots of people. As always, location, location, location.

Thursday, September 28, 2017

Bang For Your Buck? Mapping Where A Dollar Goes Furthest In America

Go to any large, high-density city like New York or San Francisco, and you’ll notice a difference in costs immediately.


The price you pay for groceries, dinner at the restaurant, filling up your tank, or even your daily coffee goes up substantially. With high-paying jobs, booming economies, limited space, and soaring levels of density, cities can be expensive.


DOLLAR DISPARITY


While this effect on costs is most evident in cities, Visual Capitalist"s Jeff Desjardins notes that it’s actually present throughout the country.


What you can buy for your paycheck varies wildly depending on where you are, greatly impacting purchasing power and the cost of living. Sometimes even a short one-hour drive can make a difference in some cases.


Today’s two maps come from TaxFoundation.org, and they look at regional differences in purchasing power, based on information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.


BANG FOR BUCK, BY STATE


The following map shows the buying power of $100 by state.


If the number is below, such as $90, it means money buys less than the federal average. If a state’s number is higher, such as $110, that means each dollar goes further, giving residents more purchasing power.



Generally speaking, dollars go furthest in states in the Southeast and Midwest parts of the country. Go to places like Arkansas or South Dakota, and you’ll see higher purchasing power.


Here are the five states that have the most buying power:



And here are the five with the least buying power:



BANG FOR BUCK, BY COUNTY


The state map does not tell the whole story, however.


The reality is that density makes a big difference for buying power, and large metropolitan areas tend to be more expensive. The following chart breaks it down based on county, creating a much more interesting contrast.



The above rendition makes it clear that the Bay Area, New York City, and Washington D.C. are the places where the relative value of a dollar is lowest.


Meanwhile, it also shows that metropolitan areas in some parts of the country are not too bad for the cost of living. Cities like Atlanta ($104.10), Nashville ($106.50), Phoenix ($102.90), Milwaukee ($104.50), Kansas City ($106.70), Jacksonville ($104.40), and New Orleans ($104.60) buck the trend, being cheaper than the American average.


Here’s another look – this time with an interactive map that allows you to hover over individual metro areas:

Friday, August 4, 2017

Albert Edwards: "The Last Time This Happened Was In January 2008"

Two days ago, we were the first to point out that in a striking case of data revisionism, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in an attempt to retroactively boost GDP, revised historical personal incomes lower, while adjusting its estimates of personal spending much higher, resulting in a sharp decline in personal savings, which as a result, was slashed from 5.5% according to the pre-revised data, to just 3.8%, in one excel calculation wiping out 30% of America"s "savings", and cutting them by a quarter trillion dollars in the process, from $791 billion to $546 billion, a level last seen just before the last US recession.


Today, SocGen"s grouchy bear Albert Edwards, commented on this drastic revision which disclosed that contrary to previous conventional wisdom that US consumers had been hunkering down in recent years and saving up for a rainy day, the surge in spending in late 2016 may have been the only catalyst that prevented the US from collapsing into outright contraction. Edwards also reminds us that such a dramatic savings slump last occurred in 2007, just before all hell broke loose.


As Edwards writes, "very recent data confirms slumping household saving ratios in both the US and UK. This was last seen in 2007, just before the bursting debt bubble blew the global economy and financial system to smithereens. The Fed and BoE should surely hang their heads in shame having presided over yet another impending disaster. Why will politicians and the people tolerate this incompetence? Indeed they won’t."


Away from the US, Edwards also notes that the UK has also recently published some shockingly low household SR data, showing a slump in Q1 to only 1.9% (see chart) and adds that "actually the UK’s situation is worse than it looks relative to the US SR if you measure it on the same basis (see chart below). The US measures household income and savings net of depreciation ? mainly of the housing stock. If you add this back (as the UK does), the US household gross SR is some 3% higher!"



Needless to say, all of the above is an ill omen for the US, and global, economy. Here"s why, in Edwards" own words, which largely echo what we said earlier in the week:





The US Bureau of Economic Analysis has this week undertaken some revisions of the US saving ratio (SR). Actually it has revised both income (downward) and expenditure (upward). And as the SR is the difference between these two very large numbers, it can be severely affected by small changes in income or spending. The new data shows the US SR actually declined from 6% to 4% through 2016 (see chart below) and undoubtedly stopped the US economy sliding into recession in the second half of last year as real household incomes suffered a severe squeeze due to rising headline CPI inflation.




We have previously highlighted on these pages that we believe it will be the US corporate sector borrowing binge that will take centre stage in the next credit crisis. Until this latest SR data we had been less concerned about the situation in the household sector. US household mortgage borrowing, comprising some two-thirds of total household debt, remained subdued in the wake of the 2003-2008 boom and bust. Indeed it is only in the last six months that the Fed Z1 Flow of Funds data shows mortgage borrowing growth has managed to crawl above 3%, compared to six years of double-digit growth in the run up to the 2008 bust. By contrast it has been consumer credit that has boomed at a 6-7% growth rate for the last five years, well in excess of that seen in the run-up to the 2008 bust, led by student and auto loans.



But the Fed has had its way. QE has not only inflated corporate debt to grotesque levels, but finally the US SR has responded to the surge in household paper wealth that QE has produced (see chart below). Typically the SR always declines (shown as a rise in the chart below) with rising wealth. Why do you need to bother saving if interest rates are close to zero and house and stock prices are rising? (Maybe some residual caution of the household sector is apparent as the SR has not fallen to a new low despite record high net wealth).





Edwards believes that the collapsing savings rate may be an even greater worry for the UK, where "history suggests that when UK SR (measured gross) declines to, or below, the US SR (measured net), as we saw in 1987 and as we see now (see chart above), we in the UK are sitting on a massive credit bubble that is primed to burst with recessionary consequences. Alarm bells will be ringing all around the Bank of
England ? but it is too late. (Incidentally note the author of the 1992 FT article below is Ed Balls, who went on to become a significant figure in Tony Blair?s Labour government as Gordon Brown?s chief economic confidant. More recently he has starred in the UK Strictly Come Dancing (Dancing with the Stars to our US friends). By contrast I am still a sell-side Global Strategist and some 25 years later, still comparing the UK SR to the US! Hey ho.)"


For those readers who think I bang on about the same theme ad nauseam, I attach a 1992 article from the FT! It shows how the situation the UK is now in has been experienced again and again. Back then an extensive period of robust GDP growth during PM Margaret Thatcher?s tenure proved to be yet another credit boom that turned to dust.



Finally, In an amusing tangent, the SocGen strategist reveals that he is "genuinely getting tired of bashing the major central banks, but every day more evidence mounts that almost exactly the same debt excesses that caused The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, are present today."





The UK Bank of England and US Federal Reserve deserve particular vilification for failing to remove the monetary punchbowl quickly enough - just like the 2003-2007 period, allowing grotesque debt excesses to build."



Ironically, the more "tired" he gets of bashing central bankers, the more he does it, which is perhaps why so many Wall Streeters - at least those who aren"t brainwashed into believing that what is going now is normal - enjoy reading his periodic missives.

Saturday, March 18, 2017

Americans Will Be The Loser In The Fed's Dangerous Game Of "Chicken"

Via Birch Gold Group,


The Federal Reserve just raised rates once again, by 0.25%.



The move implies that the central bank has confidence in the economy, and markets are riding that confidence to push upward. But analysis of the fundamentals reveals that both markets and the Fed are missing something. How long can they keep egging each other on without facing facts?


What You’re Being Told


Based solely on official government data, the economic situation today looks pretty rosy.


Unemployment is supposedly sitting at 4.7%, a “healthy level by historical standards” according to the New York Times. And the Labor Department reported a 235,000 gain of new jobs in the past month.


Then there’s inflation… which the Bureau of Economic Analysis (a sub-branch of the U.S. Department of Commerce) has great things to say about. According to the agency, prices rose by 1.9% over the last 12 months (the period ends in January). That’s just one-hundredth of a percent below the Fed’s target rate of 2%.


To top it all off, officials say that consumer spending spiked 3% in Q4 of 2016.


That’s all well and good. And it would be fantastic if we could know, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that those numbers were true. Unfortunately, it’s not that simple.


Why Government Numbers Can’t Be Trusted


The U.S. government’s official story on the economy is hardly unbiased. With a vested interest in keeping markets calm and appeased, government entities tend to “massage” economic numbers to paint the best picture possible.


According to Mike Bryan, vice president and senior economist at the Atlanta Fed’s research department, the rubric for calculating official inflation numbers has a history of getting changed as often as every month, depending on which pieces of inconvenient input data bureaucrats want to leave out for that given cycle.


Labor statistics are just as susceptible to corruption. In 2014, census survey collectors — whose work goes toward calculating not just general population statistics, but unemployment and economic insights as well — were caught filling in bogus data simply to meet their quota, irreparably tainting any later assertions based on the collection work.


The New York Post writes:





Rather than collect fresh data each month as they are supposed to do, Census workers have been filling in the blanks with past months’ data. This helps them meet the strict quota of successful interviews set by Labor.



That’s just one of the ways the surveys are falsified.



Further, according to John Williams, presidential administrations over the past several decades have all fought to weaken and revise the measures used to calculate CPI and GDP.


What the Economy Is Really Doing


While the Fed ramps up for more rate hikes and the government keeps peddling false hope, is there a way to see what’s actually happening in the economy? Yes, thankfully there is, and it’s called fundamental analysis.


When we analyze the fundamentals, there’s very little room for manipulation. Assuming we respect the numbers and evaluate them objectively, the truth has nowhere to hide.


That said, consider what’s happening to the consumer retail sector. Despite the positive tone coming from the Fed and U.S. government, the latest numbers show retail sales getting clobbered, especially department stores. Massive outdoor retailer Gander Mountain filed for bankruptcy just last week, and the Financial Times reports non-food retail sales are dropping like a stone.


This stands in complete contradiction to what Fed and government officials are telling you. If the official numbers on consumer spending are this glaringly false, how can we trust anything else they say?


How We All Lose in this Game of “Chicken”


Aside from being grossly misleading, here is the real problem with the gap between the Fed and government’s outlook versus reality: the more they push to convince markets of the economy’s strength, the more they set us up for a crisis.


When Americans finally wake up and realize the Fed and U.S. government were bluffing all along, there will be no safety net to keep the economy from crashing down.


So we’re essentially caught in a twisted game of “chicken.” The Fed raises rates, and the economy edges upward - with neither paying any mind to what’s really going on.


A crisis is inevitable, and there’s only so much you can do to protect yourself. Securing your savings with precious metals like gold is one of the best ways to insulate yourself from this fallout. The Fed’s fantasy will have its day of reckoning, and it looks as though it may come soon.

Sunday, March 5, 2017

America's Miserable 21st Century

Via Nicholas Eberstadt of CommentaryMagazine.com,


On the morning of November 9, 2016, America’s elite—its talking and deciding classes—woke up to a country they did not know. To most privileged and well-educated Americans, especially those living in its bicoastal bastions, the election of Donald Trump had been a thing almost impossible even to imagine. What sort of country would go and elect someone like Trump as president? Certainly not one they were familiar with, or understood anything about.


I


Whatever else it may or may not have accomplished, the 2016 election was a sort of shock therapy for Americans living within what Charles Murray famously termed “the bubble” (the protective barrier of prosperity and self-selected associations that increasingly shield our best and brightest from contact with the rest of their society). The very fact of Trump’s election served as a truth broadcast about a reality that could no longer be denied: Things out there in America are a whole lot different from what you thought. 


Yes, things are very different indeed these days in the “real America” outside the bubble. In fact, things have been going badly wrong in America since the beginning of the 21st century.


It turns out that the year 2000 marks a grim historical milestone of sorts for our nation. For whatever reasons, the Great American Escalator, which had lifted successive generations of Americans to ever higher standards of living and levels of social well-being, broke down around then—and broke down very badly.


The warning lights have been flashing, and the klaxons sounding, for more than a decade and a half. But our pundits and prognosticators and professors and policymakers, ensconced as they generally are deep within the bubble, were for the most part too distant from the distress of the general population to see or hear it. (So much for the vaunted “information era” and “big-data revolution.”) Now that those signals are no longer possible to ignore, it is high time for experts and intellectuals to reacquaint themselves with the country in which they live and to begin the task of describing what has befallen the country in which we have lived since the dawn of the new century.


II


Consider the condition of the American economy. In some circles people still widely believe, as one recent New York Times business-section article cluelessly insisted before the inauguration, that “Mr. Trump will inherit an economy that is fundamentally solid.” But this is patent nonsense. By now it should be painfully obvious that the U.S. economy has been in the grip of deep dysfunction since the dawn of the new century. And in retrospect, it should also be apparent that America’s strange new economic maladies were almost perfectly designed to set the stage for a populist storm.


Ever since 2000, basic indicators have offered oddly inconsistent readings on America’s economic performance and prospects. It is curious and highly uncharacteristic to find such measures so very far out of alignment with one another. We are witnessing an ominous and growing divergence between three trends that should ordinarily move in tandem: wealth, output, and employment. Depending upon which of these three indicators you choose, America looks to be heading up, down, or more or less nowhere.


From the standpoint of wealth creation, the 21st century is off to a roaring start. By this yardstick, it looks as if Americans have never had it so good and as if the future is full of promise. Between early 2000 and late 2016, the estimated net worth of American households and nonprofit institutions more than doubled, from $44 trillion to $90 trillion. (SEE FIGURE 1.)


Although that wealth is not evenly distributed, it is still a fantastic sum of money—an average of over a million dollars for every notional family of four. This upsurge of wealth took place despite the crash of 2008—indeed, private wealth holdings are over $20 trillion higher now than they were at their pre-crash apogee. The value of American real-estate assets is near or at all-time highs, and America’s businesses appear to be thriving. Even before the “Trump rally” of late 2016 and early 2017, U.S. equities markets were hitting new highs—and since stock prices are strongly shaped by expectations of future profits, investors evidently are counting on the continuation of the current happy days for U.S. asset holders for some time to come.



A rather less cheering picture, though, emerges if we look instead at real trends for the macro-economy. Here, performance since the start of the century might charitably be described as mediocre, and prospects today are no better than guarded.


The recovery from the crash of 2008—which unleashed the worst recession since the Great Depression—has been singularly slow and weak. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), it took nearly four years for America’s gross domestic product (GDP) to re-attain its late 2007 level. As of late 2016, total value added to the U.S. economy was just 12 percent higher than in 2007. (SEE FIGURE 2.) The situation is even more sobering if we consider per capita growth. It took America six and a half years—until mid-2014—to get back to its late 2007 per capita production levels. And in late 2016, per capita output was just 4 percent higher than in late 2007—nine years earlier. By this reckoning, the American economy looks to have suffered something close to a lost decade.



But there was clearly trouble brewing in America’s macro-economy well before the 2008 crash, too. Between late 2000 and late 2007, per capita GDP growth averaged less than 1.5 percent per annum. That compares with the nation’s long-term postwar 1948–2000 per capita growth rate of almost 2.3 percent, which in turn can be compared to the “snap back” tempo of 1.1 percent per annum since per capita GDP bottomed out in 2009. Between 2000 and 2016, per capita growth in America has averaged less than 1 percent a year. To state it plainly: With postwar, pre-21st-century rates for the years 2000–2016, per capita GDP in America would be more than 20 percent higher than it is today.


The reasons for America’s newly fitful and halting macroeconomic performance are still a puzzlement to economists and a subject of considerable contention and debate. Economists are generally in consensus, however, in one area: They have begun redefining the growth potential of the U.S. economy downwards. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), for example, suggests that the “potential growth” rate for the U.S. economy at full employment of factors of production has now dropped below 1.7 percent a year, implying a sustainable long-term annual per capita economic growth rate for America today of well under 1 percent.


Then there is the employment situation. If 21st-century America’s GDP trends have been disappointing, labor-force trends have been utterly dismal. Work rates have fallen off a cliff since the year 2000 and are at their lowest levels in decades. We can see this by looking at the estimates by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the civilian employment rate, the jobs-to-population ratio for adult civilian men and women. (SEE FIGURE 3.) Between early 2000 and late 2016, America’s overall work rate for Americans age 20 and older underwent a drastic decline. It plunged by almost 5 percentage points (from 64.6 to 59.7). Unless you are a labor economist, you may not appreciate just how severe a falloff in employment such numbers attest to. Postwar America never experienced anything comparable.



From peak to trough, the collapse in work rates for U.S. adults between 2008 and 2010 was roughly twice the amplitude of what had previously been the country’s worst postwar recession, back in the early 1980s. In that previous steep recession, it took America five years to re-attain the adult work rates recorded at the start of 1980. This time, the U.S. job market has as yet, in early 2017, scarcely begun to claw its way back up to the work rates of 2007—much less back to the work rates from early 2000.


As may be seen in Figure 3, U.S. adult work rates never recovered entirely from the recession of 2001—much less the crash of ’08. And the work rates being measured here include people who are engaged in any paid employment—any job, at any wage, for any number of hours of work at all.


On Wall Street and in some parts of Washington these days, one hears that America has gotten back to “near full employment.” For Americans outside the bubble, such talk must seem nonsensical. It is true that the oft-cited “civilian unemployment rate” looked pretty good by the end of the Obama era—in December 2016, it was down to 4.7 percent, about the same as it had been back in 1965, at a time of genuine full employment. The problem here is that the unemployment rate only tracks joblessness for those still in the labor force; it takes no account of workforce dropouts. Alas, the exodus out of the workforce has been the big labor-market story for America’s new century. (At this writing, for every unemployed American man between 25 and 55 years of age, there are another three who are neither working nor looking for work.) Thus the “unemployment rate” increasingly looks like an antique index devised for some earlier and increasingly distant war: the economic equivalent of a musket inventory or a cavalry count.


By the criterion of adult work rates, by contrast, employment conditions in America remain remarkably bleak. From late 2009 through early 2014, the country’s work rates more or less flatlined. So far as can be told, this is the only “recovery” in U.S. economic history in which that basic labor-market indicator almost completely failed to respond.


Since 2014, there has finally been a measure of improvement in the work rate—but it would be unwise to exaggerate the dimensions of that turnaround. As of late 2016, the adult work rate in America was still at its lowest level in more than 30 years. To put things another way: If our nation’s work rate today were back up to its start-of-the-century highs, well over 10 million more Americans would currently have paying jobs.


There is no way to sugarcoat these awful numbers. They are not a statistical artifact that can be explained away by population aging, or by increased educational enrollment for adult students, or by any other genuine change in contemporary American society. The plain fact is that 21st-century America has witnessed a dreadful collapse of work.


For an apples-to-apples look at America’s 21st-century jobs problem, we can focus on the 25–54 population—known to labor economists for self-evident reasons as the “prime working age” group. For this key labor-force cohort, work rates in late 2016 were down almost 4 percentage points from their year-2000 highs. That is a jobs gap approaching 5 million for this group alone.


It is not only that work rates for prime-age males have fallen since the year 2000—they have, but the collapse of work for American men is a tale that goes back at least half a century. (I wrote a short book last year about this sad saga.2) What is perhaps more startling is the unexpected and largely unnoticed fall-off in work rates for prime-age women. In the U.S. and all other Western societies, postwar labor markets underwent an epochal transformation. After World War II, work rates for prime women surged, and continued to rise—until the year 2000. Since then, they too have declined. Current work rates for prime-age women are back to where they were a generation ago, in the late 1980s. The 21st-century U.S. economy has been brutal for male and female laborers alike—and the wreckage in the labor market has been sufficiently powerful to cancel, and even reverse, one of our society’s most distinctive postwar trends: the rise of paid work for women outside the household.


In our era of no more than indifferent economic growth, 21st–century America has somehow managed to produce markedly more wealth for its wealthholders even as it provided markedly less work for its workers. And trends for paid hours of work look even worse than the work rates themselves. Between 2000 and 2015, according to the BEA, total paid hours of work in America increased by just 4 percent (as against a 35 percent increase for 1985–2000, the 15-year period immediately preceding this one). Over the 2000–2015 period, however, the adult civilian population rose by almost 18 percent—meaning that paid hours of work per adult civilian have plummeted by a shocking 12 percent thus far in our new American century.


This is the terrible contradiction of economic life in what we might call America’s Second Gilded Age (2000—). It is a paradox that may help us understand a number of overarching features of our new century. These include the consistent findings that public trust in almost all U.S. institutions has sharply declined since 2000, even as growing majorities hold that America is “heading in the wrong direction.” It provides an immediate answer to why overwhelming majorities of respondents in public-opinion surveys continue to tell pollsters, year after year, that our ever-richer America is still stuck in the middle of a recession. The mounting economic woes of the “little people” may not have been generally recognized by those inside the bubble, or even by many bubble inhabitants who claimed to be economic specialists—but they proved to be potent fuel for the populist fire that raged through American politics in 2016.


III


So general economic conditions for many ordinary Americans—not least of these, Americans who did not fit within the academy’s designated victim classes—have been rather more insecure than those within the comfort of the bubble understood. But the anxiety, dissatisfaction, anger, and despair that range within our borders today are not wholly a reaction to the way our economy is misfiring. On the nonmaterial front, it is likewise clear that many things in our society are going wrong and yet seem beyond our powers to correct.


Some of these gnawing problems are by no means new: A number of them (such as family breakdown) can be traced back at least to the 1960s, while others are arguably as old as modernity itself (anomie and isolation in big anonymous communities, secularization and the decline of faith). But a number have roared down upon us by surprise since the turn of the century—and others have redoubled with fearsome new intensity since roughly the year 2000.


American health conditions seem to have taken a seriously wrong turn in the new century. It is not just that overall health progress has been shockingly slow, despite the trillions we devote to medical services each year. (Which “Cold War babies” among us would have predicted we’d live to see the day when life expectancy in East Germany was higher than in the United States, as is the case today?)


Alas, the problem is not just slowdowns in health progress—there also appears to have been positive retrogression for broad and heretofore seemingly untroubled segments of the national population. A short but electrifying 2015 paper by Anne Case and Nobel Economics Laureate Angus Deaton talked about a mortality trend that had gone almost unnoticed until then: rising death rates for middle-aged U.S. whites. By Case and Deaton’s reckoning, death rates rose somewhat slightly over the 1999–2013 period for all non-Hispanic white men and women 45–54 years of age—but they rose sharply for those with high-school degrees or less, and for this less-educated grouping most of the rise in death rates was accounted for by suicides, chronic liver cirrhosis, and poisonings (including drug overdoses).


Though some researchers, for highly technical reasons, suggested that the mortality spike might not have been quite as sharp as Case and Deaton reckoned, there is little doubt that the spike itself has taken place. Health has been deteriorating for a significant swath of white America in our new century, thanks in large part to drug and alcohol abuse. All this sounds a little too close for comfort to the story of modern Russia, with its devastating vodka- and drug-binging health setbacks. Yes: It can happen here, and it has. Welcome to our new America.


In December 2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that for the first time in decades, life expectancy at birth in the United States had dropped very slightly (to 78.8 years in 2015, from 78.9 years in 2014). Though the decline was small, it was statistically meaningful—rising death rates were characteristic of males and females alike; of blacks and whites and Latinos together. (Only black women avoided mortality increases—their death levels were stagnant.) A jump in “unintentional injuries” accounted for much of the overall uptick.


It would be unwarranted to place too much portent in a single year’s mortality changes; slight annual drops in U.S. life expectancy have occasionally been registered in the past, too, followed by continued improvements. But given other developments we are witnessing in our new America, we must wonder whether the 2015 decline in life expectancy is just a blip, or the start of a new trend. We will find out soon enough. It cannot be encouraging, though, that the Human Mortality Database, an international consortium of demographers who vet national data to improve comparability between countries, has suggested that health progress in America essentially ceased in 2012—that the U.S. gained on average only about a single day of life expectancy at birth between 2012 and 2014, before the 2015 turndown.


The opioid epidemic of pain pills and heroin that has been ravaging and shortening lives from coast to coast is a new plague for our new century. The terrifying novelty of this particular drug epidemic, of course, is that it has gone (so to speak) “mainstream” this time, effecting breakout from disadvantaged minority communities to Main Street White America. By 2013, according to a 2015 report by the Drug Enforcement Administration, more Americans died from drug overdoses (largely but not wholly opioid abuse) than from either traffic fatalities or guns. The dimensions of the opioid epidemic in the real America are still not fully appreciated within the bubble, where drug use tends to be more carefully limited and recreational. In Dreamland, his harrowing and magisterial account of modern America’s opioid explosion, the journalist Sam Quinones notes in passing that “in one three-month period” just a few years ago, according to the Ohio Department of Health, “fully 11 percent of all Ohioans were prescribed opiates.” And of course many Americans self-medicate with licit or illicit painkillers without doctors’ orders.


In the fall of 2016, Alan Krueger, former chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, released a study that further refined the picture of the real existing opioid epidemic in America: According to his work, nearly half of all prime working-age male labor-force dropouts—an army now totaling roughly 7 million men—currently take pain medication on a daily basis.


We already knew from other sources (such as BLS “time use” surveys) that the overwhelming majority of the prime-age men in this un-working army generally don’t “do civil society” (charitable work, religious activities, volunteering), or for that matter much in the way of child care or help for others in the home either, despite the abundance of time on their hands. Their routine, instead, typically centers on watching—watching TV, DVDs, Internet, hand-held devices, etc.—and indeed watching for an average of 2,000 hours a year, as if it were a full-time job. But Krueger’s study adds a poignant and immensely sad detail to this portrait of daily life in 21st-century America: In our mind’s eye we can now picture many millions of un-working men in the prime of life, out of work and not looking for jobs, sitting in front of screens—stoned.


But how did so many millions of un-working men, whose incomes are limited, manage en masse to afford a constant supply of pain medication? Oxycontin is not cheap. As Dreamland carefully explains, one main mechanism today has been the welfare state: more specifically, Medicaid, Uncle Sam’s means-tested health-benefits program. Here is how it works (we are with Quinones in Portsmouth, Ohio):





[The Medicaid card] pays for medicine—whatever pills a doctor deems that the insured patient needs. Among those who receive Medicaid cards are people on state welfare or on a federal disability program known as SSI. . . . If you could get a prescription from a willing doctor—and Portsmouth had plenty of them—Medicaid health-insurance cards paid for that prescription every month. For a three-dollar Medicaid co-pay, therefore, addicts got pills priced at thousands of dollars, with the difference paid for by U.S. and state taxpayers. A user could turn around and sell those pills, obtained for that three-dollar co-pay, for as much as ten thousand dollars on the street.



In 21st-century America, “dependence on government” has thus come to take on an entirely new meaning.


You may now wish to ask: What share of prime-working-age men these days are enrolled in Medicaid? According to the Census Bureau’s SIPP survey (Survey of Income and Program Participation), as of 2013, over one-fifth (21 percent) of all civilian men between 25 and 55 years of age were Medicaid beneficiaries. For prime-age people not in the labor force, the share was over half (53 percent). And for un-working Anglos (non-Hispanic white men not in the labor force) of prime working age, the share enrolled in Medicaid was 48 percent.


By the way: Of the entire un-working prime-age male Anglo population in 2013, nearly three-fifths (57 percent) were reportedly collecting disability benefits from one or more government disability program in 2013. Disability checks and means-tested benefits cannot support a lavish lifestyle. But they can offer a permanent alternative to paid employment, and for growing numbers of American men, they do. The rise of these programs has coincided with the death of work for larger and larger numbers of American men not yet of retirement age. We cannot say that these programs caused the death of work for millions upon millions of younger men: What is incontrovertible, however, is that they have financed it—just as Medicaid inadvertently helped finance America’s immense and increasing appetite for opioids in our new century.


It is intriguing to note that America’s nationwide opioid epidemic has not been accompanied by a nationwide crime wave (excepting of course the apparent explosion of illicit heroin use). Just the opposite: As best can be told, national victimization rates for violent crimes and property crimes have both reportedly dropped by about two-thirds over the past two decades.3 The drop in crime over the past generation has done great things for the general quality of life in much of America. There is one complication from this drama, however, that inhabitants of the bubble may not be aware of, even though it is all too well known to a great many residents of the real America. This is the extraordinary expansion of what some have termed America’s “criminal class”—the population sentenced to prison or convicted of felony offenses—in recent decades. This trend did not begin in our century, but it has taken on breathtaking enormity since the year 2000.


Most well-informed readers know that the U.S. currently has a higher share of its populace in jail or prison than almost any other country on earth, that Barack Obama and others talk of our criminal-justice process as “mass incarceration,” and know that well over 2 million men were in prison or jail in recent years.4 But only a tiny fraction of all living Americans ever convicted of a felony is actually incarcerated at this very moment. Quite the contrary: Maybe 90 percent of all sentenced felons today are out of confinement and living more or less among us. The reason: the basic arithmetic of sentencing and incarceration in America today. Correctional release and sentenced community supervision (probation and parole) guarantee a steady annual “flow” of convicted felons back into society to augment the very considerable “stock” of felons and ex-felons already there. And this “stock” is by now truly enormous.


One forthcoming demographic study by Sarah Shannon and five other researchers estimates that the cohort of current and former felons in America very nearly reached 20 million by the year 2010. If its estimates are roughly accurate, and if America’s felon population has continued to grow at more or less the same tempo traced out for the years leading up to 2010, we would expect it to surpass 23 million persons by the end of 2016 at the latest. Very rough calculations might therefore suggest that at this writing, America’s population of non-institutionalized adults with a felony conviction somewhere in their past has almost certainly broken the 20 million mark by the end of 2016. A little more rough arithmetic suggests that about 17 million men in our general population have a felony conviction somewhere in their CV. That works out to one of every eight adult males in America today.


We have to use rough estimates here, rather than precise official numbers, because the government does not collect any data at all on the size or socioeconomic circumstances of this population of 20 million, and never has. Amazing as this may sound and scandalous though it may be, America has, at least to date, effectively banished this huge group—a group roughly twice the total size of our illegal-immigrant population and an adult population larger than that in any state but California—to a near-total and seemingly unending statistical invisibility. Our ex-cons are, so to speak, statistical outcasts who live in a darkness our polity does not care enough to illuminate—beyond the scope or interest of public policy, unless and until they next run afoul of the law.


Thus we cannot describe with any precision or certainty what has become of those who make up our “criminal class” after their (latest) sentencing or release. In the most stylized terms, however, we might guess that their odds in the real America are not all that favorable. And when we consider some of the other trends we have already mentioned—employment, health, addiction, welfare dependence—we can see the emergence of a malign new nationwide undertow, pulling downward against social mobility.


Social mobility has always been the jewel in the crown of the American mythos and ethos. The idea (not without a measure of truth to back it up) was that people in America are free to achieve according to their merit and their grit—unlike in other places, where they are trapped by barriers of class or the misfortune of misrule. Nearly two decades into our new century, there are unmistakable signs that America’s fabled social mobility is in trouble—perhaps even in serious trouble.


Consider the following facts. First, according to the Census Bureau, geographical mobility in America has been on the decline for three decades, and in 2016 the annual movement of households from one location to the next was reportedly at an all-time (postwar) low. Second, as a study by three Federal Reserve economists and a Notre Dame colleague demonstrated last year, “labor market fluidity”—the churning between jobs that among other things allows people to get ahead—has been on the decline in the American labor market for decades, with no sign as yet of a turnaround. Finally, and not least important, a December 2016 report by the “Equal Opportunity Project,” a team led by the formidable Stanford economist Raj Chetty, calculated that the odds of a 30-year-old’s earning more than his parents at the same age was now just 51 percent: down from 86 percent 40 years ago. Other researchers who have examined the same data argue that the odds may not be quite as low as the Chetty team concludes, but agree that the chances of surpassing one’s parents’ real income have been on the downswing and are probably lower now than ever before in postwar America.


Thus the bittersweet reality of life for real Americans in the early 21st century: Even though the American economy still remains the world’s unrivaled engine of wealth generation, those outside the bubble may have less of a shot at the American Dream than has been the case for decades, maybe generations—possibly even since the Great Depression.


IV


The funny thing is, people inside the bubble are forever talking about “economic inequality,” that wonderful seminar construct, and forever virtue-signaling about how personally opposed they are to it. By contrast, “economic insecurity” is akin to a phrase from an unknown language. But if we were somehow to find a “Google Translate” function for communicating from real America into the bubble, an important message might be conveyed:


The abstraction of “inequality” doesn’t matter a lot to ordinary Americans. The reality of economic insecurity does. The Great American Escalator is broken—and it badly needs to be fixed.


With the election of 2016, Americans within the bubble finally learned that the 21st century has gotten off to a very bad start in America. Welcome to the reality. We have a lot of work to do together to turn this around.