Showing posts with label Bad Bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bad Bank. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 2, 2017

Europe's Banking Dysfunction Worsens

Authored by Chris Whalen via The Institutional Risk Analyst,





“While the US and the UK have been mired in political chaos this year, the EU has enjoyed improved economic conditions and some political windfalls. The question now is whether this good news will inspire long-needed EU and eurozone reforms, or merely fuel complacency – and thus set the stage for another crisis down the road.”



Philippe Legrain, Project Syndicate



This week The Institutional Risk Analyst takes a look a the recent reports out of the EU regarding a proposal to “freeze” the retail accounts of failing European banks.  The original story in Reuters suggests that our friends in Europe actually think that telling the public that they will not have access to their funds, even funds covered by official deposit insurance schemes, is somehow helpful to addressing Europe’s troubled banking system.  Investors who think that Europe is close to adopting an effective approach to dealing with failing banks may want to think again.



Judging by the reaction to the story by investors and on social media, it appears that the EU has learned nothing about managing public confidence when it comes to the banking sector.  In particular, the idea that the banking public – who generally fall well-below the maximum deposit insurance limit – would ever be denied access to cash virtually ensues that deposit runs and wider contagion will occur in Europe next time a depository institution gets into trouble.





“The plan, if agreed, would contrast with legislative proposals made by the European Commission in November that aimed to strengthen supervisors" powers to suspend withdrawals,” Reuters reports, “but excluded from the moratorium insured depositors, which under EU rules are those below 100,000 euros ($117,000).



While some Wall Street analysts are encouraging investors to jump into EU bank stocks, the fact is that there remains nearly €1 trillion in bad loans within the European banking system.  This represents 6.7% of the EU economy, according to a report and action plan considered by EU finance ministers earlier this month.  That compares with non-performing loans (NPL) ratios in the US and Japan of 1.7 per cent and 1.6 per cent of gross domestic product, respectively.


But the most basic point to make about the proposal for a “temporary” suspension of access to cash is that such moves never work.  Moratoria are part of the banking laws in Germany and many other European nations, but they are never used because once invoked the institution is dead for all practical purposes.  In Spain, for example, the government had the power to impose a temporary suspension of access to deposits in the case of Banco Popular, but did not do so because it would have killed the franchise.


Jochen Sanio, the former president of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), commented about banks subject to “temporary” deposit moratoria that “they never come back.”  Sanio, who guided Germany through the 2008 financial crisis and forced the clean-up of insolvent state-owned banks, was retired and gagged for the rest of his life for challenging Germany’s corrupt political status quo of covert bailouts.


So again, one has to wonder, why any responsible official in Europe would support the plan reported by Reuters.  As the US learned the hard way in the 1930s and with the S&L crisis in the 1980s, the lack of a robust national deposit insurance function to protect retail depositors leaves an entire society vulnerable to banks runs and debt deflation.  Until the EU is prepared to do “whatever is necessary,” to paraphrase ECB chief Mario Draghi, in order to protect retail bank depositors, the EU will remain far from being a united political economy.


Readers of The IRA may recall the comments of German Chancellor Angela Merkel last Fall, when she suggested that the German government would not support Deutsche Bank AG (NYSE:DB) in the event that the institution got into financial trouble.  At the time, DB was trading at about $12 per share in New York.  We spoke about DB and the ill-considered comments made by US and German officials from Dublin on CNBC on September 30th.


At the time, we reminded investors that political officials should never talk about a depository institution while it is still open for business.  This is a basic, well-recognized rule that has been followed by prudential regulators around the world for many years.  Yet because of the popular political pressures on elected officials such as Merkel, the temptation to engage in absurd hyperbole with respect to big banks is irresistible.


We see this latest piece of news out of Europe as further evidence that there is still no political consensus about how to deal with troubled banks.  As we learned last year, Merkel could not even make positive public comments about DB for fear of committing political suicide.


The more recent bank resolutions in Spain and Italy were made to look like touch measures in public terms, even as the Rome government quietly subsidized the senior creditors of two failed banks in the Veneto.  We noted in an earlier comment, “Fade the Great Rotation into Europe,” that the EU pretends to play tough on bank rules while bailing out the senior creditors:





“Of note, Italy is being given control over the remaining ‘bad bank’ to wind down as the assets and deposits are conveyed to Intesa SanPaolo.  This permits a bailout of senior unsecured creditors.  So Italy gets what it wants – continued circumvention of EU bailout rules. If a bank disappears, notes a well-placed EU observer, ‘state aid rules do not apply.’”



The Europeans appear to be playing a very dangerous game.  On the one hand, EU officials talk publicly about getting tough on insolvent banks and even suspending access to funds for retail depositors.  On the other hand, EU governments are continuing to bail out banks and large creditors in a display of cronyism and business as usual.





“Under the plan discussed by EU states, pay-outs could be suspended for five working days and the block could be extended to a maximum of 20 days in exceptional circumstances,” Reuters reports.  “Existing EU rules allow a two-day suspension of some payouts by failing banks, but the moratorium does not include deposits.”



Contrast the EU proposal with standard practice in the US, where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) begins to market troubled banks before they fail and tries to execute bank closures and sales on a Friday to avoid frightening the public.  The branches of the failed bank then open on the following business day as part of a solvent institution without any interruption in customer access to funds.


Importantly, all insured depositors, as well as brokered deposits and advances from the Federal Home Loan Banks, are always paid out by the FDIC when the failed bank is closed in order to avoid precipitating runs on other institutions. 


In Europe, on the other hand, there appear to be a significant number of officials who seriously believe that denying retail bank customers access to funds covered by deposit insurance will not result in financial contagion.  If such a proposal is adopted, the sort of bank runs seen in Cyprus and Greece could intensify and spread to the major countries in Europe.  Imagine that a large bank failure occurs in Italy next year and Italian officials tell retail customers that they will not have access to any funds for several weeks.


As we saw in 2012 in Spain and Cyprus and 2015 in Greece, retail bank runs tend to spill over into other countries and markets, creating a situation where fear takes over from rational behavior.  The trouble is, Chancellor Merkel cannot commit Germany to supporting an EU accord to support the banks in the Eurozone without ending her political career.





“If capital flight from the peripheral economies gathers pace, it could trigger runs on entire banking systems,” notes the infamous “Plan B” memo prepared for Merkel in 2012. “That would put the ECB—and thus, indirectly, the Bundesbank and Germany—on the hook for deposits worth trillions of euros.” 



In the dark days of 2012, Merkel’s government prepared for “Plan B” and was essentially ready to allow the weaker nations on the EU’s periphery – including Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland -- to fail and drop out of euro as Germany withdrew to a core group of nations.


Just as the EU still refuses to deal with Greece’s mounting debt, likewise it cannot seem to accept that protecting the small depositors of European banks is the price to be paid for preserving social order and the EU itself. Otmar Issing, former Chief Economist and Member of the Board of the European Central Bank and the German Bundesbank, summarizes the situation: “The euro crisis is not over.”

Saturday, June 24, 2017

Two Italian Zombie Banks Toppled Friday Night

Authored by Wolf Richter via WolfStreet.com, 


ECB shuts down Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza.


When banks fail and regulators decide to liquidate them, it happens on Friday evening so that there is a weekend to clean up the mess. And this is what happened in Italy – with two banks!


It’s over for the two banks that have been prominent zombies in the Italian banking crisis: Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, in northeastern Italy.


The banks have combined assets of €60 billion, a good part of which are toxic and no one wanted to touch them. They already received a bailout but more would have been required, and given the uncertainty and the messiness of their books, nothing was forthcoming, and the ECB which regulates them lost its patience.


In a tersely worded statement, the ECB’s office of Banking Supervision ordered the banks to be wound up because they “were failing or likely to fail as the two banks repeatedly breached supervisory capital requirements.”


“Failing or likely to fail” is the key phrase that banking supervisors use for banks that “should be put in resolution or wound up under normal insolvency proceedings,” the statement said. This is the first Italian bank liquidation under Europe’s new Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. The ECB explained:





The ECB had given the banks time to present capital plans, but the banks had been unable to offer credible solutions going forward.



Consequently, the ECB deemed that both banks were failing or likely to fail and duly informed the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which concluded that the conditions for a resolution action in relation to the two banks had not been met. The banks will be wound up under Italian insolvency procedures.



And the ECB provides a little history of its failed efforts to put these banks on the right track:





ECB Banking Supervision has closely monitored the two banks since capital shortfalls were identified by the comprehensive assessment in 2014. Since then, the two banks have struggled to overcome high levels of non-performing loans and underlying challenges to their business models, which resulted in further deterioration of their financial position.



In 2016, the Atlante fund [Italy’s government-sponsored “bad bank” set up in Luxembourg to take toxic assets off Italian banks books] invested approximately €3.5 billion in Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza. However, the financial position of the two banks deteriorated further in 2017.



The ECB had therefore asked the banks to provide a capital plan to ensure compliance with capital requirements. Both banks presented business plans which were deemed not to be credible by the ECB.



So nothing worked. Private sector money stayed away in droves. JP Morgan, which had been recruited to save the Italian banks, threw in the towel. These banks had been zombies for too long. Everybody knew it. But the government kept denying it.


Just weeks ago, Italy’s Minister of Economy Pier Carlo Padoan insisted that the two banks would not be wound down. Last year, to dispel the mountain of evidence to the contrary, he insisted that that there would be no need of any future bail outs; and that, furthermore, Italy did not even have a banking problem.


In early June, the two banks were instructed by the European Commission to raise an additional €1.25 billion in private capital. No one bit. Italy’s government then tried to persuade the European Commission and the ECB to water down the requirement to €600-800 million, and it urged Italian banks to chip in to the bank rescue fund.


All that failed. So this weekend, the Italian government gets to sit down together for a friendly chat to enact the necessary measures to protect depositors and senior bondholders in those two banks. Stockholders will be crushed. Junior bondholders will likely get slammed hard. And the Italian taxpayer might face some additional pain – all of it caused by many years of terrible and reckless bank management. The saga of the long-festering banking crisis has thus moved on to the next chapter.


A new era has begun in Europe. And it started in Spain. Many Banco Popular investors were wiped out. Taxpayers are off the hook. Read…  “Bail-In” Era for Europe’s Banking Crisis Begins

Sunday, June 11, 2017

Is Another Spanish Bank About To Bite The Dust?

Authored by Don Quijones via WolfStreet.com, 


Stockholders and junior bondholders fear another “bail-in.”


After its most tumultuous week since the bailout days of 2012, Spain’s banking system is gripped by a climate of fear, uncertainty and distrust. Rather than allaying investor nerves, the shotgun bail-in and sale of Banco Popular to Santander on Tuesday has merely intensified them. For the first time since the Global Financial Crisis, shareholders and subordinate bondholders of a failing Spanish bank were not bailed out by taxpayers; they took risks in order to make a buck, and they bore the consequences. That’s how it should be. But bank investors don’t like not getting bailed out.


Now they’re worrying it could happen again. As Popular’s final days showed, once confidence and trust in a bank vanishes, it’s almost impossible to restore them. The fear has now spread to Spain’s eighth largest lender, Liberbank, a mini-Bankia that was spawned in 2011 from the forced marriage of three failed cajas (savings banks), Cajastur, Caja de Extremadura and Caja Cantabria.


This creature’s shares were sold to the public in May 2013 at an IPO price of €0.40. By April 2014, they were trading above €2, a massive 400% gain. But by April 2015, shares started sinking. By May 2017, they were trading at around €1.20.


But since the bail-in of Popular, Liberbank’s shares have seriously crashed as panicked investors fled. Scenting fresh blood, short sellers were piling in. On Friday alone, shares plunged another 17%. At one point, they were down 38% before bouncing at the close of trading, much of it driven by the bank’s own share buybacks:



In the last three weeks a whole year’s worth of steadily rising gains on the stock market have been completely wiped out. The main causes of concern are the bank’s high risk profile and low coverage rate. By the close of the first quarter of 2017, Liberbank’s default rate had reached 13%, over three percentage points higher than the national average (9.8%), while its unproductive asset coverage rate was just 42.1%, compared to 47% for Banco Sabadell, 48% for Bankia, 50% for CaixaBank and 55% for Unicaja.


Worse still, the vast bulk of the bank’s unproductive assets are real estate investments. After Popular, it is the Spanish entity with most exposure to toxic real estate assets, according to the financial daily El Confidencial — a remarkable feat given the bank already had the lion’s share of its impaired real estate assets transferred onto the balance sheets of Spain’s “bad bank,” Sareb.


It’s not just the bank’s shares that are feeling the pressure. With the memory of what happened to holders of Popular’s junior, subordinate and convertible debt still fresh in their mind, investors are divesting their exposure to Liberbank’s subordinate debt. On Friday alone the bank’s most recent issuance, dating back to March 2017, generated losses of 9.8%.



Liberbank’s management has responded the only way it can — with a slew of denials. The bank is nothing like Popular, it says. It is solidly solvent and its deposits are safe, which is probably true: even the deposits of Popular’s customers are now safe despite the fact the bank had hemmorhaged €18 billion of deposits in the last few weeks of its truncated existence. It was this frantic run on deposits that ultimately sealed its fate, prompting the ECB to conclude that the bank was “failing or likely to fail.”


Banco Popular’s demise is a stark reminder that Europe’s banking woes are far from resolved, despite the trillions of euros thrown at them. “The message the market is sending is that you have to buy solvent banks and stay away from those that pose high risks,” said Rafael Alonso, an analyst at Bankinter, one of Spain’s more solvent banks.


Another Spanish bank that could be considered to pose high risks is Unicaja, the product of another merger of failed cajas that is (or at least was) scheduled to launch its IPO some time in June or July. As things currently stand, the timing could not be worse. The greater the uncertainty over Liberbank’s future, the lower the projected valuation of Unicaja’s IPO falls. Before Popular’s forced bail-in and acquisition, the Unicaja was valued at around €2.3 billion; now, just days later, it’s valued at less than €1.9 billion. If the trend continues, the IPO will almost certainly be shelved.


As for Liberbank, if things don’t improve soon and investor nerves aren’t steadied, it too could find itself on the ECB’s Single Resolution Board’s chopping board. Perhaps it too will be sold for €1 to a much larger bank that, like Santander, is able to raise billions of euros of new funds at the drop of a hat, with other too-big-to-fail banks like UBS and Citibank more than happy to lend a helping hand. And just like that, another smaller bank would bite the dust while the biggest banks get bigger and ever more dominating in the market.


Many Banco Popular investors wiped out. Taxpayers off the hook. What it means for Italy. Read…  “Bail-In” Era for Europe’s Banking Crisis Begins

Friday, June 9, 2017

This Is How A "Bail-Out" Becomes A "Bail-In"

Authored by Simon Black via SovereignMan.com,



Here’s the perfect example of how insane our financial system has become.


It was announced yesterday that, after a 24-hour white-knuckled ride, Spanish banking giant Banco Popular had been sold to Banco Santander for the price of just 1 euro.


Note- that’s 1 euro in TOTAL. Not 1 euro per share.


Banco Popular had once been one of Spain’s largest banks.


But just as certain banks tend to do from time to time, Popular sacrificed responsibility and good conduct for quick profits.


They spent years gambling their depositors’ savings away on idiotic, dangerous, pitiful loans. And those bad loans eventually came back to bite them.


The modern business of banking is all about pooling customer deposits together and making various loans and investments with those funds.


Safe, responsible banks make sensible investments.


They maintain extremely high loan standards. And they keep a SUBSTANTIAL rainy day fund set aside in case those loans and investments go bad.


Banco Popular did none of those things.


Back in 2006 during the height of the real estate bubble, for example, Popular maintained a liquidity ratio of less than 2% according to its annual report that year.


This means that over 98% of its customers’ savings had been gambled away on bad loans and bad speculations.


Eventually those risky loans started failing, and the bank started losing money.


Last year alone Popular lost 3.5 billion euros, which is about as much as they earned in all of the bubble years combined.


Fearing for the banks ability to continue servicing its customers, European regulators stepped in on Tuesday and forced a fire sale.


Banco Santander “won” that auction, again, paying a symbolic price of just 1 euro.


This means that Banco Santander will now inherit all the toxic loans (and consequent losses) that Popular had on its books.


The insanity here is that Santander had almost no time to conduct its due diligence, i.e. research the business to understand what they were buying.


Banco Popular had a balance sheet worth over $150 billion with hundreds of thousands of different loans.


It would take months to even begin scratching the surface of such a massive balance sheet.


By comparison, the last time I bought a business I paid $6 million and spent more than a year conducting due diligence.


Santander bought a $150 billion business and spent less than 24 hours trying to understand what they were buying.


This is nuts. And ENORMOUSLY risky for Santander.


But perhaps even more insane is that this deal is now being hailed by European governments and financial media as a wonderful solution to the looming problem of bank insolvency.


It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to understand that this problem wasn’t really solved.


It was just transferred from one bank to another. The assets are still toxic. They just happen to be owned by Santander now.


Most importantly, Banco Popular is FAR from alone.


Here in Italy, in fact, a number of smaller banks are teetering on insolvency.


And regulators have been scrambling trying to find potential suitors to copy this shotgun wedding ‘solution’.


But so far, no success.


Not a single bank in Italy has sufficient capital to absorb the toxic debts of another.


Plus the government itself is totally bankrupt.


So basically an insolvent government and insolvent large banks are trying to figure out how to bail out insolvent smaller banks.


It’s total madness.


And this is the important lesson: eventually they run out of options.


There’s no one left to bail out a bad bank… no taxpayers, no white knight, no bondholders, no shareholders. Nobody.


Except for depositors.


This is when a “bail out” becomes a “bail in”, and the depositors get stuck with the bill.


Bottom line: This matters. It’s your money at stake.


Don’t simply assume that your bank is in good condition. Examine their financial statements and find out for sure.


Don’t keep 100% of your life’s savings at a single institution. Make sure you diversify. If a bail-in ever occurs, it will be the largest depositors who get hit first.


And definitely consider diversifying geographically. Avoid keeping everything in the same country, especially if that country is bankrupt– the bail-in risk is much higher.


The world is a big place and there’s a ton of opportunity out there, including plenty of responsible, conservative places to bank.


And it’s hard to imagine you’ll be worse off because a portion of your savings is in a safe, well-capitalized bank.

Monday, March 20, 2017

EU Taxpayers Brace As Deepening Banking Crisis Means Euro-TARP Looms

Authored by Don Quijones via WolfStreet.com, 


If the ECB scales back stimulus, banks face even greater risk of collapse. But now there’s a new solution


Events are moving so fast in Europe these days, it’s almost impossible to keep up. While much of the attention is being hogged by political developments, including the election in the Netherlands, Reuters published a report warning that the European banking sector may face even higher bad loan risks if the ECB begins to scale back its monetary stimulus programs, something it has already begun, albeit extremely tentatively.


The total stock of non-performing loans (NPL) in the EU is estimated at over €1 trillion, or 5.4% of total loans, a ratio three times higher than in other major regions of the world.


On a country-by-country basis, things look even scarier. Currently 10 (out of 28) EU countries have an NPL ratio above 10% (orders of magnitude higher than what is generally considered safe). And among Eurozone countries, where the ECB’s monetary policies have direct impact, there are these NPL stalwarts:


  • Ireland: 15.8%

  • Italy: 16.6%

  • Portugal: 19.2%

  • Slovenia: 19.7%

  • Greece: 46.6%

  • Cyprus: 49%

That bears repeating: in Greece and Cyprus, two of the Eurozone’s most bailed out economies, virtually half of all the bank loans are toxic.


Then there’s Italy, whose €350 billion of NPLs account for roughly a third of Europe’s entire bad debt stock. Italy’s government and financial sector have spent the last year and a half failing spectacularly to come up with a solution to the problem. The two “bad bank” funds they created to help clean up the banks’ toxic balance sheets, Atlante I and Atlante II, are the financial equivalent of bringing a butter knife to a machete fight. So underfunded are they, they even strugggled to hold aloft smaller, regional Italian banks like Veneto Banca and Popolare di Vicenza, which are now pleading for a bailout from Rome, which in turn is pleading for clemency from Brussels.


What little funds Atlante I and Atlante II have left are hemorrhaging value as the “assets” they’ve been used to buy up, invariably at prices that were way too high (often at over 40 cents on the euro), continue to deteriorate. The recent decision of Italy’s two biggest banks, Unicredit and Intesa Sao Paolo, to significantly write down their investment in Atlante is almost certain to discourage the private sector from pumping fresh funds into bailing out weaker banks.


Which means someone else must step in, and soon. And that someone is almost certain to be the European taxpayer.


In February ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio called for the creation of a whole new class of government-backed “bad banks” to help buy some of the €1 trillion of bad loans putrefying on bank balance sheets. Constancio’s idea bore a striking resemblance to a formal proposal put forward by the European Banking Authority (EBA) for the creation of a massive EU-wide bad bank that, in the words of EBA president Andrea Enria, would “make it much easier to achieve critical mass and to create a well functioning market for (impaired) assets.”


Here’s how it would work, according to Enria (emphasis added):





The banks would sell their non-performing loans to the asset management company at a price reflecting the real economic value of the loans, which is likely to be below the book value, but above the market price currently prevailing in illiquid markets. So the banks will likely have to take additional losses.



The asset manager would then have three years to sell those assets to private investors. There would be a guarantee from the member state of each bank transferring assets to the asset management company, underpinned by warrants on each bank’s equity. This would protect the asset management company from future losses if the final sale price is below the initial transfer price.



One of the biggest advantages of launching an EU-wide bad bank is that it would avoid the sort of public “resistance” that would occur if it was done at a national level, says Enria. Italian lenders would presumably be able to continuing pricing bad loans at or around 40 cents on the euro on average, even though their real value — i.e. the current value priced by the market — is often much lower. The difference between the market price, if any, and the price the banks end up receiving for their bad debt will be covered by Europe’s taxpayers.


If given the green light, the scheme would pave the way to the biggest one-off bail out of European banks in history. It would be Euro-TARP on angel dust, with even fewer checks and balances and much less likelihood of ever recovering taxpayer funds. According to a banker source cited by Reuters, while Germany has not yet endorsed the EBA plan, the EU documents describe the development of a secondary market for NPLs as a priority. According to Enria, the EBA hopes to finalize matters “at the European level” in the Spring.


The documents also include proposals for a wider “restructuring of banking sectors” as states address the NPLs problem. This “could lead to mergers among EU banks after they offload their bad loans,” a banking industry official said.


In other words, EU taxpayers would have to spend potentially hundreds of billions of euros saving yet more banks from the consequences of their own acts and bail out their bondholders and potentially their stockholders too, with funds desperately needed in other areas. Those banks, once saved and their balance sheets cleansed, would then be handed on a platter to much bigger banks. In return, taxpayers would end up with an even more concentrated, consolidated, interconnected financial system that is even more prone to abuse, corruption, and excess.


The ECB’s policy isn’t about creating inflation but about keeping a financial system and a currency union from collapsing upon each other. Read…  ECB Trapped in its Own “Doom Loop” as Inflation Surges

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Revisiting the Breakdown of the Macro Drivers Behind Bitcoin's Price Spike, Exactly As I Foretold 30 Day Ago

The PBOC has been expending an unprecedented amount of resources in the form of it"s FX reserves in an attempt to support the Renminbi (this article assumes you"ve read "The Macro Truth About The Bitcoin" article, if you haven"t its a prerequisite). The initial deployment of this capital to force CNY onshore caused violent capital repatriation. The result was rapid drop in BTC, as those who used CNY to purchase it were put in a predicament where CNY was too expensive to hold offshore. Long story, short, the PBOC succeeded in its goals short term. But... and there is always a but, did so at a cost. The amount of capital being deployed to manipulate the markets is quite significant, and it is now showing - exactly as I anticipated 30 days. ago - to wit:


The problem is, when you have to go to such extreme measures to draw currency back into the country, it becomes quite obvious to the prudent speculator that... 


$CNY #Yuan leaking from China into $BTC #blockchain, nearly $20M per hour, showing power of public blockchain & #Bitcoin in capital controls pic.twitter.com/T3mxP6OEkb


— ReggieMiddleton (@ReggieMiddleton) January 3, 2017


Seeing is believing... 



2017 promises to be a tumultous year of geopolitical uncertainty and macro risk. This is an environment in which Bitcoin thrives. 



 China"s remnimbi has finally received reserve currency status, but with said status comes certain responsbilities that is running counter to the controlling methods China has employed in the past. Oh no! It"s.... the Trilemma!




 





 Mucho yuan fiat was leaking (gushing?) into the bitcoin blockchain. Bitcoin"s blockchain is already a global, anitfragile, counterparty risk-free P2P value exchange. This is what our technology, Veritaseum, is built upon.



 Here, I warned that the Chinese government would likely step in. Quite the prescient comment, since lo and hehold several days later... 


Chinese Regulators Exploring Bitcoin Connection to Capital Flight, and then we got China to Restrict Bitcoin Marketing, But Blockchain Firms Unaffected. Again, I was right on point!Restrict Bitcoin Marketing, But Blockchain Firms Unaffected



 As I"ve been warnng, think tanks and research firms interviewed by Bloomberg agree.



 Reference my notes above...



 This is something you dont" see in the mainstream media or most research notes. If China doesn"t completely shut down bitcoin AND get the cooperation of other major offshore centers, any half assed attempt will simply increase the draw to bitcoin due to its very unique properties. China can actually usher in the P2P economy, by mistake. Reference  The Onramp to Peer-to-Peer Capital Markets...




 Uh huh...



 Again, I reiterate the significant and material macro component in Bitcoin adoption, use and pricing...



This is the point, chronologically, where I warned about the BTC pullback... 





For those (apparently the majority of the punditry who choose to opine) who don"t know what Bitcoin is.... 



 





BTC 1 7 17 picsay


Even with the pullback and (now, 15%) drop, Bitcoin has performed very well.... 



I"ve seen reports on the ground in China that way capital control avoidance was not a major contributor to Bitcoin activity. Well, the evidence that I"ve found says otherwise. 




Here comes the benefit of doing macro analysis. It all fits in... 



 China is painting itself into a corner with thier old school policies on capital controls... The amount of money they are spending is stupendous. The problems is, no matter how much they spend, the fundamentals are still going to be the fundamentals.



Of course, in the short run, their brute force methodology is working as yuan spikes and availability offshore dwindles. 



Here you go... 



I suppose a little strongarming doesn"t hurt, no? 



The problem is, when you have to go to such extreme measures to draw currency back into the country, it becomse quite obvious to the prudent speculator that... 



Like I said earlier it will obviously work for the short run, but in the medium term, look out below! 



The Chinse are painting themselves into a tight corner, and telegraphing it to boot.


 





This is probably the most important tweet of the series. The FUNDAMENTALS HAVE NOT CHANGED!!! No matter how much money China spends, or how draconian they decide to become to trap capital, it"s all about the fundamentals, silly! 



 thumb Chinas foreign reserves drop



 This is the Trilemma in effect!





We"ve seen this movie a few decades before. Remember when the Band of England was determined to join the EMU by any means necessary? They said they would defend the pound no matter what, foolishly and simultanesouly telegrpaphing the promise to feed trades from macro funds such as Soros & Co. all day long. So guess what? That"s exactly what happened until the BOE tapped out, permanently pushed out of the EMU. As it turned out, that was actually a good thing for the Brits, but that"s a story for another time. If you really must here the reason, view...


 thumb Soros breaking BOE




And now, China is paying the piper, exactly as I have foretold, Bank of England style when Soros manipulated their folly. Reference Reuters - China FX reserves fall $99.5 bln in Jan:


Feb 7 China"s foreign exchange reserves, the world"s largest, fell by $99.5 billion in January, the central bank said in a statement on Sunday. Foreign reserves fell to $3.23 trillion at the of January, the lowest level since May 2012. The figure was higher than a Reuters poll forecast of $3.20 trillion. China"s gold reserves rose to $63.57 billion at the end of January, from $60.19 billion at the end of 2015, the People"s Bank of China said on its website. Gold volume stood at 57.18 million fine troy ounces at the end of January, up from 56.66 million fine troy ounces in December. China"s International Monetary Fund (IMF) reserve position was at $3.76 billion at the end of January, down from $4.55 billion in the previous month. The bank held $10.27 billion of IMF Special Drawing Rights at the end of last month, compared with $10.28 billion at the end of 2015. 


This is what that looks like graphically...


PBOC fx reserves


And just as BTC got whacked when the offshore CNY liquidity got tight, the visibility that China may not be able to keep this up for long loosened the reigns - just as I told you exactly 30 days ago...


btccny


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Sunday, January 8, 2017

The Macro Truth About The Big Bitcoin Pop and Drop: The Mainstream Media Doesn't Have A Clue


Bitcoin has dropped precipitously, and as is usual, we have the cacophony of instant digital currency pundits cackling about as if they had a clue. This is the inaugural post for the re-opening of BoomBustBlog"s proprietary research (fresh paid content will be added over the next 24 hrs) and as such I want to kick it off with an indepth analysis of my Twitter stream on Bitcoin from this week.




 Bitcoin has been on a tear in 2016, particularly for the second half. 2017 started off strong, a bit too strong, so a pullback was obvious and inevitable. This is what I Tweeted on the 4th. If I"m not mistaken, it pulled back on the 5th. 



Of course, previous to that it roared. It actually roared for macro and fundamental reasons that many "experts" insisted on denying. 



Seeing is believing... 



2017 promises to be a tumultous year of geopolitical uncertainty and macro risk. This is an environment in which Bitcoin thrives. 



 China"s remnimbi has finally received reserve currency status, but with said status comes certain responsbilities that is running counter to the controlling methods China has employed in the past. Oh no! It"s.... the Trilemma!




 





 Mucho yuan fiat was leaking (gushing?) into the bitcoin blockchain. Bitcoin"s blockchain is already a global, anitfragile, counterparty risk-free P2P value exchange. This is what our technology, Veritaseum, is built upon.



 Here, I warned that the Chinese government would likely step in. Quite the prescient comment, since lo and hehold several days later... 


Chinese Regulators Exploring Bitcoin Connection to Capital Flight, and then we got China to Restrict Bitcoin Marketing, But Blockchain Firms Unaffected. Again, I was right on point!Restrict Bitcoin Marketing, But Blockchain Firms Unaffected



 As I"ve been warnng, think tanks and research firms interviewed by Bloomberg agree.



 Reference my notes above...



 This is something you dont" see in the mainstream media or most research notes. If China doesn"t completely shut down bitcoin AND get the cooperation of other major offshore centers, any half assed attempt will simply increase the draw to bitcoin due to its very unique properties. China can actually usher in the P2P economy, by mistake. Reference  The Onramp to Peer-to-Peer Capital Markets...




 Uh huh...



 Again, I reiterate the significant and material macro component in Bitcoin adoption, use and pricing...



This is the point, chronologically, where I warned about the BTC pullback... 





For those (apparently the majority of the punditry who choose to opine) who don"t know what Bitcoin is.... 



 





BTC 1 7 17 picsay


Even with the pullback and (now, 15%) drop, Bitcoin has performed very well.... 



I"ve seen reports on the ground in China that way capital control avoidance was not a major contributor to Bitcoin activity. Well, the evidence that I"ve found says otherwise. 




Here comes the benefit of doing macro analysis. It all fits in... 



 China is painting itself into a corner with thier old school policies on capital controls... The amount of money they are spending is stupendous. The problems is, no matter how much they spend, the fundamentals are still going to be the fundamentals.



Of course, in the short run, their brute force methodology is working as yuan spikes and availability offshore dwindles. 



Here you go... 



I suppose a little strongarming doesn"t hurt, no? 



The problem is, when you have to go to such extreme measures to draw currency back into the country, it becomse quite obvious to the prudent speculator that... 



Like I said earlier it will obviously work for the short run, but in the medium term, look out below! 



The Chinse are painting themselves into a tight corner, and telegraphing it to boot.


 





This is probably the most important tweet of the series. The FUNDAMENTALS HAVE NOT CHANGED!!! No matter how much money China spends, or how draconian they decide to become to trap capital, it"s all about the fundamentals, silly! 



 thumb Chinas foreign reserves drop



 This is the Trilemma in effect!





We"ve seen this movie a few decades before. Remember when the Band of England was determined to join the EMU by any means necessary? They said they would defend the pound no matter what, foolishly and simultanesouly telegrpaphing the promise to feed trades from macro funds such as Soros & Co. all day long. So guess what? That"s exactly what happened until the BOE tapped out, permanently pushed out of the EMU. As it turned out, that was actually a good thing for the Brits, but that"s a story for another time. If you really must here the reason, view...


 thumb Soros breaking BOE