Saudis Call Missile Attack "Blatant Act Of Aggression" By Iran, "Could Be Considered Act Of War"

War is coming...

This weekend"s chaos in the middle east just got considerably more serious.

Yesterday we detailed reports that the Saudis intercepted a ballistic missile over the nation"s capital Riyadh...

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At the time, Al Jazeera reported that Yemen"s Houthi rebels claimed responsibility for the attack, saying they launched the Yemeni-made, long-range ballistic missile Burqan 2-H (with a range of 500 kilometers) from the Saudi-Yemeni border before being intercepted.

But tonight, according to a statement from the Saudi coailition carried by the state-run Saudi Press Agency, the missile that targeted Riyadh has been called "a direct military aggresion" by Iran against Sauid Arabia,  that "could rise to be considered an act of war." Furthermore, the Saudi-led coalition has closed all Yemen"s land, sea and air ports after missile targeted Riyadh.

Following on what the Coalition had previously announced regarding the ballistic missiles launched by the Iranian-controlled Houthi militias from within Yemeni territory that targeted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the most recent of which was the flagrant military aggression by the Iranian-controlled Houthi militias which targeted the city of Riyadh on November 11, 2017 (Corresponding to 15/2/1439 Hijri) using a ballistic missile with a range of more than 900 Km.

 

And, after the thorough examination of the debris of these missiles, including the missile launched on July 22, 2017 (Corresponding to 28/10/1438 Hijri) by experts in military technology, has confirmed the role of Iran"s regime in manufacturing these missiles and smuggling them to the Houthi militias in Yemen for the purpose of attacking the Kingdom, its people, and vital interests.

 

The Coalition"s command considers the Iranian regime"s action in supplying the Houthi militias that it commands with these missiles to be a blatant violation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions that prohibit nations from arming these militias, specifically UNSC Resolution (2216). Further, Iran"s role and its direct command of its Houthi proxy in this matter constitutes a clear act of aggression that targets neighboring countries, and threatens peace and security in the region and globally.

 

Therefore, the Coalition"s Command considers this a blatant act of military aggression by the Iranian regime, and could rise to be considered as an act of war against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and thus affirms the legitimate right of the Kingdom to defend its territory and people in accordance with Article (51) of the U.N. Charter. The Coalition Command also affirms that the Kingdom reserves its right to respond to Iran in the appropriate time and manner, in accordance with international law and based upon the right of self-defense, including the defense of its territory, its people, and its vital interests, which is enshrined in international agreements and conventions including the UN Charter.

 

To address the vulnerabilities in the current inspection procedures that led to the continuation of the supply of ballistic missiles and military equipment to the Houthi militias which enabled them to continue to commit crimes against the Kingdom, the Yemeni people, and the peoples of countries in the region, which constitutes blatant violations to international humanitarian laws, the Coalition’s Command has decided to temporarily close all Yemeni ground, air, and sea ports. These measures will be implemented while taking into consideration the continuation of the entry and exit of humanitarian supplies and crews in accordance with the Coalition’s updated procedures.

 

The Coalition Command calls upon all relevant parties to adhere to the inspections, entry, and exit procedures to and from Yemeni ports of entry designated by the Coalition that will be announced later. All necessary legal steps will be taken against violators of these procedures. The Coalition Command calls upon the brethren Yemeni people and all civilian and humanitarian crews to avoid areas of combat operations, areas populated by the Houthi armed militia, areas and ports exploited by this Iranian-controlled militia to smuggle weapons, and areas from which this militia launch its attacks against the Kingdom. The Coalition also calls upon diplomatic missions to avoid areas that are not controlled by the Legitimate Government of Yemen.

 

The Coalition Command calls upon the international community and the United Nations Security Council including the sanctions committee established by the Council for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 2216, to take all necessary legal measures to hold Iran accountable for its violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, primarily resolution 2216, in addition to its violations of provisions and principles of international law that criminalize the aggression against other states, due to: Iran"s direct involvement in the unlawful smuggling of weapons to the Houthi Militia under its control, which threatens international peace and security; its aggression against the territory and people of Saudi Arabia and other neighboring countries; and its continued support for the Houthi militia in violation of international resolutions that aim to restore legitimacy in Yemen.

The timing is fascinating.

What better way to get the price of oil up before an Aramco IPO - which President Trump just happened to mention out of the blue.

And amid increasing evidence of Saudi rapprochement with Russia and China - and the growing de-dollarization of the anti-unipolar world - a Saudi war with Iran would require the latter to be supported by Washington to survive... which perhaps could be quid pro quo for ending any chatter about the death of the petrodollar.

President Trump"s Confidence In Missile Defense Is A Dangerous Illusion

Authored by Andrei Akulov via The Strategic Culture Foundation,

The US is pushing ahead with expansion of the nation’s homeland ballistic missile defense (BMD). The effort enjoys strong bipartisan support in Congress and among experts. Many allies place a high value on BMD cooperation with the United States. However, there are ample reasons to question the efficiency of US missile defenses, especially the capability to protect against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

“We have missiles that can knock out a missile in the air 97% of the time,” President Donald Trump said in his interview with Fox News on October 11, adding “and if you send two of them, it’s going to get knocked down.” He was talking about the threat coming from North Korea to be repelled by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) in Alaska and California – the $40 billion project administered by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

The US military conducted the first-ever missile defense test involving a simulated attack by an intercontinental ballistic missile in May. The ICBM-type target was fired from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands toward the waters just south of Alaska. The mission was to prepare for countering an intercontinental missile launched by North Korea. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) described the test as an “incredible accomplishment”. According to Vice Admiral Jim Syring, director of the agency, “This system is vitally important to the defense of our homeland, and this test demonstrates that we have a capable, credible deterrent against a very real threat.” The assessment appears to be exaggerated as the test was not conducted in a realistic environment.

The next test of the GMD system is scheduled for late 2018 and, for the first time, will involve firing two interceptors against one ICBM target. It makes unsubstantiated the president’s affirmation that two interceptors are enough to knock out a North Korean missile as no such tests have been conducted so far.

The US currently deploys 36 interceptors – 32 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. By the end of 2017, there will be 44 deployed GBIs. A majority of the interceptors use the CE-I variant of kill vehicle that has scored only two successes in four tests. At least ten interceptors are to be equipped with the CE-II Block I vehicle, which has had two successful intercept tests in three tries.

It is generally believed that it takes at least four-five interceptors to hit the target. It means President Trump is off base saying the hit probability is 97%. Prior to the ICBM test, the GMD system had successfully hit its target in only ten of 18 tests since 1999. A success rate is about 56%, not 97%. But even 56% is almost certainly an overstatement, given the less-than-realistic nature of the tests.

A success rate for four-five interceptors per target may be 97% but the possibility that each successive interceptor’s chance of successful kill might not be independent of the previous one, due to correlated factors such as design shortcomings, leading to a lower overall success rate. Nevertheless, President Trump believes each interceptor has a single-shot probability of kill (SSPK) for a given interceptor of 97% (rather than 56%).

According to the Washington Post, “No single interceptor for ICBMs has demonstrated a 97-percent success rate, and there is no guarantee using two interceptors has a 100-percent success rate. Moreover, the military’s suggestion that it could achieve a 97-percent success rate with four interceptors appears based on faulty assumptions and overenthusiastic math. The odds of success under the most ideal conditions are no better than 50-50, and likely worse, as documented in detailed government assessment.”

Joe Cirincione, the President of Ploughshares Fund and the author of Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late, investigated anti-missile programs for almost 10 years as professional staff on the House Armed Services and Government Operations Committees. He believes that “If people took a close look at just one of these interceptor tests, they would likely conclude, as I did, that the tests bear little resemblance to real-world conditions.”

If North Korea fired an ICBM - or multiple ICBMs - at the United States, the GMD with its Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) is only one system that could take a shot at intercepting and destroying the warhead outside the earth’s atmosphere in midcourse flight. Other missile defense systems such as THAAD and Aegis are in no position to hit ICBMs as they’re designed for other classes of targets.

With only one test against an ICBM, the MDA is not even close to demonstrating that the system works in a real-world setting. The GMD systems have not yet been tested in the range of conditions under which it is expected to operate. No tests have been conducted at night or against complex countermeasures, such as electronic countermeasures and decoys. The tests are always rigged because the intercept team knows the timing and trajectory of the incoming missile. But even the scripted tests have often failed. What has been done so far is insufficient to demonstrate that an operational BMD capability really exists.

The US has not publicly conducted any tests to see whether the missile-defense radars can distinguish a missile from chaff. Even cheap inflatable balloons can make all intercept efforts go down the drain. With no air resistance (or drag) in space, a decoy like a balloon shaped like a nuclear warhead could travel in the same way as the true warhead, making it difficult for a missile to distinguish the real thing from the decoy. Balloons are light enough to enable a sophisticated warhead launch 20 or 30 decoy balloons to obscure the path of the warhead, swamping the defense system with fake signals.

In February and April 2016, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed that the MDA has not “demonstrated through flight testing that it can defend the US homeland against the current missile defense threat,” relying on “a highly optimistic, aggressive schedule” to upgrade the system.

The US abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, which greatly obstructed arms control process. Efficient or not, the US current and potential BMD capability is taken into consideration to influence Russia’s military planning. It provokes Moscow into taking countermeasures to respond to BMD plans and negatively affects the prospects for future Russia-US arms control agreements. With uncertainties raised about the strict balance of arms agreed upon in New START, a chain reaction is triggered leading to arms race.

Philip Giraldi, a highly respected expert and the Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, believes that the American people are being fooled by the administration, which tries to make them think that a nuclear war is thinkable. According to him, “If that is the message being sent by the White House, it would encourage further reckless adventurism on the part of the national security state.” Mr. Giraldi hit the nail right on the head. The GMD effort creates a dangerous illusion that a victory in a nuclear conflict is achievable and no money should be spared to spur the implementation of the MDA plans. In reality, the US defense industry is the only benefactor while the taxpayers throw money into the drain. The result: further erosion of arms control and reduced security.

Are We Really Capable Of Shooting Down North Korean Missiles?

Authored by Daisy Luther via The Organic Prepper blog,

According to some analysts, Americans may be overly confident in our military’s ability to shoot down North Korean missiles if the country were to attempt to strike.

Maybe the reason we haven’t shot down North Korea’s test missiles is that we can’t. While we all certainly hope that our military would be able to successfully defend the country against incoming missiles, we need to be prepared for any possibility.

According to an article by Joe Cirincione of Defense One, the reason we don’t shoot down North Korea’s missiles when they fire them over Japan is because…

We don’t have the capability.

Joe Cirincione is the president of Ploughshares Fund and the author of several books about nuclear weapons, including Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late.

According to Cirincione, when Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said, “We didn’t intercept it because no damage to Japanese territory was expected,” this was only partially true. It wasn’t a threat, but they didn’t have the capability to shoot it down due to the altitude.

Neither Japan nor the United States could have intercepted the missile. None of the theater ballistic missile defense weapons in existence can reach that high. It is hundreds of kilometers too high for the Aegis interceptors deployed on Navy ships off Japan. Even higher for the THAAD systems in South Korea and Guam. Way too high for the Patriot systems in Japan, which engage largely within the atmosphere.

All of these are basically designed to hit a missile in the post-mid-course or terminal phase, when it is on its way down, coming more or less straight at the defending system. Patriot is meant to protect relatively small areas such as ports or air bases; THAADdefends a larger area; the advanced Aegis system theoretically could defend thousands of square kilometers. (source)

Well, that’s unsettling. So, what if we engaged the missile before it reached that high?

Cirincione says that too is unlikely to be successful.

There is almost no chance of hitting a North Korean missile on its way up unless an Aegis ship was deployed very close to the launch point, perhaps in North Korean waters.

Even then, it would have to chase the missile, a race it is unlikely to win. In the only one or two minutes of warning time any system would have, the probability of a successful engagement drops close to zero. (source)

But don’t take Cirincione’s word for it. In his article, he cited other experts who echo his sentiments.  Jonathon McDowell, an astronomer at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, tweeted in response to someone questioning why we didn’t shoot down NK’s missiles:

As well, he quoted Jerry Doyle, deputy business editor for Asia at The New York Times:

“It’s actually virtually impossible to shoot down a missile on the way up. Midcourse or terminal are the only places you have a shot.” (source)

While I’m not sure how a business editor has special knowledge of our nuclear defense system, all of these sentiments certainly raise the question:

IF WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO SHOOT DOWN NORTH KOREAN MISSILES, WHY HAVEN’T WE DONE SO?

If we attempted to shoot down a North Korean missile and missed, it would be a major propaganda coup for Kim Jong Un.

When our military practiced this, they managed to shoot down 2 out of 3 missiles.

A lot of people are putting a great deal of hope in American missile defense systems, but it’s important to note that a couple of weeks ago in a test over the Pacific, our defense system failed. This was subsequent to a previous success.

A medium-range ballistic missile was launched from a test range in Hawaii at 7:20 pm local time, but the interceptor missile fired at sea from USS John Paul Jones, a guided-missile destroyer, missed the target.

 

“A planned intercept was not achieved,” the statement said. (source)

That’s disconcerting. After the failed test, there was a third test which was successful, but it’s very important to realize that our military isn’t infallible. If our rate is 2 out of 3 missiles shot down, that means that 1 out of 3 still gets through and wreaks destruction.

So, could we actually shoot down a missile “gift package” as Kim Jong Un creepily calls it?

The unsettling answer is, maybe.

Maybe, if we were expecting it, if the conditions were right, if we were close enough, if it was low enough, if we were in a perfect position.

There are way too many “ifs” in there for me to feel fully confident in our ability to shoot down North Korean missiles before they strike the mainland, which experts now believe they have the ability to reach. We also know that North Korea also possesses the ability to create hydrogen bombs. And as I’ve written before, if you believe this is all a big set up for a false flag event, that would hardly matter to those nearby if such a thing were to happen.

If you aren’t prepped for the potential of a nuclear strike, it’s time to start learning what you need to do. (This article and this class can help you.)

Can The U.S. Intercept A North Korean Missile?

North Korea"s nuclear program has gathered serious and frightening momentum over the past few months, culminating in the isolated regime test-firing a missile over Japan in August and detonating a hydrogen bomb last Sunday. As diplomatic efforts stall, Statista"s Niall McCarthy points out that eyes are turning to the region"s missile-defense technology.

Despite it being South Korea"s first line of defense against a nuclear attack, the U.S. Army"s THAAD system has proven controversial in the country with residents fearful the areas surrounding the launchers could become North Korean targets. The most recent nuclear test has prompted the country"s defense ministry to deploy the four remaining THAAD launchers, on top of the two already in operation.

That decision may turn out to be well-founded, considering that the THAAD system has a 100 percent success rate in test interceptions. That"s according to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, who say the system hit 13 targets in 13 attempts up to May 2017 (as well as another successful test since then).

You will find more statistics at Statista

Countries in the region can also count on the Aegis missile system fitted to U.S. and Japanese naval vessels. Its Raytheon Standard missiles cannot currently engage ICBMs but they are capable of destroying ballistic missiles. They have proven reasonably reliable in tests, destroying 35 targets and failing on seven occasions.

The U.S. Patriot surface to air missile system is also used by South Korea and Japan. When it is used to engage missiles, it has a shorter range and is more effective protecting strategic targets rather than larger areas. Despite controversy regarding the system"s record intercepting Iraqi SCUD missiles during the Gulf War, anti-missile tests have generally proven successful.

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense is responsible for defending North America by intercepting incoming warheads in space during the midcourse phase of ballistic trajectory. So far, however, the system has proven far from reliable with only 10 out of a total of 18 tests ending in success.

Israel has demonstrated how far missile defense technology has evolved, deploying its Iron Dome system with great success.

As North Korea continues testing and sabre-ratting, the U.S. and its allies will be hoping their own defenses won"t be put to a far greater test.

Turkey "Turns Away" From NATO, Buys Russian Advanced Missile System For $2.5 Billion

In a move that Bloomberg has defined as "signalling a turn away from the NATO military alliance that has anchored Turkey to the West for more than six decades" Turkey agreed to pay $2.5 billion to acquire Russia’s most advanced missile defense system, a senior Turkish official told Bloomberg on Thursday. The proposed deal which was first reported here back in November 2016, has been finalized and the preliminary agreement sees Turkey receiving two S-400 missile batteries from Russia within the next year, then producing another two inside Turkey.

For Ankara, which has had a dramatic falling out with its NATO partners over the past year, the missile deal with Russia “is a clear sign that Turkey is disappointed in the U.S. and Europe,” said Konstantin Makienko, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow think-tank. “But until the advance is paid and the assembly begins, we can’t be sure of anything.” Furthermore, the Russian system would not be compatible with other NATO defense systems, but just as importantly wouldn’t be subject to constraints imposed by the alliance, which prevent Turkey from deploying such systems on the Armenian border, Aegean coast or Greek border. The Russian deal would allow Turkey to deploy the missile defense systems anywhere in the country, a move which will prompt a cry of outrage from Turkey"s neighbors, especially Greece.

So what does Turkey get in exchange for $2.5 billion? First and foremost, Russia"s most advanced technology or know-how, a Turkish official quoted by Bloomberg said. Turkey wants to be able to produce its own advanced defense systems, and the Russian agreement to allow two of the S-400 batteries to be produced in Turkey would serve that aim. For Russia there is little to lose from the deal as the US most likely already has the full details of the system, however they are obviously kept secret from US NATO allies, especially someone as volatile as Turkey.

“There are a lot of different levels of technology transfer,” and any offer to Turkey would probably be limited in terms of sophistication, said Makienko, the Moscow-based analyst. For Russia, the potential risk from the transaction contained: “For Turkey to be able to copy the S-400 system, it would have to spend billions to create a whole new industry.”

According to Bloomberg, the S-400 is designed to detect, track and then destroy aircraft, drones or missiles. It’s Russia’s most advanced integrated air defense system, and can hit targets as far as 250 miles away. Russia has also agreed to sell them to China and India, both nations who are masters at reverse engineering.

As further reported, Turkey and Russia are currently sorting out technical details and it could take about one year to finalize the project, although one battery may be available earlier if Russia decides to divert it from another country. The missiles are not ready to sell off-the-shelf and Russia will have to produce the batteries before delivering them.

Most concerning for NATO, however is that the systems delivered to Turkey would not have a friend-or-foe identification system, which means they could be deployed against any threat without restriction.

Meanwhile, news of the deal are likely to strain relations between Turkey and NATO to the point of breaking, if not beyond. Disagreements between Turkey, which has the second-largest army by personnel numbers in NATO, and the U.S., the bloc’s biggest military, have also impacted business. No U.S. companies bid for a Turkish attack helicopter contract in 2006 after Turkey insisted on full access to specific software codes, which the U.S. refused to share, considering it a security risk. Turkey partnered with Italy instead in a $3 billion project to co-produce 50 attack helicopters for its army.

And now, very symbolically, it has picked the sworn enemy of NATO: Russia.

There is still a chance, however slim, that the deal will fall apart:

Turkey has reached the point of an agreement on a missile defense system before, only to scupper the deal later amid protests and condemnation from NATO. Under pressure from the U.S., Turkey gave up an earlier plan to buy a similar missile-defense system from a state-run Chinese company, which had been sanctioned by the U.S. for alleged missile sales to Iran.

That said, such an outcome is unlikely as it will be seen as caving to Erdogan"s hard-knuckled negotiating style, something a "resurgent" Europe under the new ownership of Merkel and Macron will not allow.

US Missile Defense Test: Realistic Assessment Of "Incredible Accomplishment"

Authored by Andrei Akulov via The Strategic Culture Foundation,

«The intercept of a complex, threat-representative ICBM target is an incredible accomplishment for the GMD system and a critical milestone for this program», said Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Vice Adm. Jim Syring. «This system is vitally important to the defense of our homeland, and this test demonstrates that we have a capable, credible deterrent against a very real threat». The MDA press release says the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the ballistic missile defense system provides combatant commanders the capability to engage and destroy intermediate and long-range ballistic missile threats to protect the U.S.

Sounds really impressive but is it really a credible deterrent against any threat, especially in view that the single test cost about $244 million? Actually, the statement made by the head of the MDA implies that from now the US has the capability to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles. If so, the strategic balance with Russia is going to change in the US favor. It calls for going deeper into the subject.

The upgraded Ground-based Midcourse Defense is destined to kill ICBMs in space. On May 30, the GMD was for the first time fired against an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – a much faster vehicle than short or intermediate range missiles. This time Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) tested new engines while intercepting and destroying a target in a direct collision. Previous tests did not use an ICBM as a target or only tested certain components of the complicated system. One has to give the devil his due - it’s a significant step forward.

A relatively small target was hit at a great distance measured in thousands of miles with both objects moving at breath taking speed at roughly 15,000 mph (24,000 km/h). The speed guarantees a kinetic kill and no explosive is required. It’s a good start though many more tests are needed to really acquire real exo-atmospheric kill capability. Only 32 interceptors are stationed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base with eight more to be deployed till the end of the current year. The interceptors have never operated in combat conditions and there are many more tests to go through before full operational capability is reached.

Today, the GMD is hardly reliable.19 tests have been conducted since 1999 with only 9 of them successful. Combined with the high cost, the tests gave the system a bad reputation. The EKV is the main problem. If the May 30 test were a failure, the future of the GMD program would be questioned. It was a matter of survival rather than achieving a technological breakthrough.

One does need to be a military expert to realize that a real success would be achieved after a number of tests conducted under various conditions. Will the interceptors hit the targets when electronic countermeasures and decoys are used? Normally, such measures reduce efficiency by roughly 50%. Russian and Chinese missiles carry sophisticated suites of countermeasures to overcome advanced ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. The GMD interceptors can hit only unsophisticated missiles launched by those who are new to the game, like North Korea, for instance. It leaves open the question of how the GMD interceptors would perform under real war conditions.

With its limited efficiency, the program’s estimated cost is $40 billion – an enormous sum to benefit the producers. But that’s not all. There is another costly program run by the MDA to counter Russian and Chinese missiles with the help of «directed-energy airborne laser» fired from a military drone. A weapon carried by remote-control aircraft loitering high over launch sites would add early interception ability to the GMD system, but it will require much time, effort and money and the doubts are great the laser will be powerful enough to do the job.

The MDA has also accelerated development of a Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV), which turns each interceptor into a kind of precision-guided shotgun, firing multiple warheads at multiple incoming targets from a single GBI rocket. Originally scheduled to enter service around 2030, the MOKV will now go on GMD interceptors (GBIs) in 2025. Funding requested for 2018 is $259 million, out of a $7.9 billion MDA budget. Costly enough to make taxpayers ask questions about the expediency and efficiency of the plans.

So, the May 30 test was not a great breakthrough and not a quantum leap as raving media reviews describe it. It was big step forward, but not more than that. The GMD remains rather powerless against contemporary ICBMs like the Russian RS-24 Yars, for instance. But it’s hardly a coincidence that the test was conducted against the background of three carrier groups being deployed near North Korea and the urgent deployment of THAAD missile defense systems in South Korea without prior knowledge of the South Korean government! This is a sign that the US mulls a preventive strike against Pyongyang.

The May 30 test will no doubt soothe Americans’ concern over a possible North Korean response in case such an attack is carried out. The missiles North Korea has in the inventory are believed to threaten Hawaii with 11 bases across multiple service branches and the island of Guam, which is a military asset too.

And it will certainly inspire the MDA to ask for more appropriations. The agency «relative to its size has probably wasted more money on canceled technology projects than any other federal organization in modern times», Loren Thompson, a well-known defense expert wrote for Forbes in 2011. More than five years has passed and some experts are warning that as a whole the testing record is not enough to instill confidence. The system may not be as reliable as people might think. Philip Coyle, a senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation told CNN on May 31, «Based on its testing record, we cannot rely upon this missile defense program to protect the United States from a North Korean long-range missile».

The US media ravishment appears to be exaggerated. The May 30 test was a limited success. But the North Korean threat will be exploited to spur the GMD and other very costly BMD programs.

US Begins Deployment Of Controversial THAAD Anti-Missile System To South Korea

Well that escalated quickly. Just a day after North Korea"s test firing of 4 missiles towards US bases in Japan, and hours after North Korea warned the world was "on the brink of nuclear war" due to US-South Korea "maneuvers," CNN reports the first pieces of the controversial US-built missile defense system (designed to mitigate the threat of North Korean missiles) arrived at the Osan Air Base in South Korea Monday night, according to the US military.

The decision in January to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system, had angered both Russian and Chinese officials:

"We think the US-South Korean decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system has seriously threatened China"s security interest. For the region, it will also break the strategic balance. So it"s completely understandable to see countries in the region firmly oppose this decision," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said. "China and other countries have to address our own legitimate security concerns and take necessary measures to safeguard our security interest."

"Deployment of US missile defense systems in South Korea clearly goes beyond the tasks of deterring "the North Korean threat,"" Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said in October, according to Russian state-run Tass news agency.

And now - dramatically faster than expected - the deployment has begun.

Some equipments including 2 launch pads for U.S. missile defense system known as Thaad arrived in South Korea on Monday and will continue to be brought in, Yonhap News says, citing unidentified South Korean military official.

"Continued provocative actions by North Korea, to include yesterday"s launch of multiple missiles, only confirm the prudence of our alliance decision last year to deploy THAAD to South Korea," Adm. Harry Harris, commander, US Pacific Command, said in a news release.

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis and South Korean Defense Secretary Han Min-koo spoke over the phone last week and agreed that THAAD should be deployed "ASAP."

White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer signaled the deployment Monday when he told reporters that the United States is "taking steps to enhance our ability to defend against North Korea"s ballistic missiles, such as through the deployment of a THAAD battery to South Korea." U.S. defense officials confirmed to NBC News on Monday night that that meant delivery was already under way — not that the United States was simply restating its previous promises to send the system to South Korea sometime in the future.

The US and its allies in the region, notably South Korea and Japan, tend to focus on THAAD"s defensive nature. They tout its value as a system to prevent a missile from hitting a target and killing people.

"This is purely a defensive measure that the alliance must take in light of the serious threat posed by North Korean missiles," Chris Bush, a spokesman for the US Forces in Korea said.

But Beijing and Moscow don"t see it that way.

"We do not have any doubts that US, with support of their allies, will continue to build up the potential of the Asia Pacific segment of their global missile system, which will inevitably lead to disruption of established strategic balances both in the Asia Pacific and beyond."

Interestingly, it"s not just Russian and Chinese officials that are against the US deployment of THAAD; South Korean presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung and mayor of Seongnam City commented:

"We have to realize clearly that THAAD cannot stop the nuclear missiles coming from the DPRK. How can the 48 missiles of THAAD stop the over 1,000 missiles from the DPRK? The north of Chungcheongbuk-do and the capital area jointly account for more than half of our population and most of our territory. THAAD cannot even cover these areas, but merely increases the regional military tensions. To be honest, deploying THAAD will hurt both us and China. No one will gain anything from it. The starting point of THAAD is wrong, so we have to reconsider it completely. Otherwise, our future will be gloomy, chaotic and insecure."

Clearly the rush to get THAAD deployed counters any pre-emptive rejection by Lee. We are sure China"s response will be swift at this apparent "retaliation" by the US.

As Strategic Culture"s Nan Li previously noted, China is opposed to THAAD deployment for several reasons.

First, Chinese analysts believe that THAAD in South Korea is intended to intercept missiles launched, not from North Korea, but from China and Russia. THAAD has an operational range of 200 kilometers (km) and is designed to intercept missiles at altitudes between 40 and 180 km. Such altitudes, according to analysts from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), match the “terminal phase” of the intermediate, long-range and even intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), or those with ranges exceeding 3,500 km. PLA analysts also claim that they match the “mid-course phase” of medium-range missiles, or those with ranges between 1,000 and 3,500 km, including China’s DF-21 and DF-26 missiles. Because the direct threats to South Korea — including the Seoul area, where 40 percent of the South Korean population resides — are North Korea’s long-range artilleries and short-range ballistic missiles, THAAD, they believe, is clearly a mismatch against such threats.

Chinese analysts are particularly concerned about THAAD’s X-band radar. Even though it would be configured as a fire-control radar with a detection range of 600 km, it perhaps could be reconfigured as an early-warning radar, which allows a detection range exceeding 2,000 km. Such a range suggests that China’s missile activities on land and at sea in northern and eastern China may be mostly exposed. The radar allegedly can see the critical processes where warheads and decoys are released during China’s strategic missile tests. In times of war, it can undermine the reliability of China’s strategic deterrent because in comparison with Alaska-based radars, it is believed to be capable of acquiring more than ten minutes of early warning time against China’s strategic ballistic missiles. It can also differentiate real warheads from decoys. If integrated into the U.S. national missile defense network, this radar allegedly can increase the odds of success in intercepting Chinese missiles even at their “boost phase,” reducing further the reliability of China’s already small strategic deterrent and tilting the strategic balance in favor of the United States.

Moreover, Chinese analysts believe that the Korean Peninsula has historically been a nearby sphere critical to China’s security. They worry that by deploying THAAD, South Korea could share data with the United States and Japan on air traffic control, air defense, and early warning. This may help to integrate South Korea-based systems with U.S. and Japanese sensors and sea-based Aegis systems, with the goal of forming a trilateral strategic alliance to contain China at China’s door steps. Chinese analysts believe that North Korean nuclear tests were only an excuse used by the United States to deploy THAAD, the real U.S. intention being to drive a wedge between South Korea and China at a time when China-South Korea relations were improving substantially, as reflected in the countries’ booming bilateral trade and Park Geun-hye’s attendance at the Victory Day Parade in Beijing in September 2015. THAAD deployment would bring the United States and South Korea closer at the expense of China’s security. This could help the United States to stabilize U.S.-South Korea relations and prevent the possible loss of the U.S. military foothold on the Korean Peninsula.

Chinese analysts have proposed a wide range of countermeasures to retaliate against the THAAD deployment. They argue that to restore regional “strategic balance,” China should cooperate with Russia in developing strategic offensive weapons, particularly in developing “penetration” technologies that can defeat missile defense. Other proposed countermeasures include concealment and redeployment of China’s strategic capabilities to reduce their exposure to the THAAD radar, and accelerated development of China’s own missile defense systems. Other analysts argue for economic sanctions.

Russia Deploys S-400 Missile Regiment Near Moscow On Combat Duty

While the stated reason behind its deployment has not been disclosed, Russia has put on duty a surface-to-air missile regiment equipped with the brand-new S-400 air defense system, Russia’s most advanced, in Moscow’s suburbs on combat alert.

“The SAM combat squads of the Moscow Region aerospace forces have put the new S-400 Triumph air defense missile system into service, and have gone on combat duty for the air defense of Moscow and the central industrial region of Russia,” the Defense Ministry’s Department of Information and Mass Communication told Interfax. The new SAM battery arrived at its destination in the Moscow Region from Kapustin Yar in the south Russia last December, the Defense Ministry noted.

“The main task of the anti-aircraft missile troops of the Russian Aerospace Forces is air defense and protecting vital state, military, industry and energy facilities, as well as the Armed Forces troops and transport communications, from aerospace attacks,” said the ministry.

The Triumph system, which was developed by air-defense systems manufacturer Almaz Antei, is designed for high-efficiency protection against airstrikes utilizing strategic, cruise, tactical, and other kinds of ballistic missiles. The new system is capable of hitting moving targets in the air, including planes and cruise missiles, at a distance of 400 kilometers, as well as ballistic targets moving at speeds of up to 4.8 kilometers per second at altitudes ranging from several meters to several dozens of kilometers.

As RT adds, four more Triumph units are to come into service in 2017, citing the Russia’s Defense Ministry said. S-400 Triumph air defense systems have been providing air cover for Russia’s forces in Syria since November, when President Vladimir Putin order their deployment.

It was not clear however, why i) Russia is deploying one near the capital now and ii) why it is doing so publicly.

“With these complexes, we are able to destroy both sea and ground targets” at distances of 350 kilometers for sea targets and nearly 450 kilometers for ground targets, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said at the time. In October, President Putin and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed an agreement for the sale of S-400s to India. Deliveries could begin in 2020.

THAAD Is Coming To China's Doorstep (But Beijing Has A Plan To Push Back)

Submitted by Nan Li via Strategic-Culture.org,

After months of negotiation, the United States and South Korea announced on July 8 their decision to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea. During a press briefing, China’s Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said that Beijing is “firmly opposed to the proposed THAAD deployment… and will take necessary measures to maintain national strategic security as well as regional equilibrium”.

Why Is China Opposed to THAAD Deployment?

Chinese analysts are particularly concerned about THAAD’s X-band radar. Even though it would be configured as a fire-control radar with a detection range of 600 km, it perhaps could be reconfigured as an early-warning radar, which allows a detection range exceeding 2,000 km. Such a range suggests that China’s missile activities on land and at sea in northern and eastern China may be mostly exposed. The radar allegedly can see the critical processes where warheads and decoys are released during China’s strategic missile tests. In times of war, it can undermine the reliability of China’s strategic deterrent because in comparison with Alaska-based radars, it is believed to be capable of acquiring more than ten minutes of early warning time against China’s strategic ballistic missiles. It can also differentiate real warheads from decoys. If integrated into the U.S. national missile defense network, this radar allegedly can increase the odds of success in intercepting Chinese missiles even at their “boost phase,” reducing further the reliability of China’s already small strategic deterrent and tilting the strategic balance in favor of the United States.

Moreover, Chinese analysts believe that the Korean Peninsula has historically been a nearby sphere critical to China’s security. They worry that by deploying THAAD, South Korea could share data with the United States and Japan on air traffic control, air defense, and early warning. This may help to integrate South Korea-based systems with U.S. and Japanese sensors and sea-based Aegis systems, with the goal of forming a trilateral strategic alliance to contain China at China’s door steps. Chinese analysts believe that North Korean nuclear tests were only an excuse used by the United States to deploy THAAD, the real U.S. intention being to drive a wedge between South Korea and China at a time when China-South Korea relations were improving substantially, as reflected in the countries’ booming bilateral trade and Park Geun-hye’s attendance at the Victory Day Parade in Beijing in September 2015. THAAD deployment would bring the United States and South Korea closer at the expense of China’s security. This could help the United States to stabilize U.S.-South Korea relations and prevent the possible loss of the U.S. military foothold on the Korean Peninsula.

What Countermeasures Might China Take?

Chinese analysts have proposed a wide range of countermeasures to retaliate against the THAAD deployment. They argue that it is time to integrate technologies into Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles that can reinforce their penetration capabilities (????), such as those that can enhance mid-course or terminal maneuverability of warheads to dodge intercepting missiles. These technologies and measures also include integrating decoys to mislead the intercepting missiles, hardening warheads, and building more missiles. They also propose electronic countermeasures to jam THAAD radar. Some believe that China’s flight-tested DF-ZF supersonic missile delivery vehicle, which allegedly can reach the speed of Mach 10, can “turn all missile defense systems obsolete in one night.” Some also argue that in times of war, China should “at the first moment” launch strikes to destroy THAAD. To elude South Korea-based THAAD, Chinese analysts propose to deploy China’s strategic nuclear submarines to the Pacific Ocean for routine patrol. Being highly mobile and more concealed than China’s land-based nuclear deterrent, these submarines can enhance the survivability of China’s sea-based nuclear force, thus enhancing the credibility of China’s second strike nuclear capabilities.

Chinese analysts argue that to restore regional “strategic balance,” China should cooperate with Russia in developing strategic offensive weapons, particularly in developing “penetration” technologies that can defeat missile defense. Other proposed countermeasures include concealment and redeployment of China’s strategic capabilities to reduce their exposure to the THAAD radar, and accelerated development of China’s own missile defense systems.

A Moderate View?

While a majority calls for sanctions, there also exists a minority view based on a more nuanced and moderate interpretation of the THAAD deployment. On the effectiveness of THAAD to intercept short-range missiles, this view agrees that a launched North Korean Scud missile targeting Seoul may fly lower than 40 km because of the short range. This missile cannot be intercepted by THAAD because such low altitudes do not match the interception altitudes of THAAD, even though it can be intercepted by South Korea’s Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors. But if a Scud missile is fired to hit a South Korean target 300 km away, it would reach the maximum height of 80 km and then descend to 40 km in slightly more than a minute, which matches the interception altitudes of THAAD. For this school of thought, a major challenge for South Korea is how to acquire sufficient defenses against North Korean missiles, while at the same time not undermining China’s strategic security. The best option, according to these analysts, is for South Korea to replace the current AN/TPY-2 radar with the Israeli Green Pine radar, which has an effective search range of 500 km. Such a range can provide South Korea sufficient protection against North Korean missiles, while posing no threat to China’s strategic missiles.

A Critique

China’s security analysts have offered great insights into why China is opposed to THAAD deployment in South Korea, and what countermeasures China might take to “maintain national strategic security as well as regional equilibrium.” However, a few important issues may require closer scrutiny in order to gain a balanced understanding of THAAD deployment in South Korea.

As pointed out by Chinese analysts, it is probably true that the interception altitudes of THAAD match the “terminal phase” of longer-range Chinese ballistic missiles, or those with ranges exceeding 3,500 km, including China’s ICBMs. Of note, however, is that these Chinese missiles are not intended for targets in East Asia. If launched, they are unlikely to have their “descending” or “terminal phase” in this region. So they are less likely to be intercepted by South Korea-based THAAD.

South Korea-based THAAD is more likely intended to intercept China’s medium-range ballistic missiles, or those with ranges between 1,000 and 3,500 km, including China’s DF-21 and DF-26 missiles. This is because these missiles may aim at military targets in the Asia-Pacific region, including U.S. military bases in Japan and on Guam, and its aircraft carrier strike groups deployed in this region. But because North Korea is also developing and deploying medium-range ballistic missiles, it is reasonable to assume that THAAD is intended to intercept both North Korean and Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles.

As mentioned earlier by some Chinese analysts, THAAD can be effective in intercepting a North Korean short-range ballistic missile attempting to hit a South Korean target 300 km away, because its “terminal phase” matches the interception altitudes of THAAD. It is also known that the North Korean ballistic missile arsenal consists mainly of hundreds of modified Scud missiles with ranges between 300 and 700 km. Because these missiles can hit any South Korean target beyond the Seoul area (which is protected by Patriot PAC2/3 interceptors), the primary objective for deploying THAAD in South Korea is in all likelihood for defending against short-range ballistic missiles from North Korea.

Chinese analysts believe that the X-band radar can gain more than ten minutes of early warning time compared to Alaska-based radars against Chinese strategic missiles flying toward the United States, which undermines the reliability of China’s already small strategic deterrent. Assuming this radar can easily be converted to an early-warning radar, however, whatever extra time it can contribute to early warning against Chinese missiles may become less significant for two reasons. One is that the two Japan-based X-band radars can also see the flight paths of Chinese missiles early and provide somewhat similar extra early warning time. The other is that the U.S. ballistic missile early-warning systems based on constellations of satellites, either deployed or under development such as the Space-Based Infrared System, may also be capable of provide early warning time sufficient to marginalize the contribution of the South Korea-based X-band radar.