Showing posts with label Alternative investment management companies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alternative investment management companies. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 12, 2017

John Burbank Shuts Flagship Hedge Fund, Plans Launch Of Cryptocurrency Unit

The writing for John Burbank"s Passport Capital was on the wall back in August, when as we reported, in his latest letter to investors Burbank reported that at what was once a multi-billion fund, total firm assets at Passport had shrunk to just $900 million as of June 30 as a result of net outflows totaling a whopping $565 million, or a nearly 40% loss of AUM due to redemptions. The collapse in assets took place just a few months after Passport announced it was liquidating its long/short strategy in April.



And unfortunately for Burbank, just four month later, a chapter of Passport Capital"s history comes to a close, because as Bloomberg reported, the fund would shutter its flagship hedge fund after returns slumped and following unprecedented redemptions. Passport - which shot to fame for its lucrative bet against subprime housing ahead of the global financial crisis - peaked at around $5 billion but lately managed a fraction of that after a double digit loss last year and further losses in 2017.


The fund’s "returns over the past two years are unacceptable and cause me to rethink how to manage money in this environment," Burbank wrote in a Dec. 11 letter to investors, the Wall Street Journal first reported overnight. Passport will continue to operate its roughly $300 million special opportunities fund, which holds some of the firm’s more successful bets on companies such as Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.


As Bloomberg reminds us, Burbank founded Passport in 2000 which was best known for its big bet on a tumble in subprime mortgages in 2006. His fund made 220% the following year, ushering in the good times - if only briefly - with Passport AUM briefly hitting a peak of $5 billion before a double-digit loss last year and more losses in 2017, as we reported previously. Total assets declined to $2.4 billion in April, then plummeted further to $900 million amid client withdrawals and after it wound down its Long-Short Strategy fund after an "incredibly disappointing 2016," Bloomberg reported earlier this year.


“You will not hear about Passport shutting down -- there is too much opportunity available to do that,” Burbank wrote, adding that the firm may announce a new area of investment in the near future.


Well, yes, hedge funds rarely want to publicize that they are closing. And yes, even as Passport the hedge fund as we know it no longer exists, the company has decided to pivot into Mike Novogratz" sandbox, and as the WSJ reports this morning, even as Burbank"s hedge fund is pulling back from traditional investing and trading, it is launching a new arm that focuses only on cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin. More from the WSJ:








Despite his recent performance, Mr. Burbank’s pronouncements remain closely followed by his peers. He would become one of the more prominent major investors to go big on bitcoin and the like, along with the former Fortress Investment Group hedge-fund manager Michael Novogratz and Horizon Kinetics Chief Investment Officer Murray Stahl.



To be sure, the burly John Burbank - a Duke University graduate - is in some ways an unlikely evangelist for digital currency. As the WSJ describes him, "he made his name buying up credit default swaps ahead of the financial crisis, resulting in a more-than 200% gain for his main fund in 2007. That year, he made $370 million personally, Forbes estimated."








His predictions have mostly failed to pan out since. Passport bet big on gold mining companies in 2014, but prices dropped thereafter, and slashed its overall exposure to rising stocks in early 2015, missing out on some of the subsequent rally.



Burbank"s interest in bitcoin and cryptos is hardly new, however, and was reinforced in his last investor letter in which he shared the following perspective:








We have been monitoring block chain technology and cryptocurrencies for some time. We believe this technology represents a secular change with the potential to profoundly disrupt many markets. AMD is the first position in the portfolio that has been a net beneficiary of this trend, but we expect our understanding of block chain technology’s potential to be an increasingly relevant factor in stock selection.



Burbank continued in Monday"s letter:








“Technological progress and its non-linear enhancement or deflation of the biggest industries and markets in the world is my choice for what will have mattered most five years from now. I want to capture these extraordinary outcomes in new ways appropriate to the current era.”



The new cryptocurrency-focused fund’s leadership will include longtime Passport executive Seth Spalding, the WSJ said. While Passport hasn’t told prospective investors much about its strategy, but has scheduled a call for later this week to lay out more.


It is unclear if bitcoin - in addition to everything else - will also emerge as a "hail mary" pass for fading hedge fund managers desperate to attract just enough capital - through the use of buzzwords or otherwise - to stay in business for just one more lap. If Burbank is successful, watch as every other hedge fund and family office promptly launches their own [Insert Name Here] Crypto Asset Special Situations LLC.









Monday, December 4, 2017

Paul Tudor Jones: "This Market, Which Is Reminiscent Of The 1999 Bubble, Is On The Verge Of A Significant Change"

Just hours after Neil Chriss announced that his $2.2 billion Hutchin Hill hedge fund is shuttering due to underperformance and admitted that "we fought hard, but did not deliver the performance that you expected from us", another legendary hedge fund announced it was undergoing a significant restructuring as a result of relentless investor withdrawals: citing a November 30 letter, Bloomberg reported that Paul Tudor Jones" Tudor Investment Corp, which lost 1.6% YTD,  was closing its Discretionary Macro fund "and letting investors shift assets to the main BVI fund as of Jan. 1" with the letter clarifying that "Jones will also principally manage Tudor’s flagship BVI fund, which will be the firm’s only multi-trader fund next year."



The restructuring took place as clients pulled half a billion dollars from Tudor in the third quarter, leaving the firm’s assets at $7 billion, roughly half the level it managed in June 2015, Bloomberg News reported previously.  As part of the sweeping overhaul, Andrew Bound and Aadarsh Malde, formerly co-CIOs of the Tudor Discretionary Macro Fund, would depart. In a move reminiscent of George Soros" recent return to more active management, Jones, who ran the BVI fund with a team of managers, would now have a smaller team and will assume a more dominant role in the fund. 








"I will be the largest risk taker and will manage a notional capital account equal to the AUM of the Tudor BVI strategy itself," Jones said in the letter, referencing assets under management. "This means that my results will have a one-for-one performance impact on Tudor BVI. I relish this challenge."



Jones and other Tudor partners are the largest investors in the BVI fund, which unlike the soon to be shuttered TIC, is up 0.8% through Nov. 3. More details from Bloomberg:








The firm opened the Tudor Discretionary Macro Fund in 2012 with $500 million. It had 14 portfolio managers and was seeded with $150 million from the firm. At the time, funds that bet on macroeconomic themes were a big draw for investors who expected the strategy to benefit from events such as the European sovereign debt crisis.


 


Those expectations were dashed as the strategy has produced lackluster returns in recent years. Hedge funds betting on macroeconomic themes climbed an average of 3.8 percent this year through October on an asset-weighted basis, to rank as the worst strategy globally, according to Hedge Fund Research Inc.



Yet while the internal reorganization of multi-billion hedge funds are hardly of material interest to ordinary retail, or even institutional, investors, PTJ"s outlook on the market always is, and it was concerning: frustrated by the collapse of market vol as a result of record central bank monetary easing, Jones said "the environment is on the verge of a significant change" and that the current market is reminiscent of the bubble of 1999.


"That was a year in which Tudor BVI’s macro book was basically flat while U.S. equities experienced one of the greatest bubbles in history,” Jones, 63, wrote. “The termination of that bull market kicked off a three-year macro feast.” adding that "the plot is much the same today but we can substitute Bitcoin and fine art for the Nasdaq 100 of 1999."


Of course, critics will be first to point out that this is simply yet another prominent trader lamenting the end of markets as we knew them before the takeover by central banks, and Jones himself seems to partially agree, observing in a November 30 market note that the low volatility market environment has been an "anathema" to traditional macro funds and is becoming a "dangerous place," lulling investors into a false sense of complacency. 


"In the face of a shock, investors may be surprised to find themselves jammed running for the exit," he wrote. However, as Howard Marks has repeatedly cautioned in the past 3 years, this will be a problem as "the amount and quality of liquidity is lower than people recognize", and "hidden leverage in the market will make a mass exit even more challenging."


At a loss how to trade a market that appears to have little logic to it, Jones, a pioneer in the industry, has recently turned to more computer-driven trading and hired scientists and mathematicians to help revamp the firm. As Bloomberg reported previously, Tudor raised $300 million for a new macro fund, which started trading in October, that uses machine-learning algorithms to help its manager make trades.


It is unclear if that particular fund has had more success than more traditional, "fundamental" investing approaches.


As for PTJ"s warning that a 1999-style blow up is imminent, while many of his macro peers would be the first to agree, the real question is how will central banks react: after all in the face of trillions in liquidity created out of thin air, if there is one thing the past decade has taught us is that fighting central banks is not only hazardous for one"s health, but destructive to one"s professional financial career. Then again, amid countless such warnings from the "legends of investing" crowd, this may finally be the proverbial moment when the broken clock is right...









Saturday, November 25, 2017

"This Is A Paralyzed Market": Hedge Fund Turnover Drops To All Time Low

Back in July, Canaccord analyst Brian Reynolds put out a contrarian piece which broke with numerous conventional wisdom norms about the state of the market, key among which was that traders are not complacent, but rather - in light of collapsing trading volumes, something which has plagued bank income statements in the past 2 quarters - simply paralyzed, as they no longer have a grasp of financial "logic" when it is all superceded by central bank liquidity injections, and as such most trades feel fake, forced and just part of the FOMO charade to avoid losing one"s job.


As Reynolds explained, "Investors are not complacent. Their stances range from extremely aggressive to bearish" and added that these "opposing forces have led to a compression of volatility. When stocks have rallied strongly, they have then been met with investor selling. When stocks sell off, the buybacks have picked up after the selling runs its course. That has been the case for more than eight years. Those forces have led to an equity bull market that moves higher in fits and starts, with some brief pullbacks from time to time. Given the positioning of equity investors and continued flows into credit, we do not see that pattern changing for some time." Meanwhile, sandwiched inbetween these two trends, investors - both retail and institutional - find themselves in trade limbo, and the outcome is a gradual decline in trading volumes "which is more reflective of paralysis than complacency among equity investors."


And while one can posit theories explaining this bizarre market until one is blue in the face, the most vivid confirmation of Reyonld"s "paralysis" thesis emerged in the latest batch of hedge fund 13Fs, which was analyzed by Goldman earlier this week, and noted here in "These Are The Top 50 Hedge Fund Long And Short Positions."


In the report, Goldman highlighted various notable outliers, such as the latest record high in hedge fund leverage...



... coupled with the recent plunge in short interest (which as a share of S&P 500 market cap sits just below 2.0%, matching January of this year as the lowest level since 2012)...



... even as hedge fund "crowding" in a handful of top names hits an all time high:



But the most interesting to us, and the hedge fund community, we believe is the following chart, which shows that hedge fund portfolio turnover continued its downward trend and reached a new record low in the third quarter Across all portfolio positions, turnover registered 26% in 3Q. Turnover of the largest quartile of positions, which make up the vast majority of fund portfolios, fell to just 13%.



This means that once hedge funds have established positions, they no longer trade in and out, but simply lean back and let it ride. And why not: with the most popular hedge fund positions this year being also the best performing ones, namely Facebook, Amazon, Alibaba, Alphabet and Microsoft, why ever both selling.  Indeed, as the next chart shows, the bulk of the collapsing turnover is largely due to tech stocks:



Of course, this strategy of loading up on winner and letting them ride is a two-edged sword. while it is the best strategy on the way up, it also becomes a quasi private equity strategy, in which the price formation is created on the margin with increasingly less volume. And, since such tech holdings are becoming ever more illiquid, the threat is what happens once the narrative shifts and instead of buying, hedge funds start to sell these most concentrated of growth names. One could say that a tech selloff is emerging as one of the more concerning black - or at least gray - swans in the market. In fact, we are did say just that...








Wednesday, November 22, 2017

These Are The Top 50 Hedge Fund Long And Short Positions

In its latest quarterly hedge fund trend monitor - a survey of 804 hedge funds with $2.1 trillion of gross equity positions ($1.4 trillion long and $704 billion short) - which analyzes hedge fund holdings as of Sept 30, Goldman makes some interesting observations about the current state of the hedge fund industry. First and foremost, it finds that the average equity long/short hedge fund has posted a 10% YTD return, which while the strongest since 2013 is once again underperforming the S&P for the 7th consecutive year.



In terms of holdings, it"s a continuation of what we discussed the last two quarters - everyone and their kitchen sink is plowing into high beta, "growty" and "momentum" tech names, and since most funds still underperform the S&P, the average net leverage is at all time high. Here"s Goldman:








Fund performance has been lifted by sector (Information Technology) and factor (growth, momentum, large-cap) exposures. Our Hedge Fund VIP list of the most popular long positions,  whose top five stocks are FB, AMZN, BABA, GOOGL, and MSFT, has outperformed the S&P 500 by 770 bp YTD (25% vs. 17%).



Also notable, while at least on paper hedge funds are expected to diversify, in reality the average HF carries 68% of its long portfolio in its top 10 positions, just below the record high reached in early 2016. Meanwhile, confirming that the market is afflicted by a creeping paralysis, portfolio position turnover fell to a new record low last quarter, at just 13% for the largest fund positions. Oh yes, and nobody is short: hedge fund short interest as a percent of S&P 500 market cap remained close to 2%, near the lowest level in five years.



Below are Goldman"s 5 key observations from this edition of the HF Trend monitor:


  1. PERFORMANCE: The average equity long/short hedge fund has returned +10% YTD on the strength of the most popular long positions, high exposure to Information Technology, and atypical factor tilts toward large-caps and away from value stocks. This ranks as the strongest return since 2013 and compares with 17% for the S&P 500, 16% for the average large-cap core mutual fund, and 2% for macro hedge funds.

  2. SECTORS: Information Technology remains the largest net sector exposure, accounting for 27% of fund portfolios. However, the 307 bp overweight tilt relative to the Russell 3000 is 100 bp smaller than at the start of 3Q. Materials represents the largest sector overweight. Financials is the largest underweight and a major source of disagreement with large-cap mutual funds, which are overweight the sector. Current overweights in Energy and Consumer Discretionary are nearly the smallest tilts in recent history, as is the underweight in Utilities.

  3. LEVERAGE: Hedge funds increased net leverage in 3Q 2017 as the most popular positions continued to outperform a rising equity market. Short interest as a percent of S&P 500 market cap remained close to 2%, near the lowest level in five years.

  4. VERY IMPORTANT POSITIONS: Our Hedge Fund VIP list (ticker: GSTHHVIP) of the most popular long positions has outperformed the S&P 500 by 770 bp YTD. The VIP list contains the 50 stocks that appear most often among the top 10 holdings of fundamentally-driven hedge fund portfolios. The basket’s absolute and risk-adjusted YTD returns rank as the strongest since 2013. The list’s top 5 stocks are FB, AMZN, BABA, GOOGL, and MSFT. The basket has outperformed the S&P 500 in 65% of quarters since 2001, generating an average quarterly excess return of 62 bp. 10 new constituents entered the basket this quarter, compared with a quarterly average of 16 stocks since 2001: EQIX, GDDY, IAC, IQV, MGM, MPC, NRG, SBAC, TTWO, and XPO.

  5. CROWDING AND TURNOVER: Hedge funds continue to demonstrate high conviction in their favorite positions. The typical hedge fund has 68% of its long equity assets in its top 10 positions, just below the record high of 69% in 1H 2016. Similarly, our crowding index increased but remains shy of its 2016 extremes. Quarterly turnover of the largest portfolio positions fell to new historical lows, at 13%, declining in all sectors but Health Care.

The biggest component of the favorable hedge fund return in Q3 was a result of the outperformance of the Goldman Hedge Fund VIP basket, also known as the "hedge fund hotel"index, a list of 50 names which are the most widely held hedge fund stocks. Good luck selling them during a firesale, as happened in early 2016 when the GSTHHVIP basket crashed, wiping out four years of gains in a few months.


With no crash yet, and despite softness during the last month, Hedge Fund VIP names outperformed the broad market YTD both in absolute and risk-adjusted terms according to Goldman.








The basket’s strong  return has more than made up for its higher volatility (8 vs. 6 for S&P 500), combining for a YTD ratio of return/volatility of 3.0, above the ratio of 2.8 for the S&P 500 and the best since 3.2 in 2013.




What is more concerning is that as discussed the past two quarters, the trend of growing hedge fund leverage (to make up for loss of alpha), continues, and according to Goldman, funds added net leverage entering 4Q. Data calculated by Goldman Sachs Prime Services on exposures in their business show that net leverage has risen in recent months and is near cycle highs.



Meanwhile, everyone has given up on shorting: in fact, short interest as a share of S&P 500 market cap sits just below 2.0%, matching January of this year as the lowest level since 2012. Relative to trading volumes, the short interest ratio (days to cover) ranks higher compared with history but still far below the cycle high in 2015.



Predictably, with market leadership increasingly more concentrated, and with fewer leaders, the density of hedge fund portfolios is near all time highs.


Hedge fund crowding in the most popular positions rose slightly in 3Q 2017 but remains below the extremes reached in 2016. The average hedge fund holds 68% of its long portfolio in its top 10 positions, just below the record “density” of 69% in 1H 2016. The increase in hedge fund portfolio density mirrors the growing share of S&P 500 market cap accounted for by the 10 largest index constituents, which has risen steadily for two years but even now sits near the average level since 1990.



As a tangent, those who were long tech, remained long tech as the average infotech portfolio turnover dropped to the lowest on record.



So putting it all together, here are the 50 positions which make up the latest GS VIP list, i.e., the 50 most popular hedge fund longs...



... and the list of 50 stocks representing the most important short positions.



Finally, here are the 20 stocks with the highest positive and negative changes in popularity.



As a reminder: traditionally, being long the most shorted hedge fund names and shorting the most favored ones has been a source of double digit alpha ever since 2011, and while this year that may have been different, for now, there is no reason to assume this normalcy will persist especially once the revulsion with tech names reappears once more.









Wednesday, November 15, 2017

Massive Hedge Fund CEO "Ready To Add Bitcoin To Investment Universe"

Just yesterday we noted that billionaire hedge fund legend Mike Novogratz said "the institutionalization of [the crypto space] is coming... and it"s coming quick."



Novogratz said he expects major financial firms will soon start to offer bitcoin or similar products as an investment option, one that could be easily purchased over the phone.


“When it’s that easy, the price of bitcoin or ethereum is going to go much higher. And that is a lot closer than people think,”



How right he was as the CEO of massive hedge fund Man Group just confirmed they will "add bitcoin to its investment universe" once CME launches Bitcoin futures.


As BI reports, one of the largest hedge funds in the world might hop on the bitcoin trade.


Luke Ellis, the CEO of Man Group, the UK-based investor with $95 billion in funds under management, said the firm would include bitcoin in its "investment universe" if bitcoin futures successfully launch, according to a tweet by Reuters.


 


CME announced at the end of October that it would launch a bitcoin futures product by year-end.


 


On Monday, CME chairman and CEO Terry Duffy said such a product would likely be ready by the second-week of December.



Additionally, as CoinTelegraph reports, earlier today on Nov. 14, Multicoin Capital Managing Partner Kyle Samani revealed that he had met with an institutional investor with a $30 bln fund. The investor disclosed the fact that fund managers within the company are restricted to issuing checks with the minimum value or $300 mln.


“More. Just met with an institutional manager. $30 bln fund. Minimum check size $300 mln. Current crypto allocation: $0. We aren"t even close to the top,” said Samani.



Previously, even up until early 2017, it was not possible for institutional investors to allocate hundreds of millions of dollars in Bitcoin because the market was premature and the liquidity was limited.


In January of 2017, the market cap of Bitcoin was only $15 bln. The market was simply not deep and mature enough for institutional investors and large-scale hedge funds to commit.


In the past 10 months, the market valuation of Bitcoin has grown to $110 bln, with a daily trading volume of $4 bln. As such, Bitcoin has become more liquid than the most liquid stock on earth, Apple.


Finally, we note that Novogratz"s biggest regret this year has been not buying more cryptocurrencies when prices fell, because he knew that they would keep going up. He sees bitcoin, for instance, hitting $10,000 by March.


The basis of the price target of Novogratz was established by several indicators including the Metcalfe’s law, a widely acknowledged metric which has been utilized to measure the growth rate of communication networks like Facebook, and the likelihood of the entrance of institutional investors and retail traders into the cryptocurrency market.









Thursday, October 5, 2017

Macquarie Identifies The Winners And Losers Of MiFID II

Macquarie"s equity research team has just offered up a valuable economics lesson which seems to perfectly, if inconveniently, explain why their business model is doomed by the upcoming implementation of MiFID II. 


So what happens when you compete in a "slightly" fragmented market (see below) to sell a highly commoditized product to a customer that places so little value on the product that it has historically only existed courtesy of subsidies from trading revenues...then a regulatory body suddenly comes along and says you have survive as an independent operation?



Well, as Macquarie notes today, almost everyone, particularly those in an equity research group, loses.





As equity research analysts, we can’t close the review of MiFID II implementation without discussing the implications of research unbundling, by which asset managers will have to pay separately for execution and trading. Here are a few points that have emerged as consensual on a number of white papers and articles:



  • P&L method over RPA. An increasingly large number of leading asset managers already announced they will internalise the cost of research in their P&L instead of charging it separately to investors via Research Payment Accounts that are seen as overly cumbersome to implement. The list includes, in alphabetical order, Allianz Global, Aviva, Axa IM, BlackRock, Deutsche AM, Franklin Templeton, HSBC AM, Invesco, Janus Henderson, JPMorgan AM, M&G, Robeco, Schroders, Standard Life, T Rowe Price, UBS and Union (please see live list here).

  • Research budget cuts. A McKinsey report estimated a 10-30% reduction in buy side’s external payment for research over the next three years, while an S&P survey indicates a 10-15% increase in internal research budget.

  • Run to the bottom on pricing – a number of FT articles indicate bulge brackets demanded a minimum payment of up to £300-400k/year for access to written research, but that has decreased significantly. JPMorgan is reportedly offering entry level access for $10k/year and Jefferies will offer its research for free, not to jeopardise banking revenues.

According to the S&P survey mentioned above, asset managers’ EBIT may decline by 15%/ 30% as a result of the shift to P&L accounting for external research. In any case it is clear that both buy side and sell side are involved in the consumption and production of research will see a decrease in profitability and may seek cost savings, continuing the gloomy trend in headcount decline highlighted in Fig 5-6.



Meanwhile, Macquarie highlights the fact that the upcoming implementation of MiFID II will only add to the complete decimation of the financial industry that has already lost 1,000"s of jobs over the past 6 years.





According to a recent report by Coalition (Fig 5), front office headcounts declined 21% since 2011, in spite of a generally supportive macro environment. The data show a much harder decline in FICC (-32%) compared to -12% to -14% for Equity and Advisory. Part of the decline may be explained with business cycle, but we believe an acceleration in the shift to electronic trading is also at play.



Lastly, data compiled specifically by McKinsey on the Equities segment of the top 9 investment banks show that sales and trading headcount declined three times faster than research since 2011 (Fig 6). For example, Goldman Sachs’ US cash equities business moved from 600 traders in year 2000 to only 2 traders in 2016, plus 200 programmers.




Finally, for those who have managed to avoid this particular distraction and have no idea what MiFID II is, the global equity research industry is in the midst of a major disruption which has been brought on by the European Union’s MiFID II regulations, enforced from Jan. 3, which aim to tackle conflicts of interest by requiring asset managers to separate the trading commissions they pay from investment-research fees.


Of course, the biggest problem with such a regulation continues to be that literally no one knows the true "value" of equity research, not even the investment banks that are selling it.  Meanwhile, we"re almost certain that hedge funds don"t feel the need to buy 50 different versions of a research report on the same company that can all be summarized in four words:  "Buy The Fucking Dip."

Monday, September 18, 2017

Pine River Closing Master Fund Following Surge In Redemptions

Back in January 2016, we reported that Pine River Capital Management, then run by noted hedge fund investor Steve Kuhn, was shuttering its Fixed Income fund, and returning roughly $1.6 billion to investors. The wind down was surprising for one of the industry"s most prominent names: Kuhn was one of four managers who helped the Pine River Fixed Income Fund score some of the industry"s biggest gains. They included a 93% return in 2009, fueled largely by bets on the housing market.


Unfortunately, the hedge fund had remained unable to replicate its profitable ways in recent years, and according to both Reuters and Bloomberg, Pine River is closing its master fund following a wave of client withdrawals that would bring assets below $300 million.





The fund, which started in 2002, had about $1 billion in assets prior to the latest redemption schedule. Because the withdrawals would cause the portion of illiquid assets to increase relative to the overall fund, the managers discussed placing those investments in a segregated account called a side pocket.



As Reuters adds, clients said the request was a response to a move by investors to pull more money than Pine River expected from its $1 billion flagship fund, which has significantly lagged behind the S&P 500 the past two years. As a result, Pine River had asked fund investors in recent weeks if it could segregate roughly $90 million in illiquid assets to sell them off over time instead of immediately. The assets Pine River wanted to place in a side pocket included equity and debt in Africa and Latin America, according to Reuters sources, and equity in and loans made by online lending firm CircleBack Lending.


And while investors approved of that plan, the firm’s managers ultimately decided instead to close.


The reason for the untimely death of the fund is familiar: the multi-strat master fund suffered from years of lackluster performance against a backdrop of rising investor discontent with hedge funds’ high fees. According to investor documents, the fund gained 1.7% this year through August, and was up 1.4$ last year after dropping 2.75 percent the year prior. That compares with 11.9% and 12% in total returns by the S&P 500 for the YTD and 2016 periods. The fund"s average annualized return is 9% since its 2002 inception through August.


The redemptions in its flagship fund add to recent challenges for Pine River. Its assets under management dropped by more than 40% since a 2015 peak of about $15 billion and there has been turnover among its investment professionals, including the departure last year of key portfolio manager Steve Kuhn.



Steve Kuhn


As Bloomberg adds, the decision marks another turn for the Minnetonka, Minnesota-based hedge fund firm, which has closed a handful of funds and seen staff departures over the last year or so. In addition to the liquidation of its fixed income fund, Pine River is also closing its $560 million China hedge fund and ending long-short equity trading amid a shift toward event-driven strategies, Bloomberg reported this June and July. Additionally, the firm’s money manager Renos Dimitriou is planning on spinning out his $1.7 billion government bond-trading fund into a standalone company.


Pine River still oversees $1.5 billion in customized accounts and $4.1 billion across two real estate investment trusts according to Bloomberg. That’s a fall of nearly two-thirds from $15 billion in assets under management in 2015. Pine River is hardly alone: "since 2015, the hedge fund industry has lost more money than it’s attracted from investors in every quarter but one, according to Hedge Fund Research Inc. More hedge funds have closed than opened for the last two years."

Sunday, July 30, 2017

The Hedge Fund That Almost Broke The World

Before the financial crisis and the billions of dollars in corporate bailouts, and trillions more in central bank quantitative easing, the world of investing was simpler.


Back then, markets moved in two directions, traders trusted their models, and hedge funds stacked with PhDs and top executives from well-respected bond trading houses were expected to make money hand over fist. And for three glorious years in the mid-1990s, Long Term Capital Management did exactly that. But when the fund suddenly imploded in 1998, stung by economic crises in Russia and Asia that caused it to lose $4 billion in a bizarre six-week stretch...



... it almost brought the entire financial system down with it.


In a recent interview on Real Vision"s Adventures in Finance podcast, former LTCM Founding Partner Victor Haghani, who was at the epicenter of the firm’s meteoric rise and catastrophic collapse, discusses the birth of the fund, its flawed investment strategy and the impact its collapse had on the broader financial landscape.



His story begins shortly after the 1991 Salomon Brothers scandal, when the Treasury banned the firm, then one of Wall Street’s most aggressive and well-respected bond-trading shops, from participating in Treasury bond auctions. After the firm"s dramatic fall, prospective investors encouraged several senior executives who either left the firm, or were forced out, to consider starting a hedge fund.





“I was married in January 1993, and that’s when it was starting. I decided I definitely wanted to leave Solomon with John [Gutfreund] having left and some of my other mentors having left, it was time to smell the roses and take some time off. I didn’t need to make both decisions at the same time.



It was a period of great change at Salomon Brothers when John Gutfreund, Tom Strauss and John Meriwether had all taken leave from the firm because of the 1991 Treasury bond auction scandal, I forget what the rulings were but John Meriwether could’ve come back to Salomon. In this period of months when those three executives were kind of defending themselves over the Treasury bond scandal and trying to set the record straight, a number of investors came to John Meriwether who said ‘listen you should start a fund and do what you did at Salomon on the outside,’ and that sort of got things going.



And there were other people. Bob Merton and Myron Scholes also were interested in doing this project  outside of Salomon Brothers. It’s hard to remember exactly how it all took shape but it took shape pretty quickly in 1993 and by January of 94 we were up and running and investing.”



With Meriwether at the helm, and not one but two Nobel Laureates, the firm sought to pioneer a computer-driven approach in which its models would identify arbitrage opportunities for the firm to capitalize on. Real Vision recalled the culture of risk taking at Salomon brothers, which was inculcated in the new firm as well. During one quarter when Salomon’ trading business lost a lot of money, Gutfreund, then CEO, explained that they staked the firm’s whole balance sheet on a European convergence trade that would eventually result in enormous profits.


Back to Haghani, the former LTCM partner describes how the successes of the firm’s early years helped instigate its collapse as the firm became emboldened to use an increasing amount of leverage.





“We were surprised by the high returns we were earning in our first three years and the reason was there was a lot of capital coming in to these trades. We were doing them and there were a lot of people coming to the beach to come swimming with us.



We never understood why they were so high, we just saw everything converging really quickly.”



Haghani"s views on what caused the firm’s collapse have evolved since the financial crisis, explaining that employing leverage in a relative-value trading strategy that includes a universe of exotic and illiquid investments, just wasn"t - and isn’t - smart for a small hedge fund.





“Post 2008, the view I have and that a lot of people share is what we were doing just wasn’t a good idea. It’s not a question of how we were doing it, it’s just a question of leverage. Relative value investing as a hedge fund isn’t a good idea.



That basic model isn’t a good idea because at some point things will move far enough that you will be forced to liquidate positions. You can’t really run this business with a tight stop loss approach. It’s not consistent with an expansive relative value frame work.



You could say well we could have tight stop losses, do relative value and limit ourselves to liquid investment but that wasn’t our model. Ours was a model where the only sort of stop loss was as we lost money, we would reduce positions. We would reduce risk in line with our capital.”



Thanks to the billions of dollars in leverage extended to LTCM by a coterie of banks, the Fed was forced to step in and demand that the firm’s lenders agree to a bailout.





“The world’s financial system ground to a halt as the fed had to cut rates just for this firm, and it was a hedge fund,” Haghani added.



To summarize, the lesson from LTCM was clear though, as the financial crisis nearly a decade later would demonstrate, none of the bankers, regulators or central bankers were paying attention. These guys, Haghani explains, were the smartest guys in the world. So nobody was checking their numbers. But of course, all traders inevitably get certain things wrong. And liquidity was what LTCM got wrong. Oh, and finally, LTCM got bailed out, setting the stage for the longest period of institutionalized moral hazard, in which nobody is allowed to fail any more, in the process destroying the risk/return calculus, but making a mockery of capitalism.


The Haghani interview begins roughly 20 minutes into the podcast below.

Thursday, July 27, 2017

Paulson Shutters Long-Short Equity Fund Amid Massive Healthcare Losses

After gaining instant fame with his massive subprime bet back in 2008/2009, John Paulson can"t seem to buy a clue of late.  Over the past couple of years, a series of strategic missteps have resulted in abysmal returns and increasing concern among investors that Paulson may have been nothing more than a "one-trick pony" all along.


Of course, as we pointed out back in November, one of the biggest of those "missteps" seems to have been the creation of a $500 million, long-short equity fund focused on healthcare about two years ago. 


The strategy seemed simple enough at the time: make a massive, Paulson-esque bet on the consolidation of large multi-national pharmaceutical businesses, hedge that bet with bearish wagers on the broader markets and sit back and wait for the money to flow in just like with the subprime bet.  Unfortunately, exactly the opposite happened in 2016 with the broader markets advancing while Paulson"s largest pharma holdings completely collapsed anywhere from 30% - 85%.  Oops.




Alas, it seems that Paulson is finally willing to admit what the market has been telling him for quite some time now, namely that he just might have been exactly wrong on his healthcare bet.   As Bloomberg points out today, this inevitable capitulation from Paulson has resulted in a "re-focusing" of his firm and the shuttering his first ever separately managed fund.





Paulson & Co., the investment firm that shot to fame betting on the collapse of the U.S. housing market, is closing its 2-year-old long-short equity fund in an effort to shift strategies after a steep drop in assets.



“We are re-focusing the funds on our core areas of expertise in merger arbitrage and distressed credit, where our assets have been growing,” founder John Paulson said in a letter to investors seen by Bloomberg News. “We thank the long-short team for their efforts on behalf of the company.”



Amid the changes, Jim Wong, the head of the firm’s investor relations, is leaving after 14 years, Paulson told clients in its letter. He will be succeeded on Aug. 1 by Tina Constantinides, who’s been with the company for 13 years.



Of course, the healthcare fund in question, the Paulson Long/Short Fund, was celebrated just over two years ago when it was launched with $500 million in seed capital.  Guy Levy was named the sole portfolio manager of the fund which marked the first (and we suspect the last) time Paulson granted autonomy over a separately manged pool of capital under his umbrella of funds.  Per CNBC back in June 2015:





Billionaire investor John Paulson is looking to make more money on health care.



Hedge fund firm Paulson & Co. is launching the Paulson Long/Short Fund to initially focus on health care, pharmaceutical, and related technology and consumer sector investments, according to a letter sent to clients obtained by CNBC.com. The firm, which runs approximately $20 billion overall, is seeding the fund with $500 million.



Guy Levy, Paulson"s health-care expert, will be portfolio manager of the new fund, according to the communication.



"Guy"s talent and expertise in health care, pharmaceutical and related sector investing have added significantly to our performance over the past five years, giving me confidence in his abilities to lead this new fund," John Paulson wrote in the letter.



While the strategy to "make more money on health care" was genius, if we understand it correctly, apparently it didn"t go exactly to plan...

Wednesday, June 28, 2017

Quants Haven't Made Human Investors Obsolete Just Yet

We are already unquestionably living in the era of the quantitative fund: Not only are quant funds receiving a larger percentage of new investor money than their discretionary peers, but as JPM Morgan’s head quant noted earlier this month, passive and quantitative funds now account for about 60% of equity assets, compared with less than 30% a decade ago.


Indeed, the chart below confirms what JPM already revealed: "for now, systematic traders are the dominating force in markets."



But while the asset-management space is increasingly looking like a “quant’s world”, with carbon-based traders looking increasingly anachronistic, a handful of fund managers are aggressively pushing back against the notion that human investors are headed toward obsolescence.


At least that’s what a quartet of money managers have posited in recent weeks, according to Bloomberg.





“Winton, a $30.6 billion hedge fund that’s used algorithms to trade for two decades, told clients that people must still make the big decisions. Michael Hintze, who runs another major fund, said computer models can spot market anomalies but rarely provide answers. Jordi Visser, investment chief at a third firm, said humans still have the upper hand when it comes to recognizing patterns. Billionaire bond manager Jeffrey Gundlach said he’s betting people will prevail."






“Despite the immense power of modern computing, it is neither advisable -- nor even possible -- to dispense with humans entirely,” Winton, founded by David Harding, who earned a degree in theoretical physics before going into finance, wrote in its letter to clients this month.”



These fund managers are not alone in their belief in the essentiality of human reasoning: Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said that he isn’t worried about artificial intelligence taking American’s jobs. Never mind that his remarks arrived on the same day as a PWC report which showed that more than a third of U.S. jobs could be at "high risk" of automation by the early 2030s, a percentage that’s greater than in Britain, Germany and Japan.


Not to mention what Bloomberg described as “a crescendo of warnings from the likes of Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and software billionaire Bill Gates that big data and machine learning may unleash a wave of automation on the US.”


Doubleline Capital’s Gundlach said he doesn’t believe in machine’s taking over finance. His advice for beating them? “Work hard.”



Jeff Gundlach


Winton said that while some tasks, like recurring calculations for assessing risk and vetting trading algorithms for anomalies, might be outsourced to computers. Most investment decisions at the fund will still need to be vetted by humans.





“Winton wrote in its letter, there are big tasks at hedge funds ripe for automation, such as performing large-scale, recurring calculations for assessing risk across portfolios. But according to the firm, whose 450 employees include astrophysicists and other scientists, computers are far from ready to make investing decisions independently. Instead, people will be running software at every stage of the process.



Winton managers design and choose algorithms that are ultimately approved or rejected by its investment board. And while computers are better suited to handle early stages of checking data, once anomalies are flagged, humans are better at cross-referencing the irregularities against other sources to draw conclusions, the London-based firm said.”



“The notion that human involvement in investment management should, or even could, be fully automated is wide of the mark,” Winton, which returned 1.3 percent this year through May on its main fund, wrote in the letter.”



To be sure, none of this will stop the biggest banks – and at least one fund - from trying to automate as many tasks as possible, from aspects of underwriting, to asset management, to legal tasks.





“Billionaire trader Steven Cohen is experimenting with ways to automate his best money managers. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. is developing systems to eliminate hundreds of hours of human labor in initial public offerings. JPMorgan Chase & Co. is using machine-learning techniques to take over work from lawyers. (Its CEO, Jamie Dimon, said in an interview published Monday that people are massively overreacting to the threat of technology.)”



But even the automation of low-level tasks could threaten at least one crucial aspect of the hedge-fund industry: The exorbitant fees charged by most managers.





“Hedge fund managers, for example, traditionally charged clients 2 percent of assets and 20 percent of profits. It’s harder to justify if automated platforms can achieve decent results without a big bite. Such has been the case with index funds.”



Some fund managers are also skeptical of backtesting – the process of trying to determine the efficacy of a trading algorithm by checking it against historical data. Successful traders will find ways to incorporate technology into their processes without relying on it alone to drive investment decisions, one fund manager said.





“The industry’s survivors will be the ones who imbibe technology into their processes, Visser said. The trick is to use a combination of human judgment and models, “while artificial intelligence tries to catch up to the power of the brain,” he said.”



And while some quant-driven strategies have certainly proven successful at sniffing out market anomalies, successful investors still need to grasp the basics.





"Hintze at CQS, a $14 billion hedge fund based in London, concedes that quant-driven strategies are here to stay, and that they’re good at taking advantage of anomalies in markets. While engineering and mathematics are intriguing, successful investing is based on an understanding of fundamentals, technicals and investor sentiment, he said."


Thursday, June 22, 2017

Real Gold or Paper Proxies: What Billionaire Gold Investors Actually Buy

Infographic website Visual Capitalist recently published an eye-catching infographic on behalf of Sprott Physical Bullion Trusts which featured 4 well-known billionaire investors and their supposed investments in gold. The infographic is titled “Why the World’s Billionaire Investors Buy Precious Metals” and can be seen here.


The 4 investors profiled in the infographic are:


  • Jacob Rothschild (Lord), chairman of London-based investment trust RIT Capital Partners Plc

  • David Einhorn, president of Manhattan-based hedge fund firm Greenlight Capital

  • Ray Dalio, chairman and CIO of hedge fund firm Bridgewater Associates, Westport (Connecticut)

  • Stanley Druckenmiller, chairman and CEO of Manthattan-based Duquesne Family Office (and formerly of Duquesne Capital Management)

Overall, four very famous investors, and four names that should at least be vaguely familiar to almost anyone who has a passing interest in financial markets and investing.


For each of the 4 billionaires, the Sprott infographic provides a few quotes about their views on gold and then moves on to record their recent ‘Moves’ into ‘gold’, or in some cases their recent readjustments of existing ‘gold’ exposures.


However, the trouble with this infographic is that although it’s visually appealing, nowhere does it mention how these famous investors achieve their exposures to ‘gold’, i.e. what form their gold investments take.


This is something which is also regularly bypassed in financial media articles, especially those published by Bloomberg, articles which refer to hedge fund managers such as Druckenmiller, or John Paulson, or Ray Dalio buying ‘gold’, but which all too often are too lazy to do basic research into the actual trades that these hedge fund managers execute to acquire their positions in ‘gold’ and whether these positions are actually in real physical gold or in some form of synthetic or derivative or paper gold.


In fact, the first comment posted on the Visual Capitalist website under said Sprott infographic when it was published asks exactly this question:


“I’d like to know if they are holding physical bullion, presumably in guarded safe vaults, or just paper.”


Given that the infographic is ‘Presented by’ Sprott Physical Bullion Trusts, one might assume that Rothschild, Einhorn, Dalio and Drukenmiller are all investing in physical bullion.


But are they? This is the question I set out to answer and which is documented below. Some of my findings may surprise you.


The Rothschilds: Jacob & RIT Capital Partners


First port of call, the Rothschilds of St James’s Place in London. Given that the Rothschilds are probably the richest family in the world and have been involved in the gold market for hundreds of years, you might assume that the family of the Five Arrows knows a thing or two about the difference between real gold bars and paper gold. And presumably they do. However, no one seems to have told this to the day-to-day managers of RIT Capital Partners Plc, the Rothschild controlled investment vehicle quoted in Sprott’s infographic.


Investment trusts are actually public limited companies (Plcs) which are structured as closed-ended investment vehicles. These vehicles issue a certain number of shares that can then be publicly traded. RIT Capital Partners plc, formally called the Rothschild Investment Trust (hence the name RIT), trades on the London Stock Exchange. Jacob Rothschild (The Lord Rothschild) is chairman of RIT Capital Partners Plc.


As a publicly traded vehicle, RIT Capital Partners Plc publishes annual and half-yearly reports, and is therefore more transparent than its hedge fund brethren. RIT’s latest report, an annual report for year-end 2016, was published on 28 February 2017.


Strangely, although the Sprott infographic was only published on 7 June 2017, it quotes not from the annual report for year-end 2016 but from RIT’s half-yearly report to 30 June 2016, which was published on 15 August 2016.


The Sprott infographic states:


“In a 2016 shareholder update [Jacob] Rothschild outlined bold changes to the RIT Capital Partners’ portfolio, including…increased exposure to gold and precious metals to 8%”


Similarly, in the RIT Chairman’s Statement (page 2) of the 30 June 2016 report, Jacob Rothschild said “We increased gold and precious metals to 8% by the end of June.”


Glancing at either the Chairman’s statement or the Sprott infographic, you might think ‘ok, so RIT holds (or held) 8% of its portfolio in gold and precious metals’. However, this is not the case, a fact which becomes clear when we look at the Investment Portfolio (holdings) of RIT that are detailed in the same report.



Jacob Rothschild, RIT Capital Partners


RIT is a global investment fund whose holdings span equities, hedge fund investments, private investments, real assets, credit, and bonds. It’s ‘gold’ and ‘precious metals’ holdings are listed under ‘Real Assets’. The entire RIT portfolio is worth £2.73 billion.


The Real Assets section of the RIT report to 30 June 2016 (on page 6 of the report, page 8 of the pdf) lists relevant gold-related line items as:


  • “BlackRock Gold & General Fund”, described as “Gold and precious metal equities”, valued at £22.9 million, and representing 0.9% of the NAV, with a fund weight of 0.83%

  •  “Gold Futures” with a description “Long, 6.0% notional“, valued at £7.6 million, represents 0.3% of the NAV

  • “Silver Futures with a description “Long, 1.2% notional” valued at £7.6 million, representing 0.0% (rounded) of the NAV

These are the only gold-related investments in the entire RIT portfolio. Therefore, could this 8% that Jacob Rothschild refers to as “we increased gold and precious metals to 8% by the end of June” be a combination of a 6% notional long on gold futures, a 1.2% notional on long silver futures, and a 0.8% fund weight in gold mining equities through the BlackRock Gold & General Fund holding?


In short, the answer is Yes.


Firstly, looking at the BlackRock Gold & General Fund, this is a UCITS equity fund which exclusively invests in the shares of gold and silver mining companies such as Newcrest, Newmont, and GoldCorp and which is benchmarked against the FTSE Gold Mining Index (an equity index). However, the BlackRock website reminds us that “The Fund does not hold physical gold or metal.” Like all equity investments, this fund exposes its holders to equity risk, currency risk, sectoral risks (in this case the mining sector), possible gold hedging risks, and the general corporate risks that come with stock specific investing in any publicly quoted company, some of which cannot be diversified through portfolio investing.


Next up are the precious metals futures line items. In investment portfolios, notional is literally the gross exposure of a position. In this case, the RIT portfolio being long 6.0% notional in gold futures just means that the portfolio’s notional exposure to gold (via the gold futures position) represented (on 30 June 2016) an amount which was 6.0% of the total (gross) exposure of the portfolio. This is also a leveraged position since it was acquired via the purchase of exchange traded futures and the maintenance of these futures via margin. The amount reflected in the NAV for this position just refers to the margin.


I also checked with RIT investors relations as to whether Jacob Rothschild, when he stated that RIT holds gold, was actually referring to these gold futures positions. RIT investor relations responded:


“Yes, we do refer to long gold futures exposure as “holding gold”. We take this view since we are confident that gold futures are acting as a suitable proxy for gold both from a regulatory perspective and in terms of where we are in the cycle.


However, it should be clear to all that holding gold futures is not the same thing as holding vaulted physical gold. Gold futures may provide exposure to the US Dollar price of gold, but that’s about it, and even if they can be theoretically exercised into physical gold on the COMEX or ICE platforms, no one uses them for this purpose. For example, only 0.04% of COMEX gold futures contracts result in physical delivery each year.


Gold futures also entail exchange risk, risk of not being able to exercise for delivery, margin risk, forced cash settlement risk, etc etc. Gold futures are also derivatives that can come into existence in massive quantities as long as there are counterparties to take the other side of the futures trades.


Allocated physical gold on the other hand is an asset which exists in limited quantities, has no counterparty risk, has intrinsic value and has been used as money and as a store of value for thousands of years.


The “regulatory perspective” that RIT refers to just seems to mean that the fund’s exposure ticks various compliance boxes and is an acceptable security from a compliance and regulatory perspective.


The “where we are in the cycle” phrase probably refers to the interest rate cycle in terms of interest rate movements, inflation, real interest rates etc, but surely this is irrelevant because if you really believe that gold futures prices are a perfect proxy for gold prices, then the existence of a “cycle” and the phases of such a cycle become irrelevant to the investment decision?


In summary, it should be clear that RIT Capital Partners Plc does not hold any gold or other precious metals, because it merely holds gold futures and units in a BlackRock fund which itself only holds gold and silver equities (common shares) and which does not hold physical gold.


Just for completeness, let’s turn to the latest annual report from RIT for year-end 2016 that Sprott did not refer to. Has anything changed compared to 30 June 2016? At year-end 2016, according to Jacob Rothschild:


“We continue to hold gold and gold mining shares amounting to 6% of the portfolio.“


Therefore, by the end of 2016, by RIT’s logic, it now had a 6% exposure to gold (and the exposure to silver futures had disappeared). However, as per the 6 month earlier period, this was really a) exposure to the US dollar price of gold via gold futures and b) an exposure to the common equity of publicly-traded gold mining companies through the BlackRock fund investment.


In the Real Assets section of the RIT annual report (page 13 of the report, page 15 of the pdf), it lists:


  • “BlackRock Gold & General Fund”, with a description “Gold and precious metal equities” valued at £20.3 million, representing 0.9% of the NAV, and with a fund weight of 0.7%

  • “Gold Futures” with a Description “Long, 5.7% notional” representing (0.2%) of the NAV

Again, the 6% Rothschild reference includes the 5.7% long notional on gold via the gold futures, the BlackRock fund with a weight of 0.7%, and possibly the (0.2%) NAV (margin), which altogether net to approximately 6% when rounded down. Since 8% sounds better than 6%, Sprott may have chosen to reference the 30 June 2016 RIT report and not the more recent 30 December 2016 RIT report as this would make Rothschild appear more bullish on gold.


David Einhorn and Greenlight Capital


Hedge funds by their nature are very secretive, and because they are private pools of capital, they have no obligation to report detailed holdings even to their clients, let alone to the general public. Some of the justifications for hedge fund secrecy include preventing other trading parties adversely trading against them and preventing competitors replicating their positions. Note, hedge funds still have to report equity holdings to the US SEC and they do this via their quarterly 13F form submissions, which can be viewed on the SEC EDGAR website about 6 weeks after quarter end.


Sometimes hedge fund stars will drop hints about some of their positions or engage with the financial media, but this is mainly to talk their positions and trading books up. Often however, the “partner letters” (similar to shareholder letters) that hedge fund partnerships send to their clients / investors will give some indication as to their positions and asset allocations, and for whatever reason, some of these letters seem to make it into the public domain pretty quickly. Note that most hedge funds are established as Limited Liability Companies (LLCs), a structure which supports the partnership model.


Following Jacob Rothschild, next up on the Sprott infographic is hedge fund manager David Einhorn and his Greenlight Capital hedge fund firm. Greenlight, as a hedge fund firm, runs a series of funds that invest in equity, debt etc but also include global macro and that are known as the “Greenlight Capital funds” a.k.a. “The Partnerships”. There are at least 6 funds in this group, maybe more.



David Einhorn, Greenlight Capital



The Sprott infographic refers to a recent gold-related ‘Move’ that Einhorn that made as follows:


“In early 2017, Einhorn mentioned on an earnings call that he was:…Keeping gold as a top position”


More recently, Greenlight again refers to its gold positions in a partners letter dated 25 April 2017, in which it wrote that “gold gave us a small profit in macro”, and that:


 “Gold remains a long-term position with a thesis that global fiscal and monetary policies remain very risky”


So we can assume that Einhorn maintains a gold exposure of some sort. Since there was no information in the above partner letter as to what exactly Greenlight refers to as a gold position, and nothing that I could find on the web, I did what any junior Bloomberg reporter should but doesn’t do, and shot off an email to Greenlight asking how Greenlight Capital attains its long gold exposure? Surprisingly, or maybe not, within about 20 minutes Greenlight answered with a short and sweet one-liner:


 “We hold physical allocated gold in all our funds.” 


This response came from the top of the Greenlight tree, close to Einhorn. Hint David Einhorn only follows three accounts on Twitter, one of which is Donald Trump another of which is the Einhorn Trust. So now we know that at least one major hedge fund firm holds physical allocated gold.


On a side note, Greenlight also offers two funds called Greenlight Capital (Gold), LP and Greenlight Capital Offshore (Gold), Ltd. These two funds actually offers investors a gold class which denominates investments in that class in gold rather than USD. This is similar to a USD denominated fund offering shareholders a EUR or CHF class, the only difference being that this class is in gold. 


Ray Dalio and Bridgewater


Bridgewater Associates, based in Westport in Connecticut, runs some of the largest and most well-known individual hedge funds such as the global macro Pure Alpha as well as other well-known funds called ‘The All Weather’  and ‘Pure Alpha Major Markets’. Ray Dalio is founder, chairman and chief investment officer (CIO) of Bridgewater.


In the Sprott infographic, the gold ‘Move’ which they chose to highlight Dalio for was that:


“In 2016, Dalio said it is prudent to have a ‘well-diversified portfolio’ that is 5-10% gold”


However, unlike the other investors profiled, i.e. Rothschild, Einhorn, and Druckenmiller, who had investment decisions attributed to them that involved taking or extending long positions, there is nothing, at least in the infographic, that refers to Dalio taking on or amending a gold position.


When Dalio refers to gold, which he has done publicly on a number of occasions, he tends to do so in generalistic terms such as the following comments which were taken from Dalio’s appearance at the CEO Speaker Series conversations organised by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR):


“And so gold is one of the currencies. So we have dollars, we have euros, we have yen and we have gold.”


“Now, it [gold] doesn’t have a capacity — the capacity of moving money into gold in a large number is extremely limited.”


“I think … there’s no sensible reason not to have some — if you’re going to own a currency, … it’s not sensible not to own gold”


“I don’t want to draw an inordinate amount of attention to gold”


“a certain limited amount, at least passably, should be in gold, just like you would hold a certain amount in cash”


“Now, it depends on the amount of gold, but if you don’t own, I don’t know, 10 percent in — if you don’t have that and then it depends on the world, then you — then there’s no sensible reason other than you don’t know history and you don’t know the economics of it.”




Ray Dalio, Bridgewater Associates



Dalio frequently, in various forums, demonstrates his understanding of the historical importance of gold in the monetary system. Based on the language that Dalio uses about capacity of the gold market and his appreciation of the history of gold, my hunch is that Bridgewater does hold physical gold in a similar manner to how Greenlight Capital holds gold.


Dalio has also gone on record with Tony Robbins hinting at a gold allocation that he would use for an “all weather fund”. This is not the Bridgewater All Weather Fund, but it could be something similar. Dalio’s recommended asset allocation that he gave Robbins was:


  • 30% Stocks

  • 40% Long-Term Bonds

  • 15% Intermediate-Term Bonds

  • 7.5% Gold

  • 7.5% Commodities

Although it is quite tricky to contact Bridgewater, I did manage to find Dalio’s email (somehow or other) and like an aspiring Bloomberg reporter (or not), I shot off an email to Dalio asking:


“Does Bridgewater hold physical gold in its funds (e.g. Pure Alpha, All Weather, and Pure Alpha Major Markets) or some other type of long gold exposure?” 


The same day, I received back an automated response:



______________________________________________________________________

Message from "Ray Dalio"
______________________________________________________________________

I recognize from your email address that this is the first message I have received from you since Bridgewater Associates began using Sender Address Verification (SAV).

Your message is very important to me. Like you, we are very concerned with stopping the proliferation of spam. We have implemented Sender Address Verification (SAV) to ensure that we do not receive unwanted email and to give you the assurance that your messages to me have no chance of being filtered into a bulk mail folder.

By pressing REPLY and SEND to this message your original message will be delivered to the top of my inbox. You need only do this once and all future emails will be recognized and delivered directly to me.
...


Thank you!

Ray Dalio

However, after replying as per the instructions above using the verification address, there was no further response from Bridgewater. Maybe he is on vacation!


So the jury is still out on how Bridgewater acquires its exposure to gold, assuming that its funds actually have exposure to gold. But my guess is that at least some of Bridgewater’s funds do hold gold, and probably hold real physical allocated gold.


Stanley Druckenmiller and Duquesne


Finally, the Sprott infographic features Stanley Druckenmiller, founder and former chairman and president of Pittsburgh-based Duquesne Capital Management, and also former portfolio manager of Soros’ Quantum Fund. In 2010, ‘Stan’ Druckenmiller wound down Duquesne Capital since he claimed it was becoming harder to deliver consistently high returns, but he continued to manage his own wealth through Duquesne Family Office LLC, which is based out of Manhattan.


According to the infographic, in early 2017 Druckenmiller said:


“Gold was down a lot, so I bought it.”




Stan Druckenmiller, Duquesne


This quote was reported in a 8 February 2017 Bloomberg article which itself was based on a CNBC interview from 7 February:


“I wanted to own some currency and no country wants its currency to strengthen,” Druckenmiller said Tuesday in an interview. “Gold was down a lot, so I bought it.” 


As per usual, Bloomberg doesn’t bother to find out or mention what form of gold exposure Druckenmiller was referring to in that interview.


Strangely, Bloomberg says that Druckenmiller bought gold in late December and January having previously sold his ‘gold’ on election night in November when Trump was elected. I say strangely because Druckenmiller is known for getting his US dollar ‘gold exposure’ via the gold-backed ETF the SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) however, the Duquesne Family Office 13F filings with the SEC don’t show GLD activity in Q4 2016 or Q1 2016.


Looking at recent Duquesne Family Office 13F filings which show reportable equity holdings (including GLD since GLD is a listed security and is basically like a share), the last time Duquesne Family Office had a long exposure to the SPDR Gold Trust was in Q1 2016 when it held 2,016,000 call options on the SPDR Gold Trust (Cusip 78463V907) which at the time had a notional exposure of $237.16 million. Druckenmiller had purchased 2,880,000 call options on GLD during Q2 2015 but reduced this to 2,016,000 calls during Q1 2016. Duquesne has not held any SPDR Gold Trust shares or options since Q1 2016.


However, looking at the Duquesne 13F filings for Q3 2016, Q4 2016 and Q1 2017, there are some interesting changes in reported holdings of some gold mining equities over this period.


As of the end of September 2016, Duquesne reported holding 1.8326 million Barrick Gold shares and 530,800 Agnico Eagle Mines shares. Then, as of the end of December 2016, neither of these stocks appeared on the Duquesne 13F list.


However, as of the end of March 2017, both Barrick and Agnico reappeared on Duquesne’s filing, with Druckenmiller’s family investments holding 2.85 million Barrick Gold shares, and 882,900 Agnico Eagle Mines shares. Barrick Gold, headquartered in Canada, is the world’s largest gold mining company. Agnico Eagle, also headquartered in Canada, is another large gold mining company.


The timing of Druckenmiller saying that he sold his ‘gold’ on election night in November 2016 and the bought gold in late December 2016 and January 2017 fits very well with the Duquesne trades of selling Barrick Gold and Agnico Eagle so that they appeared in the Q3 13F, but not in the Q4 13F and then reappeared in the Q1 2017 13F. If this is the case, then Druckenmiller’s Duquesne does not hold gold but holds gold mining equities, and Druckenmiller’s recent references to buying gold are really references to holding common shares in publicly-traded gold mining companies.


Duquesne, however, could hold other ‘gold exposures’ such as gold futures or even real physical allocated gold. But due to the non-obligation of these investment pools to report holdings, this is unclear.


I also sent an email to Stan Druckenmiller at his Duquesne address, asking him:


“Does Duquesne Family Office hold physical gold as part of its exposure to gold within its investments, or is the exposure some other type of long gold exposure such as the gold-backed ETF GLD?”


However, as of the time of writing, Druckenmiller has not responded.


Druckenmiller’s gold exposure via GLD calls between Q2 2015 and Q1 2016 also deserves some commentary. Readers of this website will know that holding a gold-backed ETF such as GLD is not the same as owning real physical gold. Although the Trust behind GLD holds gold bars, GLD units just provide exposure to the US dollar price of gold and there is no conversion option into real gold. With GLD, the holder is a shareholder and not a gold holder. There are many other concerns with GLD, all of which are documented on a BullionStar infographic.


However, Duquesne’s ‘exposure’ is even one more step removed from gold since it was in the more of a derivative (call option) on an underlying (GLD) which itself does not provide ownership of any gold to the holder. So in some ways this could be called a second order derivative.


Paulson & Co


Although Sprott’s infographic doesn’t feature John Paulson of hedge fund firm Paulson & Co, maybe it should have. However, on second thoughts maybe not, because Paulson & Co is currently the 6th largest institutional holder of SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) shares, which as explained above, is not the same as owning real physical gold. According to its latest 13F filing, Paulson & Co holds 4,359,722 GLD shares worth a sizeable $500 million.




John Paulson (far right), along with Jim Simons of Renaissance (middle) and George Soros (left) 



Paulson also launched a specific gold fund in 2010 which is now called the PFR Gold Fund, named after Paulson, and the two managers who used to run the fund, namely, Victor Flores and John Reade, hence the PFR. Reade has now left Paulson & Co, and moved to the World Gold Council (WGC), which derives the majority of its revenue from…wait for it….the SPDR Gold Trust, since WGC’s 100% owned subsidiary World Gold Trust Services is the sponsor of the GLD.



According to HedgeTracker, the PFR Gold Fund has a “long-term strategy focus investing in mining companies and bullion-based derivatives“, so again you can see that this is nothing to do with owning and holdings real physical allocated gold.


Conclusion


After this whirlwind tour, we know the following:


RIT Capital Partners Plc claims to hold gold but really holds a) gold futures which provide notional long gold exposure and b) a BlackRock fund which invests in gold mining shares.


Greenlight Capital holds allocated gold in all of its hedge funds (and they are good about replying to emails).


Bridgewater Associates probably holds gold exposure across at least some of its funds. Given Ray Dalio’s grasp of the importance of real physical gold, I would be surprised if Dalio’s funds do not hold real physical gold. But Dalio is a hard man to track down, so the jury is still out on this one.


Stan Druckenmiller’s Duquesne Family Office had a large exposure to the SPDR Gold Trust via call options in 2015 and early 2016 but then closed this exposure. Duquesne also invests in gold mining equities Barrick Gold and Agnico Eagle Mines, and this could be what Druckenmiller is referring to when he said he sold and then bought back gold.


Paulson is a big fan of the SPDR Gold Trust, a vehicle which is in no way the same as owning physical gold, because it merely provides exposure to the US dollar price of gold.


If and when the paper gold market implodes and the price of real physical gold diverges from the paper price of gold, the world’s billionaire investors will need to line up their ducks and explain to their partners and shareholders if they actually hold tangible physical gold bars, and if not why not.


This article originally appeared on the BullionStar website under the title "Are the World’s Billionaire Investors Actually Buying Gold?"