Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs Asset Management. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs Asset Management. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 7, 2017

Goldman"s Asset Arm Takes Big Hit On Venezuelan Bond Bloodbath

The fallout from the Venezuelan bond restructuring has claimed a major victim in Goldman Sachs Asset Management, or rather some of the “muppets” who trusted Goldman to invest their money. However, the route which led Goldman to losing a chunk of client money wasn’t just a case of bad judgement, being riddled with the usual mixture of greed, questionable ethics and government intervention. As we detailed in “Goldman Accused Of Funding Maduro’s Dictatorship”.


Goldman controversially purchased $2.8 billion of 2022 bonds in May 2017 in the state-owned oil producer PDVSA, for about $865 million - or about 31 cents on the dollar. This prompted Julio Borges, President of the National Assembly and head of Venezuela’s opposition, to accuse Goldman of “aiding and abetting the country’s dictatorial regime.” Borges threatened that any future democratic government would not recognise or pay on the bonds. In true Goldman fashion, however, the deal was just too lucrative to pass up, or so it seemed at the time, as Goldman paid a then 30% discount to other Venezuelan bonds with a similar maturity.


 


Goldman’s ”defence” was that it did not buy the bonds directly from PDVSA, consequently it did not transfer funds directly to the Venezuelan regime.




To make matters worse, when the Trump White House extended sanctions against Venezuela over the Summer, including a ban on trading Venezuelan debt, Goldman’s bonds were mysteriously exempt. As we argued here.


“the logic is that if Goldman was forced to liquidate the bonds, or worse was stuck holding them as Venezuela went bankrupt, it would take a huge hit on the nearly $3 billion notional position. As such, Goldman"s advisors to Trump made it quite clear that any sanctions against Venezuela would have to be Goldman Sachs revenue neutral first and foremost. That"s precisely what happened.”



We have to acknowledge, however, that the next comment of ours was only half correct.


“Of course, Venezuela"s default is just a matter of time, but it won"t take place before Goldman dumps its bond holdings to some unwitting retail investor or some German widows and orphans.”



It turns out that Goldman had only dumped part of its holdings prior to the expected default, and is sitting on a sizeable loss, as the FT explains.


Ricardo Penfold, a senior portfolio manager at Goldman Sachs Asset Management, earlier this year swooped on a big slice of a bond issued by PDVSA, Venezuela’s state oil company, people familiar with the matter say. Mr Penfold paid $865m for bonds with a face value of $2.8bn — a price of just under 31 cents on the dollar — reflecting the elevated risks of a default even at the time. While GSAM has since sold off chunks of the bond, it was still listed as the single biggest overall owner of the PDVSA bond maturing in 2022, with a face value holding of $1.3bn at the end of the third quarter. But with Thursday’s announcement that Venezuela would seek to restructure all its foreign bonds, the bond is now trading at 25 cents on the dollar, down from 29 cents at the start of last week. That would translate into a paper loss of $54m in just five days if GSAM has not reduced its stake since the end of the third quarter…


 


GSAM is listed as the single biggest overall owner of PDVSA debts, according to Bloomberg data based on fund filings, with $1.8bn of face value holdings.


 


A Goldman spokesman said: “We are monitoring this situation closely.” The summer deal was particularly controversial, attracting condemnation from the Venezuelan opposition and US senator Marco Rubio, because it in effect constituted a cash infusion for the increasingly autocratic government led by Nicolás Maduro. GSAM bought the bond via an intermediary, but it was sold by the central bank.



As we said, and other analysts agree, Goldman should have seen it coming. From the FT article.


Many investors who had been betting that Venezuela would manage to avoid defaulting are nursing losses. Venezuelan bonds suffered a drubbing in the wake of Mr Maduro announcing plans to restructure the country’s $89bn debt pile. “This has been a well-telegraphed train wreck,” said Robert Koenigsberger, head of Gramercy, an emerging markets-focused asset manager.


 


“There are reasons to expect that prices will go even lower from here.” GSAM and other big Venezuelan bond investors — such as Fidelity, T Rowe Price and Ashmore — could still end up making money from their Venezuelan bond purchases, as analysts expect the ultimate “recovery value” on Venezuelan debt to be higher than where the bonds are trading at now.



While the article suggests the possibility of a more favourable exit for Goldman in due course, the restructuring of Venezuelan debt is not going to be a “plain vanilla” variety. Indeed, it might be more complicated than any previous sovereign debt restructuring. The irony for Goldman, as the FT explains, is that the extension of sanctions by the US Government will make it much harder for the bank to recover its losses.


Venezuela’s plans to restructure its debts are riddled with complications. The mess of bonds issued by the country and PDVSA are hard to disentangle, and oil exports — the country’s sole financial lifeline — are vulnerable to seizures from litigious creditors. However, the biggest wrinkle is the US government’s sanctions on Venezuela, unveiled in August after the GSAM deal. In practice, they prohibit any US institutions from involvement in any Venezuelan debt restructuring.


 


“Sanctions will prevent a conventional exchange offer,” said Lee Buchheit, a senior partner at Cleary Gottlieb, who has represented a series of countries when they restructure their debts. “It’s really not clear what Maduro has in mind, or whether he even has anything in mind."


 


Venezuela owes about $750m in bond arrears and is facing a further $965m of interest payments over November and December, calculates Patrick Esteruelas, global head of research at Emso Asset Management. If Caracas has run out of money — and Russia or China decline to extend more loans to Venezuela — it will have to default. But as long as US sanctions remain in place, this will push Venezuela into financial purgatory of a protracted, unresolvable debt default. “In a world where you can’t pay and you can’t restructure, all you can do is default,” Mr Koenigsberger said. “Even without the sanction, this would have been an exceptionally tough debt restructuring. It will now be exponentially harder than anything we have seen before. And I don’t think that is priced in yet.”



It will be tragically amusing to watch what extraordinary measures the heavily Goldman-influenced White House takes to bail the bank out of its latest predicament.









Wednesday, June 7, 2017

Venezuela's "Mysterious" Bond Deal Reappears, And This Time China Wants Out

As its foreign reserves dwindle to less than $10 billion, the government of Venezuela – desperate for any kind of financial lifeline - has partnered with a Chinese brokerage to try and resell $5 billion in bonds that it initially issued at a deep discount, according to the Wall Street Journal. The brokerage, Haitong Securities USA, a unit of China’s Haitong Securities, is quietly marketing the bonds to yield-starved hedge fund managers.


What makes today"s news particularly notable is that the original bond transaction in question was highlighted here back in January when in a post titled "In "Mysterious" Bond Sale, Venezuela Issues $5 Billion In Debt To Itself With China As Underwriter" we reported that the Maduro government appeared to be effectively selling debt, and raising dollar funds, from (and to) itself with China as an intermediary; as Reuters added at the time, the deal was peculiar in that the transaction did not bring in actual new funds for the cash-strapped OPEC nation.


Quoted by Bloomberg in January, Francisco Rodriguez, the chief economist at Torino Capital in New York, said that "my guess - but it’s just a guess - is that given uncertainty as to whether Venezuela would be able to deliver the oil necessary for repayment, the Chinese may have asked for the loan to be also guaranteed with a bond,” he told Bloomberg by email, adding that he had been expecting a disbursement of $5 billion related to the renewal of a loan from China.


Bond traders were just as confused as reporters and analysts: Russ Dallen, a managing partner at Caracas Capital, told Bloomberg that "bond markets will likely react with “befuddlement. Taking place on Dec. 29 with no approval by the National Assembly and no promulgation notice in the Official Gazette, this smells of some kind of end of the year financial shenanigan from a government that is out of cash and is desperately trying to hide it,” he said.


As we concluded at the time, "With that assumption in place, we look forward to learning the details of just how China is now funding insolvent supplier sovereigns by the back door, and where else besides Venezuela is this arrangement in place."


Five months later, we may have gotten the answer, and it now appears that Haitong had simply kept the bond without syndicating to end buyers, and - for whatever reason - is now desperate to dump them to any willing purchaser, a move which bodes poorly for China"s ongong relationship with Venezuela.


Reports that Venezuela is shopping around the bonds arrived just a week after Goldman Sachs Asset Management inadvertently ignited a PR crisis when it bought $2.8 billion worth of Venezuelan bonds issued by state oil company PDVSA from an obscure UK brokerage. Opponents of the brutal regime of Nicolas Maduro accused the bank of buying “hunger bonds” and Venezuela opposition leader Julio Borges accused it of “aiding and abetting the country’s dictatorial regime.”



As we noted last week, it appears that Goldman turned around and sold those same bonds, which it bought at a discount, for a tidy profit.


Haitong is reportedly offering the bonds at an even deeper discount than the 31 cents on the dollar that Goldman paid. But the latest batch of bonds currently on sale is different from those purchase by Goldman (and Nomura) as they remain unregistered with clearing organizations like Euroclear and the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., which is required for the bonds to trade electronically, WSJ reported.


Aside from the illiquidity issue, potential buyers have other reasons to be wary of lending to the Maduro regime: The political opposition has argued that the bond sales are illegal because they were never approved by the legislature.


Some would-be buyers told WSJ they"re afraid that if Venezuela defaults, the owners of the 2036 bonds wouldn’t have the same claim on the country’s debt as other bondholders because the bonds were issued through an intermediary. Of course, any potential buyer should probably be concerned about the huge sheer size of the discounts, as the WSJ points out tongue-in-cheek.





“It’s like they’re having a going out of business sale,” said Russ Dallen, a partner at Brokerage Caracas Capital.



“And that’s what buyers should be worried about. Either they’re really desperate, or they’re just filling up their credit card with no plans of paying back.”



There is a reason for Venezuela"s desperation: after two decades of economic mismanagement, the largest global banks refuse to do business with the insolvent socialist country - which has on numerous occasions tried to lease or sell outright some of its gold reserves - making it impossible to plug holes in its budget by issuing debt. Instead, the country must rely on small and often little-known institutions to peddle its bonds. 


That, and of course, hyperinflating away its debt. Venezuela’s economy has shrunk by an estimated 27% since 2013. The International Monetary Fund says inflation this year will hit 720%, and the country’s central bank hasn’t publishing basic economic indicators like balance of payments and gross domestic product since September 2015, rendering the country’s basic economic indicators, let alone calculations of its capacity to repay, a giant question mark for investors and credit rating firms alike.


With that in mind, we’re curious to see who – if anyone – is willing to step up and buy the latest batch of "hunger bonds" in the aftermath of the shock treatment that Goldman received after it was revealed that Blankfein"s firm may have been covertly funding Maduro"s central bank.


But the far bigger question is whether China - as the Haitong firesale appears to suggest - has finally given up on the melting Venezuelan ice cube, also known as one of its main foreign crude oil vendors. If so, Maduro"s days are indeed numbered.

Monday, May 15, 2017

Some Of The Funds Losing Billions In Puerto Rico's Historic Bankruptcy

In the aftermath of Puerto Rico"s historic bankruptcy, a clearer picture of losses accrued by U.S. mutual funds on their holdings of Puerto Rican debt is beginning to emerge: the WSJ has calculated the red ink at as much as $5.4 billion over the last five years on total holdings of $14.6 billion.  Wall Street"s paper of record lists the funds who have piled up losses, both realized and unrealized, on the trade. These include: Franklin Resources, Oppenheimer, Vanguard, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Western, Lord, Abbett, AllianceBernstein and Dreyfus.


Of these, Franklin and Oppenheimer are the biggest losers, according to Morningstar data cited by the Journal. Oppenheimer has lost as much as $2.1 billion, and Franklin as much as $1.6 billion. That"s compared with AUMs of $230 billion and $741 billion, respectively.


Meanwhile, six other fund families managed by Vanguard, Goldman, Western Asset, Lord Abbett, AllianceBernstein Holding and Dreyfus have racked up between $100 million and $200 million in losses each.


Of course, in the grand scheme of the funds" AUMs, the losses so far are negligible, so before retail investors assume that Meredith Whitney"s prediction is finally coming true, resulting in another muni fund panic, it is worth recalling that all these funds have at least $100 billion each in muni-bond assets under management.  Furthermore, these investors are likely in better shape than some of their hedge fund colleagues as the damage done to mutual funds, and by extension the retirees and middle-class savers to which they cater, will be an important factor in the court-mandated restructuring of the island"s debt, which begins Wednesday with a hearing in San Juan.


As a reminder, earlier this month, the island"s governing body petitioned for - and its federal oversight board approved - its own version of bankruptcy protection under Title III of a rescue law passed by Congress late last year. 


The mutual funds will have a greater incentive to agitate for maximum recovery especially since they purchased debt closer to par values.  Mutual funds were the most heavily invested in Puerto Rican debt, tempted by attractive yields - 8% at the last issuance of GOs in 2014 - along with an exemption from federal taxes.


* * *


Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that as the island"s restructuring progresses, creditors of Puerto Rico"s insolvent government development bank today agreed to accept losses by exchanging their bonds for new securities, moving the island another step toward restructuring its crushing debt load. Under the agreement, bondholders would exchange their debts at 55 percent, 60 percent or 75 percent of face value, depending on whether they elected to receive higher interest payments or the prospect of a greater recovery through debt with less legal claim to the bank’s cash, according to terms disclosed in a bond filing.





The deal comes less than two weeks after Puerto Rico initiated bankruptcy-like proceedings, giving it power to have debts dismissed in U.S. court if creditors don’t voluntarily agree to accept less than they’re owed. Puerto Rico has already reached a similar agreement with creditors of the government electric company and officials have said they intend to continue negotiating with investors.



"This agreement is an example that the government is regaining the credibility it had lost over the past few years,” Rossello said. “We are satisfied with this agreement.”



Debt could be issued for first-lien bonds at 55 percent of par with 7.5 percent coupons, or 60 percent of par with 5.5 percent coupons. Those electing for subordinate bonds would get 75 percent of par and coupons of 3.5 percent. New issuer will receive assets of GDB, with a book value of $5.3 billion.


Despite the enforced bondholder haircuts, the agreement would allow creditors to recoup more of their investment than current trading prices suggest. Government Development Bank bonds due in August traded Monday for an average of 24.3 cents on the dollar.



The negotiation has a long way to go: Governor Ricardo Rossello said at a press conference Monday that 45% of bondholders have so far consented to the restructuring. Under the federal emergency rescue law that allows for Puerto Rico to legally cut its debts, any voluntary agreement must be approved by a two-thirds vote of bondholders.


Today"s deal included the so-called ad hoc group, comprised mostly of hedge funds managed by Avenue Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management, Fir Tree Partners and Solus Alternative Asset Management, as well as local bondholders.


And speaking of hedge funds, as we documented previously, here"s a rundown of the other biggest losers, which include a handful of hedge funds and bond insurers - not to mention the Puerto Rican people, about half of whom live in poverty and will likely be forced to cope with cuts to basic services mandated by an austerity regime not unlike those seen across Europe.


  • General Obligation bondholders include: Aurelius Capital Management, Autonomy Capital and Monarch Alternative Capital LP,

  • Sales tax revenue-backed (Cofinas) bondholders: Scoggin Capital Management, GoldenTree Asset Management, Merced Capital, Tilden Park and Whitebox Advisors have held Cofinas.

  • Bonds insurers: roughly $12 billion of the island’s $70 billion in outstanding debt is insured. It will be up to the bond insurers to fill the gap when interest and maturity payments are missed. Insurers backed a wide swath of bonds from Puerto Rico, complicating the island’s ability to prioritize payments. Among the companies with the biggest exposure to Puerto Rico debt include Ambac Financial Group, National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation, Assured Guaranty Ltd. and Financial Guaranty Insurance Company.

PR"s constitution requires the government to pay back GO bondholders in full, and the island has already offered a restructuring that favored GO bonds, over COFINAs, which are backed by tax revenue. However, other recent municipal bankruptcy cases have seen GO investors accept huge losses, according to data from Moody"s Investors Service.


  • In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, bondholders took a 25 cents on the dollar haircut

  • In Stockton, California, the haircut was 50 percent.

  • In Detroit, where pensioners suffered losses of about 18 percent, bondholders were slapped with a 75% haircut, taking home just 25 cents on the dollar.

Despite this, Moody"s rates PR"s GO and COFINA debt on equal footing, forecasting holders of both securities will recoup between 65 and 80 cents on the dollar, higher than the less than 35 cents expected for holders of debt from Puerto Rican agencies like the Government Development Bank.


With much left undecided, it"s pointless at this stage to anticipate how long this case may take, and what any final settlement might look like; nobody can say for sure whether the courts will find that they have the legal authority to issue a ruling. At some point, the Supreme Court may need to make a ruling.


Stock investors, for one, appear to be biding their time: While Detroit"s decision to file for bankruptcy back in 2013 shook markets, the Puerto Rican newsflow has barely registered outside of muniland.

Friday, April 21, 2017

Fed's Fischer Responds To Paul Tudor Jones

"We"re not terrified," proclaimed a cognitively dissonant Stanley Fischer, responding to concerns raised by legendary trader Paul Tudor Jones over the stock market"s extreme valuation - the value of the S&P relative to the size of the economy - should be “terrifying” to a central banker, Jones said earlier this month at a closed-door Goldman Sachs Asset Management conference, according to people who heard him.




*FISCHER SAYS STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY DOESN"T TERRIFY HIM


"I"m not terrific at forecasting stock market directions" - which begs the question, what are you terrific at forecasting?




On The Dollar, Fischer dismissed Trump"s comments but seemed to let slip some awkward reality...





Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer, when asked about President Trump’s comment on the USD, says “we do not take a particular statement, by even a president, into account in making our decisions on the interest rate.”



“The markets know how to price the dollar fairly well, and the dollar has actually been depreciating lately, and that’s of some help, but it wasn’t part of our plan,” Fischer said Friday in interview on CNBC



He then added that "should the dollar get too strong, we"ll respond," seemingly indicating a 3rd leg to the mandate stool that Congress is unaware of.



Fischer also noted that the US economy is not performing as well as The Fed had expected (understatement of the week).



But he had an excuse for that:





"Something going on that Fed doesn’t quite understand in consistently weak 1Q data"



So it"s transitory... which is also what he said about inflationary forces really.

Paul Tudor Jones Has A Message For Janet Yellen: "Be Terrified"

Billionaire investor Paul Tudor Jones has a message for Janet Yellen and investors: Be very afraid.



Echoing a number of recent high profile managers" warnings...





Guggenheim Partner’s Scott Minerd said he expected a "significant correction" this summer or early fall,  citing as potential triggers President Donald Trump’s struggle to enact policies, including a tax overhaul, as well as geopolitical risks.



Philip Yang, a macro manager who has run Willowbridge Associates since 1988, sees a stock plunge of between 20 and 40 percent, according to people familiar with his thinking, citing events like a severe slowdown in China or a greater-than-expected rise in inflation that could lead to bigger rate hikes.



Seth Klarman, who runs the $30 billion Baupost Group, told investors in a letter last week that corporate insiders have been heavy sellers of their company shares. To him, that’s “a sign that those who know their companies the best believe valuations have become full or excessive."



Larry Fink, whose BlackRock Inc. oversees $5.4 trillion mostly betting on rising markets, acknowledged this week that stocks could fall between 5 and 10 percent if corporate earnings disappoint.



Another multi-billion-dollar hedge fund manager, who asked not to be named, said that rising interest rates in the U.S. mean fewer companies will be able to borrow money to pay dividends and buy back shares. About 30 percent of the jump in the S&P 500 between the third quarter of 2009 and the end of last year was fueled by buybacks, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The manager says he has been shorting the market, expecting as much as a 10 percent correction in U.S. equities this year.



Even billionaire Leon Cooperman -- long a stock bull -- wrote to investors in his Omega Advisors that he thinks U.S. shares might stand still until August or September, in part because of flagging confidence in the so-called Trump reflation trade.



Their views aren’t widespread. They’ve seen the carnage suffered by a few money managers who have been waving caution flags for awhile now, as the eight-year equity rally marched on.


But, the nervousness feels a bit more urgent now, as Bloomberg reports,  legendary macro trader Paul Tudor Jones, who runs the $10 billion Tudor Investment hedge fund, says that years of low interest rates have bloated stock valuations to a level not seen since 2000, right before the Nasdaq tumbled 75 percent over two-plus years.


That measure -- the value of the S&P relative to the size of the economy -- should be “terrifying” to a central banker, Jones said earlier this month at a closed-door Goldman Sachs Asset Management conference, according to people who heard him.




In fact Total US Market Capitalization-to-GDP is struggling to bust above its 2007 highs...



While the billionaire didn’t say when a market turn might come, or what the magnitude of the fall might be, he did pinpoint a likely culprit.


Just as portfolio insurance caused the 1987 rout, he says, the new danger zone is the half-trillion dollars in risk parity funds. These funds aim to systematically spread risk equally across different asset classes by putting more money in lower volatility securities and less in those whose prices move more dramatically. Because risk-parity funds have been scooping up equities of late as volatility hit historic lows, some market participants, Jones included, believe they’ll be forced to dump them quickly in a stock tumble, exacerbating any decline.





“Risk parity,” Jones told the Goldman audience, “will be the hammer on the downside.”



Indeed, with all that low-vol leveraged, it wouldn"t be the first time...