In An Unexpected Outcome, Trump Tax Reform Blew Up The Treasury Market

Over the past week we have shown on several occasions that there once again appears to be a sharp, sudden dollar-funding liquidity strain in global markets, manifesting itself in a dramatic widening in FX basis swaps, which - in this particular case - has flowed through in the forward discount for USDJPY spiking from around 0.04 yen to around 0.23 yen overnight. As Bloomberg speculated, this discount for buying yen at future dates widened sharply as non-U.S. banks, which typically buy dollars now with sell-back contracts at a future date, scrambled to procure greenbacks for the year-end.

However, as Deutsche Bank"s Masao Muraki explains, this particular dollar funding shortage is more than just the traditional year-end window dressing or some secret bank funding panic.

Instead, the DB strategist observes that the USD funding costs for Japanese insurers and banks to invest in US Treasuries - which have surged reaching a post-financial-crisis high of 2.35% on 15 Dec - are determined by three things, namely (1) the difference in US and Japanese risk-free rates (OIS), (2) the difference in US and Japanese interbank risk premiums (Libor-OIS), and (3) basis swaps, which illustrate the imbalance in currency-hedged US and Japanese investments.

In this particular case, widening of (1) as a result of Fed rate hikes and tightening of dollar funding conditions inside the US (2) and outside the US (3) have occurred simultaneously. This is shown in the chart below.

What is causing this? Unlike on previous occasions when dollar funding costs blew out due to concerns over the credit and viability of the Japanese and European banks, this time the Fed"s rate hikes could be spurring outflows from the US, European, and Japanese banks’ deposits inside the US. Absent indicators to the contrary, this appears to be the correct explanation since it"s not just Yen funding costs that are soaring. In fact, at present EUR/USD basis swaps are widening more than USD/JPY basis swaps.

According to Deutsche, it is possible that an increase in hedged US investments by Europeans could be indirectly affecting Japan, and that market participants could also be conscious of the risk that the repatriation tax system could spur a massive flow-back into the US, of funds held overseas by US companies

In fact, one can draw one particularly troubling conclusion: the sharp basis swap moves appear to have been catalyzed by the recently passed Trump tax reform.

• Corporate tax reform in the US

The United States House of Representatives and Senate recently passed a tax reform bill that lowers the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% starting 2018. Lowering corporate taxes would likely accelerate the pace of Fed rate hikes, which could trigger a shift from dollar deposits to Government MMFs. Revisions to interest tax deductions would encourage companies to repay corporate bonds and could spur a decrease in dollar deposits (however, demand to bank loan could also weaken).

• Repatriation tax system

The tax bill also includes the abolishment of taxation (currently 35%) on dividend payments from overseas subsidiaries. However, overseas subsidiaries" retained earnings would be subject to a one-time tax. It is expected that this repatriation tax system would result in reserves held overseas by US companies (we estimate 90% are USD-denominated) flowing back into the US. This could create tighter conditions for USD financing outside the US.

Which leads to a bizarre outcome, that while the GOP tax reform may benefit corporate America, it appears set to punish America itself as buyers of US Treasurys suddenly require far greater yields to offset the surge in funding costs!

* * *

Whatever the cause behind these sharp funding shortages, one thing is clear - dollar funding costs (FX hedging costs) for both Japanese and European insurers and banks to invest in US Treasuries are surging (with Japanese buyers and reached a post-financial-crisis high of 2.35% on 15 Dec. And in terms of practical implications for the treasury market this means that, all else equal, marginal demand for US paper is about to plunge for one simple reason: the FX-hedged yields on US Treasurys have plunged to (negative) levels never seen before (unless of course foreign investors buy US Treasurys unhedged).

To demonstrate this point, the chart below from Deutsche Bank shows the yields on currency-hedged US Treasuries from the perspective of Japanese investors. Japanese financial institutions tend to use 3-month FX forwards when they invest in hedged foreign bonds. Annualized hedge costs have recently risen to 2.33%, which means that investments in 10y US Treasuries result in virtually no yield. Furthermore, yields from investment in shorter than 10y US Treasuries would be less than JGBs and result in negative spreads. This means that unless funding costs slide, Japanese buyers will simple pick JGBs over TSYs, eliminating one of the biggest sources of Treasury demand in receng years.

There is another consideration: as Deutsche Bank notes, whenever it is time to roll over a hedge, financial institutions need to decide whether to (A) sell US Treasuries or (B) hold them as unhedged foreign bonds. Engaging in (B) on a large scale would be difficult unless the institution"s outlook calls for yen depreciation. After implementing (A), institutions should then choose to invest in high-yielding US MBS (high interest rate risk), medium- to low-rated corporate bonds (high credit risk), European and other sovereign bonds, or to reinvest in JGBs.

Moving away from Japan, and looking at Europe one finds an even more dramatic slide in hedged TSY yields, which net of hedge costs have plunged to -0.6%, by far the lowest - and most negative - on record, something we highlighted yesterday in "There"s Never Been A Worse Time For A European Investor To Buy US Treasuries" .

The conclusion is that as a result of the recent surge in funding costs, seemingly in response to the nuances of Trump tax reform as explained above, suddenly buying US Treasurys is no longer an economic option for virtually all foreign buyers! Needless to say, something will need to change because if funding costs stay where they are, yields across the curve will have to jump for US Treasurys to once again be an attractive purchase for foreign buyers, which as a reminder comprise the majority of TSY buyers in recent years.

What is the outlook? Some parting thoughts from Deutsche, which writes that according to the chart below, fundings costs will likely continue widening as the Fed raises interest rates.

DB then also warns that the repatriation tax system that was just passed into law, coupled with ongoing Fed rate hikes, will indirectly result in the widening of dollar funding conditions in and outside of the US. And the punchline: if these indeed continue to widen, and US long-term interest rates stay at a low level, "this would restrict investments in US Treasuries by Japanese financial institutions relying on short-term dollar funding." This could then lead to a sharp move higher in US yields - and rates- as the US finds it needs an aggressive increase in foreign demand to finance the widest US budget deficit in years. 

In other words, by pounding the table on - and recently passing - tax reform, Donald Trump appears to have sown the seeds of the equity market"s own destruction, because remember that the one thing that can bring the house of manipulated cards down faster than you can say covfefe, not to mention burst the equity bubble, is a sharp move higher in long-term yields, rates, and ultimately - inflation.

Is it "Late 2007" For the Everything Bubble?

Timing the end of a major bubble is extraordinarily difficult as it entails figuring out when a critical mass of investors shift from greed to fear.

Having said that, we’ve recently seen a number of developments that would suggest we’re near the end of the current Bond Bubble.

Back in June the world saw the unveiling of perhaps the single most insane investment of all time: the 100-year bond.

To make matters more insane, the countries that were issuing these bonds (Argentina and Austria) both have experienced numerous sovereign dent crises in the last 100 years.

More recently, Austria almost went bust in 2015. And Argentina only just resolved issues with debt-holders from its 2001 default last year (2016).

Of course, 100-year bonds are not entirely new: Belgium and Ireland issued 100-year bonds last year (2016).

However, both of these issues were via private placements (meaning the bonds were sold at set prices to a select group of investors).

By way of contrast, both Argentina and Austria issued their 100-year bonds on the open market to anyone and everyone. Even more insane, both debt issues experienced tremendous investor demand!

Argentina sold $2.75 billion of a hotly demanded 100-year bond in U.S. dollars on Monday, just over a year after emerging from its latest default, according to the government.

The South American country received $9.75 billion in orders for the bond, as investors eyed a yield of 7.9 percent in an otherwise low yielding fixed income market where pension funds need to lock in long-term returns.

Source: Reuters

Austria has sold €3.5bn of 100-year debt in the largest century bond to hit the markets to date, the latest indication of hot investor demand for very long-dated debt. Bids from potential investors reached €11.4bn, dealmakers said.

Source: Financial Times

Let’s put this in very simple terms… two countries, both of which struggled with sovereign debt issues in the last four years, saw investors place between $3 and $4 in bids for every $1 in new debt issuance… on 100-year bonds.

This is beyond insanity. It is the textbook definition of a bubble. And it indicates we are nearing the end of the line for this current bubble.

The time to prepare for this is NOW before the carnage hits.

On that note, we are putting together an Executive Summary outlining all of these issues as well as what’s to come when The Everything Bubble bursts.

It will be available exclusively to our clients. If you’d like to have a copy delivered to your inbox when it’s completed, you can join the wait-list here:

https://phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/TEB.html

Best Regards

Graham Summers

Chief Market Strategist

Phoenix Capital Research

Bubble Watch: US Margin Debt Now Equal the Economy of Taiwan

When Central Banks attempted to corner the sovereign bond market via ZIRP and QE, they forced ALL risk in the financial system to adjust lower.

Remember, in a fiat-based monetary system such as the one used by the world today, sovereign bonds NOT gold are the ultimate backstop for the financial system.

And for the US, which controls the reserve currency of the world, sovereign bonds, also called Treasuries, represent the “risk-free” rate of return for the entire world.

So when the Fed moved to corner this market, forcing the yields on these bonds to drop to all-time lows, it was effectively forcing ALL risk in the US financial system to adjust to an abnormal risk-profile.

Put simply, the Fed created a bubble in bonds, which in turn fueled a bubble in everything.

Yes, everything… corporate bonds, municipal bonds, stocks, even consumer credit. Indeed, nine years into this insanity things have reach such egregious levels of excess that even tertiary debt instruments such as margin debt have reached levels greater than ever before.

What is margin debt?

Margin debt is money that stock investors borrow in order to buy stocks. It is direct leverage. And it just hit a new record… or $561 billion.

To put this number into perspective, it is:

• Equal to the entire economy of Asian powerhouse Taiwan.

• Nearly greater than the amount of margin debt borrowed at the peak of the last bubble in 2007 50%.

• DOUBLE the amount of margin debt borrowed at the peak of the Tech Bubble.

Now, no one in their right mind would argue that late 2000 or late 2007 were periods of fiscal restraint.

Well, today investors are borrowing hundreds of billions or dollars MORE to invest in the stock market than they were at those times.

As I explained in my bestseller, The Everything Bubble: the Endgame For Central Bank Policy, the bubble in bonds is what finances this entire mess.

By creating a bubble in bonds, the US Federal Reserve has created a bubble in EVERYTHING because borrowing costs are at absurdly low levels.

This is why I coined the term The Everything Bubble in 2014. It’s also why I wrote a book on this issue as well as what’s coming down the pike: because when this bubble bursts (as all bubbles do) the policies Central Banks employ will make those from 2008-2015 look like a cakewalk.

We are putting together an Executive Summary outlining all of these issues as well as what’s to come when The Everything Bubble bursts.

It will be available exclusively to our clients. If you’d like to have a copy delivered to your inbox when it’s completed, you can join the wait-list here:

https://phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/TEB.html

Best Regards

Graham Summers

Chief Market Strategist

Phoenix Capital Research

 

 

 

China Deleveraging Hits Corporate Bonds As Cascade Effect Begins

Following the market lockdown during October’s Party Congress, many commentators were disturbed by the continued rise in Chinese government bond yields as we returned to “business as usual”, with the 10-year rising to 4%. At the beginning of this month, we discussed the sell-off (see “China: Shadow Bank Inflows Are Critical To Sustain The Ponzi…But They’re Falling”) and noted a useful insight from the Wall Street Journal.

An important anomaly to note about the bond rout: as government bonds sold off, yields on less-liquid, unsecured Chinese corporate bonds barely moved.

 

That is atypical in an environment of rising rates - usually, bond investors shed their less-liquid holdings and hold on to assets that are more easily tradable, like government debt.

The question was…why had corporate bond yields barely moved? The answer, according to the WSJ, was that China’s deleveraging policy led to redemptions in the shadow banking sector, e.g. in the notorious $4 trillion Wealth Management Products (WMP) sector. Faced with redemptions, shadow banks had to sell something…quickly…and highly liquid government bonds were the “easiest option”. Furthermore…and this is potentially significant…the WSJ noted.

Meanwhile, the nonbanks have held on to their higher-yielding corporate bonds, which at least have the benefit of helping them to maintain high returns.

Not any more (see below).

We agreed with the WSJ’s explanation at the time, but noted that the government bond sell-off was actually a sign of the unravelling of the WMP Ponzi scheme. The Chinese authorities are wise to the Ponzi which is why they announced the overhaul of shadow banking and WMPs last Friday (see “A ‘New Era’ In Chinese Regulation Means Turmoil For $15 Trillion In China"s ‘Shadows"). However, the new regulations don’t kick in until mid-2019, a sign to us that when they looked “under the bonnet”, they didn’t like what they saw.  

We doubt that China can achieve an orderly restructuring of its shadow banking sector, never mind its much larger credit bubble. A sign that we have taken another step towards China’s “Minsky moment” is that the bond sell-off has spread to the corporate bond market. The chart shows how spreads versus sovereign bonds have blown out during the last few weeks.

Bloomberg noted how the 10-year yield on China Development Bank notes, a quasi-sovereign issue, closed above 5% for the first time since 2014 today while, in another report, it put the corporate bond sell-off in a wider context.

China’s deleveraging campaign is finally starting to bite in the nation’s corporate-bond market, a shift that will make 2018 a clearer test of policy makers’ appetites to let struggling companies fail. Yields on five-year top-rated local corporate notes have jumped about 33 basis points since the month began, to a three-year high of 5.3 percent, according to data compiled by clearing house ChinaBond. Government bonds, which have far greater liquidity, had already moved last month as the central bank warned further deleveraging was needed.

With more than $1 trillion of local bonds maturing in 2018-19, it will become increasingly expensive for Chinese companies to roll over financing -- and all the tougher for those in industries like coal that the nation’s leadership wants to shrink. Two companies based in Inner Mongolia, a northern province that’s suffered from a debt-and-construction binge, missed bond payments on Tuesday, in a demonstration of the kind of pain that may come.

Bloomberg tries to put a positive spin on the corporate bond sell-off, defaults are healthy in terms of differentiating good and credits.

In the long haul, that all may be good for China. Allowing more defaults could see its bond market become more like its overseas counterparts, with a greater differentiation in price. And that could mean it channels funds more productively. “The deleveraging campaign and the new rules on the asset management industry will further differentiate good and bad quality credits, and make the onshore credit market more efficient,” said Raymond Gui, senior portfolio manager at Income Partners Asset Management (HK) Ltd. “Weaker companies will find it harder to roll over their debts because funding costs will stay high.” Gui predicts yields will keep climbing. The average for top-rated corporate bonds is already 2.2 percentage points above what investors demanded to hold them in October last year.

The rise comes as authorities show greater determination to shift the economy onto a more sustainable footing, with less debt. The latest move was a plan to discipline the asset-management industry, including banning guaranteed rates of return. People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan graphically depicted the risk of excess leverage, by evoking a "Minsky moment," or sudden collapse of asset values. Key to that endeavor will be scaling back some of the implicit credit guarantees that have backed a broad swathe of Chinese borrowers. The country only started allowing corporate defaults in 2014. Last year there was a record, coming in at at least 29. It’s unclear yet whether that total will be met in 2017.

Bloomberg spoke to an analyst who also believes the recent sell-off in Chinese bonds is more to do with separating the “wheat from the chaff”, rather than anything more profound.

"We expect the divergence of performance between different bond categories (Chinese government bonds, policy bank bonds and credits) to become more prominent into 2018," Albert Leung and Prashant Pande, rates strategists at Nomura Holdings Inc., wrote in a note Wednesday.

We disagree. From our perspective, it looks like early signs of cascading sell-offs within Chinese financial markets, which have long been abused by excessive leverage and Ponzi characteristics. Talking of which, the Shanghai Composite Index suffered its biggest one-day drop since June 2016.

What caused the sell-off? According to some commentators it was fear that the local bond rout was getting out of control...hence "cascade". We noted last week that traders had been stunned by the official warning from Beijing that some stocks - in this case Kweichow Moutai - had risen "too far, too fast". Zhengyang Shen, a Shanghai-based analyst at Northeast Securites commented.

"The decline in Moutai has triggered selloffs in some of this year"s best performing stocks."

Which sounds an awful lot like another example of cascading selling...

Moody"s Boosts Modi: India Gets First Sovereign Credit Upgrade Since 2004

Moody’s upgrade to India’s credit rating comes as a much-needed boost for India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who has been criticised for the fallout from the goods and services tax (GST) and demonetisation reforms. Indeed, Moody’s argued that Modi’s reforms will help to stabilize India’s rising debt levels. According to Reuters.

Moody"s Investors Service upgraded its ratings on India"s sovereign bonds for the first time in nearly 14 years on Friday, saying continued progress on economic and institutional reform will boost the country"s growth potential. The agency said it was lifting India"s rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and changed its rating outlook to stable from positive as risks to India"s credit profile were broadly balanced. Moody"s upgrade, its first since January 2004, moves India"s rating to the second lowest level of investment grade. The upgrade is a shot in the arm for Prime Minister Narendra Modi"s government and the reforms it has pushed through, and it comes just weeks after the World Bank moved India up 30 places in its annual ease of doing business rankings.

Moody"s believes that Modi’s reforms have reduced the risk of a sharp increase in India’s debt, even in potential negative scenarios. On the GST reform, which converted India"s 29 states into a single customs union, the rating agency expects it to boost productivity by removing barriers to inter-state trade. In addition, the recent $32 billion recapitalisation of state banks and the reform of the bankruptcy code are beginning to address India’s sovereign credit profile.

"While the capital injection will modestly increase the government"s debt burden in the near term, it should enable banks to move forward with the resolution of NPLs."

Following the upgrade, India’s S&P BSE Sensex Index rose 1.1%, with metals, property and banks the strongest performers. The Sensex has risen 25% so far in 2017, while the banks sector is 42% higher. Retail investors have piled into financial assets and the banking system has been awash with funds since Modi unexpectedly banned high denomination bank notes last November.

As Reuters notes, the Indian government had been unsuccessful at persuading Moody’s to upgrade the rating in 2016.

Last year, India lobbied hard with Moody"s for an upgrade, but failed. The agency raised doubts about the country"s debt levels and fragile banks, and declined to budge despite the government"s criticism of their rating methodology. The government cheered the upgrade on Friday with Economic Affairs Secretary S. Garg telling reporters the rating upgrade was a recognition of economic reforms undertaken over three years.

The Rupee and Indian bonds also rallied on the Moody’s announcement – although some debt traders expressed scepticism that the rally was sustainable.

"It seems like Santa Claus has already opened his bag of goodies," said Lakshmi Iyer, head of fixed income at Kotak Mutual Fund said. "The move is overall positive for bonds which were caught in a negative spiral. This is a structural positive which would lead to easing in yields across tenors," she said. 

 

The benchmark 10-year bond yield was down 10 basis points at 6.96 percent, the rupee was trading stronger at 64.76 per dollar versus the previous close of 65.3250. "We have been expecting it for a long time and this was long overdue and is very positive for the market. Looks like sentiments are going to become positive," said Sunil Sharma, chief investment officer with Sanctum Wealth Management. However, debt traders said the rally was unlikely to last beyond a few days as the coming heavy bond supply and hawkish inflation outlook were unlikely to change soon.

 

"Who has the guts to continue buying in this market?" said a bond trader at a private bank.

India has basked in its status as the world’s fastest growing major economy and Moody’s forecasts suggests that it will continue to outpace China’s roughly 6.5% growth, but only marginally. In the fiscal year to March 2018, Moody’s expects the Indian economy to grow at 6.7% versus last year’s 7.1%. From Reuters.

Moody"s noted that while a number of key reforms remain at the design phase, it believes those already implemented will advance the government"s objective of improving the business climate, enhancing productivity and stimulating investment. “Longer term, India"s growth potential is significantly higher than most other Baa-rated sovereigns," said Moody"s.

Bloomberg published some initial reactions from portfolio managers and analysts.

Luke Spajic (head of portfolio management for emerging Asia at Pacific Asset Management Co. in Singapore)

• “The upgrade came sooner than expected. India has undertaken some tough but necessary reforms like demonetization and the GST, the benefits of which are yet to be fully calculated”


• “India is on the right long-term path with capital markets -- in both debt and equity -- pricing in potential improvements in investment quality”

Lin Jing Leong (investment manager, Asia fixed income, at Aberdeen Standard Investments in Singapore)

• “The upgrade has been long time coming” given Modi’s reform ambitions. “This is not a surprise -- we do believe all the rating agencies have been behind the curve somewhat”


• Initial Indian market reaction is likely to be knee-jerk, but we still expect dollar-India credit spreads, onshore India bonds and the rupee to continue outperforming the broader Asia and emerging-market bloc.

Navneet Munot (chief investment officer at SBI Funds Management Pvt. in Mumbai)

• This will boost global investors’ confidence in India, but factors like world monetary policy shifts and company earnings will also be key to foreign inflows.


• Investors like us who have long positions on India always expected an upgrade.


• The firm has been boosting equity holdings in Indian corporate lenders, industrial and telecommunications companies.

Nischal Maheshwari (head of institutional equities at Edelweiss Securities Ltd. in Mumbai)

• Equity markets have already given a thumbs up to the news”.


• It will lead to a reduction in borrowing costs, which is a major improvement.


• “For foreign investors in equity, it doesn’t change much as their concerns around high stock valuations remain. However, their commitment to the country is in place and the upgrade will only help reiterate their position”.

Shameek Ray (head of debt capital markets at ICICI Securities Primary Dealership in Mumbai)

• Foreign investors won’t be able to take full advantage of the positive sentiment from the upgrade as quotas for them to buy into rupee-denominated government and corporate debt are full, Ray says.


• “Whenever these quotas open up there will be keen interest to take India exposure,” but in the meantime Indian companies will get more access to offshore markets.


• “We could see them pricing dollar or Masala bonds at tighter levels”.

Ken Hu (chief investment officer for Asia-Pacific fixed income at Invesco Hong Kong Ltd.)

• The upgrade confirms Invesco’s positive view on India’s structural economic reforms.


• “With more political capital, Modi and his party are able to launch more difficult but more impactful structural reforms. The positive feedback loop will continue to lead to more credit rating upgrades of India in future”.

Chakri Lokapriya (managing director at TCG Asset Management in Mumbai)

• The upgrade is “very positive for banks, infrastructure and cyclical sectors”.


• “Banks will benefit strongly as their credit costs come down leading to a reduction in interest costs for infrastructure and manufacturing companies”.

Ashley Perrott (head of pan-Asian fixed income at UBS Asset Management in Singapore)

• The upgrade is a bit of a surprise, so the market is likely to see some initial bond-spread tightening.


• “But raising one notch does not make much difference from a fundamental perspective”.

Avinash Thakur (managing director of debt capital markets at Barclays Plc in Hong Kong)

• “The upgrade should help issuers from India as they are no longer on the cusp of investment grade”.


• “It makes a big difference to investors and we will see more dollar bond supply from India”.

Albert Edwards On The Selloff: "Comparisons With October 1987 Are Entirely Justified"

Last week, when equities were still blissfully hitting daily record highs, we showed the one "chart that everyone is talking about", or if they weren"t they soon would be: the sharp, sudden disconnect between the junk bond and stock market ...

... a disconnect which - as we showed at the time - was last observed in mid-August 2015, just days before the infamous ETFlash crash. Fast forward to day, with stocks suddenly hitting air pockets around the globe and rapidly catching down to junk yields...

... when this enveloping divergence between the conflicting narratives by equities and bonds was the center piece of Albert Edwards latest letter to clients. In it, the SocGen strategist highlights the ZH chart and, ever the pragmatist, wonders why it took not only stocks, but junk bonds so long to react to the steady deterioration in underlying balance sheet quality, a topic discussed most recently by his colleague Andrew Lapthorne...

...  who showed that "interest coverage for the smallest 50% of US companies is near record lows, at a time when interest costs are extremely depressed and when profits are at peak." Lapthorne"s conclusion, which echoed what the IMF said earlier in the year, "It is difficult to envisage a scenario in which this ends well."

Albert picks up on this theme in his latest note released today, and writes that "investors are beginning to punish the corporate debt and equity of highly indebted US companies. We have highlighted consistently that excess US corporate debt is probably the key area of vulnerability that could bring down the QE inflated pyramid scheme that the central banks have created."

To demonstrate this point, Edwards shows another bizarre "balance sheet debauchment" divergence, one between surging leverage, and record low junk bond yields, to wit:

... we think the high yield corporate bond market should have been revolting against balance sheet debauchment some time ago. That would be the normal state of things with net debt/profit ratios so very high (see chart below but note bottom-up data shows a far higher peak than this top-down Fed data but peaks normally occur as profits fall in recession).

As the chart above suggests, junk bond yields would have to be double current levels to be aligned with "fair value" as imputed by the current state of the corporate balance sheet, however with the ECB purchasing billions in corporate bonds every month, this clearly won"t happen for a long time.

Edwards also show a chart revealing why the US is unique among the major developed regions: only there has corporate debt bloated to levels last seen during the great financial crisis. As for the reason, we just discussed it earlier: all bond issuance has been used to fund stock buybacks, pushing the S&P to all time highs.

And speaking of the final frontier, i.e. equities, which are always the last to get any memo, Edwards"s biggest concern is the sheer euphoria and that various sentiment indices - such as the record expectations of higher market moves 12 months forward as per UMich - have reached extremes of bullishness which have rarely been seen. One among these is the Investor Intelligence Sentiment Survey.

CNBC reports that “the roaring stock market has professional investors riding high, so much so that it"s rekindling memories of the 1987 crash. In terms of sentiment, the difference between bulls and bears hasn"t been this high in 30 years, according to the latest Investors Intelligence reading… Investor Intelligence editor John Gray noted, sentiment readings have roughly followed their 1987 pattern. Then the bulls  peaked (near 65%) with initial market highs early that year and they returned to above 60% levels months later after more index records. In 1987 stocks crashed a few months after that. A repeat of that scenario suggests potential significant danger for over the remainder of 2017!" – see see chart below. Strangely we only recently compared the current conjuncture with 1987 in terms of valuation excess combined with extreme macro and market bullishness .?

Between the recent reality check for junk bonds, and the sudden decline in equities, Edwards believes that "comparisons with October 1987 are entirely justified." Still, there have been so many headfakes in the past 9 years, could this be just the latest one? Here are Edwards" 2 cents on how to decide:

"the market itself can signal a top. For example, I remember in early 2000 our then Japan Strategist, Peter Tasker, warning that the tech heavy Jasdaq index had turned down sharply ahead of the Nasdaq March 2000 peak. I also remember our technical analyst pointing out the significance of the Nasdaq Composite failing to follow the lead of the Nasdaq 10 to make a new high at the end of March 2000. These proved to be early warning signs of the subsequent September peak in the S&P. In short, the 2000 bear market was clearly flagged if you knew how to read the technical and macro runes. The same was true in 2007. Is the market?s current behaviour already ringing a bell to warn investors intoxicated by risk appetite that the party is over and it is time to head to the exits before the stampede starts?"

Not to put too fine a point on it, Albert, but everyone would like to know the answer.

Are "Happy Days" In Credit Over? According To BofA, Just One Thing Matters

Just one month ago, we showed a chart according to which the corporate bond spreads as tracked by the BofA/ML Corporate Master Index had tumbled to a level not seen since July 2007...

 

... while European high yield bonds have sunk below 2%, a head-scratching plunge in European "high" yields. As we have observed previously, the catalyst for the dramatic collapse in yields has been an obvious one: central banks, which have not only crushed asset volatility, but through the ECB"s explicit guarantee to be the buyer of last resort for corporate bonds, pushed yields to unprecednted low levels.

How unprecedented? Commenting on recent market moves, BofA"s credit strategist Barnaby Martin writes that even when accounting for Draghi"s pledge to buy "sizable" amounts of corporate bonds next year, the bullish spread reaction over the last few weeks "has caught us by surprise."

As the charts below show, the credit market is posting eye-catching - and now somewhat perverse - valuations in places. Valuations that start to challenge the "natural order" of relative value…

 

HY vs. USTs

 

For example, high-yield bond yields in Europe are now yielding just 1.9%, a 50bp drop since the start of October. And Euro high-yield yields are lower than those on ICE BofAML"s US Treasury Master Index.

 

AT1s vs dividend yields

 

Moreover, as Chart 3 shows, the aggressive move of late has been in the AT1 space, where yields have declined over 70bp since the start of October. This has left CoCo yields very close to the dividend yield on European bank stocks. And what if AT1 yields dip below this threshold? We think this would create a fairly unique - and perhaps troubling - pricing point for the credit market, given that fixed-income securities with less upside than (but with all the downside of) equity are yielding less for investors.

However, in the subsequent weeks - especially on this side of the Atlantic - there has been a sharp repricing of corporate debt, especially junk bonds, which as we showed earlier today have dropped sharply in the past month...

... leading also to a sharp divergence in equity vs credit risk.

 

So is the recent move wider the end of what Martin "happy days" in credit? There are two main catalysts that could pop the credit euphoria observed in markets:

The first is a surprise in the form of higher-than-expected inflation: this would be the big negative for credit markets down the line. The irony, of course, being that as Martin observes this is exactly what central banks would love to see materialize, as it would safeguard the health of the European periphery, in particular. Signs of success with inflation could easily provoke central banks to rethink their patient and dovish monetary stance…with higher rate volatility stunting the big "reach for yield" underway in corporate bonds.

Then again, considering that central banks have been desperate to boost inflation - at least the "flawed" inflation as captured by erroneous CPI measures - for nearly a decade while injecting $15 trillion in liquidity, this is probably not an immediate worry.

What else may cause central banks to exit sooner than expected?  Here, we once again go back to central banks, because the other major risk listed by Martin is that financial stability concerns and fears over misallocation of capital prompt central banks to curtail stimulus sooner than expected.

We sense some central banks are already becoming more cognizant of the financial stability implications of low for long rates. And given how much monetary support has already been doled out (Chart 6), reducing stimulus would at least build some ammunition for any slowdown in the future. Likewise, we think surprise rate hikes from central banks - on financial stability grounds - would be very problematic for credit markets.

To this end, Martin admits that even Bank of America is worried that a bubble in credit is forming:

We think the last few weeks of impressive tightening have shown that credit bubbles are a legitimate risk in Europe down the line, and we think central banks should pay attention to this. After all, it was extremely tight credit markets in "05 and "06 that provoked higher levels of risk taking by investors, and the advent of riskier products.

Meanwhile, many of the other pre-crisis hallmarks of investor exuberance have returned today. Martin also notes in the charts below that LBO leverage levels have climbed again over the last year. In the US in particular, LBO leverage levels are close to their 2007 highs (although US tax reform may slow this). Europe is a bit further behind, though, however the creep higher in LBO leverage over the last year is still visible.

Fast forwarding to BofA"s conclusion, just as it all started with central banks, so it will eventually end with them: with little vol, investors are incentivized to keep crowding into high-beta parts of the bond market. But if central banks begin to contemplate curbing stimulus on the grounds of financial stability, then we think the end of "predictable" monetary policy would be a game changer for credit."

If This Line Breaks, We"re in Serious Trouble

Let’s talk about Junk Bonds.

Junk Bonds are corporate debt issued by companies that have a significant chance of defaulting (meaning they don’t pay you back).

Why would anyone want to lend these companies money?

Because these bonds are risky, they typically pay very large yields to compensate for the increased risk. Think yields of 8% or even 10%.

Put simply, these are high risk, high reward bonds. They typically rally more than safer bonds when the bond market is healthy… and conversely, they typically crash a lot harder when the bond market is in trouble.

With that in mind, take a look at this chart:

The Junk Bond Index is beginning to roll over. As I write this, it’s right at THE line for its two-year bull-market run.

This is a MAJOR warning that the bond market is beginning to enter a “risk-off” stage. If we take out this line, Junk Bonds will be in very serious trouble.

What could be triggering this?

Inflation.

As I’ve explained time and again, bonds trade based on inflation expectations among other things. So to see Junk Bonds starting to roll over (meaning Junk Bond yields are rising) "tells" us that the riskiest segment of the bond market is beginning to adjust to the future threat of inflation.

It"s not alone.

The yields on the 10-Year US Treasury are beginning to rise as well, breaking a multi-year downtrend. Remember, this is the single most important bond in the world. And it"s signalling that inflation is on the rise.

Put simply, BIG INFLATION is THE BIG MONEY trend today. And smart investors will use it to generate literal fortunes.

Imagine if you"d prepared your portfolio for a collapse in Tech Stocks in 2000... or a collapse in banks in 2008? Imagine just how much money you could have made with the right investments.

THAT is the kind of potential we have today. And if you"re not already taking steps to prepare for this, it"s time to get a move on.

We just published a Special Investment Report concerning FIVE secret investments you can use to make inflation pay ou as it rips through the financial system in the months ahead

The report is titled Survive the Inflationary Storm. And it explains in very simply terms how to make inflation PAY YOU.

We are making just 100 copies available to the public.

To pick up yours, swing by:

https://www.phoenixcapitalmarketing.com/inflationstorm.html

Best Regards

Graham Summers

Chief Market Strategist

Phoenix Capital Research

China: Shadow Bank Inflows Are Critical To Sustain The Ponzi... But They"re Falling

During the Party Congress, even China’s somewhat watered down versus of the free markets was suspended so as not to disturb the glorification of Xi Jinping as the nation’s greatest leader since Mao. Returning to “business as usual”, some commentators have been disturbed by the continued rise in government bond yields with the 10-year hitting 3.93% earlier this week.

Bloomberg described it this morning as a “tumultuous few days”.

We also noted Huachuang Securities Co. comment that bond holders may be about to get hit by “daggers falling from the sky,” if the Party adopts more aggressive deleveraging policies. In a far less sensationalist way, the Wall Street Journal has attempted a post-mortem on the recent sell-off in the Chinese government bond market.

Catching sight of a chain reaction in China’s markets is rare.

 

Carrying out a postmortem of a recent selloff in China’s $9 trillion bond market shows how it is becoming harder for Beijing to untangle its increasingly intertwined financial system. In the aftermath of China’s twice-a-decade party congress last week, yields on benchmark 10-year Chinese government bonds spiked to 3.9%, their highest in three years. Government bond futures fell.

 

Reasons proffered for the sudden rout ranged from expectations of higher U.S. interest rates to general fearmongering.

Having acknowledged the growing complexity of China’s financial system, WSJ provides a valuable insight, noting the relative stability of corporate bond yields during the recent sell-off in the government sector...

An important anomaly to note about the bond rout: as government bonds sold off, yields on less-liquid, unsecured Chinese corporate bonds barely moved.

 

That is atypical in an environment of rising rates - usually, bond investors shed their less-liquid holdings and hold on to assets that are more easily tradable, like government debt.

Using this handy (kind of) diagram of flows in China’s financial system...

...WSJ tries to explain “how the selloff in China really worked”.

In essence what happened is that, as funding costs for Chinese banks have risen, they have been forced to compensate by placing more money in the shadow banking sector, with all the risks that entails (i.e. leverage and risky assets). Here’s the Journal’s version.

Let’s start with the travails of China’s small and midsize lenders that—like most banks—fund themselves by taking in customer deposits and by borrowing in wholesale markets.

 

In China, the latter has increasingly meant issuing short-term bonds known as NCDs, or negotiable certificates of deposit. The trouble for Chinese banks of late is that both these funding sources have become expensive: Borrowing costs have risen as Beijing pursues its deleveraging campaign, while bank-deposit growth has also been slowing.

 

To balance out these rising costs, banks have been placing more of their money with so-called nonbank financial institutions—the likes of trust companies, funds and securities companies—that offer high returns from investing in various markets, from bonds to stocks and commodities.

 

Deposits placed by banks with these nonbanks - the bulwarks of China’s infamous shadow banking system - had grown to more than $4 trillion as of September this year.

Okay, this is where things get more interesting.

Please bear in mind that (as we’ll explain later) a key pillar supporting the stability of China’s financial system is the maintenance of rising flows into the Chinese shadow banks.

This Bloomberg chart shows the rapid growth in China’s shadow banking system in recent years.

The WSJ explains that the reduction in flows into the shadow banks has led to redemptions and something had to be sold quickly...

But with less funds coming into banks now, less can go out. That has led to trouble for the nonbanks, which, after years of only ever-higher inflows, have started facing redemptions.

 

Banks’ claims on nonbanks have dropped 2% since peaking in June, according to Wind Info, equivalent to a $90 billion withdrawal of funds.

 

In addition to these redemptions, the cost for nonbanks of juicing returns on their investments by leveraging up has also risen because of the higher interest rates mentioned above.

 

That brings us to the bond market. Faced with redemptions, nonbanks have needed to sell something, and quickly. Offloading highly liquid government bonds has proven the easiest option.

 

Meanwhile, the nonbanks have held on to their higher-yielding corporate bonds, which at least have the benefit of helping them to maintain high returns.

We think that the Journal’s analysis is correct…but it doesn’t fully appreciate the bigger picture regarding shadow banks’ need to “maintain high returns”.

China’s shadow banks are, in part, engaged in Ponzi schemes, for example in the $4 trillion Wealth Management Products (WMP) sector. In May 2017, Forsea Insurance, one of China’s largest insurers, warned that there would be “mass defaults and social unrest” if it was prevented from selling new WMPs to meet payouts. See “Chinese Insurer Warns Of ‘Mass Defaults, Social Unrest’ Due To ‘Mass Redemption’ Run”.

A month earlier, Minsheng Bank, China’s largest private bank, was found to have committed a RMB 3.0bn fraud by selling non-existent WMPs. See “Investors Rage After 3 Billion Yuan Vanish From China"s Largest Private Bank”.

The sell-off in Chinese government bonds implies that the deleverage in shadow banking we identified in September in beginning to bite.

We are in the last lap of the Chinese Ponzi as, piece by piece, the whole decrepit system is being exposed. In the end, it will boil down to how many trillions of RMB the PBoC needs to print to make the banks and their shadow banking relatives whole.

"Daggers Are Falling From The Sky" - China Stocks, Bonds Tumble After National Congress Ends

Who could have seen this coming?

After weeks of "calm" - demanded by The People"s Party - and well-managed "National Team" ramps top "prove" how much Xi"s plan for the nesxt five years is being received, the end of China"s National Congress has been met with... a plunge in stock and bond markets.

 

 

This is the biggest drop in the Chinese market in 11 weeks...

But it"s not just stocks. The Chinese bond market is getting slammed...

China 10Y yield is up 6 days in a row (the biggest surge in rates since May) to their highest since Oct 2014...

With the Chinese yield curve now inverted for 10 straight days - the longest period of inversion ever...

As Bloomberg reports, the situation that’s existed for most of 2017 - sovereign yields rising, and corporate debt remaining relatively resilient - is at risk of cracking. As appetite for bonds of any kind dwindles and authorities roll out measures that target higher-risk investments, company securities are in the line of fire.

Now that the Communist Party Congress is over, China’s bond holders may be about to get hit by “daggers falling from the sky," said Huachuang Securities Co., referring to aggressive deleveraging policies.

 

“It’s very likely we will see a significant increase in corporate yields in the coming year," said David Qu, a market economist at Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. in Shanghai.

 

"The trigger could be tougher regulations or a default. A majority of non-bank financial institutions’ debt holdings are corporate bonds, so their selloff can lead to severe consequences. Banks are underestimating authorities’ intentions to tighten regulations.”

 

“The deleveraging campaign hasn’t even gone half way, and the risk of banks redeeming entrusted funds could surface at the end of this year," said Qin Han, chief bond analyst at Guotai Junan Securities Co. in Shanghai.

 

"The chance of a selloff in corporate bonds is increasing, which will result in a widening of their yield premium over sovereign notes."

But this is far from over, as we noted earlier, the end of China"s National Congres is also ushering in the end of "coordinated global growth"...

As Citi writes, "China’s Party Congress has concluded and Xi Jinping’s position as President has been consolidated. Given there are no standing committee members in their 50s, it suggests there are no apparent heirs for Mr. Xi, opening the door for him to stay on beyond 2022. One of the key questions in the run up to the congress was that once power was consolidated, would China accelerate its economic reforms. We think this is unlikely but do expect a moderation of growth, with data momentum perhaps set to continue to slow at its current pace. Note how China’s MCI tends to lead Citi’s macro data index for China and our MCI is still tightening."

It gets worse.

As Capital Economics writes in its China Activity Monitor note this week, the firm"s China Activity Proxy (CAP) suggests that growth in China slowed last month to the weakest pace in a year and with property sales cooling and officials continuing their efforts to rein in financial risks, Cap Econ thinks that looking ahead "the economy will slow further over the coming quarters."

CapEco"s ominous conclusion:

Looking ahead, we think growth will continue to slow over the coming quarters. The current props to growth appear shaky. With investment contracting in real terms, industrial output will probably soften over the months ahead. Property sales also look set to weaken further as the government’s purchase curbs continue to expand. This will weigh on construction before long. More generally, with tighter monetary conditions weighing on credit growth, activity looks set to weaken further.

That the past 18 months of coordinated global growth will end in China, is quite symmetric: back in January 2016, as global markets were tumbling, aborting the Fed"s plans to hike rates 4 times in 2016 and resulting in sharp economic slowdowns around the globe, it was the (still mysterious) Shanghai Accord that "saved" the world, and unleashed a burst of unprecedented, and coordinated, growth... which only cost China some $8 trillion in debt.

It will only make sense that another major Chinese event will mark the top of this economic mini cycle, and lead to the next global downturn, not to mention spike in market volatility.