Showing posts with label Aftermath of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Aftermath of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 26, 2017

Citi"s "What If?" Scenarios: Part 2

Yesterday we published the first set of 7 "What If" scenarios that didn"t make it into the Citi Credit team"s (already rather gloomy) year-ahead forecast. Because while Citi"s "base case" was clearly bearish (our summary can be found here), what was left unsaid was even more unsettling, if not troubling. As the bank"s credit team wrote "what about the outcomes that didn’t quite make it into our base case? The scenarios that aren’t central, but which aren’t entirely implausible either – both bullish and bearish." Citi then listed the following 7 scenarios in the first part of its quasi-forecast:


  • idiosyncratic risk is returning to credit?

  • European corporates get more aggressive?

  • global growth & commodity prices disappoint?

  • inflation accelerates as output gaps close?

  • the US yield curve inverts?

  • central bank tapering really is a non-event?

  • the market doesn’t like the choice of ECB successor?"

A full discussion of the above scenarios was posted yesterday.


Today, we follow up with part 2, or the second set of 7 hypothetical questions for 2018, which shifts away from economics and finance, and focuses on politics and Europe. As Citi"s credit team writes "you tend to worry less about your leaky roof when the sun is shining. And at the moment the cyclical economic upturn is beaming across Europe. Yet there are clouds which might conceivably hold moisture – or as our economists have put it: political risk is not dead in Europe."


So to avoid a leaky roof turning into a flood, Citi once again set out some of the economic and fundamental scenarios for 2018 that aren’t in the bank"s base case, but which remain reasonably plausible nonetheless; specifically Citi looks at the list of "potential political dark horses for next year." These include the following "what ifs":


  • … the market falls out of “amore” with BTPs?

  • … Catalonia declares independence (and means it)?

  • … meaningful EU reforms actually happen?

  • … the UK leaves the EU without a deal?

  • … Brexit is called off?

  • … Corbyn becomes PM?

  • … US tax reform fails?

While Citi concedes that there are many others it could have included, like Middle-East tensions, North Korea tensions, global trade relations, US mid-term elections, escalation in the South China Sea or relations between Russia and the West, these will have to wait for another time. Until then, here is a breakdown of the political "What Ifs" that would keep Citi at night if they were allowed to be part of the bank"s official base case.


1. the market falls out of “amore” with BTPs?


Markets seem largely to have grown comfortable with the idea of an unusually large number of different political constellations that are feasible after the next Italian general election. Legally, they must take place by May, but national newspapers have reported that a deal has been made to hold them on March 4.


Our economists see a centre-right victory as marginally the most likely outcome, but longer-term, big question marks remain over which individual party will dominate within the bloc and the true depth of ostensible EU-scepticism. A grand coalition over the middle also remains a possibility, albeit a fading one. Either would probably be seen as somewhat positive by markets in the immediate aftermath. However, with the M5S still gaining in many polls at the expense of a struggling PD, their involvement in a future coalition of the left remains a reasonable probability. Although M5S has certainly shifted its stance on the EU significantly, with its candidate for PM declaring he wants to stay in the EU and toning down his party’s opposition to the euro, other of their desired reforms would likely be seen as negative by the market. A less likely coalition between M5S and a party on the right, like Lega Nord, could potentially be more confrontational and even less marketfriendly.


While the moderation in stances and the cyclical upturn in Italy have diminished the probability of more extreme outcomes, demand for BTPs could still prove fickle amid the uncertainty and a reduction in ECB purchases.


Indeed, you could argue that private investors fell out of love with BTPs quite some time ago. As illustrated in Figure 1, just about every other major investor type has become a net seller (to the ECB) or a non-buyer of BTPs over the last couple of years. To change that behaviour, we think it remains pretty likely that there will need to be an adjustment in prices. As our rates strategists have pointed out, the ECB could counteract this through an “Italian Operation Twist” (lengthening the maturity of their BTP holdings), but such a response might not come immediately, given the ECB’s reluctance to favour individual countries, unless associated with the conditionality that comes with an economic adjustment programme.


To our minds, this remains one of the most significant political risks to € credit in 2018. Most likely the spillover on credit would be concentrated on Italian and other periphery names, banks in particular. The scenario of a full-on funding crisis is a much lower probability in our view, but would obviously have more systemic implications across the € credit market.



* * *


2. Catalonia declares independence (and means it)?


Then there is the question of Catalonia. Opinion polls suggest that the separatist and non-separatist camps are neck and neck. How the marginal mandates fall will have a very important bearing on what happens next. The scenario where nonindependence parties secure a majority would probably put the whole question on the backburner for the time being, even if they fail to form a formal coalition. Yet with risk premia already so suppressed we doubt that the reaction in the broader market would be discernible – it would not change our central scenario at all.


However, most polls still suggest a narrow majority of seats will go to the three independence parties. In recent statements, two of the three have moved away from a formal deadline for independence, and indicated more openness towards alternative solutions to independence, implying a moderation in their stance. As such, even if they secure a small majority of seats, there is a good chance a repeat of the standoff from October with the central government can be avoided.


Risks arise in the scenario where the more radical separatist parties do materially better than the polls suggest. In particular, if the independence parties were to achieve more than 50% of the overall vote (as opposed to a mere majority of seats). We think the probability has receded greatly in recent weeks, but in an outcome where tension with the government in Madrid escalates again and major protests break out in the region, a more assertive unilateral declaration of independence remains conceivable.


Although actual independence from Spain even in the long term would remain unlikely even under such a scenario, we’d expect a rise in Spanish risk premia especially on those companies with direct exposure to the region. We note that the main banks have already shifted legal domicile to ensure access to ECB liquidity. In all but the most extreme situations we would expect the broader reaction across € credit to remain muted, as it was in October.


We would assign no more than a 10-15% probability to such an outcome and for impact on the wider € IG market you have to move significantly further out on the tail.


* * *


3. Meaningful EU reforms actually happen?


Optimism about major EU reforms following Macron’s election were dealt a significant blow by German voters in September. Yet there seems to be widespread recognition among policymakers that Europe runs a high risk of another sovereign crisis whenever the ongoing cyclical upturn ends, unless the framework is reformed. Banking union remains incomplete, capital markets union remains an ongoing project and with limited scope for a major increase in the EU’s budget, a strengthened lender-of-last-resort mechanism for sovereigns, like the European Monetary Fund proposed by the Commission, would potentially increase resilience considerably.


The differing objectives in European capitals likely either imply protracted negotiations or watered-down compromises that fail to provide markets with much reassurance. Even beyond resources devoted to Brexit negotiations, tensions with several Eastern European member states (though outside the Euro area) also act as a distraction. Poland’s prime minister has stated that he expects the Commission to propose an article 7.1 determination as early as next week. Article 7 is intended to safeguard the values of the EU, which may ultimately result in a member state having voting rights suspended. 7.1 is a warning stage in that process.


As such, major reforms are not in our base case for next year, but are not  inconceivable either. We would argue that sovereign risk premia in European credit are minimal at the moment, limiting the upside from such a scenario to a handful of basis points. Evidently, a strengthened framework ought to have the biggest impact on periphery credit, especially those whose fortunes are tied to their sovereigns, most obviously the banks.


4. the UK leaves the EU without a deal?


In a strictly legal sense, it’s difficult for a “no deal” scenario to materialise next year. According to Article 50 TEU, the EU treaties only cease to apply either when a withdrawal agreement comes into effect or after two years have passed since activation, i.e. March 2019. In practice, though, even with the first phase of negotiations now agreed, the chasm between what many in the UK believe can be achieved on trade in a short space of time and what the EU seems likely to offer means that a complete breakdown of negotiations is a real possibility.


And realistically, to allow for ratification across member states a final deal will need to be reached before the end of 2018. The fact that the trade agreement with Canada was nearly prevented by opposition in Wallonia, while the EU-Ukrainian trade deal was delayed by a Dutch referendum, illustrates that ratification is by no means guaranteed. Article 50 does, of course, leave scope for an extension should more time be needed, but this too, requires unanimity of the EU27 (and the UK) in the Council – and as such may not be completely straightforward.


So if negotiations do break down to the extent that “no deal” becomes central scenario, that should be reflected in spreads already next year.


From a trade perspective, the particular weak spot would be those sectors of the UK economy with a high EU trade intensity while not being covered by WTO goods trade rules, like tech and transport. More than tariffs, we suspect the chief impact would come through increased friction, in the form of additional paperwork and lack of mutual recognition of standards.


The sector that is most obviously exposed is the heavily regulated world of financial services. Admittedly, all banks passed the rather strict “hard Brexit” stress test conducted by the Bank of England, but spreads on those UK banks and insurers that depend on Europe for a significant proportion of their revenues should still react to the considerable uncertainty associated with a “no deal” scenario,  if it becomes central late in 2019.


The broader impact of “no-deal” on domestic UK sentiment also needs to be considered. It would evidently depend on the policy stance adopted by the UK government. But given both the limited fiscal space it is already confronted with, together with the balance of Brexiteer opinion favouring a more protectionist “drawbridge” Brexit as opposed to the “Singapore-on-Thames” that some aspire to, the economic consequences for the UK would likely be severe and rapidly felt. Though some of the negative impact of a “no deal” would likely be offset by a weakening currency, we doubt that would suffice to counteract the otherwise deeply market-unfriendly implications.


A trajectory towards a no-deal Brexit probably has only limited implications for broader credit spreads, but it should still leave spreads on credits with material exposure to the UK, and UK-EU trade in particular, 10-30bp wider relative to our central scenario.


5. … Brexit is called off?


Calling off Brexit (Brexit-exit) entirely would, in practical (though not in legal) terms, almost certainly require another referendum – it is hard to imagine any politician doing without consent from the electorate. Until now a second vote hasn’t appeared very likely. But a Survation report for the Mail on Sunday last week found that 50% of voters now want a referendum on a final deal, while only 34% were against. As recently as in June, the same poll showed a majority against a second vote, so this is a significant shift, likely in response to the arduous negotiations.


However, we think a second referendum called by the current government remains unlikely unless there is also a significant shift in the polls on the likely outcome. Though even among Leave voters only a small minority (28%) now expect the UK to secure a “good deal” in its negotiations with the EU, YouGov data indicates that the decline in support for Brexit among UK voters is still quite small. Many polls still suggest the outcome of another referendum would be within the statistical uncertainty. However, as Gordon Brown has suggested, it is possible that this changes if more of Teresa May’s red lines are crossed next year.


If the UK did opt for a second referendum and voted to call off Brexit, between the ambiguity in article 50 and goodwill among other member states, we believe the rest of the EU would agree on surmountable terms.


All else equal, Brexit-exit should be a positive for UK assets, and would likely help £ spreads erase some of their YTD underperformance against € and $ credit (albeit the latter have been boosted by ECB buying and the prospects for US tax reform respectively). Even the scenario where the UK ends up staying in the Single Market and the Customs Union for all intents and purposes is probably a positive relative what is priced currently (unless it involves the scenario below also). And the probability of that happening is significantly higher than of Brexit-exit. Either would in our opinion be viewed as a positive for European cohesion as a whole, shaving perhaps 3-7bp of spreads from our base case scenario.


6. Corbyn becomes PM?


We assume that PM May will survive both the recent brouhaha over the Irish border, being voted down in Parliament and, more importantly, trade negotiations over the coming year. But not with great conviction. The status quo remains highly vulnerable: after all, the threat of a Corbyn government is probably one of the main factors that has held Ms May’s fragile coalition together thus far, in our  view. That logic should continue to hold over 2018, but even if the appetite for another election is miniscule within the Conservative party, the risk of a party split remains elevated. Recent opinion polls suggest that Labour is pulling ahead, with some suggesting they would potentially end up with an overall majority.


For markets, this would have mixed implications.


On the one hand, a Labour government would almost certainly mean a more flexible approach to Brexit. While the Labour leadership has not come down firmly in favour of continued customs union and single market membership (with their preference in favour of keeping the UK “in the customs unions and single market in the transition period and leaving the options on the table for after the transition period”, in the words of Labour Brexit spokesman Keir Starmer), a Corbyn premiership would certainly make that more likely.


At the same time, Mr Corbyn’s policy platform of higher taxes and nationalisations is unlikely to be welcomed by business. Shadow Chancellor John McDonald recently stated that shareholders in key utilities would be offered government bonds in exchange for their shares at rate determined by the government. In theory, government ownership should be positive for bondholders, but under the  associated uncertainty we doubt that’s how risk premia would react initially. And Corbyn’s strong rhetoric towards the City of late doesn’t portend a particularly easy relationship were he to be in power either.


Ultimately, a narrow mandate, a coalition or merely the responsibilities of government might demand a more pragmatic approach once in power. But in the run-up to an election where opinion polls show a Labour lead, we doubt markets would afford UK credit the benefit of the doubt. We’d put the probability of a Corbyn premiership in 2018 at around 15-25%, so it is already somewhat reflected in our base case for £ credit. This anticipates underperformance of names with a high degree of UK exposure, but in an election scenario there we still see further downside to our forecast numbers.


7. US tax reform fails?


As far as credit specifically is concerned, our previous principal worry over US tax reform, namely that the removal of interest tax deductibility would lead US companies to transfer more of their issuance to overseas entities, potentially driving up reverse yankee supply significantly, has largely been dealt with by the current plan’s allowance for interest to be tax deductible up to 30% of earnings. But to the extent that the envisaged mandatory repatriation lowers US corporates funding requirements (a prospect our US colleagues are admittedly more sceptical of than most), failure to pass tax reform would increase the funding requirement in US credit next year, potentially adding to reverse yankee issuance too. On its own this would be a somewhat bigger spread negative for the US, and a smaller one for euro credit, especially for existing reverse yankee bonds.


Failure to get tax reform through would also curtail the earnings boost that European multinationals (concentrated in the health care, consumer staples, industrials and commodity sectors) can expect to see from a reduction in tax rates on their US subsidiaries (estimates we have seen put this in the range of 2-4%). This would be a bigger deal for equities than credit, and it’s not clear how much the assumption of a tax reform-driven boost to earnings have been factored into consensus expectations yet anyway, but at the margin this would also be a small negative for the companies that stand to benefit most.


Overall though, a failure to get tax reform through, after health care reforms had to be shelved earlier this year, would call into question the feasibility of the Republicans’ legislative agenda. Our economists have factored in a 0.4% boost to US growth next year from tax reform, and a scaling back of US growth expectations. We think the spillover on global risk appetite would likely lead to at least 5bp of widening from current levels.


So ‘what if’ then?


As mentioned at the onset, none of these scenarios are base case individually. They weren’t meant to be. But what’s striking is how many are at play in 2018: we managed to come up with more with more than 40 "what ifs" in less than an hour. What you see above is merely a selection. To us, it again illustrates the uncertainty around the prevailing paradigm as we head into 2018. How they play out remains to be seen and there are positive risks too, but overall the exercise has really rammed home how lop-sided risk-reward is at the onset. When spreads are at historical tights, no news is probably the best news one can realistically hope for.









Monday, November 20, 2017

UK Cabinet Poised To Increase Brexit Divorce Payment By Another 20 Billion Euros

Theresa’s May’s government is poised to concede an improved Brexit settlement offer to gain EU approval to move the negotiations on to the next stage.


May reportedly has the backing of senior ministers ahead of a critical cabinet meeting on Monday afternoon. The list of senior ministers is thought to include chancellor, Philip Hammond, Brexit secretary, David Davis, environment secretary, Michael Gove and weakened foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, who famously said in July that the EU could “go whistle” over a divorce settlement. Hammond said at the weekend “we’ve always been clear it won’t be easy to work out that number, but whatever is due, we will pay”. Press reports suggest that the UK will formally offer about 40 billion Euros, versus the previous 20 billion. The news caused Sterling to rise more than half a percent to a two and a half week high of 1.3272, its strongest level since 2 November 2017. According to Bloomberg.


The U.K. could be about to improve its financial offer to the European Union ahead of a crucial meeting of the bloc’s leaders in December. Members of Prime Minister Theresa May’s divided cabinet will consider Britain’s divorce from the EU at a meeting Monday afternoon of the Brexit sub-committee that could be key to unlocking the most controversial matter in the negotiations -- money. Britain is “on the brink of making some serious movement forward” and starting to break the “logjam,” Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond told the BBC on Sunday. While Hammond is among the most pro-European members of cabinet, his suggestion follows Brexit Secretary David Davis’s hint from Berlin on Friday that more details on a financial settlement would be presented within weeks. With businesses clamoring for clarity and the departure just 16 months away, pressure is mounting to break the impasse.



The impact of a 40 billion Euros settlement offer is hard to judge as it likely to fall short of the EU’s demands, while it might enrage a substantial proportion of the British public. Bloomberg continues.


The EU is pushing for Britain to pay at least 60 billion euros ($71 billion) to cover budgetary commitments and future liabilities such as pensions for EU civil servants. So far, May has said she will make 20 billion euros of budget payments after Brexit, and is going through the other items line by line. The Times said that while the government wouldn’t put a figure on it, it was likely to add another 20 billion euros to what it’s already agreed to. There’s a risk that might not be enough to unblock talks. It’s also unlikely to go down well domestically. “If we start saying that we’re going to give 40 to 50 billion to the EU, I think the public will go bananas, absolutely spare,” Robert Halfon, a Conservative lawmaker and former minister, said late Sunday in a BBC radio interview. “That is going to be very difficult if it is going to be that sum, amount of money.” Halfon has a point: one of the main messages of the pro-Brexit wing in last year’s referendum was that it would put an end to sending large sums of money to the EU, and polling shows the British public are adverse to paying a large exit bill. A YouGov poll in September found that even a bill of 20 billion pounds was unpalatable to 63 percent of voters surveyed.



Time is running out for the financial settlement to be agreed if it is to be approved at the next EU Council meeting in mid-December. After meeting Prime Minister May on Friday, EC President Tusk indicated that early December was the deadline. As Bloomberg explains.


“We are waiting for a substantial offer from the British,” Dutch Foreign Minister Halbe Zijlstra said on Monday.


 


“It has to be concrete and on the table instead of in the press”…


 


Time is pressing on Britain to come up with an improved offer after EU President Donald Tusk said early December would be “the latest” for additional concessions on the bill if talks are to advance beyond the divorce and on to future trading arrangements after a mid-December summit. “We will make our proposals to the European Union in time for the council. I am sure about that,” Hammond said in an interview with the BBC on Sunday. Asked if time was running out for the U.K. to make an improved offer on its exit payment, he replied that “the council is in three weeks, so, yes.”



With the deadline approaching, the posturing by both sides is ratcheting up and an agreement – or otherwise – will probably go down to the wire.


The process has been complicated along the way by what sometimes looks like a game of brinkmanship. In an interview with the BBC, Davis insisted that Britain has “made all the running” and that now “I want them to compromise,” meaning the EU. Tusk responded by saying he found that position laughable: “I really appreciate Mr. Davis’s English sense of humor.”



Another point is that success or failure could well be decided at the highest political levels and relatively last minute. In Berlin on Friday, Davis said “we’ll make some decisions, political decisions, later on.” The stalemate in Brexit talks is dragging on as EU leaders refuse to discuss a future trade deal with the U.K. until sufficient progress is made on money, guaranteeing rights of citizens, and the Irish border.



Ahead of today’s cabinet meeting, an MP from May’s party warned her not to “play Santa Claus” to the EU. As the BBC reports.


The UK government cannot afford to "play Santa Claus" to EU bosses by handing over billions of pounds, a Conservative MP says. Nigel Evans accused the EU of demanding "ransom money" from Theresa May to move Brexit negotiations forwards. He was speaking ahead of a meeting between Mrs May and senior ministers to try to make progress on the stalled talks.



This was May leaving church with her husband in a red coat on Sunday.



It’s been clear that EU bureaucrats were determined to extract the maximum possible settlement to punish the UK for leaving. However, the sudden weakening in Merkel’s position, after her failure to negotiate a new coalition government, might shake Brussels’ hardline approach enough to get a compromise deal over the finishing line.


We never fully bought into the “Merkel is May’s ally” narrative, but time will tell.









Wednesday, October 11, 2017

Nigel Farage: "This Is The Clearest Proof Yet That The Great Brexit Betrayal Is Under Way"

Authored by Nigel Farage, originally published in the Telegraph


Theresa May is now the EU"s Stepford Wife: subservient and submissive to their every whim


So there we have it. Theresa May does not believe in Brexit. In an interview with Iain Dale on LBC, she completely collapsed, proving incapable of answering the question of how would she vote if there was a referendum now. She simply would not answer if she would support Leave.


Everyone listening to that interview knows that the reality is that May is still a Remainer. I don’t believe it’s possible to carry out this great, historic change against a huge amount of international criticism unless you truly believe in it. Nor, as it happens, does May: in a speech on June 1 she herself said: “To deliver Brexit you have to believe it”. This is the clearest proof yet that the Great Brexit Betrayal is under way.


It is only the latest piece of evidence in a whole procession. On Monday we also found out that Boris Johnson – supposedly Brexit"s loudest cheerleader in the Cabinet – has bottled it. Last month the Foreign Secretary stated in print his demand that the UK must leave the wretched European Court of Justice (ECJ) on Day One of our exit from the EU in March 2019. But then folded like a cheap suit by backing to the hilt Theresa May’s House of Commons Brexit statement – a speech which was itself further confirmation of the great betrayal.


This came to light in her answer to the rapier-like question from Jacob Rees-Mogg MP, in which she said that the UK will still be bound by ECJ rulings during the Brexit transition period, Jacob looked somewhat deflated by this answer. She also would not deny that any new EU laws would be applicable to us, simply trying to ignore the question by saying it was ‘highly unlikely’ this this would occur.


During her parliamentary address, May admitted to MPs that Britain will still be bound by the ECJ’s rulings during the Brexit transition period, currently set to end in 2021. Not only that, but she suggested this country will also have to accept any new EU laws which are dreamt up in Brussels during this time. 


In her world, this arrangement represents part of a “smooth and orderly process of withdrawal, with minimum disruption”.


To me, this demonstrates that May has become the Stepford Wife of the EU – conformist, subservient, submissive. It is woeful stuff.


The only good news of the day is that, at last, some contingency plans have been prepared for a no deal outcome. The only trouble is I simply do not believe that May has the courage to opt for this.



Depressingly, another supposed Brexiteer in the Cabinet, Environment Secretary Michael Gove, joined Johnson, hailing May’s “strong statement” in the Commons. To him, it was as though she had just made some important breakthrough for the good of mankind when all she had done was roll over and surrender for even longer our courts and laws to a distant power.


I realise that Johnson and Gove have assumed this new anything-goes position because they want to publicly support their troubled party leader at a difficult time and, by extension, remain in government for as long as possible. Anything to keep Jeremy Corbyn out of Downing Street is the mantra.


But is there not something utterly shameless about their acquiescence? Indeed, does anyone seriously believe either man actually welcomes our remaining under the ECJ for the foreseeable future?


By putting themselves and, let’s face it, their careers first, Johnson and Gove have made clear that they have no serious interest in carrying out the will of the 17.4 million people who last year voted to leave the EU. To them, the lives of the citizens are secondary.









In backing a proposition they don’t even agree with, they have done little more than make themselves look foolish and mocked the notion that we are an independent state.


What their actions show is that this is fast becoming Brexit in name only and, as I’ve written before, it should concern everybody that our politicians are caving in at the very time they should be standing firm.


What sort of message does it send to potential trading partners in the world that Britain is still bowing and scraping to the institution which in June 2016 we very publicly dumped?


Countries outside the EU will regard us as flaky, a shadow of ourselves, perhaps even untrustworthy. At the same time, some within the EU will smell blood, and will use our confused domestic political situation to punish us as they see fit. It is lose-lose.


With every week that passes we see May and her government dither and delay over one issue or another, and it is this sense that she is being worn down by her opponents in the EU that I find truly alarming. The fight appears to have gone out of her at the time we need it most. I wrote last month of May’s naivety in thinking that the EU even wants to do a deal with Britain. It is blatantly obvious they don’t, and that she should call their bluff and walk away. The time for appeasing Messrs Juncker, Barnier and Verhofstadt is over.


Yesterday, Theresa May became Theresa Maybe in that she left open the door to further concessions. Once again I find myself wondering whether, 16 months after we voted to do so, we have the leaders to complete the job.







Friday, September 22, 2017

Complete Preview Of Theresa May's "Florence" Brexit Speech

On Friday - a day many have called  "the most important day for Brexit since the referendum" - Theresa May will delivers her much anticipated Brexit speech in Florence. The roughly 5000-word speech is scheduled at begin around 09:15 EDT and is expected to provoke an immediate response from Brussels.


Among the flurry of last minute preparations, earlier this week, the Telegraph reported that Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson will resign if May veers toward a "Swiss-style" EU arrangement in her speech (more here). Earlier today, BBC Political Editor Laura Kuenssberg reported that May’s Friday speech will say the UK willing to pay €20BN during transition period “BUT only if we have access to single market + some form of customs union.” As RanSquawk added, the €20BN does not cover long term liabilities, so the eventual total departure bill to taxpayers will potentially be far higher.


Taking a step back, here is a bigger picture preview of what is known - and unknown - about tomorrow"s speech courtesy of RanSquawk


What will May Say?


Few specific details are available on what UK Prime Minister Theresa May will cover in her speech, to be delivered from Florence, Italy, on 22 September. However, it is expected that the material will be significant given that the UK delayed the fourth round of Brexit talks (which were set to take place in the week of 25 September). A spokesperson for May has been quoted as saying that the speech would outline the UK"s hopes for a "deep and special partnership" with the EU following Brexit. May was said to have discussed the particulars with her Cabinet on Thursday 21 September. At the time of publication, no firm details have been leaked, although a BBC reporter was told that May will seek a transitional agreement, with a time frame of two years being touted.


"In the wake of slow progress on Brexit negotiations, the United Kingdom may be preparing to adjust its approach," analysts at Stratfor write. "Brexit negotiations have achieved limited progress so far, and the EU side has warned that talks are still far from the "sufficient progress" necessary to move to their second phase, which is meant to address the future bilateral relationship" which the UK was eager to begin in October.


One theory that is gaining traction, therefore, is that the UK will offer some concessions to the EU which will help move the discussions on.


Tensions Within May"s Cabinet


The secrecy surrounding her speech was causing tension in May"s Cabinet. Reports in the Telegraph newspaper suggested that Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson would tender his resignation if May pivoted towards a "Swiss-style" arrangement. The news drove sterling higher, with traders seemingly taking comfort from the idea that some of the more extreme, "hard" voices around May would leave the Cabinet, allowing her to pursue a "softer", more amenable deal.


However, the story was denied and it has been subsequently reported that May made moves to appease Johnson; the Telegraph reported "the Cabinet truce over Britain"s future payments to the EU involves paying substantial sums to the bloc, but no further payments after Britain"s transition period."


The FT later wrote that PM May believes the UK can achieve a "bespoke" final deal with the EU, and May reportedly said neither a Canadian-style nor a Norway-style deal for single market was appropriate for the UK.


Divorce Bill


The Financial Times this week reported that the UK was set to make an "offer to fill a post-Brexit EU budget hole of at least €20bn" in an attempt to settle its so-called "diovrce bill." The FT adds "UK officials have indicated Britain would ensure no member state would have to pay more into the EU budget or receive less money from it until 2020, the end of EU"s current long-term budget planning period. The expected hole in those two years after Brexit would be at least €20bn when payments the UK receives back from Brussels are excluded.


"A figure of €20bn is pretty close to estimates for what the UK"s net contribution to the EU budget would have been under the status quo "Remain" scenario," say analysts at RBC Capital, "however, it is unlikely that monies relating to the current EU budget period will be the end of the financial settlement negotiation between the UK and the EU." Later reports, which followed Ma"s Cabinet meeting, suggested any financial settlement - which May would not directly address in her speech - would be contingent on single market access.


It is unclear how the EU might respond, given earlier demands from some suggesting a figure of as much as €60bln may be needed.


"On the EU side, any response next week which hints progress is sufficient to move towards discussing the future UK-EU trade deal before year end should be supportive of a view that the two-year Article 50 process isn"t too far off-track," RBC says.


Transitional Period


May is also expected to acknowledge the need for a transitional period to avoid a "Brexit cliff", where the UK would continue to abide by EU rules in some areas, while phasing out a withdrawal in other areas. "While the British government seemed to be aiming for a two-year transition, we have been told May prefers a longer hiatus of three years, which would give her enough time to prepare for elections, to be held on their scheduled date, in 2022," analysts at SGH Macro argue.


* * *


Want more? Here is another preview, this time from Barclays?


Media speculation is mounting over the content of UK PM May’s Brexit Speech in Florence tomorrow. This is the first big Brexit-specific speech by the PM following the General Election. It is designed to outline the basis for negotiations at the fourth round of EU-UK negotiations in Brussels next week. Following that, the UK Conservative Party Conference will take place on 1-4 October, where PM May will need to satisfy her own party members with regards to the tone set over Brexit. Hence, the challenge for the PM in her speech will be to appear constructive to her EU partners, so as to advance the negotiation process, while at the same time not angering those within her own party, who may prefer a less accommodative course vis-a-vis the EU in the negotiations.


May is expected to outline three key issues – The transition, the EU withdrawal bill, and the future relationship.


  • Transition – Highlights were provided by Chancellor Hammond last week. He insisted that the UK will leave the Single Market and the Customs Union in March 2019. The UK will seek to maintain the status quo of trade and access. A two-year transition period is seen as most likely to stop cabinet in-fighting.

  • EU Withdrawal bill – PM May is likely to commit to the UK paying what is deemed reasonable during a transition period. Her traditional style has been vague and there is a chance she may continue with this approach, and stop short of stating an actual figure that could leave herself open to attack during the upcoming Tory Party conference. However, press speculation is mounting of a £20bn figure as a starting point for negotiations, conditional upon access to the single market and some form of Customs Union (source: BBC). We expect an eventual figure in the region of £40-50bn may be negotiable. The reaction to this from Brussels and the UK media will be important for PM May going into the Tory Party conference.

  • Future relationship – Hammond gave some colour last week, focusing on financial services, and recognised concerns about the UK potentially deviating from high EU regulatory standards. We expect PM May to reiterate the importance of regulatory homogeneity in the short run. May is likely to try to insist on the need for the UK to negotiate trade deals, even if legally, this cannot begin until the second phase of negotiations.

  • Reaction following the speech: The key to watch here would be the reaction from EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, as well as the UK press. The speech lays the foundations for the EU-UK negotiations next week, and EU officials have voiced increasing frustration over delays, bearing in mind that the principles for the first phase of negotiations, covering  guarantees, commitments on citizens rights, are due to be agreed between October to December before it is possible to move on to trade issues in Phase 2.

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

EU Accuses UK Of Backtracking: UK MPs Threaten To Block Divorce Payments

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk.com,


Brexit negotiations hit the rocks with the size of the Brexit divorce bill the key issue.


The Independent reports: Britain is ‘backtracking’ on its Brexit divorce bill commitments, moans Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator warns.


My response: Hooray for the UK!






Michel Barnier said he was “disappointed” by the UK position and publicly warned the British team it should go back to the drawing board after it presented a legal analysis arguing that Britain owed far less than the Commission believed.



“So there’s a moral dilemma here: you can’t have 27 paying for what was decided by 28, so what was decided by 28 member states, that has to be borne out by 28 member states right up to the end, it’s as simple as that.



The UK says it wants to go through the Brexit bill line-by-line to work out what it owes the EU, but the EU says spending commitments already agreed to during the current budget round should simply be honored.



David Davis told the House of Commons earlier this week that he had “significant differences” with the EU on the Brexit divorce bill and that the two sides were taking “very different legal stances”.



European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has said the final divorce bill could be around £55bn. Mr. Davis has dismissed reports the UK secretly agreed on a bill of up to £50bn. Others suggested the divorce bill could reach £92bn.



The so-called divorce bill has caused controversy for months. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson faced criticism in July for suggesting the EU could “go whistle” if they expected the UK to pay any money to leave.



EU Hucksters


The Sunday Express explains Why EU will NEVER get its £90bn Brexit divorce bill.





EU negotiators were said to have been left “flabbergasted” after British lawmakers told them there was little or no legal basis for their £90billion claim. A young civil servant reportedly left EU negotiators “open-mouthed” with a line-by-line “technical” demolition of the demand.



Tory grandee John Redwood said last night that there was no legal basis for the demand. He also said Mr Davis had no right to authorise it without parliamentary approval.



“Article 50 is clear,” he said. “Once a state leaves it has no further rights and benefits, and no further duties or obligations. It is of course true the treaty does not prevent the EU accepting a payment volunteered by a departing state if it wished to pay one. However, the UK could not make such a payment legally under our own law and system for controlling public spending.”



The former Welsh secretary, who voted for Brexit, said ministers have “absolutely no authority to make one-off additional payments to the EU. The only way Mr. Davis could authorize a leaving payment would be to put through an Act of Parliament specifically authorizing such an ex gratia payment. I can’t see many Conservative MPs wanting to vote for that.”



Eurosceptics on both sides of the house said MPs were likely to vote down any demand deemed “excessive” – even those who had voted Remain.



Mr Rees-Mogg said: “Almost certainly there will have to be a vote. The money has to be voted through by Parliament and with MPs facing the fury of voters, it cannot be too much money.”



Fellow Brexiteer and Tory MP Andrew Bridgen said: “Any deal will have to go through Parliament and if its seen in any way excessive then it won’t go through.”



Referring to an ICM poll which found that two-thirds of voters would find paying anything over £10 billion “unacceptable”, he added: “That polling data gives you a ballpark figure of what the British public would find acceptable. We buy more from the EU than we sell, we aren’t charging them for access to our market so what possible reason would they have to charge us for access to theirs unless they want to cost Europeans their livelihoods?



“The British public won’t accept a punishment payment. No MP in their right mind would vote for that, whether they are Brexiteers or Remainers. The EU is talking about multi-billion pound payments in line with the entire NHS budget. The electorate won’t stand for it.”



Labour MP Kate Hoey, who also voted Leave, agreed. She said: “If you give up your membership of a leisure or social club, you don’t have to carry on paying for the staff pensions after you’ve left.”



Journalist Blasts Bexit Divorce Bill



He surprised others on the news panel show Dateline after the three other correspondents relentlessly criticised David Davis and the British negotiating team.


Mr. Burns also hit out at Michel Barnier’s “frankly insulting” tone towards Britain and warned Jean-Claude Juncker that he was “sitting on a volcano”.


John Fisher Burns, who previously worked for the New York Times, delivered a stunning rebuke as the lone voice defending Britain’s approach to Brexit on a BBC show.


“Barnier’s position seems to be a combination of Napoleonic hauteur and fairground hucksterism,” said Burns.


MPs Threaten to BLOCK any Big Brexit Divorce Bill


The Daily Mail reports MPs Threaten to BLOCK any Big Brexit Divorce Bill.





MPs are threatening to block any big divorce bill Theresa May tries to agree with the EU. The warnings underline the scale of the challenge the government faces if it signs up to paying large sums of money to Brussels. The EU has made clear it wants up to £100 billion to settle the UK’s ‘liabilities’ when we leave the bloc.



Eurocrats have insisted the principles of the financial divorce must be agreed before they will start talking about trade talks – effectively attempting to hold the UK to ransom.



There are claims ministers might be willing to consider a figure closer to £50billion to end the stand-off- although Brexit Secretary David Davis has dismissed that as ‘total rubbish’.



Even a significantly lower payment could be a serious problem for the government, with leading Eurosceptics insisting an Act of Parliament would be needed to authorize handing over the cash.



Former Cabinet minister John Redwood said he did not believe many MPs would vote in favor of such a payment.



‘The only way UK Ministers could authorize a leaving payment would be to put through an Act of Parliament specifically authorizing such an ex gratia payment. I can’t see many Conservative MPs wanting to vote for that,’ he told The Sun.



Labour MP Kate Hoey added: ‘I suspect a lot of MPs would in principle vote against any excessive payment.



‘I would vote against paying a big bill unless I could be convinced that all the money we have paid in over many years had been taken into account first.



‘But my quick calculations suggest that the British public would be expecting to pay very very little, if anything at all.’



My Take


The UK owes the EU nothing. £10 billion would be a generous offer.


The EU may stall, and stall and stall. Another possibility is the UK agree may agree to a lengthy transition period in which the UK keeps paying EU dues. Those dues could mount up.


To avoid such stalling tactics, The best thing to do is simply leave and pay nothing, then revoke EU fishing rights and threaten to lower corporate taxes. Then and only then will negotiations make any sense.


Unfortunately, the nannycrats still act as if they have the upper hand. The sooner the UK ends that delusion, the better.

Saturday, June 24, 2017

Brexit One Year On: Political Chaos, Pounded Currency, & Pressured Consumers

It is exactly one year since the UK held the historic referendum vote on EU membership. As Deutsche Bank"s Jim Reid notes, whether you think that has passed quickly or not probably depends on if you’re a Sterling FX trader, in which case it’s more than likely been a long year. With today being the anniversary we thought we would see how assets have performed over the past year since the vote...


First and foremost the standout is the currency has been pounded with a huge decline for Sterling versus both the Dollar (-15%) and Euro (-13%). That massive move in the currency has helped to prop up local currency returns however and we’ve seen the FTSE 100 surge an impressive +22% (clearly boosted by big UK exporters) while GBP credit has returned between +8% and +15% and Gilts have returned +7%.



Under the covers of the index - there are big winners and big losers (in local currency terms) also...



However it is the USD hedged returns which are of most interest and this is where we have seen UK assets really underperform.



Gilts have returned -9%, GBP credit -2% to -8% and the FTSE 100 a more benign +4%. Indeed the FTSE 100 has underperformed all other equity markets in our sample in USD terms. The Athex (+32%), Hang Seng (+26%), IBEX (+23%), DAX (+22%), European Banks (+21%) and Nikkei (+20%) are all up over 20% while the S&P 500 is also up an impressive +18%. Credit returns outside of GBP credit are more muted but still flat to +11% generally.


Where we have seen some weakness however is in rates. While bond markets initially rallied in the first week or two post the vote yields have for the most part edged higher ever since. Gilts still standout for their underperformance but Bunds (-3%), BTPs (-3%), Treasuries (0%) and Spanish Bonds (0%) haven’t rewarded investors as one might expect given the huge uncertainty that the result created. Indeed the same can also be said for Gold (-1%). If you exclude currencies, then 33 out of 43 assets in our sample have a positive total return in local currency terms and 26 out of 43 assets in USD terms have a positive total return.



So, as Deutsche"s Reid notes, it"s been an impressive rally for risk despite an outcome which has seen political Europe enter unknown territory. On that any hopes that the UK political situation would be resolved or at least stabilise essentially came to an end following the snap election earlier this month.


Since the referendum result we have seen Political Chaos:


  • A year of leadership contests within the two main political parties in Britain;

  • Court cases trying to prevent Brexit from happening;

  • Embarrassing leaks demonstrating Prime Minister Theresa May"s weak ability to negotiate with the EU.

  • Volatile markets, the decimation of the pound, and preparations for job relocations;

  • A disastrous general election that has put Britain in line for a Brexit deal that looks very similar to what we have now;

  • A  government in disarray;

  • And finally the possibility that Brexit could be reversed ...

The possibility of another election in the future hasn’t necessarily gone away either while the Conservatives and DUP parties are still to come to an agreement. What that means for Brexit talks is also still a bit of an unknown which is why there is a fair bit of focus on the two-day EU summit which kicked off yesterday. This is the first summit since the election for Theresa May and also coincides with Brexit negotiations having kicked off on Monday. Yesterday May proposed a “fair and serious” offer to guarantee the rights of EU citizens living in Britain, telling leaders of the EU that no EU citizens living in Britain lawfully at the time in which Britain leaves the EU would be asked to leave.


And finally, the consumer has been pressured by soaring prices as inflation bites...


"The main financial effect of Brexit has been felt in the pound, though weaker sterling has pushed up inflation and also boosted the stock market. Holidaymakers have probably been the most obvious losers from Brexit so far, though inflation is also gradually ratcheting up the pressure on consumers more broadly," said Laith Khalaf, senior analyst at Hargreaves Lansdown.



Finally, Khalaf sums up the year...





"The performance of capital markets over the last year tells us that the financial effects of Brexit are about as predictable as the British weather."


Monday, June 12, 2017

Brexit Still Means Brexit! May's Mistake Not What Most Suggest

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk.com,


Contrary to what many are saying, the Tory election debacle was not about Brexit. Rather, the election was about everything but Brexit.


Sure, the youth vote, turned out en masse for Corbyn, but Labour and Corbyn himself had already admitted the Brexit reality.


Tory MP Jacob Rees-Mogg explains nicely in This election created no mandate for watering down Brexit. There must be no backsliding.





Negotiations are about to start, and the nation cannot afford to show weakness across the channel. Already, people who never wanted to leave the European Union are calling for a change of tune, by which they mean a reversal of the referendum. “Hard” and “soft” Brexit are code words for leaving or staying in the EU, rather than for the terms of our departure. No such denial of the people’s will can be permitted.



Indeed, the essence of our strength is in the negotiating reality that no deal really is better than a bad deal. By the end of March 2019, if nothing has been agreed, we leave with all our money, laws and border controls, and the ability to trade with the EU the way we successfully do with everyone else. This is rather an attractive position, and much preferable to being a European satrapy. Mrs May seems to be aware of the strength of this position, and that is a good reason for her to remain.



As for the claim that this result means Mrs May must now drop her approach to Brexit and seek to keep Britain inside the European Economic Area, that is simply wrong. Although the Tory party hoped that the general election of 2017 would be about Brexit, it was not. Indeed, it was about everything except Brexit – social care, grammar schools, foxhunting – and the cleverness of Labour’s campaign was to leave Brexit alone. It is clear that voters did not want to be asked the same question twice; one decision was made in 2016, and fresh ones were to be made on Thursday. Similarly, the Scots showed they did not want to be asked the same question multiple times, hence the SNP’s decline.



This means that there is no mandate at all from this election for undermining Brexit. Remainers kept quiet during the campaign because they knew the matter was settled – with the exception of the Lib Dems, who, despite getting a few seats, are irrelevant.



The Labour Party likewise made no serious challenge to the outline set out by the Prime Minister. This election was therefore a tacit endorsement of Mrs. May’s Brexit strategy, for voters showed no desire to change it; it is better that she should carry it out.



MP Daniel Hannan Tweets















Reflections on Hannan



May’s Mistake Not What Most Suggest






The youth vote turned out, en masses, demanding “free stuff”.

Monday, June 5, 2017

The Market Has Zero Concerns About Thursday's UK Election

Having learned its lesson that both an "unexpected" result (in the case of Brexit and Trump), and a "priced in", favorable election outcome both lead to higher risk prices, the market no longer even pretends to be nervous about the outcome of this Thursday"s general election in the UK.


To be sure, it has good reason for that: despite fluctuating polls, virtually every analyst"s base case for this election remains a Conservative majority large enough to allow for the necessary compromises to deliver an orderly "hard Brexit" with a transition period lasting 1-2y. However, as shown in the chart below, a recent narrowing of the polls poses risks to this scenario.



In terms of election outcome, the extent of the Conservative majority matters most for Brexit risks; a less than 60 seats increases the risks of the UK walking away from Brexit negotiations according to BofA. On the other hand, a larger conservative majority increases the likelihood of securing transitional arrangements and fully implementing Brexit; a larger majority should enable Prime Minister May increased flexibility to compromise with the EU-27, despite opposition from the Eurosceptics within her own party.


Alternatively, while a Labour-led coalition or outright victory has the potential to lead to a softer Brexit, analysts are worried about growth risks posed by some of the policies put forward in their agenda.


Not everyone is "worried" however, and certainly not the market.


In an analysis released today, Goldman asks "what does the market appear to be pricing in the way of moves in UK asset prices around the event?" The answer: "not much, in line with depressed vol across assets." More:





1m GBP/US$, FTSE 100 and 10-year rates implied vols are at their 28th, 17th and 0th percentiles since the start of 2016, respectively. While short-dated GBP implied volatility has increased in the past month, it still remains far below any other peaks over the past 18 months, e.g. when Brexit began to come more into focus in the summer of last year. There has also been no spike in 1-month vol as we have come closer to the event, which is unusual when compared with previous political events in the past year.



The collapse in vol ahead Thursday"s "event risk" is shown below.



Of course, the market is reacting logically: having learned the hard way that anticipating volatility ahead of major political events only leads to losses, few bother to buy event protection any more. On the other hand, Thursday will also bring the ECB"s "hawkish" announcement and Comey"s testimony, both of which carry some potential for surprise. With vol trading at record lows, some heging may not be the worst idea.


Finally, for those the skeptics out there, here are Capital Economics" John Higgins & Paul Hollingsworth, explaining how markets could react if the Conservatives do not win:





Although bookmakers’ odds still suggest that the Conservative Party will win an outright majority in Thursday’s UK General Election, the odds on a hung parliament have shortened considerably in the last few weeks. Indeed, the implied probability of this outcome recently rose to nearly 20%. While there hasn’t been a big reaction in the financial markets, there clearly could be one if the probability became reality.



In the short run, we suspect that a hung parliament would be negative for sterling. When the election was called on 18th April, the polls pointed to a landslide victory for the Conservative Party. This boosted the UK’s currency, as investors assumed that such an outcome would lead to a “smoother” Brexit. In the event of a hung parliament, negotiations would probably be “bumpier” and political uncertainty would rise. Although some investors might envisage a softer Brexit, there isn’t much to choose between the Conservative Party and the main opposition Labour Party when it comes to their views on the UK’s departure from the EU. The upshot is that sterling might falter – indeed, the boost the currency received after the election was called has already faded, as the possibility of a hung parliament has grown. (See Chart 1.)





Meanwhile, sterling weakness in the aftermath of a hung parliament could conceivably boost the UK stock market, as it did after the vote for Brexit. But we are not convinced that equity prices would continue to rise, given the political uncertainty. In our view, the main beneficiary from such uncertainty might be UK government bonds.



It might not be long, though, before we started to see a different reaction in the markets. After all, if a hung parliament resulted in a workable minority Labour government, there could be a shift towards much looser fiscal policy. This would probably lead to a renewed rise in Gilt yields, which have already fallen to very low levels, by driving up expectations for interest rates. Such a mix of looser fiscal and tighter monetary policy could also benefit sterling. A renewed rise in the currency, coupled with Labour’s plans for much higher corporation tax, would, however, be bad news for UK equities.


Tuesday, May 23, 2017

Nigel Farage Responds to Manchester Suicide Attack: 'This is a Direct Attack on Children'

Nigel Farage was interviewed by Tucker Carlson this evening to discuss the suicide attack in Manchester that killed at least 19 and wounded dozens.


Farage told Carlson, “we have been lulled into a slight sense of complacency,” refraining, however, from jumping to conclusions as to who was responsible for the attack.


He noted that Britains shouldn"t put their guard down, post BREXIT, saying "we"ve convinced ourselves that we’re in a better place than the rest of Europe on this.”


Farage pointed out that the bombing was a "direct attack on children... marks a new low in all forms of terrorism."


Watch.



Content originally published at iBankCoin.com

Monday, May 22, 2017

UK Threatens To Quit Brexit Talks Over Excessive 'Divorce Payment' Demands

With negotiations between the UK and EU likely to formally begin on June 19, Bloomberg reports that Brexit Secretary David Davis has pre-emptively lashed out at EU officials, threatening that "The UK will quit talks on leaving the European Union unless the bloc drops its demands for a divorce payment as high as EUR100bn."



Britain’s negotiations would otherwise be plunged into “chaos,” and even a 1 billion-pound settlement would be “a lot of money,” Davis said in an interview published in the Sunday Times.


As Bloomberg notes, the size of Britain’s exit bill, and which types of negotiations can begin before it has been agreed, has been a source of debate for weeks.





European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has said the U.K. will have to pay about 50 billion pounds, while Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Xavier Bettel has signaled a figure between 40 billion euros and 60 billion euros.



The Financial Times estimated the cost could balloon to 100 billion euros, while a study by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales put the cost at as low as 5 billion pounds ($6.5 billion).



Prime Minister Theresa May’s government has said it will meet its commitments to the EU, but has questioned how Brussels officials reached their preliminary estimates... especially the oddly round number of 100-billion-euros...





"We don"t need to just look like we can walk away, we need to be able to walk away...Under the circumstances, if that was necessary, we would be in a position to do it."



May also weighed in on the Brexit bill, saying in an interview with the Sunday Telegraph that “money paid in the past” by the U.K. into joint EU projects and the European Investment Bank ought to be taken account in the final sum.





“There is much debate about what the U.K.’s obligations might be or indeed what our rights might be,” she said.



“We make it clear that we would look at those both rights and obligations.”



Cable was lowe rin early trading on the headlines...



But, interestingly, Barclays fears that two years may not be enough time to complete comprehensive Brexit talks...


  • A long road ahead. We believe full negotiations will last much longer than the two years set out for withdrawal. New trading relationships with the EU and the RoW will likelyto be complex and drawn out. As a result, firms are likely to review their operations along the entire value chain, with tariffs only being a small part of their worries.

  • Accordingly, the government should focus on a bridge agreement to avoid a “cliff edge”. The EU also made clear that a new trade agreement can only be finalised once the UK becomes a third country. That will also involve EU27 member-state ratification.



Which leaves three possible paths ahead...The soft, the hard and the ugly Brexit


While it remains unclear what kind of Brexit PM May is seeking, we believe that her insistence on regaining control of borders and withdrawing from the ECJ is fundamentally inconsistent with the EU’s funding principles and makes an exit of the single market unavoidable.


The distinction between soft and hard Brexit will be whether the final outcome is a trade agreement a minima or whether the UK and EU can agree on maintaining some of the deep and comprehensive ties that create economic value.


We believe the final outcome will be one of the following:





A crash Brexit: the UK leaves the EU without any agreement and falls back to WTO tariffs and rules immediately after leaving the EU. Economic consequences would be maximal and disruptive. Such a scenario is likely to crystallise very late in the process but might be delayed or avoided by an extension of talks, which would require a unanimous vote by the EU27.



A soft Brexit : the UK leaves the single market but is able to establish an enhanced partnership with the EU (such as improved equivalence, preferential access, etc) . Under such a scenario, the deviation from the status quo is small and the economic impact, still negative, but largely contained.



A hard Brexit: the UK leaves the single market but is not able to establish an strong partnership with the EU. Although a transitional period could avoid a cliff edge after the actual exit, the negative economic impact is magnified by the fact that businesses must adjust their operations substantially and over a short period of time



While information regarding a soft and hard Brexit will likely be revealed along the way (that is a transparency prerequisite of the Council), a crash exit might only materialise very late in the process as both parties fail to agree on or ratify a final deal.


Europe still faces a very crowded political agenda ahead..



*  *  *


Full Barclays Presentation on UK Brexit Themes...

Monday, May 8, 2017

"London Bridge Is Down"

Authored by Raul Ilargi Meijer via The Automatic Earth blog,


The French election, won overnight by Emmanuel Macron, put several segments of the French population opposite one another in a pretty fierce contest. And that contest will continue. Because Macron won’t be able to lift the French economy out of its doldrums any more than Le Pen could have, or than Trump can life the US, and the new president will have the honor of presiding over a further and deepening downturn. The French political dividing line was aptly described by Simon Kuper recently:





The ultra-nationalist writer Charles Maurras believed there were “two Frances”. The one he loved was the “pays réel”, the real country: a rural France of church clocks, traditions and native people fused with their ancestral soil. Maurras loathed the “pays légal”, the legal country: the secular republic, which he thought was run by functionaries conspiring for alien interests.



Maurras was born in 1868 and died in 1952. But if he returned on Sunday to witness the French presidential run-off, he would instantly recognise both candidates. He would cast Emmanuel Macron as the incarnation of the “legal France” and Marine Le Pen as embodying the “real” one.



Maurras may have been a questionable character, but that description is not half bad. Once enough people in the country understand the failure of ‘legal’ France, they will want ‘real’ France back. That will be true in countries all over Europe; to a large extent it already is. Marine Le Pen summed up the key issue really well a few days ago when she said of the country post election: “France will be led by a woman, me or Mrs. Merkel.”


There is only one reason the French people would ever tolerate Germany having an outsized influence in their politics and economics: that they feel they benefit from it financially. And yes, if you put it that way, it’s already quite something that they haven’t revolted more and earlier.


The generous unemployment benefits are undoubtedly part of that. But those can’t last. And since the Germans owe their influence in Paris to the EU, it’s obvious how the French will feel they can stop that influence. And then the EU will turn out to be not a peacemaker, but the opposite.


Still, as much as France is divided, and as serious as that division is, the country is a shining beacon of unity compared to the UK, where the dividing lines are as manifold as they are laced with toxins. The snap election PM Theresa May called, in just over a month, can do nothing to resolve any of it. That means the EU can do what they want in the Brexit negotiations. Which will therefore be an unparalleled disaster for May and the UK.


The EU can and will ‘have its way’ with the UK for one simple reason: the United Kingdom is anything but United. It makes no difference what the EU does to the UK, the British won’t blame them for it. They will blame each other instead. No matter what happens these days, the British always know in advance who’s to blame, and it’s never themselves; it’s always another group of Brits.


The Tories are deeply divided between pro- and anti-Brexit forces. Labour is divided along those same lines, and adds pro- and anti-Corbyn sentiments for good measure. Other parties don’t really matter much, but they have similar dividing lines as well.


Anti-Corbyn Labour MPs have convinced themselves they know better than pro-Corbyn party members. They’ve kept claiming for so long that Corbyn is unelectable it’s become a self-fulfilling prophecy. They’ll be lucky not to face the fate of their former brethren in François Hollande’s Parti Socialiste, who ended up with just 6% of the vote in the 1st round of the French elections.


PM Theresa May called the snap election for June 8 to hide some of the divisions behind, to make them appear less relevant, or even to profit from them and grab more power. But the very fact that Brexit was voted in, already makes the election nigh irrelevant.


Whoever wins, and it looks certain to be May herself. will open themselves to being scapegoated in a big way. Which won’t keep them from seeking victory, because the loser can expect the same fate. The trenches have been dug, and deeply. Governable? Don’t count on it. It feels more like 40 years later we’re back to Johnny Rotten ‘singing’ Anarchy in the UK.


If May threatens to leave the EU ‘cold’ and trigger a ‘Hard Brexit’, she will simultaneously trigger a whole lot more, and much wider, divisions in the country (or is that countries?!), and that’s even without mentioning an entire minefield of legal, and potentially constitutional, issues. The latter especially because Britain doesn’t have an actual -written- constitution.


For Brussels, it’s easy pickings, and pick they will. This week, they casually raised the UK’s cost of leaving the EU to €100 billion, from estimates varying from €40 billion to €60 billion before. Paddy Power and its equally powerful bookie ilk soon won’t be taking any bets below, say, €150 billion. In that regard, and many others, the EU will do to the UK what it is doing to Greece.


The only way to stand up against that is to show a common front. But there will be no such thing in the Divided Kingdom, not for a long time. Everyone has their favorite scapegoat, for some it’s Nigel Farage, for others David Cameron, George Osborne, Tony Blair, Jeremy Corbyn or Theresa May. And nobody is going to leave their blame trenches. They’re the only places they feel somewhat comfortable, less scared, in.


Theresa May, if the polls are to be believed -and given the divisions we might for once-, will have to sit down and negotiate with the multi-headed Hydra that is the EU, ‘strengthened’ by a major election victory, but she will find it the ultimate Pyrrhic victory, because Brussels will have a ball playing her divided ‘nation’.


Scotland can probably easily be seduced with the carrot of EU membership, but more importantly, Juncker and his people can cast doubt on the entire Brexit vote, and they will have many interested takers.


The Brexit negotiations will take at least 2 years. But it could be 3 or 4 years, who knows? May has no power over that durationm unless she walks. She won’t. And as things are drawn out, Juncker et al have all the time and opportunities they want to tell both May and the British public that Brussels has no intention of punishing them, but will have to do so anyway.


After all, Brexit is a threat to the entire European project, and all the leaders of the 27 remaining nations, as well as the vast majority of their domestic opposition parties, are behind that project, no questions asked. And the many thousands of people working their very well-paid jobs in Brussels and Strasbourg are not too critical either.


All in all, the British need to wake up and smell the roses as long as there are any left, and before they have been replaced with less savory odors. Or they will have to seriously wonder whether the Kingdom, united or not, can outlive the Queen, aka the London Bridge.


*  *  *


“London Bridge is Down” was recently revealed as the secret UK government code for the moment the Queen dies.

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Spanish Gunship Makes "Illegal Incursion" Into British Waters Off Gibraltar

Just days after a post-Brexit UK cabinet put Europe on edge when a former Conservative leader said on Sunday that Theresa May "would go to war" to protect Gibraltar, Spain has tested the former EU member"s resolve when on Tuesday afternoon the Gibraltar government tweeted that a Spanish gunship has made an illegal incursion into British waters off Gibraltar amid rising Brexit tensions over the territory.



According to SkyNews which broke the story, the Royal Navy told the ship to leave but the incident, the seventh of its kind this year, is likely to escalate already rising tensions over the sovereignty of the Rock.



The alleged incursion comes the day after Spanish foreign minister Alfonso Dastis told the UK not to "lose tempers" after the EU Brexit negotiation guidelines effectively gave Spain significant power over Gibraltar"s future.


Theresa May and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson have moved to reassure the people of Gibraltar that the territory will remain under British control. Lord Howard told the Sophy Ridge on Sunday programme: "I think there"s no question whatever that our Government will stand by Gibraltar." As we reported previously, over the weekend former Conservative leader Lord Howard told Sky News Theresa May could be willing to defend the British territory - like Margaret Thatcher had over the Falklands.


He said: "Thirty-five years ago this week, another woman prime minister sent a task force half way across the world to defend the freedom of another small group of British people against another Spanish-speaking country.





"I"m absolutely certain that our current prime minister will show the same resolve in standing by the people of Gibraltar."



Downing Street said it would not be sending a task force to Gibraltar but did not condemn Lord Howard"s comments. A spokesman said on Monday: "All that Lord Howard was trying to establish is the resolve that we will have to protect the rights of Gibraltar and its sovereignty."



Spain has a long-standing territorial claim on Gibraltar, which has been held by the UK since 1713 and has the status of a British overseas territory; recent post-Brexit developments suggest that Europe, and especially Spain, may have renewed claims on the territory.

Thursday, March 30, 2017

The Definitive Brexit "Wall Chart"

Yesterday the UK government triggered Article 50 and fired the starting gun on a two-year negotiation towards the UK"s exit from the EU. These negotiations will be complex and contentious, and as Goldman writes this morning, the open question is whether they will prove constructive or adversarial.


While Goldman provides an extensive analysis of next steps, including a framework of the three most imporant issues to watch, what we found most useful for readers is the following "Wall Chart" which lays out in clear detail not only what the next two years will look like for the Brexit process, but superimposes on it parallel key events from across Europe.


Brexit wall chart -- The Long March: A crowded schedule for the two-year negotiation



With that out of the way, here are excerpts from Goldman"s take on Article 50 and the long march to Brexit, as well as the three main issues to watch:


By Goldman analysts Andrew Benito, Huw Pill and Dylan Smith


Article 50 and the long march to Brexit — Three issues to watch


Yesterday (March 29), the UK government triggered Article 50 and thus fired the starting gun on a two-year negotiation towards the UK"s exit from the EU. These negotiations will be complex and contentious. The open question is whether they will prove constructive or adversarial.


In the context of political negotiations in general — and EU negotiations in particular — process is an important determinant of outcome. Keeping track of process is central to understanding whether we will end up with a mutually beneficial agreement or a Brexit that is unnecessarily costly for both sides.


Given each party has its own interests and domestic political constraints, EU negotiations inevitably require an element of compromise. By broadening the set of issues that the contracting parties can trade off against one another, two mechanisms underlying EU negotiations promote such compromise: (1) the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"; and (2) the practice that agreement is only achieved at the last moment.


Applying these mechanisms to the Brexit negotiation may improve the chances of a constructive final outcome. But they imply that few concrete decisions will emerge in the coming months. In the meantime, businesses are left in limbo.
We identify three indications that would suggest Brexit negotiations are proceeding in a constructive rather than adversarial manner, increasing the likelihood of a benign outcome:


  • Substantial discussions on a broader final agreement (including on post-Brexit trading arrangements) start before agreement is reached on the mechanics of the exit itself.

  • The EU-27 show flexibility over the timing (and thus immediate magnitude) of payments to settle the UK"s legacy liabilities to the EU, which would avoid them becoming an obstacle to constructive negotiation owing to domestic political resistance in the UK.

  • Most importantly, the UK government shows a preparedness to accept ECJ jurisdiction over any transitional phase after Brexit, even if this entails a political climb-down from its established "red lines".

* * *


What to watch #1. Whether difficulty in reaching an exit agreement (in particular, over its financial aspects) holds up progress on other dimensions of the negotiation will be an important early indicator or whether the Brexit discussions are amicable or adversarial.


Even if they improve the chances of eventually reaching a mutually agreeable compromise, these two procedural mechanisms come with costs. Businesses have to plan ahead. Lack of any concrete agreement until autumn 2018 at the earliest leaves their decision-making in limbo. Contingency plans have to be activated. From the UK perspective in particular, the risk exists that nothing being agreed until everything is agreed at the last moment leads to a closing of the political barn door after the economic horse has bolted.


A changing political context — in both the EU and the UK


For many continental European politicians, Brexit is an unfortunate and (in their eyes) unnecessary distraction. They have plenty on their plates already: fixing Euro area governance; dealing with immigration from the Middle East and North Africa; facing down the rise of Eurosceptic populism at home; addressing security threats from Russia and the Middle East; and managing the economic nationalism of the new US administration.


In the face of these challenges, progress in deepening European integration has stalled, as tacitly acknowledged at last week"s summit to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The recent Commission white paper was realistic in sketching out scenarios for the future of the EU, where the prospect of further integration was limited.[1] European leaders have publicly (although not uncontroversially) discussed the potential for a "multi-speed" Europe.


There are those on the UK side who believe a fractured and weakened EU will be forced to accommodate British demands within the Brexit negotiation, particularly on immigration issues. While there is validity in this view, we believe an important distinction needs to be drawn between public concern over immigration from outside the EU (which is rising in many EU countries, in sympathy with concerns in the UK) and heightened concern in the UK over immigration from within the EU.


More generally, the sustainability of the EU in its current form is open to debate over the medium term, since it is widely accepted that institutional and governance reforms are needed to make the Euro area more workable. Electoral risks in France and Italy over the coming year cannot be ignored. But even if a troubled EU may create some tactical advantages for the UK"s Brexit negotiators, they need to be careful what they wish for: an EU in chaos is directly damaging to the UK"s economy and financial system, and is unlikely to constitute a rational and attentive negotiating partner.


Our working assumption is that the EU-27 will continue to operate on broadly the current basis through the two-year Brexit process. We are sceptical that fundamental changes to the EU will take place over that horizon which create greater flexibility to accommodate the UK in a form of associate membership.


In parallel, the political situation within the UK may also be in flux: political uncertainties are not one-sided. PM May"s overall parliamentary majority is small. Internal division within the ruling Conservative party over the character of Brexit and the compromises with the EU-27 that are possible persists. Calls for a general election to bolster Ms. May"s political position are returning. The weakness of the Labour opposition has re-opened questions about a realignment of political parties.


Moreover, the territorial integrity of the UK is again being questioned. Less than three years after the Scottish referendum, Scotland"s Parliament has again called for a vote on independence on the grounds that the nature of the UK union will fundamentally change upon Brexit. Albeit for longstanding historical reasons more than over Brexit, Northern Irish politics is in turmoil. Commitments to maintain a "soft" border between the north and south of Ireland after Brexit raise questions about whether a similar soft border could be established between Scotland and England, allowing the former to remain within the single market as its government has proposed.


Brexit negotiations will take place in a context of political and institutional uncertainty.


* * *


What to watch #2. Transitional arrangements between Brexit in March 2019 and agreement on a new UK/EU relationship are key. Flexibility on the UK side towards accepting ECJ jurisdiction during this interregnum despite the political climb-down from established "red lines" this would involve would be a signal that a constructive outcome can emerge.


As Brexit becomes more immediate, parts of the UK government have started to show greater flexibility, at least with regard to the transitional arrangements. In part, this reflects practicalities. While accumulated European regulation and directives (the acquis in Eurospeak) can be transposed directly into UK law via the envisaged Great Repeal Bill, the regulatory authorities to implement those rules in the UK simply do not exist at present. Even if the expertise required is available domestically, creating, staffing and funding those institutions takes time.


Relying on the existing European institutions beyond March 2019 may therefore simply be a matter of necessity in some cases. Recognition of such necessity may open up scope for a constructive compromise for the transitional period despite the political obstacles, and thus for less adversarial negotiations about the final arrangements. But should a hard line be imposed by the Eurosceptic hard Brexiteers, this would damage prospects for successful conclusion of a mutually beneficial final deal.
Agreeing a new trade relationship


The UK government"s negotiating position establishes that it does not seek to participate in the EU"s single market or customs union. As regards trading relationships, the "deep and special partnership" sought by the UK with the EU after Brexit (to quote from yesterday"s letter triggering Article 50) is therefore likely to take the form of an Free Trade Agreement (FTA).[4] But — notwithstanding its name — an FTA represents a significant degradation in the nature of that trading relationship relative to the status quo.


An FTA is likely to neglect trade in services and focus on trade in goods. Unless agreements on services — which typically involve much deeper (and more politically sensitive) treatment of regulation and labour mobility — can be established in parallel, this implies a significant deterioration in the UK"s access to EU markets in the services sector within which it has specialised.


By their nature FTAs require local content rules. Otherwise third countries could circumvent trade restrictions of some members of the FTA by exporting to the member with easiest access. (The distinction between an FTA and a customs union is that the former allows participants to run their own commercial policy with the rest of the world, whereas the latter requires adherence to a single common commercial policy.) But policing local content requirements is potentially bureaucratic and invasive.


One way of overcoming the shortcomings of an FTA would be to create sector-specific carve-outs, whereby certain industries or activities are treated on a different basis from the normal rule. Such an approach has been entertained for the UK post-Brexit (e.g., in financial services, where the City of London plays a special role as a financial centre; and/or for the auto sector, where pan-European supply chains are the norm). But defining sectors may prove controversial. As with local content requirements, the bureaucratic process of policing sector-specific deals (and their limits) threatens to be costly in time and efficiency, and thus may mark a significant degradation in trading arrangements to that currently available within the single market.


All in all, the more ambitious the scope and depth of any FTA, the more that it will rely on goodwill and trust among the contracting parties. This is one of the mechanisms whereby the process will determine the outcome of the Brexit negotiation. If trust is lost early in the discussions (e.g., over the financial cost of exit), the more difficult it will be to find a constructive way to address the practical difficulties of policing local content requirements and industry or sector borders, which are likely to be crucial elements of any future trade agreement.
Settling outstanding bills


* * *


What to watch #3. Understandably, the EU-27 will expect the UK to cover the costs of any reliance on EU institutions or programmes after Brexit. Flexibility on the EU-27 side regarding the timing (and thus immediate magnitude) of payments to settle the UK"s legacy liabilities — thereby avoiding these becoming a domestic political obstacle to constructive negotiations in the UK — would represent a positive signal for a mutually beneficial final outcome.


The long march to Brexit


Brexit negotiations are complex. Little concrete can or will be finally agreed until the end of the Brexit process. This leaves business decisions in limbo.


We identify three indicators of progress in the negotiations: (1) willingness to conduct exit negotiations in parallel with discussion about the new UK/EU relationship; (2) EU-27 flexibility over the timing of UK payments to meet legacy financial obligations; and (3) UK government flexibility over the jurisdiction of European courts and institutions during any transitional phase after Brexit. We believe these indicators will signal whether a constructive or adversarial approach is being adopted by the negotiating parties.


The immediate reaction to PM May"s Article 50 letter has not been constructive. British Eurosceptics have been understandably rigid on the government"s red lines, while Germany"s Chancellor Merkel has emphasised the EU-27"s insistence on sequencing exit negotiations ahead of talks on a new EU/UK relationship. But much of this reflects attempts to harden opening bargaining positions.


If such rigidity were to be maintained into the fall of this year, we would become more concerned that an adversarial negotiation could lead to "cliff edge" outcome on Brexit, with the likely economic disruptions that would cause. But our base case remains that an agreement can be found for tariff-free trade in goods between the EU and UK, an outcome that would require some flexibility on both sides. Nonetheless, this outcome falls well short of the status quo.