How Russia Expedited Syria"s Victory

Via Oriental Review,

On Monday, Vladimir Putin unexpectedly interrupted his journey to Egypt, stopping off at Russia’s Hmeymim airbase in Syria and announcing the windup of Russia’s most successful military campaign abroad.

Thousands of combat sorties have been flown, tens of thousands of terrorists and their infrastructure have been destroyed, and hundreds of Syrian cities and towns have been liberated. We have previously published accounts of how Russian pilots, special ops, marines, doctors, and diplomats spent two years helping the lawful president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, hold his country together and rid it of terrorists.

Russia enters the conflict

By the fall of 2015, the war in Syria had already dragged on for four long years. The mass anti-government demonstrations that began in March 2011 had quickly escalated into skirmishes with the military. And terrorist factions immediately “hijacked” these popular protests. Soon, the leading role in the battle against the ruling regime was being played by extremists from the Islamic State, Jabhat Al Nusra, Al-Qaeda, and many factions within what has been called the “moderate opposition” – mainly in the Free Syrian Army that has been so championed by the West.

From the very beginning, Russia provided diplomatic support to Syria. Back in the spring of 2011, Vitaly Churkin, the late Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, vetoed the draft Security Council resolutions being proposed by some Western and Arab countries that were anti-Syrian in nature.

In addition, Russia backed the government of Bashar al-Assad by supplying arms, military equipment, and ammunition, in addition to training officers and providing military advisers.

But as the terrorist organizations and forces of the “moderate opposition” continued to make territorial gains, it became clear that this support was not enough. The Syrian Arab Army was running out of steam. Huge losses, shortages of the most essential materials, plus low morale forced those soldiers loyal to Assad to cede more and more territory, retreating as far as the coastal province of Latakia and the city of Damascus. By September 2015, it looked like Syria’s leader had only a few weeks left in power.

Areas of control in Syria in September 2015

So that month, at the request of President Bashar al-Assad, Russia’s Federation Council approved Vladimir Putin’s decision to move Russian troops into Syria. On Sept. 30, a Russian military operation began in that country.

The composition of the Russian air fleet

The composition of the air fleet often changed in accordance with the tasks assigned to it. Based on the data at hand, at various times it included:

• Up to ten multi-role Su-35S fighter jets


• Up to four Su-27SMs


• From 12-16 two-seater Su-30SM fighter jets


• Up to 12 Su-34 fighter-bombers


• Up to 30 Su-24M front-line bombers


• Up to 12 Su-25SM close-support aircraft


• Up to 15 multipurpose Mi-8 helicopters in various modifications


• Up to 15 Mi-24 and Mi-35 attack helicopters


• Up to five Ka-52 attack helicopters

Strikes were even launched against the terrorists’ base camps from inside the Russian Federation.

• Six supersonic Tu-160 missile carriers


• Five Tu-95MS strategic bombers


• From 12-14 Tu-22M3 long-range bombers-missile carriers

The A-50 early warning and control aircraft, the Tu-214R, and the Il-20M1 radio reconnaissance plane coordinated air operations, carried out reconnaissance missions, and pinpointed targets for the strike formations.

Russian forces in Syria

Air and naval activities

Russian aviation really ran the show in Syria. Militant training camps, command posts, weapons and ammunition depots, oil fields, and convoys of gasoline tankers found themselves decimated by massive attacks launched from the Hmeymim airbase, the staging bases for air strikes, and the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier. Bombers, close-support aircraft, and fighter planes, taking advantage of their total mastery of the air, managed to destroy more than 100,000 different terrorist facilities. The first wave of the massive air strikes against IS came at the end of 2015. That was when Russian planes pulverized a buried IS command post, underground bunkers, and warehouses in the province of Hama.

During their high-profile mission to “seek and destroy” gasoline tankers, Su-34 fighter-bombers managed to sniff out approximately 500 tanker trucks carrying petroleum products, plus dozens of oil refineries, grinding them into the sand. That was a punch to the gut of the IS war chest, as its main source of income was the illegal sale of black gold.

In late 2015, the Syrian desert was rattled by the most powerful blow yet – strategic Tu-160 bombers, Tu-95MSs, and long-range Tu-22M3s dropped more than three dozen missiles and a multitude of bombs, destroying the command posts of IS detachments in the Idlib and Aleppo provinces, as well as training camps for suicide bombers. In the summer of 2016, long-range Tu-22M3 bombers took off from Hamadan Airbase in Iran and blew out their bomb bays over militant targets in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Idlib. Regular air sorties supported the Syrian operation from beginning to end.

In addition to aircraft, Russia also put its combat ships, submarines, and coastal missile systems to effective use in Syria. Some types of weapons got their first test under battle conditions. In November 2016, to be exact, the Russian military employed its Bastion coastal-defense missile systems to spectacularly obliterate a large warehouse belonging to the militants with the help of its Onyx anti-ship missiles.

In October 2015, the Russian Navy was responsible for a widely reported cruise-missile attack from the Caspian Sea that annihilated militant positions with an unprecedented show of strength. The Dagestan, a missile-armed frigate, and the Grad Sviyazhsk and Veliky Ustyug small missile patrol ships released an enormous swarm of Kalibr cruise missiles that flew over several countries to blow up more than a dozen targets in militant-controlled territory. In June 2017, the Russian Navy’s Admiral Essen and Admiral Grigorovich frigates, as well as its Krasnodar submarine, used Kalibr cruise missiles to inflict a powerful blow from the Mediterranean Sea against terrorist command posts and ammunition depots in Hama province.

The capture of Aleppo marked the final turning point for the government forces in Syria, after which it was possible to withdraw about half of the air formations from the Hmeymim airbase in May 2017 and send them home.

The makings of victory

Russian aircraft were able to administer continuous, nonstop strikes against targets belonging to terrorist groups in Syria. From the onset of the military operation until September 2017, over 30,000 sorties were flown and about 92,000 attacks on terrorists were carried out.

Russian planes bashed terrorists with the active support of the most elite force in the Russian military, the soldiers from the Special Operations Forces, who conducted reconnaissance missions, corrected the moves of aircraft and artillery, trained Syrian soldiers and officers, conducted raids deep into enemy territory, set up countless ambushes along the routes of terrorist convoys, and neutralized the leaders of outlaw gangs. The ships and airplanes of the Syrian Express had an important role to play, supplying weapons, armored vehicles, and ammunition to the embattled country. Russian doctors were responsible for true acts of heroism, treating the civilians and servicemen who had suffered injuries in the war.

And a huge role in the resolution of the Syrian crisis was played by the Russian diplomats who set in motion the negotiations in Astana. Those made it possible to establish the de-escalation zones in Syria that are still operating effectively today.

Syrian peace talks in Astana

But of course it was the Syrian people who won the real victory – the Russian military just helped to remind them that the enemy can be defeated even if it enjoys the unconditional support of the West.

What comes next

It was revealed in late November that the Russian forces currently stationed at the Hmeymim airbase near Latakia and the naval base in Tartus would remain there. Their presence will clear the path for Russia to fend off any threat in the Eastern Mediterranean and to thus ensure the strategic parity that guarantees long-term peace in this volatile region. While the Syrian peace process is under its way the situation in the country and around is very fragile. The key game players and war profiteers are still on the ground and they are not to leave the Syrian territory. So the primary goal is to prevent anybody from the “defeated party” to undermine the talks and to secure desperately needed reconstruction programs, renovation and stabilization of normal social, economic and political life in Syria.

Saudi Arabia Might Recognize Israel Because Of NEOM

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Oriental Review,

The half-a-trillion-dollar initiative to build a tristate city at the Saudi, Egyptian, and Jordanian border in the Gulf of Aqaba will more than likely lead to Riyadh recognizing Israel and integrating Tel Aviv into the project.

The ambitious Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman unveiled a $500 billion project at an investment forum earlier this week in an effort to bring some serious substance to his Vision 2030 project of fundamentally diversifying his country’s oil-dependent economy in the coming decade. The proposal calls for a gigantic city called NEOM to be built at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba in the northeastern corner of the Red Sea, with the plan being for it to eventually extend into neighboring Egypt and Jordan as well. The Crown Prince promised that it would be a technologically advanced city with its own laws and administration, and it will also be free from anything “traditional”.

The latter remark hints that Mohammed Bin Salman won’t allow the Kingdom’s traditional Wahhabi socio-cultural “regulations” to be enforced there, which goes along with his other headline-grabbing statement during the event when he said that Saudi Arabia will “return…to moderate Islam” and “swiftly deal a blow to extremist ideologies”. Quite clearly, as analyzed in the author’s earlier piece this month about Saudi Arabia’s shifting grand strategy, a “deep state” conflict is indeed being fought in the country between its monarchic and clerical factions, with the former poised to carry out a “soft coup” against the latter as it seeks to “modernize” the country. This will surely result in some behind-the-scenes tumult in the coming future, if not overt destabilization, but the point of the present article isn’t to dwell too much on that tangent.

Instead, it’s relevant to have brought that up in order to make the case that Saudi Arabia is on the cusp of an unprecedented paradigm change that will likely see it recognizing Israel if the monarchy is successful in snuffing out the clerics’ political influence. Saudi Arabia’s Egyptian and Jordanian NEOM partners have already recognized and signed peace treaties with Israel, and Riyadh is known to be coordinating with Tel Aviv in crafting a comprehensive anti-Iranian regional policy, amongst other strategic commonalities that they share. Moreover, the secret meetings between Saudi Arabia and Israel over the years suggest that their relationship is much warmer in private than either side publicly presents it as for their own respective domestic political reasons.

Israel has always wanted relations with Saudi Arabia, though Riyadh has traditionally shirked away from this because it wanted to present itself as a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause, made all the more symbolic by the Saudi monarchy’s custodianship over the Two Holy Mosques given the religious dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, if Mohammed Bin Salman comes out on top in his “deep state” “soft coup” against the Wahhabi clerics, then he can easily lay the “blame” on them for his country’s refusal to recognize Israel after all of these decades. Not only could he be interested in doing this as the ultimate expression of his country’s radically transformed identity under his stewardship, but he might be just as importantly driven by the geostrategic imperatives related to Vision 2030’s flagship NEOM project.

The Gulf of Aqaba was chosen not just because it would allow NEOM to spread into Egypt and Jordan, but also because of its proximity to Israel, which is promoting its “Red-Med” railway proposal as the perfect Mideast complementary component of the New Silk Road. Tel Aviv keenly knows that the Chinese are always looking for backup plans and transport route diversification in order to not be too dependent on any single connectivity corridor, and in this case, overland rail transit from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Eastern Mediterranean via Israel comes off as exceedingly attractive to Beijing’s strategists. Furthermore, China has fantastic relations with both Saudi Arabia and Israel, so from Beijing’s perspective, this is the perfect Mideast “win-win”, especially if the People’s Republic can find a way to insinuate that its possible financing of both the NEOM and “Red-Med” projects contributed to bringing peace to the Mideast.

In addition, there’s also the Russian factor to take into consideration, and it’s objectively known – though commonly denied in the Alt-Media Community – that Moscow and Tel Aviv are on excellent terms with one another and basically cooperate as allies in Syria. When accounting for the fast-moving Russian-Saudi rapprochement and Moscow’s envisioned 21^st-century grand strategic role in becoming the supreme balancing force in Eurasia, it’s likely that Russia would be in favor of any Saudi recognition of Israel and Tel Aviv’s integration into the NEOM project because it would then allow the Russian business elite both in the Russian Federation and Israel to invest in this exciting city-state and the complementary “Red-Med” Silk Road corridor.

Seeing as how Mohammed Bin Salman is trying to purge the clerics’ political influence from the Kingdom, it’s very possible that Saudi Arabia will end up recognizing Israel in the near future and blaming its decades-long delay in doing so on the Wahhabis. The grand intent behind this isn’t just to formalize the Saudi-Israeli anti-Iranian partnership or to show the world just how serious the Crown Prince is in changing the course of his country, but to please Riyadh’s newfound Multipolar Great Power partners in Moscow and Beijing, both of which enjoy exceptional relations with Tel Aviv but would probably be reluctant to invest in the Kingdom’s NEOM city-state project so long as its connectivity access remained dependent on the Suez Canal chokepoint.

Russia and China would feel more strategically secure if Israel was incorporated into this megaproject so that its territory could be used for overland transshipment between the Red and Mediterranean Seas via the “Red-Med” railway proposal, which would then make NEOM infinitely more attractive from a logistics perspective for all sorts of investors.

If Saudi Arabia doesn’t recognize Israel, then this non-Suez workaround is impossible and the NEOM city-state loses its grand strategic significance in the context of the Multipolar World Order, which could consequently lead to a lack of investment and therefore the potential failure of Vision 2030’s flagship project. As such, due to the economic-strategic imperatives associated with NEOM, as well as the geopolitical paradigm shift staking place in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh will probably recognize Israel in the coming future in order to guarantee that its city-state initiative succeeds and ultimately transitions the Kingdom away from its oil-exporting dependency.

Italian Migration Crisis: The Big Picture

Via GEFIRA,

Gianandrea Galiani interviewed by Daniel Moscardi

Gianandrea Gaiani is the director of the highly respected online magazine analisidifesa.it and an expert on immigration. He is a regular contributor to a number of Italian newspapers and appears frequently on numerous TV channels as an on immigration and security topics. He’s also the author (together with Giancarlo Blangiardo and Giuseppe Valditara) of the recent book (in Italian) Immigrazione, tutto quello che dovremmo sapere (Immigration. All you need to know about”).

Gefira asked Gianandrea Gaiani in an exclusive interview about his views on the latest developments in the arrivals from Libya and Tunisia and the current approach of the Italian government. Outspoken and anything but politically correct, Gaiani hits the spot about the recent change of policy of the Italian government on the NGO’s code of conduct as well as Italy’s achievements and (so called) “partners” in Libya.

GE: What caused last summer’s change of course by the Italian government and its approach toward the NGOs and the arrivals from Libya in general?

GG: The answer is quite simple. The disaster for the PD (Partito Democratico), leader of the current government, at the June administrative elections, sounded an alarm, showing clearly that when it comes to immigration, many center-left voters steer clearly to the right. A swift change of course was badly needed, with the obvious intent of reassuring disenchanted and alarmed Italians that the government was in charge of the situation.

GE: The numbers show that the arrivals have diminished significantly but that’s just that. We are still very far from the pre-2011 numbers.

GG: That’s because the government, on the other side, has to keep being complacent to the industry of immigration. It’s a network that profits – and thrives – on new arrivals, and this network galaxy is NOT happy if the arrivals complete stop. And their votes are also badly needed by the current government.

GE: A network made of? 

GG: NGOs, Pro-migrants cooperatives, all the businesses catering to the migrants and last, but certainly not least, the ubiquitous Caritas and other Catholic Church’s organisations. We are talking about a huge pie made of billions of euro, and everybody wants a piece.

GE: What is the current situation in Libya?

GG: The coastal city of Sabratha was the theater of war between different militias for about two weeks in September. This has been hardly covered by mainstream media but we have reports that the two groups which are now in control of the city have received “counseling” from units of the French Army. The two militias are Ghorfat Amaliyet and the Wadi Brigade, and they are opposing the militia groups that were operating on behalf of Al-Sarraj, who had implemented a cooperation partnership with Italy. Italy was committed to financial help for villages and municipalities of the area under control of Al-Sarraj, but not military aid to armed groups of any kind.

Reportedly, upon seizing full control of the city, the militias discovered approximately 7.000 migrants packed in various buildings throughout the city. It is unclear whether the militias now in control will let them leave Libya towards Italy or they will relocate them somewhere else. The problem is, in my opinion, when you have the French and the British in the middle of operations like these.

GE: What do you mean by that?

GG: What I mean is that the French and the British are officially our “partners” but in reality they are acting very much against Italy’s interests in Libya. In fact, let me say, quite openly, that France and the UK are currently our worst enemies in Libya.

GE: Why?

GG: They simply will continue to operate, covertly or not so covertly, in order to make sure that Italy doesn’t have a leading role in Libya. It’s as simple as that. After all, the UK, France and the US knew all too well that the removal of Qaddafi in 2011 was a direct blow to Italy’s numerous interests in Libya, given the strengthened that the Italian government had under Berlusconi.

GE: How coincidental, shall we add, the recent malicious articles by Le Monde and the Financial Times, showing all this “humanitarian concern” about the migrants’ conditions in Libya who are now “held at bay” by (supposedly) Italian-paid militias…

GG: Let’s be pragmatic. In a situation like Libya right now you either send troops, which I see it quite unlikely, or you simply negotiate with those in control, regardless of who they are. If those in control are not exactly paladins of human rights, so be it. That is what any sovereign country concerned about its borders should do. As soon as Italy tries to regain (some) control of the situation, critics full of over zealous – and quite hypocritical – concern about the migrants “shameful conditions” in Libya appear overnight, ready to point their fingers at Italy as the culprit.

GE: Can you tell us more about the recent agreement signed between Italy and Niger?

GG: Niger – one of the poorest countries in the world – has asked Italy for logistic help in order to be more effective in patrolling its borders and eventually reduce the flow of sub-Saharans toward Libya. It is certainly a positive move but one that will hardly make a substantial difference overall.

GE: Why?

GG: Because the only effective move in order to really make a difference in order to significantly reduce the arrivals is to bring them back to the starting point. If they have to pay even more money to get back at sea towards Italy, with the risk of being deported again, they will start thinking: “is this worth it”?

GE: How do you do that?

GG: Given the absolute fact that practically 100% of those landing in Italy are illegal aliens as they are NOT running away from wars and political persecutions, the Geneva convention clearly states that NO country has the duty nor the obligation to welcome and give assistance to immigrants who pay criminal organizations to cross several borders. Now, it is a duty and an obligation to rescue human beings in a situation of distress at sea. That’s maritime law and the Italian Navy alone is perfectly capable of fulfilling that task without any phony “humanitarian” help from these NGOs that are there to fulfil “somebody else’s” agenda, certainly not on behalf of the Italian people.

But, once rescued at sea, these people must be brought back to the departing country. Now, this can be implemented as easily and as safely as possible. If the conditions of the “migrants” in that country of departure are not optimal for human rights or for their comforts, in that case we have an effective tool to curb this trend. People will start going home, especially given the fact that most of them are anything but poor – for African standards – and that no one is threatening their lives at home.

GE: The final question is – given the ongoing debate in Italy – about the Ius Soli law, that is the law that would grant immediate citizenship to many new immigrants.

GG: That is going to be the final blow to our society as we know it today. Those who are in favour of this law are quite careful in not mentioning the alarming situation in western EU countries. They don’t tell the general public that from France to Sweden, not to mention other countries, there are areas, so called no-go zones, that are practically off-limits to local law enforcement agencies, as the local Muslim communities have declared those areas under their control. We still don’t have that in Italy. Everybody knows by now that the left in Italy is pushing hard for this law because they think that, once naturalized, an immigrant will vote for those parties that granted him or her the citizenship. But with these hopes they are naive, or stupid at the same time.

GE: Why do you say that?

GG: Because as soon as they are citizens they will form an Islamic party, with all the related consequences. Now a foreign national suspected of ties or sympathies to terror groups can be deported from Italy, even if he or she are here legally. When they become Italian citizens where will they be deported to? The core of the problem lies in the massive brainwashing we have been subject to in western Europe about “multicultural societies”. Muslims are not interested the least in “multiculturalism”. They want their model, their values, in short their society to prevail and impose itself on the others. When the average Italian realizes this, it will be too late.

GE: Any message of hope at the end of this interview?

GG: I entertain hopes from Mitteleuropa’s countries like Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia and now Austria. They are defending their societies, their citizens, their values from this induced brainwashing that has already overwhelmed us in Western Europe. In fact, at present they are the last defence of our civilisation. I just hope they – in fact all the Visegrad group countries – will resist the incredible pressure from external forces.

It's Time To Take Out "Freedom Insurance"

Authored by Nick Giambruno via InternationalMan.com,

Only a fool tries to survive by acting like a vegetable, staying rooted in one place, when the political and economic climate changes for the worse.

—Doug Casey

Unless you’ve been living under a rock, you know that America is in turmoil. That was on full display recently in Charlottesville, Virginia.

But it’s not just Charlottesville. There have been deadly clashes in Ferguson, Charleston, Dallas, St. Paul, Baltimore, Baton Rouge, and Alexandria.

America is headed for a new kind of civil war.

And when it erupts, you and your family will want “freedom insurance” - the ability to get out fast and set up comfortably in a more stable country.

I recently spoke with my friend and colleague Chris Lowe about this, and I knew I had to pass along our discussion to International Man readers. Chris is the editor of Bonner & Partners’ Inner Circle. His publication shares insights from Bill Bonner’s personal global network of analysts and investment experts.

*  *  *

Chris Lowe: You’ve been urging folks to diversify internationally. Why is that message so important now?

Nick Giambruno: The US is becoming more and more fragmented, as I’m sure our readers have noticed. I’ve never seen it more polarized.

In fact, I’ve only seen this degree of polarization in countries that have gone through civil wars. It all feels eerily familiar.

I was born in the US, and grew up there. But I used to live in Lebanon, which went through a nasty 15-year civil war. More than 120,000 died. Thousands more lost their homes.

And I currently live in Colombia part of the year. The country has a 50-year history of civil conflict.

Chris Lowe: What’s to blame for this situation?

Nick Giambruno: Identity politics are a big factor.

That’s when your religion, race, ethnic background, and so forth are the most important thing in politics. You’re no longer an individual American. You’re part of some group, undoubtedly being victimized by another group.

This naturally leads to collectivism, tensions… and eventually violence between the groups.

Identity politics were a big factor in Lebanon’s civil war. And they’re a big factor in the US right now. This poisonous trend is growing, and it’s probably unstoppable.

The media is another big factor. Most Americans live in a partisan information bubble with these 24-hour news networks and partisan websites. That accelerates the divide.

I lived in Beirut, Lebanon’s capital city, for about three years. It reminds me of the media there. About 6 million people live in Lebanon, but it has about a dozen 24-hour news channels. Each one caters to a different political/sectarian/ethnic group. This allows each group to live in its own media bubble.

Lebanon’s bloody civil war happened in the 1970s and 1980s. But it’s still an extremely divided country. It wouldn’t take much for its civil war to start up again.

The media in Lebanon helps incubate tensions there. Today, the same thing is happening in the US.

I don’t mean to sound dramatic, but Americans hate each other right now. And it’s getting worse. We’re just a market crash… a recession… or some other extreme event away from more widespread violence. A new form of civil war is even possible.

Chris Lowe: We’re not talking a return to 1861—to pitched battles between armies and hundreds of thousands dead. But if you define “civil war” as a situation where you have widespread violence, a rejection of political authority, and the National Guard on the street, it’s easy to see how America gets there.

Nick Giambruno: I agree. I can’t say exactly what it is. But something does seem to be brewing. And it’s not good. That’s why Doug Casey and I urge our readers to internationalize their lifestyles.

Call it what you want, but American society is cracking. Like you say, it’s not necessarily just the political system, but society itself. And that’s probably more worrisome.

Doug and I have talked about this a lot lately. Doug is older than I am. He’s in his 70s. And he says he hasn’t seen anything like this in his lifetime.

This is why I urge readers to diversify outside of the US. The fracturing of society will create a lot of political risk. And that’s on top of the risks from money printing, higher taxes, and increasing regulations.

Chris Lowe: What do you say to folks who see the idea of an America at war with itself as farfetched?

Nick Giambruno: We’ve seen this movie before. As Doug has been warning his readers for years, it happened in Bosnia in the 1990s. It happened in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It happened in Rhodesia—now Zimbabwe—in the 1970s. It happened in the Belgian Congo in the 1960s… in Cuba in the 1950s… in China in the 1940s… in Germany in the 1930s… and in Russia in the 1920s.

It also happened recently in Ukraine, where Doug and I visited last year. There, it started with the downfall of a Russian-backed thug who was replaced by a US-backed thug. The country lost itself in identity politics—people who identified with Russia versus those who didn’t.

From there, it descended into armed conflict. So far, more than 10,000 are dead and many thousands more are wounded.

As Doug puts it, if you stay put in one place… and you don’t have options when one of these extreme events happens… you’re going to wind up a victim.

No matter where you live, international diversification can greatly reduce the threat your home government poses to your personal and financial wellbeing.

Chris Lowe: How does it work?

Nick Giambruno: You know the benefits of diversifying your investment portfolio. If you put all of your asset “eggs” in one basket, you could lose your entire portfolio if that basket breaks.

The same idea applies to political risk. If your home country fractures—and suffers the kind of civil unrest and violence we’ve been talking about—you could lose everything.

Most people have medical, life, fire, and car insurance policies. You hope you never have to use these policies. But you have them anyway. They give you peace of mind and protection if the worst comes to pass.

International diversification is the ultimate insurance policy. Think of it as “freedom insurance.” It frees you from dependence on any one country. Achieve that freedom, and it becomes extremely difficult for any one group of bureaucrats to control you. The results can be life changing.

Everyone in the world should aim for political diversification. But it’s especially critical for those who live under a government that’s sinking hopelessly deeper into financial trouble. That means most Western governments… and the US in particular, given what’s going on right now.

*  *  *

We recently released a memo that reveals the underlying source of all this political polarization and social unrest in America… and a troubling truth about America that no one else will tell you. Click here to read it now.

"What Did They Expect?" Turkey Pivots From NATO, Signs Russia Missile Deal

Confirming, and sending the clearest sign of his previously discussed pivot toward Russia and away from NATO and the West, on Tuesday President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey had signed a deal to purchase a Russian surface-to-air missile system, and paid the first installment. The deal cements Turkey"s recent rapprochement with Russia, despite differences over the war in Syria, the downing of a Russian fighter jet over Turkey in late 2015 and the assassination of a Russian ambassador earlier this year, and comes as Turkey’s ties with the United States and European Union have become strained to the point of breaking.

Although the missile purchase from Russia was made public several months ago, Erdogan’s announcement was the first confirmation that Turkey had transferred money to pay for the S-400 missile system.

“Signatures have been made for the purchase of S-400s from Russia,” Erdogan said in comments published in several newspapers on Tuesday. “A deposit has also been paid as far as I know.”

As the NYT writes, "the purchase of the missile system flies in the face of cooperation within the NATO alliance, which Turkey has belonged to since the early 1950s. NATO does not ban purchases of military hardware from manufacturers outside the American-led alliance, but it does discourage members from buying equipment not compatible with that used by other members."

According to reports in the Russian media, Turkey is to get four batteries of S-400 launchers complete with targeting radar and control posts. Some aspects of the deal are reportedly to be finalized, but Russian officials said the contract furthers Russia’s geostrategic interests.

* * *

Predictably, the Pentagon promptly reiterated its concerns over the deal, which it said undermines inter-operability of weapons systems among NATO allies. “We have relayed our concerns to Turkish officials regarding the potential purchase of the S-400. A NATO inter-operable missile defense system remains the best option to defend Turkey from the full range of threats in its region," spokesman Johnny Michael said in a statement.

A NATO official in Brussels where the alliance is headquartered, said that no NATO member currently operates the Russian missile system and that the alliance had not been informed about the details of the purchase by Turkey. “What matters for NATO is that the equipment allies acquire is able to operate together,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity as required by alliance procedures. “Interoperability of allied armed forces is essential to NATO for the conduct of our operations.”

However, on Wednesday Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan slammed the critics of Turkey’s deal with Russia, saying Ankara had no intention of waiting for the protection of its NATO allies.

“They have gone crazy because we made a deal for S-400s,” Erdogan said Wednesday in a speech to the ruling AKP mayors in Ankara, as cited by Hurriyet.

“What do you expect? Should we wait for you? We take care of ourselves in every security point. We are taking precautions and we will continue to do so,” the Turkish leader said.

Erdogan criticized the reluctance of US and Israel to authorize supply of combat drones to Turkey as another example of how Turkish security was sidelined by its allies.

“When they did give [drones], their repair and maintenance put us in a difficult position. Now [Turkey] has come to a point where it can produce its own unmanned, armed air vehicles. And now they are uncomfortable with that,” Erdogan added.

Erdogan also dismissed issues of interoperability, brand loyalties or the geopolitical optics of such a sale. “Nobody has the right to discuss the Turkish republic’s independence principles or independent decisions about its defense industry,” the daily newspaper Hurriyet reported him as saying.

“We make the decisions about our own independence ourselves,” he said. “We are obliged to take safety and security measures in order to defend our country.”

As the NYT adds, Erdogan’s announcement — made to Turkish journalists aboard his presidential jet as he returned from Kazakhstan — appeared timed as a response to two judicial cases announced last week in the United States. One is against his presidential bodyguards, who are charged with assaulting protesters when Mr. Erdogan visited Washington this year. The other is against a group of Turks, including a former minister, accused of breaking United States sanctions against Iran. Erdogan has angrily criticized both cases.

* * *

The S-400 SAM is designed to detect, track and then destroy aircraft, drones or missiles. It’s Russia’s most advanced integrated air defense system, and can hit targets as far as 250 miles away. Russia has also agreed to sell them to China and India, both nations who are masters at reverse engineering.  Most concerning for NATO, however is that the systems delivered to Turkey would not have a friend-or-foe identification system, which means they could be deployed against any threat without restriction.

Turkey has been weighing options for acquiring long-range SAMs for years. In 2013, Ankara surprised other NATO members by announcing that it was going to purchase the FD-2000 system from China, sparking criticism from Washington. Defense observers speculated that Turkey played the China card to put pressure on its allies and get better terms for buying a NATO-compatible SAM system, such as the US-made Patriot PAC-3. The Chinese deal stalled and was eventually scrapped, with Turkey reportedly unhappy over Beijing’s reluctance to hand over the technology behind the advanced system. Last year Ankara announced that it was in talks with Russia over a potential purchase of the S-400.

Turkey has other reasons for the missile purchase. It needs to cultivate good relations with Russia, and it also needs to build its own military defense, said Asli Aydintasbas, a fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Turkey wants the deal,” she said, “and Russia is only too happy to drive a wedge into the NATO alliance.”

While NATO’s collective defense should have been sufficient for Turkey - NATO deployed Patriot missiles there during a rise of tensions with Syria in the past - Erdogan lost trust in the West since last year’s failed "coup attempt", which he slammed repeatedly as a Western plot to oust him, and appears determined to secure his own defense.

Furthermore, the transfer of technology from Russia is attractive to Turkey: Erdogan has spoken also of his frustration at having requests to the United States for drones turned down, and of his satisfaction that Turkey developed its own.

Notably, Erdogan’s announcement of the deal with Russia came after Germany said that it was suspending all major arms exports to Turkey because of the deteriorating human rights situation in the country and the increasingly strained ties. “We have put on hold all big requests that Turkey sent to us, and these are really not a few,” the German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, said during a panel discussion in Berlin on Monday, according to Reuters.

While the purchase of Russian missiles will take cooperation between the two nations to a new level, but is not the first time that Turkey has bought military equipment from Russia. It turned to Moscow in the early 1990s to buy military helicopters and armored personnel carriers. Last year, Russia and Turkey reached an agreement to revive a suspended natural-gas pipeline project.

Meanwhile, as the US military-industrial complex has flourished in recent months following a spike in deals with Saudi Arabia, South Korea and other nations courtesy of rising geopolitical tensions, Russia has remained largely squeezed out of the arms market in Western and Eastern Europe, even in countries that once bought nearly all their weapons from the Soviet Union, has looked for years to NATO’S eastern flank as a promising market and the alliance’s weakest link. It has also sold weapons to Greece, another NATO member and to Cyprus, which is not a member of NATO but houses British military bases and effectively serves as an outpost of the alliance.

Meanwhile, as Turkey"s suspicions toward the West have grown, relations with Russia warmed, driven by the personal relationship between Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. Erdogan has expressed personal admiration for Putin, to the consternation of many European and American leaders, if not President Trump. Erdogan has also shown a preference for the Russian model, with its sense of restoring a lost empire, returning Turkey to a more independent place in the world and rejecting Western democracy.

At the same time, the fact that Turkey belongs to NATO has only increased Mr. Putin’s desire to forge strong relations with Mr. Erdogan despite their differences over the conflict in Syria.

“Mr. Putin and myself are determined on this issue,” Erdogan told journalists about the missile deal.

Gas Games In The Eastern Mediterranean Are Threatening Europe

Authored by Pyotr Iskenerov via The Strategic Culture Foundation,

The European Commission is offering European consumers the so-called Southern Gas Corridor, which provides for the supply, in particular, of Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas along the Turkey–Greece–Italy route. The project’s potential participants have their own interests, however, and are divided by long-standing antagonisms that are turning the corridor into a military and political delayed-action mine.

Turkey, which is traditionally reluctant to play by the European Union’s rules, is playing a particular role here. Ankara’s plans to build an Israel–Turkey pipeline are being superimposed on the desire of the Turkish elite to occupy key positions in the development of offshore natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, primarily around Cyprus. These plans are unleashing a whole host of problems between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, while, at the same time, affecting the interests of Israel, as well as Egypt and Libya, which are claiming their rights to the continental shelf. The world’s leading oil and gas companies are also pursuing their own economic objectives in the region, the most active of which are the French company Total and the Italian company ENI. 

The current focus of contention is the offshore «Block 11», situated in the territorial waters of Cyprus. Turkey, which is also speaking on behalf of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has already sent a frigate, TCG Gökçeada, to the region. The frigate’s commander has been ordered to use whatever measures necessary to counteract ‘undesirable’ activity around the continental shelf. But any actions by Nicosia and Athens in support could be deemed ‘undesirable’, since Turkey’s official position is that all the gas resources on Cyprus’ continental shelf belong not only to the Greek Cypriots, but also to the Turkish Cypriots. And by the latter is meant the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 

Speaking in July at the World Petroleum Congress in Istanbul, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an stated:

«What we expect from anyone who takes sides in the developments in Cyprus is that they should refrain from steps that might pave the way for new tensions in the region. I would like to remind them that they could face the risk of losing a friend like Turkey, not just in the region, but anywhere and in any field».

Ankara has already sent its own flotilla to the potentially oil-rich regions of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, including the drilling vessel Barbaros Hayrettin Pa and several navy vessels. 

Athens has not stood idly by either, officially declaring that Greece will respond to Turkey’s «countermeasures against the development of Cyprus’ ‘Block 11’» and that the country is «ready to defend its sovereign rights». In this regard, it is worth remembering that in 1993, Greece and Cyprus adopted the Defence Doctrine of the Single Area, which aims to jointly react to an aggression by another country.

Israel, Libya and even Egypt are showing an increased interest in the deposits – each considers them to be extensions of their own continental shelf. And this interest is being reinforced by concrete military measures. The Israeli Ministry of Defence, for example, has signed a $420-million contract to equip the country’s navy with special systems to defend gas fields and navigable waterways. The deal is intended to supplement an earlier purchase of four Sa’ar 6 warships, which will be used to protect Israel’s economic waters in the Mediterranean Sea. As for Egypt, there is growing opposition to Turkey in connection with Ankara’s support of Qatar, which, in turn, is openly sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt.

Rivalries surrounding the gas fields of the Mediterranean shelf could mean that the possibility of constructing one of the world’s longest gas pipelines between Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Italy (more than 2,000 kilometres) comes to nothing. The estimated cost of the project stands at more than $6 billion, some of which the project’s participants are planning to obtain from the funds of the European Commission as part of the notorious ‘diversification’ of energy supplies. In this project, the bulk of the gas will come from Israel’s Leviathan gas field, the reserves of which amount to around 613 billion cubic metres of gas and 39.4 million barrels of gas condensate. «We are confident that in the future, Europe will buy gas produced in the Eastern Mediterranean», stated Israel’s Minister of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Resources, Yuval Steinitz. «Intensive talks are currently underway on the construction of two pipelines. One of these will stretch to Turkey and then on to Europe. The other pipeline will go through Southern Cyprus and Greece to Italy».

The Balkans could end up the biggest loser in disputes over the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, and calls from Brussels and Washington to diversify energy sources are hardly helping. There will simply end up being nothing with which to diversify Russian gas imports, especially given the current confrontation between the US and the EU on US sanctions against Russian energy projects.

By imposing sanctions against Moscow, America is «restricting economic cooperation with Russia in order to foist US shale gas on Europeans. Resentment is growing at the dishonest way the US looks after its own interests at the expense of others», writes the German newspaper Handelsblatt.

NATO Member Turkey Turns To Russia For Air Defense Cooperation

Authored by Peter Korzun via The Strategic Culture Foundation,

Turkey has agreed to pay $2.5 billion to acquire S-400 – the Russia-made most advanced long-range missile defense system in the world. Russian President Vladimir Putin has already said that Moscow is ready to sell it. According to Russian Presidential Adviser for Military and Technical Cooperation Vladimir Kozhin, Russia’s contract with Turkey has been agreed in general, with financial details still to be ironed out. The system is capable of intercepting all types of modern air weaponry, including fifth-generation warplanes, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles at a maximum range of nearly 250 miles.

According to the preliminary agreement, Ankara is to receive two S-400 missile batteries within the next year, and then produce another two inside Turkey, although the Turkish defense industry has no experience of producing such systems. Not yet.

Unlike NATO’s US-made Patriots temporarily deployed in Turkey some time ago, the Russian S-400 deal has no political strings attached, and could, potentially, boost Turkey’s defense industry bringing Russian-Turkish military cooperation to an unprecedented level. The two nations will work together for many years and the process is likely to encompass other areas of interaction.

Last year, Russia and Turkey signed a declaration on partnership in defense industry. The parties agreed to form a joint military and intelligence mechanism to coordinate their activities in the Middle East. Ankara also seeks procurement deals with Russia in electronic systems, ammunitions and missile technology.

In 2013, Turkey wanted to purchase the HQ-9 long-range air defense system from China but had to scupper the deal in 2015 due to political pressure from NATO allies. Not this time. The pressure is there but Turkey stands tall - it wants the best and the best is S-400. Today, the Turkish government is pursuing a more independent policy while its ties with NATO, the EU and the US are getting increasingly strained.

The deal is a clear shift of Turkey away from NATO and the West. The system won’t be compatible with the rest of the alliance for the purposes of integration. In March, 2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, «Being a NATO member does not mean we are not independent. We can have close ties with Russia while performing our responsibilities toward NATO. We find objections on this matter inappropriate».

Turkey has been angered by what it sees as lukewarm condemnation by its Western allies of the abortive July 2016 putsch against President Tayyip Erdogan. Ankara suspected that the West had a role to play. Russia was the first country to be visited by the Turkish president after the failed coup.

The idea of joining the EU has lost its attraction for Ankara as the union is facing a number of problems, including Brexit, the refugee crisis, the surge of far-right movements and the creation of blocs within the bloc while the concepts of «two-speed Europe» and «multi-speed Europe» are seriously considered as alternatives to the EU we know today.

The territorial dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea and Turkey’s support for Northern Cyprus has traditionally spoiled relations between Turkey and NATO. According to the NATO 2016 annual report, Turkey took part in only four of the 18 key NATO exercises held last year. Despite having the fourth-strongest military in the bloc and the second-highest number of military personnel, Turkey’s involvement in NATO"s deployments amounts to just 4 percent of the personnel in the mission to train the Afghan security forces, and 7 percent of the Kosovo force.

Turkey has recently blocked some rolling programs with NATO, including political events, civilian projects and military training, in an escalation of its diplomatic dispute with a number of European states. The action encompasses many more areas of NATO’s activities as the programs cover most of Europe, plus many countries in the Middle East and Asia. As its relations with the West sour, Turkey is looking for other partners.

Russia and Turkey lead the management crisis process in Syria. With the Islamic State (IS) retreating everywhere, the time draws nearer when Russia and Turkey will face the question about what to do next. It could be the start of forming a broader alliance.

If the coordination of efforts in Syria is successful, the lucrative prospect in bilateral trade, mutual investment, tourism and the Turkish Steam gas project will provide a powerful impetus to the development of relationship.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the first statement about the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as far back as 2013. In 2016, he repeated it again, saying «Some may criticize me but I express my opinion. For example, I have said ‘why shouldn’t Turkey be in the Shanghai 5?» Turkey was granted dialogue partner status in the SCO in 2012. This year, Ankara chairs the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Energy Club. The SCO’s clout is rapidly increasing in the world. The accession would bring economic benefits for Turkey.

Ankara is also showing increasing interest in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). It was invited to join the organization in 2014. Many of the present and potential members of the EAEU are countries with whom Turkey already has close relations in many fields.

Ankara is also getting closer to Beijing. The two countries are closely cooperating to implement China’s the One Belt One Road project. Turkey is again taking the position as a key investment and cooperation partner that will help bridge the East and the West.

Turkey’s gradual shift from the West to Eurasia and other partners is part of a broader process as the West gets weakened, divided and less attractive. The very notion of «Western unity» is fading away. Unsurprisingly, as its relations with the West sour, Turkey is reaching out to other poles of power. The S-400 deal conforms to the trend.

The US Deep State: Sabotaging Putin-Trump Ceasefire Agreement In Syria

Authored by Federico Pieraccini via The Strategic Culture Foundation,

The meeting between Trump and Putin at the G20 in Hamburg injects new hope into the complicated relationship between the United States and Russia. Only time can confirm whether there is any basis for this hope.

The most eagerly anticipated meeting of the year, that between Putin and Trump, lasted far more than the scheduled 20 minutes, extending past two hours. This is not too much of a surprise given the points of friction that needed to be discussed, the many outstanding issues in international relations, and the fact that this was the first official meeting between the two world leaders. The results achieved exceeded initial ambitions, and the personal chemistry between Putin and Trump seems to have been sufficient to reach an important agreement in Syria as well as to conduct discussions surrounding cyber security. Trump even asked Putin about the alleged Russian hacking in the US presidential election as a way of appeasing detractors back home. The statements of both presidents following their meeting underlined their positive intentions. Putin called Trump a very different person from the one portrayed in the media, mentioning that he was reflective and very attentive to details. Trump, for his part, praised the meeting with Putin, stating the importance of dialogue between nuclear-armed superpowers.

The most important agreement concerned a ceasefire in southern Syria along the border with Israel and Jordan. This is a very active area of fighting, and so the ceasefire obviates the possibility of dangerous confrontations between the United States and Russia, as well as between Syria and Israel, which could escalate out of control as seen when the US Air Force shot down a Syrian Su-22 jet as well an Iranian drone. Israel, from its position in the occupied Golan Heights, has repeatedly struck the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), in a desperate effort to halt its gains against al Qaeda and Daesh terrorists.

In their first meeting, within less than two hours, Putin and Trump came to an agreement on potentially the most volatile situation in the region, saving hundreds of civilian lives in the process. The agreement on Syria now has to run the gauntlet of the deep state and all the other interests arrayed against Trump. Just four days following a similar agreement reached in 2016 between Obama and Putin, everything was upended by the US Air Force bombing and killing nearly a hundred soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army in Deir ez-Zor, shredding the ceasefire agreement that had just been reached.

Trump is dealing with the same occult forces that sabotaged Obama’s ceasefire agreement. It is impossible to know how much strategic support the US deep state has for the ceasefire decision. Ever since the SAA reached the Iraqi border north of al-Tanf, the space available for the US and her allies to maneuver has been dramatically diminished. With al-Tanf isolated, Washington"s ceasefire does not change or shift the already heavily altered balance of power in that area of Syria. For all these reasons, the ceasefire does not appear to be a concession by either party but merely a commonsense move to lessen the possibility of a direct confrontation between super-powers.

The military apparatus seems to be focused on the situation in northern Syria, with Raqqa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) being the central pivot for the US to reach Deir ez-Zor and its associated oilfields. The US State Department, as well as the US military wing involved in Syria, hope to balkanize Syria, dismembering it in different regions and putting Raqqa under the control of a puppet authority in Damascus. However, such American hopes of imposing a Brennan-style governorate as in Iraq is forlorn, as Damascus is the only authority recognized on Syrian territory, and once Raqqa is filled with returning Syrian citizens, such American plans will fall apart. Moreover, the Baghdad authorities have already made clear on two occasions how reluctant they are to support Americans in their military operations. In the case of Mosul, they reiterated that the US deployment and involvement be minimal, while the Iraqi authorities have already announced that they want to place under their full control their border with Syria, in effect hobbling Washington’s plan to leave chaos and instability along the borders of the two countries. The US deep state finds in chaos the ideal way to channel conflict and foment instability. One of the most important objectives of the Syrian and Iraqi armies is therefore to isolate the borders and control the flow of human traffic from one country to the other, nixing in the process what has hitherto been a strategic advantage for Daesh and other terrorist organizations, where they have been free to cross borders with weapons and whatever else they please.

Trump and all the actors involved in this negotiation are finally able to make an agreement between Moscow and Washington stand. Unlike with previous agreements, the US in Syria is now in a worse situation than it was 12 months ago, having failed to achieve many of its strategic objectives. Cooperation with Turkey in northern Syria was wrecked following the liberation of Aleppo and the clear US support for the Kurds (SDF). Similarly, areas of deconfliction in Syria agreed to in Astana (between Iran, Russia and Turkey) have stopped the gains of terrorists in many active areas of the conflict, leading to zero chances of occupying more towns. Such efforts have been important bargaining chips during the various peace negotiations.

The crux of this strategy seems to be a focus on the only possible solution that meets the interests of the deep state’s military wing, related to the original plan to dismantle Syria once the removal of Assad failed. From a certain point of view, it may make sense to focus on the situation in the north of the country in Raqqa, the only area where the US still has some influence. This may be the contorted vision drawn up by contending factions of American deep state. Certainly from the point of view of Moscow, the strategy in Syria is a mix of diplomatic solutions, seeking to reach multiple ceasefire agreements with major players like Turkey and the United States, but never setting aside the war effort carried out by Russia, Iran and Syria.

The agreement between Putin and Trump will firstly benefit Syrian civilians as well as widening the opportunity for the SAA to liberate more towns and villages from the grip of terrorism. It is a long-awaited agreement and solution that is now met by the predominant wing of the US deep state. In the event of a failure of the agreement, Trump will be obligated to point out to the world the subversion of the Washington establishment and its deep state, which works to frustrate his agenda and replace it with its own terrible policies.

Moscow"s confidence in deriving concrete benefits from this deal increases hour by hour, thanks to the truce continuing to hold. From the Russian point of view, any military sabotage would once again lay American intentions bare, regardless of Trump"s subsequent moves. However, one thing that is certain is that in the case of sabotage, Trump will be faced with having to make a definitive choice.

• Either he will surrender to the deep state, returning the situation back to a state of hyper-conflict with a nuclear superpower; or


• he will confront and overcome the deep state, thereby enabling him to implement his electoral promises.

Greek Coast Guard Fires At Turkish Freighter, 16 Bullet Holes Reported

A Turkish-flagged ship has comes under fire off the Greek island of Rhodes, according to Turkey"s Deniz news, citing the ship’s captain, Haluk Sami Kalkavan, who told CNN TURK there were at least 16 bullet holes on board, although no injuries have been reported.

Son dakika... Yunan Sahil Güvenli?i"nden Türk gemisine uyar? ate?i

More details from CNN Turk, google translated:

According to the Deniz News Agency, the Greek Coast Guard boats from Iskenderun to the Gulf of Izmit have armed attack on the Turkish flagged M / V ACT named freighter. It was fired by Greek SSI boats on the island of Rhodes on the Turkish flagged dry dock named M / V ACT, which has a capacity of 4300 DWT carrying capacity towards the Izmit Gulf with the load it has loaded from ?skenderun.

M / V ACT named load cargo going to Izmit Gulf after ?skenderun"s iron steel load, Greek Coast Guard boats in international waters on the outskirts of Rhodes are required to dock to Greek Harbor but the captain can not comply with this directive. he gave. While heading to Turkish territorial waters, the Greek Coast Guard M / V ACT carried out a military attack on the named freighter.

"There are 16 holes on board"

Sami Kalkavan, the captain of the island told CNN TURK. Kalkavan said, "Coast guard wanted immediate withdrawal of the ship from Port of Lodos, we did not accept it. They wanted to check, we did not accept it. They told us they would shoot if we did not stop. They did it. Now there are 16 holes in the ship. There"s no danger of water getting in the ship, but we"ve done a great deal of danger. These were all good things about us, "" he said.

Turkey"s NTV adds that the Turkish Foreign Ministry is “in contact with relevant institutions” over the incident.

While it is unclear yet if this is the start of another major diplomatic incident between the volatile neighbors, NTV also adds that there are now 2 Turkish coast guard vessels off Rhodes following the incident.

Everything You're Not Being Told About The US War Against ISIS In Syria

Authored by Darius Shatahmasebi via TheAntiMedia.org,

It’s time to have a sane discussion regarding what is going on in Syria. Things have escalated exponentially over the past month or so, and they continue to escalate. The U.S. just shot down yet another Iranian-made drone within Syrian territory on Tuesday, even as authorities insist they “do not seek conflict with any party in Syria other than ISIS.”

Col. Ryan Dillon, chief U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, seemed to indicate that the coalition would avoid escalating the conflict following Russia’s warning that it will now treat American aircraft as potential targets. He stated:

“As a result of recent encounters involving pro-Syrian regime and Russian forces, we have taken prudent measures to reposition aircraft over Syria so as to continue targeting ISIS forces while ensuring the safety of our aircrews given known threats in the battlespace.”

So what is really going on in Syria? Is the U.S. actually seeking an all-out confrontation with Syria, Iran, and Russia?

The first thing to note is that a policy switch under the Trump administration has seen the U.S. rely heavily on Kurdish fighters on the ground as opposed to the radical Gulf-state backed Islamist rebels, which the U.S. and its allies had been using in their proxy war for over half a decade. Even the Obama administration designated the Kurds the most effective fighting force against ISIS and partnered with them from time to time, but Turkey’s decision to directly strike these fighters complicates the matter to this day.

Further muddling the situation is the fact that the U.S. wants the Kurds to claim key Syrian cities after ISIS is defeated, including Raqqa. However, the reason this complicates matters is that, as Joshua Landis, head of the Middle Eastern Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma explains, the Kurds have “no money” nor do they have an air force.

“[T]hey’ll be entirely dependent on the US Air Force from now to eternity, and the United States will be stuck in a quagmire, defending a new Kurdish state that America had partnered with to defeat [ISIL],” Landis said, as reported by Quartz.

So what has the U.S. proposed as a solution to this perpetual dilemma? To put it simply, the U.S. is not only training the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to retain the vitally strategic border crossing area of al-Tanf, which, if owned and operated by the Syrian government, could link Iran to Syria, Iraq, and right through to Hezbollah in Lebanon (incidentally, al-Tanf is the latest instance of the U.S. shooting down an Iranian-made drone took place). The U.S. is now also backing these Kurdish fighters to retake an area known as Deir ez-Zor.

The Syrian government retains an isolated outpost at Deir ez-Zor, and the region is almost completely encircled by ISIS fighters. Just last week, a video emerged of convoys of ISIS fighters fleeing the war in Raqqa unscathed. Anti-Media speculated that these fighters were most likely headed towards Deir ez-Zor as they have done in the past, and this area is now widely regarded to be the scene of ISIS’ last stand in Syria.

The U.S. needs a strong ISIS presence in Deir ez-Zor to justify an offensive to retake the city, especially considering the fact that Syrian government troops are already present there. This is why the U.S. delivered airstrikes to stop government forces from repelling ISIS fighters in an air raid in September of last year that reportedly lasted well over an hour and killed over 60 government troops.

Deir ez-Zor is immensely important because it is home to Syria’s largest oil fields. As Quartz explains, according to Landis, America’s strategy is “for the Kurdish forces to take Deir al-Zour, the major regional city and the hub for its oil fields. That way, the Kurds would be able to afford to buy airplanes from the US, rather than require Washington to give them for free.”

As Iranian-backed militiamen — supported by Iranian-made drones — amass upon a U.S. training base in al-Tanf, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Syrian government and its allies will not want to cede strategic territory to the U.S. without a fight. At the very least, Iran intends to encircle al-Tanf and cut the U.S. off from the rest of Syria, rendering the base useless for America’s goals in the country.

However, Deir ez-Zor is where things could potentially get more heated than they already are between the U.S. and the pro-Assad alliance in al-Tanf and Raqqa.

Russia, a staunch ally of Iran and Syria, is already bombing the areas around Deir ez-Zor in full preparation for this battle. According to the Independent, Russia just claimed it killed around 180 ISIS militants and two prominent commanders, Abu Omar al-Belijiki and Abu Yassin al-Masri, very close to ISIS’ stronghold in Deir ez-Zor.

Iran launched a mid-range ballistic missile attack on a position in Deir ez-Zor over the weekend, as well. According to Military Times, Iranian officials said the purpose of the strike was to send a message to the United States and Saudi Arabia and have warned of more strikes to come, with former Guard chief Gen. Mohsen Rezai — an Iranian politician — stating “[t]he bigger slap is yet to come.”

Landis believes these recent escalations only mark a “gnashing of teeth and growling” between the Russians and the Americans and that both powers are merely working out where the new boundaries will fall between American-backed forces and Syrian government forces.

But there is a crucial difference between the Russian-led campaigns and the American-led campaigns within Syria: Russia was invited by the Syrian government and is not clearly not attempting to invade Syria in the traditional sense of the word, as they are relying on local troops to retake the territory that still belongs to the Syrian government. In contrast, the United States has invaded Syrian territory without authorization from Congress or the international community and has partnered with incredibly controversial militias on the ground to claim Syrian territory, further partitioning the country and over-complicating an already convoluted battle arena.

And what will happen if Syria decides that the oil-hub area of Deir ez-Zor is too important to allow the U.S.-backed forces to take it away from them? The fact that Russia and Iran are already bombing this area speaks volumes as to its strategic value, and it seems increasingly unlikely that the pro-Assad alliance will give up the location freely.

Further, having complete control of Deir ez-Zor without opening up the al-Tanf border to Syrian government control would make the liberation of Deir ez-Zor almost meaningless to Syria and its allies, as Deir ez-Zor would be cut off from the rest of Syria. The two offensives go hand in hand, and this is exactly why we see the war escalating rapidly on these two fronts.

Not to mention, Syrian Member of Parliament Ammar al-Asad reportedly just told Russian state-owned Sputnik that the Syrian army will respond to America’s provocative actions by conducting “massive strikes” on positions held by American-backed militants.

*  *  *

An optimist would view the recent developments in the humanitarian disaster that is the so-called Syrian revolution with the hope that the U.S., Iran, and Russia are merely muscle-flexing inside Syria in an attempt to control as much of the country as realistically possible following the downfall of ISIS – and will eventually settle amicably on a drawing of Syria’s new boundaries.

A pessimist might not be so hopeful, as Iran and China held naval drills in the Strait of Hormuz just days after Secretary of State Rex Tillerson admitted the U.S. is officially targeting Iran for a regime change operation.

Partitioning Syria: Oil, Gas, And Peace

Authored by James Durso via OilPrice.com,

It’s the 101st anniversary of the Sykes–Picot Agreement and, in light of the non-stop Syrian Civil War, it’s time to ask, “How’s that working out for you?”

The Sykes–Picot Agreement formalized the British and French spheres of influence in the Middle East and set the stage for the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, which ran from 1923 to 1946. In 1936, Ali Sulayman al-Assad, grandfather of Syrian President Bashir Assad, and other Alawite notables petitioned French President Leon Blum, in an attempt to stay under French protection: “The spirit of hatred and intolerance plants its roots in the heart of Muslim Arabs toward everything that is non-Muslim, and is forever fueled by the spirit of the Islamic religion. There is no hope that the situation will change. If the Mandate is canceled, therefore, the minorities in Syria will become exposed to a risk of death and annihilation…”

Al-Assad’s thoughts are timely in light of a proposal by Jamsheed and Carol Choksy of Indiana University for an “impartial partition plan” for Syria. The proposal would complement a cease fire with partition along ethnic lines (with concomitant population transfers) and no role for Russia, Iran, and Turkey who have acted as belligerents. The majority Sunni Arabs would get the provinces in the center and the north, the Kurds would take the northeast, the Alawites and Shiites would keep the Mediterranean coastal provinces, the Christians, Druze, and Jews would share the southwest and south, and the Yezidis would get an enclave on the Syria-Iraq border.

The proposal recognizes that Syria’s many sects were never “bonded together by secularism and tolerance” and that the pitiless fighting since 2011 has only sharpened ethno-sectarianism. Autonomous areas may ensure a measure of security for minority Christians, Jews, Druze, and Yezidis whose cooperation with the Assad regime secured protection, and who will want to escape Sunni retribution.

The international community should seriously consider a proposal for independent ethnic states or autonomous areas and take the opportunity to avoid repeating the sectarian character of Iraq’s constitution which, Iraqis point out, was not drafted by Iraqis. This goes against the grain in the West, which “celebrates diversity” but has been dealing, often unsuccessfully, with strains bought on by uncontrolled immigration from Africa and Latin America.

Four factors will bedevil the negotiators of an ethnic autonomy arrangement: the oil and natural gas in the Levant Basin Province; two competing proposals for natural gas pipelines that cross Syria; Iran’s transport corridor through Syria, which Iran needs to support the Assad regime and its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah; and the Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons.

1. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates there are potential mean recoverable resources of “1.7 billion barrels of oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of [natural] gas” in the Levant Basin Province, which is offshore Israel, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria. Israel is developing its fields and is becoming an energy exporter. Lebanon likely has a similar bounty and has passed legislation governing oil and gas exploration, but development has stalled as Lebanon and Israel are disputing a 300 square mile area both countries claim for their Exclusive Economic Zones. The gas in Gaza’s waters won’t be safe to develop until the Israelis and Arabs conclude a peace deal and the Palestinians adopt rigorous transparency measures due to the Palestinian Authority’s corruption. Syria has limited oil reserves in eastern Deir ez Zor province which have been productive through the civil war, and both the Assad regime and ISIS have benefitted from smuggling oil to Turkey.

The ethnic states/autonomous areas will likely demand a share of the oil and gas revenue from the fields offshore the two provinces controlled by the Alawites and Shia before they agree to a cease fire and partition. A solution may be to form an operating company with transparency as the foundation of its corporate charter or endow it with a governance structure informed by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

It will be important to keep track of the money as it will be needed for reconstruction, estimated to cost at least $180 billion. Russia and Iran have enough money to disrupt Syria, but not to rebuild it. The U.S. is focusing on domestic concerns and, if America is out, Europe will never be all-in. Turkey will want a piece of the action, but no one will tether a reconstruction effort to the authoritarian Pasha. The Gulf states have cash but may lack the contract administration skills to oversee rebuilding. China may want to include Syria in the One Belt, One Road transport network, but only if it gets security and natural resource guarantees.

2. Competing natural gas pipelines that cross Syria will be vital. In 2009, Qatar approached Syria about routing its planned 1,500 mile natural gas pipeline to Europe via Syria’s Aleppo province. Qatar wanted a pipeline to Europe as its gas transport modes were limited to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tanker, mostly to Asia with limited spot shipments to Europe, or the Dolphin pipeline to the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Syria refused Qatar’s offer and, in 2011, Syria, Iran, and Iraq agreed to build a pipeline to connect Iran’s South Pars gas field to Europe. The pipeline would run from Assalouyeh, Iran to Europe via Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, with Syria as the center of assembly and production.

The projects are dead, but the obituaries haven’t been published. The physical risk is “at 11” so no lender will touch them, even if a long term purchase contract could be conjured up. The political risk is almost as bad, as pipeline transits would have to be negotiated with sub-national groups and maybe a surviving Syrian government with little remaining institutional capacity. With an abundance of gas discoveries in the region, there are other ways for a natural gas company CEO to get a headache than getting involved in Syria.

But the projects aren’t useless; they have political utility. Their sponsors – Iran and Qatar – can manipulate the fighting and keep the politicians’ and warlords’ dreams of transit fees alive by saying “when the time is right”.

3. Iran’s Syrian corridor. Iran built a corridor through Syria to support the Assad regime and its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The route originally skirted the Syria-Turkey border before turning south to Homs and Latakia. In response to the U.S. troop build-up in the northeast, Iran shifted the route 140 miles south, mostly though Homs and Deir ez Zor provinces, which will be Sunni-controlled in the mooted partition.

Under partition the loss of the corridor through Sunni territory would be a strategic setback for Tehran as it would have to rely on ocean shipments, many of which have been intercepted, and air shipments, which are expensive and limit the size of the cargo. In addition, increased use of Iran’s airlines to support Assad and Hezbollah will expose them to increased Western sanctions – and may cripple the deals with Boeing and Airbus - at a time when Iran is trying to integrate with the world economy. This will cause tensions between the siloviki and the economic reformers which may dilute Iran’s expansionist efforts, to the benefit of Iran’s neighbors, and the victims of Assad and Hezbollah.

4. The last issue, and one that may swamp the others, is Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). There are almost five million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Turkey has the largest contingent of refugees, almost three million, but also has the most developed economy and capacity to host them - for now. Jordan hosts over 650,000 Syrian refugees, and Lebanon hosts over 1 million, over twenty percent of the native population of 4.5 million. Iraq hosts over 200,000 refugees, all in areas controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government. There are six million IDPs, many caused by combat operations. Increased military activity by the U.S. and alleged forced displacement of civilians by U.S. proxies may be sowing the seeds of future trouble.

Jordan and Lebanon are least financially able to indefinitely host the refugees, and they have the most precarious ethnic balancing acts and lack the money to paper over the differences, so the priority should be repatriating the Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon. But repatriate them to where? The only lure may be a share of the oil and gas revenue allocated to the independent ethnic states or autonomous areas. Given that, Lebanon and Jordan won’t be interested in delays or excuses.

The above list isn’t all inclusive. Other potential troubles are:

- The status of the Golan Heights. If Syria goes away, will Israel annex the Golan and just get it over with?

- Absorption of the ethnic states/autonomous areas by neighboring states. Turkey won’t like a semi-autonomous Syrian Kurdish province; it might like a larger Iraqi Kurdistan even less. And in Iraq, will a larger Iraqi Kurdistan cause the Kurds to demand a greater share of oil and seats in the Council of Representatives?

- Russia playing the spoiler. Russia will make things difficult, on the ground and in the UN Security Council, unless it secures naval and air bases in the “Alawite entity” and its national champions Gazprom and Rosneft participate in the development of the Levant Basin. Both firms, however, are under Crimea-related sanctions so they may be weak players.

The word “unprecedented” has been thrown around a lot in regards to Syria. It may be time to apply that thinking to Syria’s partition. The default setting for the international community will be to try to patch the old Syria back together within the internationally recognized borders, but that is make-work for bureaucrats, the aid agencies and their contractors. The impartial partition plan for Syria will give each ethnic or sectarian group territory under its own control.

Should Syria be patched back together? Maybe, but that’s a question for the Syrians and the answer won’t be rendered in this political cycle. Reconstruction after America’s Civil War took 12 years, from 1865 to 1877, and that was for a fight between people of the same ethnic group and religion that weren’t determined to exterminate each other. In Syria, the final decision on unity will be made by the grandchildren.