China Regulators Complete Final "Drill" In Preparation For Petro-Yuan Futures Trading

Amid all the chatter of Venezuela and Russia potentially creating oil-backed cryptocurrencies, the "huge news" of China"s launch of the Petro-Yuan has fallen off the front page... until now.

This week saw the Shanghai Futures Exchange complete its fifth yuan-back oil futures contract trading drill successfully...

As Bloomberg reports, 149 members of Shanghai International Energy Exchange traded 647,930 lots in the drill with total value of 268.2b yuan, according to a statement from the exchange, which added that the system basically met the listing requirements of crude futures after the drill.

While this was a success, it"s not all plain-saling...

As Bloomberg notes, as the world’s largest energy consumer and an increasing source of investment capital for oil-producing nations, China has an interest in using its own currency rather than that of a geopolitical competitor.

One hurdle for setting up a rival to Brent or West Texas Intermediate: Overseas oil producers and traders would need to swallow China’s capital controls and penchant for occasional market interventions.

Similar hurdles have kept foreign investors as bit players in China’s giant mainland stock and bond markets, and the share of payments in Yuan in the Global SWIFT system has fallen...

"This contract has the potential to greatly help China’s push for yuan internationalization," said Yao Wei, chief China economist at Societe Generale SA in Paris.

 

"But its success will hinge critically on the degree of freedom allowed for the capital flows related to the contract," she said.

 

"It is not unreasonable to envision a world in which the overwhelming share of commodity contracts, especially for oil, are no longer denominated just in dollars," said Eswar Prasad, a former China division chief at the IMF.

 

But "the yuan’s role in global finance will ultimately be determined by the degree of commitment of Xi Jinping’s government to economic and financial market reforms."

But, as we detailed previously, the writing is on the wall for dollar hegemony, and we suspect teh decline in global yuan trade volumes is another reason for China to push ahead sooner.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin said almost two months ago during the BRICs summit in Xiamen,

“Russia shares the BRICS countries’ concerns over the unfairness of the global financial and economic architecture, which does not give due regard to the growing weight of the emerging economies. We are ready to work together with our partners to promote international financial regulation reforms and to overcome the excessive domination of the limited number of reserve currencies.”

As Pepe Escobar recently noted, "to overcome the excessive domination of the limited number of reserve currencies" is the politest way of stating what the BRICS have been discussing for years now; how to bypass the US dollar, as well as the petrodollar.

Beijing is ready to step up the game. Soon China will launch a crude oil futures contract priced in yuan. This means that Russia – as well as Iran, the other key node of Eurasia integration – may bypass US sanctions by trading energy in their own currencies, or in yuan. Inbuilt in the move is a true Chinese win-win; the yuan - according to some - will be fully convertible into gold on both the Shanghai and Hong Kong exchanges.

The new triad of oil, yuan and gold is actually a win-win-win. No problem at all if energy providers prefer to be paid in physical gold instead of yuan. The key message is the US dollar being bypassed.

China"s plans for oil futures trading go back more than two decades, with the government introducing a domestic crude contract in 1993 and stopping a year later amid an overhaul of its energy industry. But in 2013, we first hinted at the birth of the petroyuan was looming...

In doing so China is effectively lobbing the first shot across the bow of the Petrodollar system, and more importantly, the key support of the USD in the international arena... setting the scene for the petroyuan.

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And now it just became one step closer to reality, as Bloomberg reports, China’s government State Council has officially approved the listing of a crude futures contract in Shanghai, according to people familiar with the matter.

While the date of launch will be determined by China Securities Regulatory Commission and Shanghai Futures Exchange, it would appear we are within weeks of it becoming a reality as China prepares to roll out a yuan-denominated oil contract...

"Approval of the trading rules by the securities regulator marks the clearance of a major hurdle toward launch of the contract," Li Zhoulei, an analyst with Everbright Futures, said by phone.

 

"The latest rules raised entry threshold for investors from the draft rules, which shows the government wants to avoid volatility when it first starts trading."

Which, according to Adam Levinson, of hedge fund manager Graticule Asset Management Asia, will be a “wake up call” for investors who haven’t paid attention to the plans.

Yuan Tumbles As Moody's Downgrades China To A1, Warns On Worsening Debt Outlook

Offshore Yuan tumbled as Moody"s cut China"s credit rating to A1 from Aa3, saying that the outlook for the country’s financial strength will worsen, with debt rising and economic growth slowing. This leaves the world"s hoped-for reflation engine rated below Estonia, Qatar, and South Korea and on par with Slovakia and Japan.

“While ongoing progress on reforms is likely to transform the economy and financial system over time, it is not likely to prevent a further material rise in economy-wide debt, and the consequent increase in contingent liabilities for the government,” the ratings company said in a statement Wednesday.

And the most obvious reaction was Yuan selling.

Full Statement: Moody"s Investors Service has today downgraded China"s long-term local currency and foreign currency issuer ratings to A1 from Aa3 and changed the outlook to stable from negative.

The downgrade reflects Moody"s expectation that China"s financial strength will erode somewhat over the coming years, with economy-wide debt continuing to rise as potential growth slows. While ongoing progress on reforms is likely to transform the economy and financial system over time, it is not likely to prevent a further material rise in economy-wide debt, and the consequent increase in contingent liabilities for the government.

The stable outlook reflects our assessment that, at the A1 rating level, risks are balanced. The erosion in China"s credit profile will be gradual and, we expect, eventually contained as reforms deepen. The strengths of its credit profile will allow the sovereign to remain resilient to negative shocks, with GDP growth likely to stay strong compared to other sovereigns, still considerable scope for policy to adapt to support the economy, and a largely closed capital account.

China"s local currency and foreign currency senior unsecured debt ratings are downgraded to A1 from Aa3. The senior unsecured foreign currency shelf rating is also downgraded to (P)A1 from (P)Aa3.

China"s local currency bond and deposit ceilings remain at Aa3. The foreign currency bond ceiling remains at Aa3. The foreign currency deposit ceiling is lowered to A1 from Aa3. China"s short-term foreign currency bond and bank deposit ceilings remain Prime-1 (P-1).

RATIONALE FOR THE RATING DOWNGRADE TO A1

Moody"s expects that economy-wide leverage will increase further over the coming years. The planned reform program is likely to slow, but not prevent, the rise in leverage. The importance the authorities attach to maintaining robust growth will result in sustained policy stimulus, given the growing structural impediments to achieving current growth targets. Such stimulus will contribute to rising debt across the economy as a whole.

RISING DEBT WILL ERODE CHINA"S CREDIT METRICS, WITH ROBUST GROWTH INCREASINGLY RELIANT ON POLICY STIMULUS

While China"s GDP will remain very large, and growth will remain high compared to other sovereigns, potential growth is likely to fall in the coming years. The importance the Chinese authorities attach to growth suggests that the corresponding fall in official growth targets is likely to be more gradual, rendering the economy increasingly reliant on policy stimulus. At least over the near term, with monetary policy limited by the risk of fuelling renewed capital outflows, the burden of supporting growth will fall largely on fiscal policy, with spending by government and government-related entities -- including policy banks and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) -- rising.

GDP growth has decelerated in recent years from a peak of 10.6% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2016. This slowdown largely reflects a structural adjustment that we expect to continue. Looking ahead, we expect China"s growth potential to decline to close to 5% over the next five years, for three reasons. First, capital stock formation will slow as investment accounts for a diminishing share of total expenditure. Second, the fall in the working age population that started in 2014 will accelerate. Third, we do not expect a reversal in the productivity slowdown that has taken place in the last few years, despite additional investment and higher skills.

Official GDP growth targets have also adjusted downwards gradually and the authorities" emphasis is progressively shifting towards the quality rather than the quantity of growth. However, the adjustment in official targets is unlikely to be as fast as the slowdown in potential growth as robust economic growth is essential to fulfilment of the current Five Year Plan and appears to be considered by the authorities as important for the maintenance of economic and social stability.

As a consequence, notwithstanding the moderate general government budget deficit in 2016 of around 3% of GDP, we expect the government"s direct debt burden to rise gradually towards 40% of GDP by 2018 and closer to 45% by the end of the decade, in line with the 2016 debt burden for the median of A-rated sovereigns (40.7%) and higher than the median of Aa-rated sovereigns (36.7%).

We also expect indirect and contingent liabilities to increase. We estimate that in 2016 the outstanding amount of policy bank loans and of bonds issued by Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) increased by a combined 6.2% of 2015 GDP, after 5.5% the previous year. In addition to investment by LGFVs, investment by other SOEs increased markedly. Similar increases in financing and spending by the broader public sector are likely to continue in the next few years in order to maintain GDP growth around the official targets.

More broadly, we forecast that economy-wide debt of the government, households and non-financial corporates will continue to rise, from 256% of GDP at the end of last year according to the Institute of International Finance. This is consistent with the gradual approach to deleveraging being taken by the Chinese authorities and will happen because economic activity is largely financed by debt in the absence of a sizeable equity market and sufficiently large surpluses in the corporate and government sectors. While such debt levels are not uncommon in highly-rated countries, they tend to be seen in countries which have much higher per capita incomes, deeper financial markets and stronger institutions than China"s, features which enhance debt-servicing capacity and reduce the risk of contagion in the event of a negative shock.

Taken together, we expect direct government, indirect and economy-wide debt to continue to rise, signalling an erosion of China"s credit profile which is best reflected now in an A1 rating.

REFORMS WILL NOT FULLY OFFSET THE RISE IN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISK

The authorities are part of the way through a reform program intended to sustain and enhance the quality of growth over the longer term, as well as to reduce the risks to the economy and the financial system posed by high corporate and, in particular, SOE debt. One related objective is to contain, and ultimately reduce, SOE leverage.

The authorities" commitment to reform is clear. It is quite likely that their efforts will, over time, improve the allocation of capital in the economy. Over the nearer term, the authorities have taken steps to contain the rise in SOE debt and to discourage some SOEs from further domestic and external investment, particularly in over capacity sectors.

However, we do not think that the reform effort will have sufficient impact, sufficiently quickly, to contain the erosion of credit strength associated with the combination of rising economy-wide leverage and slower growth. In particular, in our view, the key measures introduced to date will have a limited impact on productivity and the efficiency with which capital is allocated over the foreseeable future.

For example, one key set of reforms is the program of debt-equity swaps which aims to lower leverage in parts of the SOE sector, transferring the associated risks to the banking sector. At present, we estimate that the value of swaps announced is a very small fraction -- around 1% -- of SOE liabilities. Moreover, there is very little transparency about the terms of these transactions or their likely impact on SOEs" and banks" creditworthiness.

Other measures intended to improve investment allocation include negative lists on investment in excess capacity sectors and the introduction of mixed ownership. The former will likely reduce the major losses on investments of the past. However, excess capacity sectors only account for a small proportion of total investment. Only limited improvement in the allocation of capital would result from such measures. Meanwhile, mixed ownership is at a very preliminary stage, having been introduced in only a few dozen SOEs, and on too small a scale for now to have any impact on productivity in the economy as a whole.

Looking beyond the corporate sector, the financial sector remains under-developed, notwithstanding reforms introduced to improve the provision of credit; pricing of risk remains incomplete, with the cost of debt still partly determined by assumptions of government support to public sector or other entities perceived to be strategic. And with increased scrutiny of capital outflows, the capital account remains largely closed. While that insulates the economy and financial system from global volatility, it also constrains the development of domestic capital markets by limiting the flow of inward and outbound capital.

Overall, we believe that the authorities" reform efforts are likely, over time, to achieve some measure of economic rebalancing and improvement in the allocation of capital. But we think that progress will be too slow to arrest the rise in economy-wide leverage.

As Mystery Of China's Multi-Billionaire Default Deepens, A New "Bond Scare" Emerges

Last week, in a largely "under the radar" event, one of China"s wealthiest billionaires (if only on paper), Wu Ruilin, chairman of the Guangdong based telecom company Cosun Group, and whose personal fortune of 98.2 billion yuan ($14 billion) makes him wealthier than Baidu founder Robin Li who is ranked 8th on the Hurun Rich List 2016, shocked Chinese bond market watchers when he defaulted on a paltry 100 million yuan ($14 million) in bonds sold to retail investors through an Alibaba-backed online wealth management platform, citing "tight cash flow."

Needless to say, many were stunned that a billionaire for whom $14 million is pocket change, blamed "tight cash flow" for defaulting on mom and pop investors. In any case, as South China Morning Post reported, despite the founder"s personal fortune, according to a notice put up by the Guangdong Equity Exchange on Tuesday, two subsidiaries of Cosun Group are each defaulting on seven batches of privately raised bonds they issued in 2014. According to the notice, “the issuer had sent over a notice on December 15, claiming not to be able to make the payments on the bonds on time, due to short-term capital crunch."

To be sure, yet another default in a Chinese landscape suddenly littered with bankrupting debt dominoes would have been the end of it, however this morning Reuters added to the mystery when it said that the fate of the defaulted $45 million Chinese corporate bond sold through an Alibaba-backed online wealth management platform was thrown into doubt on Monday, after a bank said letters of guarantee for the bonds were counterfeit.

Quoted by Reuters, China Guangfa Bank Co Ltd (CGB) said guarantee documents, official seals and personal seals presented by the insurer of the bonds "are all fake" and that it has reported the matter to the police.

The dispute highlights challenges in China"s loosely regulated online finance industry, where retail investors often buy high-yielding bonds and other assets, expecting them to be "risk-free" due to guarantees provided by various parties.

As first reported last Wednesday, at the center of the latest dispute are up to 312 million yuan ($45 million) worth of high-yielding bonds issued by southern Chinese phone maker Cosun Group that defaulted this month. The bonds were sold through Zhao Cai Bao, an online platform run by Ant Financial Services Group, the payment affiliate of e-commerce firm Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.

Ant Financial has asked Zheshang Property and Casualty Insurance Co Ltd, which wrote insurance on the bonds, to repay investors. On Sunday, Zheshang Insurance published two documents on its website that it said were from CGB carrying the bank"s official seals, and that guaranteed Zheshang Insurance policies for the Consun bonds. The letters were issued at CGB"s Huizhou branch in December 2014, when the Cosun bonds were sold, Zheshang Insurance said.

And yet, suggesting there is a massive landmine hiding just below the surface of China"s bond market, far worse than merely the consequences rising interest rates, on Monday, CGB said the documents were fake and that it had reported the incident to police as "suspected financial fraud."

While material misrepresentation of facts in Chinese finance is hardly new, the recent alleged violations usher in a whole new breed of fraud, one which is far less nuanced and far more simpllistic and includes outright forgeries of documents that backstop tens if not hundreds of billions in debt. The Cosun dispute follows similar instances of financial fraud this year including forged bond agreements that led to brokerage Sealand Securities sharing potential losses of up to $2.4 billion. In May, the government advised banks to be vigilant after several cases of bill fraud.

Ant Financial on Tuesday said Zheshang Insurance "hasn"t any reason to refuse repayment" which it was obliged to do "within three days" of default.

Making matters worse, the fraud has taken place in the context of a bond default that, according to an Ant Financial spokeswoman cited by Reuters, was a "a one in billions incident" on the platform.

Incidentally, Cosun"s bond issuance totals 1 billion yuan, according to Zheshang Insurance. The insurer"s total registered capital is 1.5 billion yuan.

Should more such "one in billions incidents" emerge, Chinese bond investors - already freaked out by the recent record plunge in Chinese govt bond futures, soaring overnight funding rates, and fears over Fed rate hikes - will rush for the exits just as China"s housing bubble is also popping as reported yesterday, leading to a rerun of the US 2006/2007 dual bursting of the housing/credit bubbles, only this time instead of an $8 trillion financial system, the world will have to backstop China... whose banking system at last check had over $30 trillion in liabilities.

Incidentally, we wonder if now that China"s bond insurers are also under the spotlight, if that means China"s very own MBIA/Ambac moments is imminent, as billions in bond insurance contracts are deemed "fake" by the insurers who would rather not pay up on what is set to be an avalanche of defaults.

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Finally, for those interested in what Bloomberg last week dubbed the "latest China Finance Scare", namely outright forgeries in various debt products, mostly focusing on Entrusted Bonds, here is a useful primer courtesy of BBG:

There’s another Chinese financial practice that’s prompting high-decibel warnings. So-called entrusted bond holdings are a way for financial institutions to skirt rules on using borrowed money to invest in bonds. How? By getting a third party to buy the bonds and agreeing to purchase them at a later date. What could possibly go wrong? How about the worst rout in China’s bond market in a decade. That’s left regulators concerned about the prospect of investors failing to make good on such arrangements, estimated to involve at least $144 billion of bonds.

1. Why entrust us with this news only now?

Concerns about entrusted bond holdings have worsened the tumble in the debt market. Last week, Caixin cited market rumors when it reported a brokerage called Sealand Securities Co. had refused to take over bonds held by a counterparty. That got investors worried. Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. then said in a note, citing media reports it didn’t identify, that the entrusted holding agreement may have been tied to alleged fraud by ex-staff. Sealand cleared the air when it said it would in fact fulfill the bond contracts that had been stamped with a forged seal. The whole incident was enough to frighten an already jittery market.

2. So why do investors use entrusted holding agreements?

Brokerages and other institutional investors ask counterparties to buy bonds from them when they need to circumvent internal rules on note holdings and leverage, according to Xu Hanfei, a bond analyst at Guotai Junan Securities Co. Or they can simply have third parties buy the notes directly from the market. The practice boosts leverage by effectively giving the financial institutions loans: As brokerages and institutional investors don’t carry the bonds on their books, they can use the funds freed up on paper to purchase more bonds, which can then be rolled into more such agreements. “Non-bank financial institutions, which emphasize returns, have more motivation to amplify leverage through entrusted holdings,” said Li Liuyang, a market analyst at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ in Shanghai.

3. How widespread is the practice?

Outstanding entrusted holdings are "in the trillions of yuan," according to Guotai Junan’s Xu. That estimate is based on the bond holdings of the brokerages and smaller banks that are major participants in such transactions. That means the amount of money tied up in such deals is at least 5 percent of the 21 trillion yuan ($3 trillion) of outstanding corporate notes in China, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

4. What broader risks does it pose to China’s financial markets?

A default in an entrusted holding could turn what otherwise might have been a problem with one company’s liquidity into a broader credit event, given that multiple parties may be involved, according to Li at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ. Li says “everyone is worried about similar situations in their transactions with non-bank financial institutions.” OCBC said that things had got so bad that banks were reluctant to lend to non-bank institutions amid a breakdown in trust between investors.

5. What are regulators doing about it?

Authorities including the central bank and the China Securities Regulatory Commission are investigating some financial institutions’ entrusted bond holdings after the Sealand incident, people familiar with the matter said Tuesday. The holdings run contrary to the central bank’s push to trim investments made on borrowed money, according to China Merchants Bank Co. “It’s just a question of when Chinese regulators will clean up entrusted bond holdings,” said Liu Dongliang, a senior analyst at the bank. Tommy Xie, an economist in Singapore at OCBC, says China’s market rout may prompt regulators to strengthen rules on entrusted holdings. He describes them as "a common practice in the grey area of the bond market.”