Axiom: "Red Flags" Suggest China Credit Event Is "Closer Than It Appears"

Submitted by Gordon Johnson of Axiom Capital

While we, as well as the few bearish peers we have, have warned of a pending “credit event” in China for some time now – admittedly incorrectly (China has proved much more resilient than expected) – the more recent red flags are among the most profound we’ve seen in years – in short, we agree with fresh observations made by some of the world’s most famous iron ore bears. Thus, while it is nearly impossible to pinpoint exactly when the credit bubble will definitively pop in China, a number of recent events, in our view, suggest the threat level is currently at red/severe.

WHERE IS CHINA AT TODAY VS. WHERE THE US WAS AT AHEAD OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS? At the peak of the US subprime bubble (before the failure of Bear Stearns in Mar. ‘08, and subsequently Lehman Brothers in Sep. ’08, troubles in the US credit system emerged as early as Feb. ’07), the asset/liability mismatch was 2% when compared to the total banking system. However, in China, currently, there is a massive duration mismatch in wealth management products (“WMPs”). And, at $4tn in total WMPs outstanding, the asset/liability mismatch in China is now above 10% – China’s entire banking system is ~$34tn, which is a scary scenario. In our view, this is a very important dynamic to track given it foretells where a country is at in the credit cycle.

WHAT ARE THE SIGNS WE ARE SEEING? In short, we see a number of signs that point to what could be the beginning of the “popping” of the credit bubble in China. More specifically: (1) interbank rates in China are spiking, meaning banks, increasingly, don’t trust each other – this is how any banking crisis begins (Exhibit 1), (2) China’s Minsheng Bank recently issued a ghost/fraudulent WMP (they raised $436mn in funds for a CDO-like asset that had no assets backing it [yes, you heard that right] – link), (2) Anbang, the Chinese conglomerate who has used WMP issuance as a means to buy a number of assets globally (including the Waldorf Astoria here in the US),  is now having issues gaining approval for incremental asset purchases (link), suggesting global investors may be getting weary of the way in which Anbang has “beefed up” its balance sheet, (3) China’s top insurance regulator, Xiang Junbo, chairman of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, is currently under investigation for “severe” disciplinary violations (link), implying some/many of the “shadow” forms of transacting in China could become a bit harder to maneuver (which would manifest itself in higher rates, which his exactly what we are seeing today), and (4) as would be expected from all of this, as was revealed overnight in China, bank WMP issuance crashed 15% m/m in April to 10,038 from 11,823 in March, a strong indicator that faith in these products is indeed waning.

Exhibit 1: Interbank Rates in China

Source: Bloomberg.

DOES CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING HAVE ALL OF THIS UNDER CONTROL? In a word, increasingly, it seems the answer is no. What’s the evidence? Well, in March, interbank rates spiked WAY past the upper corridor of 3.45% to ~11% (Exhibit 2), a strong indicator that the PBoC is losing its ability to “maintain order”. And, admittedly, while there are levers the PBoC can pull, FX reserves are at scary low levels (discussed below), suggesting the PBoC is quickly running out of bullets. Furthermore, corporate bond issuance in China was negative in C1Q, which means M2 is going to be VERY hard to grow (when MO is negative); at risk of stating the obvious, without M2 growth in China, economic growth (i.e., GDP) will undoubtedly slow – this is not the current Consensus among market prognosticators who think things are quite rosy right now in China; yet, while global stock markets are soaring, the ChiNext Composite index is down -7.5% YTD vs. the Nasdaq Composite Index being up +12.8% YTD. In our view, given China’s importance to the global commodity backdrop, we see this as a key leading indicator (the folks on the ground in China are betting with their wallets, while global investors continue to place their hopes on: [a.] a reflationary tailwind that we do not believe is ever coming [China is now destocking], and [b.] hope that President Trump will deliver everything he’s promised [which, in this political environment, we see is virtually impossible]).

Exhibit 2: Overnight Reverse Repo Rate

Source: Bloomberg.

CHINA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE (“FX”) RESERVES ARE DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO LOW LEVELS THAT WILL LIKELY CAUSE AN INFLECTION LOWER IN THE CURRENCY. Based on a fine-tuning of its formula to calculate “reserve-adequacy” over the years, the International Monetary Funds’ (“IMF”) approach can be best summed up as follows: Minimum FX Reserves = 10% of Exports + 30% of Short-term FX Debt + 10% of M2 + 15% of Other Liabilities. Thus, for China, the equation is as follows: 10% * $2.2tn + 30% * $680bn + 10% * (RMB 139.3tn ÷ 6.6) + 15% * $1.0tn = $2.7tn of required minimum reserves. Furthermore, when considering China’s FX reserve balance was roughly $4tn just 2 years ago, we find it concerning that experts now peg China’s unofficial FX reserve balance somewhere in the $1.6-$1.7tn range. Why does this differ from China’s $3.0tn in reported FX reserves as of Feb. 2017? Well, according to our contacts, when adjusting for China’s investment in its own sovereign wealth fund (i.e., the CIC) of roughly $600bn, as well as bank injections from: (a) China Development Bank (“CDB”) of roughly $975bn, (b) The Export-Import Bank of China (“EXIM”) of roughly $30bn, (c) the Agricultural Development Bank of China (“ADBC”) of roughly $10bn, as well as capital commitments from, (d) the BRICs Bank of roughly $50bn, (e) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”) of $50bn, (f) open short RMB forwards by agent banks of $300bn, (g) the China Africa Fund of roughly $50bn, and (h) Oil-Currency Swaps with Russia of roughly $50bn, the actual FX reserve balance in China is closer to $1.69tn (Exhibit 3).

Stated differently, based on the IMFs formula, sharply contrasting the Consensus view that China has years of reserves to burn through, China is already below the critical level of minimum reserve adequacy. However, using expert estimates that $1.0tn-$1.5tn in reserves is the “critical level”, and also considering that China is burning $25bn-$75bn in reserves each month, the point at which the country will no longer be able to support the renminbi via FX reserves appears to be a 2017 event. At that point, there would be considerable devaluation in China’s currency, sending a deflationary shock through the world’s commodity markets; in short, we feel this would be bad for the steel/iron ore stocks we cover, yet is being completely un-discounted in stocks today (no one ever expects this event to occur).        

Exhibit 3: China’s Adjusted Official Reserve Balance

How Long Can China's Debt Continue To Grow Before A Systemic Crisis Strikes?

Nearly three years ago, Morgan Stanley may have jumped the shark (a little) when its strategists Cyril Moulle-Berteaux and Sergei Parmenov declared that China"s Minsky Moment has arrived. While that may have been partially true, the fact that China managed to incur an additional $12 trillion in total debt in the interim period, suggests that Beijing at least managed to postpone the inevitable.

And since in the 3 years since little has changed, questions about how much longer the Chinese debt-fueled growth "farce" can continue have once again emerged, in their latest incarnation courtesy of UBS, whose economist Tao Wang asks "How long can debt continue to grow before a Minsky moment or systemic debt crisis?"

Here is the proposed answer:

China"s debt is set to rise further in the coming years, likely exceeding 300% of GDP within 2 years. As the government continues to rely on credit-fuelled investment growth to offset downward pressures within the domestic economy and from a subdued global environment, unless there is major debt restructuring, China"s debt/GDP ratio is set to rise further. We don"t think that there is a "magic"  level at which a debt crisis will take place. Many countries ran into debt crises at levels of debt significantly lower than China"s current level, often because debt was financed by foreign resources due to low domestic savings, and/or because of duration mismatch (Figure 11).

Conversely, there are countries (e.g. Japan, Figure 2) where debt levels have risen ever higher without triggering any obvious financial sector distress.

Four factors make a typical systemic debt crisis unlikely for China. Typical debt crises are often liquidity crises of the financial system. In China,

1) over 95% of debt is domestic debt financed mainly via banks;

2) there is a very high domestic savings & under-developed capital markets, so saving largely exists as deposits or quasi-deposits in the banking system to finance debt (Figure 12);

3) capital controls still exist to keep liquidity at home; and

4) a high degree of government control over the financial sector and largest borrowers (SOEs) means that debt restructuring can take place gradually with government coordination rather than in a disorderly manner forced by the market. A central bank that always stands ready also helps to shore up depositor confidence in the banking system, helping to reduce the risk of liquidity events. This is why we still think that China"s credit cycle may be a more drawn out process than one that is disrupted by a typical liquidity-related  debt crisis.

However, while a conventional debt crisis may be avoidable, UBS admits that ever-rising debt is problematic even if problems do not manifest themselves in a crisis.

The fact that debt is rising much faster than output year after year and an increasing share of debt is allocated in nonproductive or excess capacity sectors means misallocation of resources. Such systematic misallocation will depress long term productivity and economic growth, and wasted resources mean more potential bad debt will be created. While the aforementioned unique factors can allow China"s credit cycle to last much longer than in other economies and with less volatility, this lack of a market-clearing mechanism could depress corporate profitability and investment, leading to lower or stagnant economic growth over a prolonged period of time. Eventually, the cost of accumulating so much bad debt will have to be borne by the financial sector and savers, asset prices will have to correct, and the ultimate cost of adjustment may be substantially larger.

How will this debt cycle play out and what to watch?

In the likely scenario that China"s debt cycle is a drawn out process, the government would have to balance the need to stabilize growth and defuse debt problems by slowing credit expansion gradually, taking actions to gradually restructure the stock of debt (including by writing off bad debts, divesting some state assets and closing down "zombie" companies), and reform to encourage growth in less debt-dependent sectors. In any large credit event, banks and related financial institutions would likely be required by the government to bring some of the culprit debt on to their balance sheets, to gradually restructure its underlying assets to help the economy avoid a serious liquidity/credit crunch. If confidence in shadow bank channels drops, so long as the government retains control over the capital account, liquidity would most likely flow back to the banking system

Risk of a more disruptive break in the credit cycle has risen in recent years. The credit cycle could be more easily disrupted if 1) banks run out of "free" liquidity and have to rely on wholesale funding to finance balance sheet expansion, which provides less reliable funding. Banks may be forced to slow credit expansion sharply in the event of a market confidence collapse or asset price plunge; and 2) Large capital outflows persist for a prolonged period, with the resultant domestic liquidity tightening increasing banks" exposure to international market conditions. Indeed China is experiencing rising capital outflows as a result of the government"s earlier push for capital account opening and the more recent weakening of market confidence (Figure 13).

The rapid shadow credit expansion is a risk. Shadow credit is less regulated and adds multiple layers of intermediation that increases risks and financing costs. More importantly, when multiple layers of shadow credit underpins the economy"s overall funding structure, it becomes much harder for the government to quickly identify where funding problems may be or as they appear, compromising their ability to promptly oversee and manage any liquidity situation to prevent it from warping into a bigger systemic issue. As shadow credit becomes increasingly important, the government"s ability to use banks to bailout the shadow banking sector will also be diminished.

So while on net UBS is not yet sounding the alarm on the imminent bursting of the world"s biggest debt bubble, here are the four warning signs investors should watch for when it comes to China: 

1. Liquidity (LDR) in the broad banking system after adjusting for shadow credit;


2. change in profit margins and/or return on assets in the corporate sector;


3. size of shadow credit relative to traditional banking; and


4. net capital outflows – persistent large outflows will erode China"s domestic liquidity buffer.