The Trump Doctrine In A Regional Context

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Oriental Review,

The last section of the new US National Security Strategy (NSS) describes the envisaged application of the Trump Doctrine in a regional context all across the world, and it’s worthwhile to examine what storylines will most likely be advanced by the policy document’s intrinsic infowar component. This analysis is divided according to the geographic categories contained in the NSS and proceeds along that order, after which a brief summary will be presented in highlighting the most discernable global trends.

Indo-Pacific

The US says that “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region” as China employs multifaceted influence strategies in a concerted effort to get regional states to follow its economic and political models. Although presented by China as being mutually beneficial, the NSS describes Beijing’s Silk Road relationships as being detrimental to its partners’ sovereignty. In response, Washington claims that “states throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence”, which implies the creation of what the author has previously described as a ‘China Containment Coalition’ (CCC) to preserve the existing US-led unipolar system them. The suggested outcome of this initiative is the US’ “quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India”, with the latter once again being referred to as a “Major Defense Partner” whose “growing relationships throughout the region” will be supported by the US.

Elsewhere in the area, North Korea is identified as “a global threat that requires a global response”, later revealed in this section as being missile defense cooperation between the US, Japan, and South Korea towards the eventual aim of “an area defense capability”, one which was previously described in the document as “not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China.” Looking southwards, the US wants to “reenergize [its] alliances with the Philippines and ­Thailand and strengthen [its] partnerships with Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others to help them become cooperative maritime partners”, with it being inferred that “reenergizing” is a euphemism for “winning back” Manila and Bangkok. Altogether, the US plans to use ASEAN and APEC as regional institutions for advancing its geopolitical and economic interests, with the former probably seeing some of the ASEAN states become the US’ “Lead From Behind” partners in “containing China” while the latter will result in more bilateral trade deals.

EU

Russia is fear mongered as engaging in “subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments”, suggesting that any objective developments that even remotely hint at either of these three conclusions will be dismissed as ‘Russian propaganda’ and their messengers discredited as ‘Russian agents/trolls’. China is also mentioned in this section as having “gain[ed] a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure”, showing that the US is now paying attention to the progress that its 16+1 framework has made in the “Three Seas” region of Central and Eastern Europe and will likely go on the information offensive against it in the coming future.

Daesh and the Migrant Crisis are also listed as posing serious threats to the EU as well.

In reassuring the continent, the US says that its “European allies and partners increase [its] strategic reach and provide access to forward basing and overflight rights for global operations”, which explains the self-interested reason why Washington will evidently abide by its Article 5 commitment to NATO. It believes that deepening transatlantic collaboration is necessary to protect Europe from the aforementioned threats that were described, with military spending increases geared towards modernizing capacities and building a ‘missile defense shield’ to ‘protect’ against Russia, Iran, and even supposedly North Korea too, while US efforts to “contest China’s unfair trade and economic practices and restrict its acquisition of sensitive technologies” in the EU will probably mean that Junker’s September 2017 proposal for a “European Enabling Framework” ‘screening process’ will become a roadblock to Beijing’s plans.

Furthermore, the US wants to expand its energy exports to Europe, which might see it getting more involved in the activities of LNG terminal-hosting “Three Seas” states such as Croatia and thus setting the stage for a “Balkan Pivot” to more directly counter China there.

Middle East

Right off the bat, the US blames Iran for all of the region’s woes by stating that “the interconnected problems of Iranian expansion, state collapse, jihadist ideology, socio-economic stagnation, and regional rivalries have convulsed the Middle East”, accusing what it labels as “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism” of “tak[ing] advantage of instability to expand its influence through partners and proxies, weapon proliferation, and funding” that oftentimes takes the form of Iran “develop[ing] more capable ballistic missiles and intelligence capabilities, and [undertaking in] malicious cyber activities.” Iran is painted as the ultimate evil in order to whitewash Israel, which the US attempts to unabashedly do in the passage where the authors write that “the threats from jihadist terrorist organizations and the threat from Iran are creating the realization that Israel is not the cause of the region’s problems.”

In fact, the NSS notes, “states have increasingly found common interests with Israel in confronting common threats”, in a nod to the de-facto alliance between the GCC and Israel against Iran. The US lists its chief objectives as strengthening cooperation with the GCC and what it describes as the “independent state” of Iraq, with the latter phrase hinting that Washington will work behind the scenes to counter Tehran’s influence in Baghdad. This presumption is apparently confirmed by the next passage where the US commits to “work[ing] with partners to…neutralize Iranian malign influence”, which again implies a similar “Lead From Behind” strategy just like it wants to employ in the Indo-Pacific.

Moreover, the US says that it will “seek a settlement to the Syrian civil war that sets the conditions for refugees to return home and rebuild their lives in safety”, signaling a step back from its previous regime change obsession and possibly opening the doors for a pragmatic ‘New Détente’ deal with Russia over this issue. In addition, the expected US commitment “to helping facilitate a comprehensive peace agreement that is acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians” is reiterated in the text, though this is nothing more than rhetoric for distracting from the US’ determinedly pro-Israeli policies. Most interestingly, however, is the penultimate policy prescription that the US will “help (its) partners procure interoperable missile defense and other capabilities to better defend against active missile threats”, which demonstrates that its missile defense plans are indeed Eurasian-wide and stretch all across the EU-Mideast-Northeast Asian Rimland.

South And Central Asia

The US draws significant attention what it describes as Pakistan-based threats on multiple occasions, slyly speaking tongue-in-cheek when talking about the Pakistan that it’s supposedly seeking in order to indirectly accuse the Pakistan of today of embodying these said threats. For example, when the authors write that their country “seeks a Pakistan that is not engaged in destabilizing behavior…will press Pakistan to intensify its counterterrorism efforts, since no partnership can survive a country’s support for militants and terrorists who target a partner’s own service members and officials…(and) will also encourage Pakistan to continue demonstrating that it is a responsible steward of its nuclear assets”, it’s essentially saying that Pakistan is destabilizing the region, supporting anti-American militants and terrorists who target US forces in Afghanistan, and irresponsibly wielding nuclear weapons which might one day fall into the hands of the same terrorists that it’s accused of backing.

India, US, Japan annual Malabar naval drills

All of these hostile narratives against Pakistan explain why the US wants the world to think that “the prospect for an Indo-Pakistani military conflict [which] could lead to a nuclear exchange remains a key concern requiring consistent diplomatic attention”, as the thinly veiled inference is that Islamabad is solely responsible for this dangerous state of affairs. It’s predictable that Washington would weave such a one-sided storyline because it envisions New Delhi as its 21^st-century partner for ‘containing China’, with its strategists writing that the US “will deepen [its] strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region”.

Concerning Central Asia, the NSS says that the US “will encourage the economic integration of Central and South Asia to promote prosperity and economic linkages that will bolster connectivity and trade”, and since it’s improbable that this is an oblique statement of support for CPEC, the only realistic conclusion is that it’s an American endorsement for the Central Asian component of India’s Chabahar project. As even the most inexperienced observer would know, this port is based in Iran, so the US will have to work overtime in crafting a semi-cohesive explanation for why it doesn’t mind India working with Washington’s hated nemesis in Tehran, though the answer could probably be simplistically summed up as ‘realpolitik’ for ‘containing China’.

Another point to mention is that the US says that it “seeks Central Asian states that are resilient against domination by rival powers, are resistant to becoming jihadist safe havens, and prioritize reforms”, and that it “will work with the Central Asian states to guarantee access to the region to support [its] counterterrorism efforts.” Evidently, the US is aiming to exploit the new Daesh threat to the region that it helped transfer from “Syraq” to Afghanistan as an excuse for reestablishing the military partnerships that it used to have with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, possibly up to the point of once again basing its troops on their territory. While pretending that this is only in the interests of “counterterrorism efforts”, the real motivation would be to boost their “resilien[cy] against domination by rival powers”, or in other words, try to dislodge them from the joint Russian-Chinese multipolar orbit of the SCO.

Western Hemisphere

The US claims that “democratic states connected by shared values and economic interests will reduce the violence, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration that threaten [their] common security”, but in reality it’s only concerned about leveraging its economic connectivity with Latin American states to counter the three mentioned threats and doesn’t actually care too much about “democratic states” or “shared values”. After all, the US supports the Honduran government of Juan Orlando Hernandez despite the OAS requesting an electoral redo after the incumbent was suspected of stealing the election and then openly resorting to deadly force to suppress opposition protests against him. The Trump Administration’s visceral hatred of anything socialist is also on full display in condemning Cuba and Venezuela, which it believes have served as magnets for inviting Chinese and Russian influence into the region via economic and military means, respectively.

The NSS emphasizes the US’ “regional efforts to build security and prosperity through strong diplomatic engagement” and its desire to “isolate governments that refuse to act as responsible partners in advancing hemispheric peace and prosperity”, suggesting that the incipient anti-Venezuelan coalition model that’s forming could be replicated against the similarly multipolar-aligned ALBA states of Bolivia and Nicaragua due to their socialist ideals and in the event that they forcibly react against any forthcoming Hybrid War provocations against them. The declaration that the US “will encourage further market-based economic reforms and encourage transparency to create conditions for sustained prosperity” adds credence to the claims that it will probably expand its “Operation Condor 2.0” unconventional campaign of restoring its hegemonic hemispheric influence against those states and possibly other ones as well.

US President Donald Trump attends a working dinner with Latin American leaders in New York

On the economic front, the document says that the US “will modernize [its] trade agreements and deepen [its] economic ties with the region and ensure that trade is fair and reciprocal”, which is just a reaffirmation of Trump’s well-known intent to renegotiate NAFTA, but which could also extend to the US’ other hemispheric multilateral trade deal of CAFTA-DR and the bilateral ones that it has with Chile, Colombia, and Peru (the latter three of which plus NAFTA-member Mexico constitute the four states of the Pacific Alliance trading bloc). The phrasing about “deepening economic ties with the region” might indicate the US’ plans to reach bilateral trade deals with the Mercosur members, probably beginning with Brazil and then having the rest of the bloc fall in line afterwards. Altogether, the interweaving of bilateral trade deals all throughout the hemisphere would represent the de-facto fulfillment of the long-sought “Free Trade Area of the Americas” (FTAA).

Africa

The final section of the NSS’ regional context review is the most direct about the US’ intentions to “contain China” and obstruct its Silk Road strategy. The authors confidently write that Africa “represent[s] potential new markets for U.S. goods and services”, the demand of which “is high and will likely grow” because of what it hints as being the desire of many countries to replicate its political and economic models. This is obviously the infowar narrative that will be spun in serving as the ‘carrot’ for attracting African partners (subordinates), while the ‘stick’ is the equally weaponized storyline that “some Chinese practices undermine Africa’s long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments.”

US President Donald Trump congratulates African leaders

In case there was any doubt that the US wants to challenge China’s dominance in Africa, the document unambiguously announces that the US “will offer American goods and services, both because it is profitable for [it] and because it serves as an alternative to China’s often extractive economic footprint on the continent.”

To this end, the US “seeks sovereign African states that are integrated into the world economy”, which is a just another way of saying that it wants its partners to abandon the Chinese model of state-driven development and open up their economies to Western businessmen and their Indo-Japanese partners instead. “Support[ing] economic integration among African states” could be seen as developing an anti-Chinese trading bloc in the future, though this is unlikely since all existing economic organizations on the continent are closely aligned with the People’s Republic, as are most of the countries that are party to the massive 2015 Tripartite Free Trade Area in China’s most active “sphere of Silk Road influence”.

However, where the US is most capable of making African inroads is through military-security relations in “partner[ing] with governments, civil society, and regional organizations to end long-running, violent conflicts”, which carries with it a whiff of “Lead From Behind” “nation-building” that America is much more experienced with (for better or for worse) than China. By using the existing anti-terrorist pretext present throughout most of Africa to degree or another and especially in the transregional Sahel, the US will probably seek to leverage its military advantages to “stabilize” these states in exchange for them disengaging from China and/or clinching profitable trade deals with the US afterwards, since it will otherwise be exceptionally difficult for the US to economically counterbalance China any other way.

Global Trends

 After examining the Trump Doctrine in all of its regional contexts, it’s possible to detect several interconnected global trends that are present in the US’ National Security Strategy:

Demonization Of Strategic Rivals:

The US is hell-bent on framing its strategic multipolar rivals of Russia, China, and Iran as responsible for global destabilization in order to deflect attention from it and its partners’ responsibility for this state of affairs, with the distinct possibility that Pakistan will soon be added to this list of adversaries as America moves towards making India its top international ally in the future.

Assembling “Lead From Behind” Coalitions:

The demonization of the US’ strategic rivals provides it with the ‘plausible pretext’ for assembling regional coalitions against them all throughout the Eurasian supercontinent and potentially even in Latin America too if it gets its way against Venezuela, thus formalizing a new model of unipolar proxy control that has flexibly adapted to multipolar challenges.

Building “Missile Defense Shields”:

One of the most prominent state-to-state manifestations of “Lead From Behind” cooperation between the US and its subordinates is the construction of “missile defense shields” on trumped-up pretexts in order to undermine Russia and China’s nuclear second-strike capabilities, with the possibility existing that the same model can one day be implemented in South Asia to support India against Pakistan.

Exploiting Non-State Threats:

Another way in which the US plans to utilize its “Lead From Behind” coalitions is to exploit the prevalence of threatening non-state actors such as jihadists and transnational criminal organizations by using them as a ‘plausible pretense’ for setting up a range of differently sized regional bases in its partnered countries to support special forces raids against these shared menaces.

Stopping The Silk Road:

The combination of demonizing infowars, “Lead From Behind” coalitions, and multidimensional partnerships with its allies naturally leads one to the conclusion that the US plans to employ all instruments of its power (Hybrid War) in stopping China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity so as to counter multipolarity and indefinitely preserve the declining unipolar system.

Escobar: Vladimir Putin Takes Spotlight As Eurasia Connector

Authored by Pepe Escobar via The Asia Times,

At his trademark annual year-end press conference in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin once again let drop selected foreign-policy nuggets essential to understanding what lies ahead on the turbulent Eurasian geopolitical chessboard.

By now it’s well known that Putin will run again in the presidential elections scheduled for March 18 (“it will be self-nomination” and “I hope for the overall support from the public”). The Man in Charge might as well continue to be in charge. So it’s always enlightening to bring down the (spin) noise: sit back, relax, and just listen.

On President Trump: “I am on first-name terms with Trump; yes, we would probably use the familiar ‘you.’ I hope he’ll get the opportunity to improve relations with Russia. Look at the markets, how they have grown. This means that investors trust the US economy, this means they trust what he [Donald Trump] is doing in this field.”

On Russiagate: “What’s so strange about this [diplomats speaking with officials in their host country]? Why do you have this ‘Russian spy’ hysteria?” On accusations of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential race, Putin said, “They have been invented by those aiming to delegitimize Trump. These people don’t understand they are undermining their own country – they aren’t showing respect for the Americans [who] voted for Trump.”

On working together with Washington: “Russia and the US can work closely on a range of issues” even given the “well-known limitations” on Trump.

On potential US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: “We hear about the problems with the INF Treaty. Apparently conditions are being created and an information-propaganda campaign is being run for a possible US withdrawal from the treaty. There is nothing good about a US withdrawal, that [would] be highly detrimental to international security. The US has de facto left the INF Treaty already, with the deployment of the Aegis ashore, but Russia is not going to leave the treaty. We will not be dragged into an arms race.”

Putin stressed that Russia’s defense spending was US$46 billion a year, while the US plans to spend $700 billion in 2018.

On the Arctic: “I have visited [the Arctic archipelago] Franz Josef Land; several years ago foreign guides, accompanying foreign tourist groups, would say that these islands ‘recently’ belonged to Russia. They had forgotten that [Franz Josef Land] is a Russian archipelago, but we reminded them, and at the moment everything is fine. We shouldn’t forget it. Developing all those resources in the Arctic should take place in sync with taking care of the environment … we should not impinge on economic activities of ethnic minorities.”

On Ukraine: “The Kiev authorities have no desire to implement the Minsk agreements, no desire to launch a real political process, the completion of which could be the implementation of an agreement on the special status of the Donbass, which is enshrined in the relevant law of Ukraine, adopted by the Rada [Ukraine’s parliament]. Russians and Ukrainians are basically one people” (the audience is audibly pleased).

On Syria: “The US is not contributing enough to the successful resolution of the Syrian crisis. It is important that none of the participants in this [Syrian peace] process have the desire or temptation to use various terrorist or quasi-terrorist radical groups to achieve their immediate political goals.”

On Iraq: “Let’s say, militants are parting for Iraq. We are telling our US colleagues, ‘Militants have gone this or that way.’ There is no reaction, they [militants] are just leaving. Why? Due to thinking that they could be used in the fight with [Syrian President Bashar] Assad. That’s very dangerous.”

On Russia possibly influencing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program: “Your congressmen, senators look so good, they have beautiful suits, shirts, they are seemingly clever people. They put us alongside North Korea and Iran. At the same time they push the [US] president to persuade us to solve the problems of North Korea and Iran together with you.”

On a nuclear DPRK: “On North Korea, we don’t accept it as a nuclear country. As for the US, it has gone beyond previous deals [with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] … and has provoked North Korea to withdraw from agreements.  I think we heard the US would stop military drills, but no … they didn’t. It is vital to act very carefully when dealing with the DPRK’s nuclear program.”

On China: “I have full confidence that cooperation with China is beyond any political agenda. We will always remain strategic partners, for a long period of time. We have similar approaches to the development of the international system. We are both interested in joint [economic] projects, including integration of OBOR [One Belt One Road] and the Eurasian Union.”

Crafting the integration soundtrack

And that takes us to the heart of the geopolitical New Great Game in Eurasia: the Russia-China strategic partnership, once again reaffirmed, and the deepening of integration between the New Silk Roads, formerly OBOR, now Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAUA).

Putin is clearly positive about the benefits for Russia from this economic interpenetration. He noted how “Russia was able to overcome major crises: the collapse of prices for energy carriers and trade sanctions. But the country is moving in the right direction with a greater focus on domestic production. Our internal trade grew by 3%. This has to mean something.”

Stressing how Moscow is totally on board the BRI, Putin implied how this cooperation extrapolates to both the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) spheres as well; and that’s where we should place Moscow’s current efforts to convince New Delhi – also a BRICS and SCO member – that betting on the BRI favors India’s interests.

As recently as early this week in New Delhi, after a trilateral meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been adamant: “I know India has problems, we discussed it today, with the concept of One Belt and One Road, but the specific problem in this regard should not make everything else conditional to resolving political issues.”

New Delhi has to be listening, as it was one of Moscow’s staunchest allies during the Cold War.

In a parallel development, Iran is bound to join the EAEU as early as February, according to Behrouz Hassanolfat, director of the Europe and Americas Department of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, as quoted by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA).

As Asia Times has reported, India and Iran are getting more in sync economically via a parallel Silk Road to Central Asia centered on the port of Chabahar. Iran is also an essential BRI hub, and now will become an EAEU hub as well.

As much as Beijing in relation to its BRI, Moscow has been on a charm offensive to enlarge the EAEU. Turkey – already on board the BRI – is a possible EAEU candidate for the near future, as well as India and Pakistan.

Even as Putin at his presser once again advanced the cause of these multiple cross-pollinations of Eurasian integration, India sometimes may give the impression of being the odd partner out. New Delhi has just hosted the first ASEAN-India Connectivity Summit, which can be interpreted as an attempt to go against the BRI. Yet the emergence of an anti-China bloc across Southeast Asia seems far-fetched.

In parallel, Moscow certainly does not welcome a somewhat evolving “Indo-Pacific” US/India/Japan alliance. The undercurrent narrative in Putin’s script could not be more crystal clear: The roadmap for Eurasia integration is all about the coming together of the BRI, EAEU, the SCO and BRICS.

What Will Push Them Over The Edge?

Authored by Jeff Thomas via InternationalMan.com,

Recently, the people of two of Italy’s most prosperous regions voted in a referendum, on whether they wished to have greater autonomy from Rome.

The referendum is non-binding, but that’s not what’s most significant in the results.

What is significant is that over 95% of those who voted in Lombardy did so in favour of greater autonomy. In Veneto, the number in favour of greater autonomy was even higher, at 98%.

Roberto Maroni, president of Lombardy, said, “I now have a commitment… to go to Rome and give concrete actualization to the mandate that millions of Lombards have given me.”

It may appear on the surface that Mister Maroni intends to make an appeal for independence, but this is not what will occur. He’s a politician and won’t invite Rome to jail him for sedition. His goal will instead be to demand that a greater amount of the national income that’s generated by Lombardy and Veneto (about 20% of the total) remains within those regions.

This will not mean that he wants his people to be taxed less; his goal will be to retain a larger portion to be absorbed by the regional governments—to be in his own hands.

So much for the politicians’ agenda. But what does the referendum say about the people of the regions? Well, the extraordinarily high numbers in favour of greater self-determination demonstrate that virtually all the people in the regions have figured out that Rome is bilking them of their earnings and they’re getting pretty cheesed off.

In prosperous times, a population tends not to complain too much about being robbed through taxation. They grumble a bit, but tolerate it. However, in more stringent times, when people are finding it more difficult to make ends meet, they become more resentful of governments that are chronically both overreaching and wasteful.

Since 2008, we’ve been living in such a time, and the longer people go on without a true recovery, the more resentful they’re going to be.

Independence movements have been afoot in many countries in Europe, every state in the USA, and elsewhere on the globe, but, until recently, they’ve been minor issues, attracting primarily fringe support.

Brexit changed all that, as the people of one of the illustrious G7 countries voted to remove themselves from the parasitical EU.

This, of course, inspired the voters of “lesser” countries to consider the possibility of independence more seriously.

Some of these movements have been efforts by largely dependent entities such as Scotland to express the resentment of being the poor step-sister to a more prosperous central government, but others have been the result of the growing resentment that the province or region that’s producing the lion’s share of the national revenue is routinely having it siphoned off by the central government.

It’s predictable that any regional political leader will like the idea of independence, so that he can create his own country and become its president. However, in the present environment, we’re seeing the people of Lombardy, Veneto, Kurdish Iraq, and Catalonia voting overwhelmingly in favour of either full separation, or at least, greater autonomy.

Of course, this can’t be tolerated by the central governments, as it means that they’ll be losing all that revenue and, in many cases, this would collapse their economy.

But, at present, we’re looking at only the thin end of the wedge. There are countless other provinces and regions out there that have a similar desire to secede, and justifiably so.

After all, much of Europe, until the last century or so, was not made up of large countries. It was made up of lots of little tribal areas that sometimes worked collectively. Even the Roman Empire began as a collection of provinces.

Whilst we, today, are accustomed to a world map that’s remained largely the same throughout our lifetimes, there’s actually nothing sacred in the borders that were drawn on maps decades ago, often by people who had never been to those locales (in the case of former colonies and conquered areas). The smaller, tribal areas made more sense and actually worked more in favour of the inhabitants.

But, since World War II, the world has been headed in the direction of über states. The Unites States had already led the way in the late 18th century, but in recent times, the EU was formed and repeatedly expanded. In addition, many organisations have joined groups of countries together (ASEAN, Mercosur, Caricom, etc.).

In each case, the über states were created without the expressed majority interest of the voters. (In EU countries, referenda were sometimes held, but, in no case did a majority of voters vote in favour of joining the EU. The leaders did it in spite of the lack of support.)

Invariably, the über states were created by the political leaders and for the political leaders.

Not surprisingly, in each case in which the people of a province, state, or region have expressed a desire to secede, the central government has forcefully opposed secession. (The Americans fought their civil war, not over slavery, but over secession.)

Today, states such as Texas, which have repeatedly stated both their right and interest in possible secession, have been advised that, if they make such an attempt, they’ll be met with whatever force is required to stop it.

In Catalonia, we’re watching a standoff build between the leaders in Barcelona and Madrid, as each event unfolds.

And Catalonia is a good example of a further reason for a central government to resist the departure of a province: Should Catalonia succeed, there’s the likelihood that the adjoining regions of Valencia and the Balearic Islands might also be inspired to make an exit from Spain, and for the very same reason—because they’re the revenue producers and are having Madrid siphon off their earnings, to be spent on less-productive regions.

Governments have had a long history of claiming, “If we don’t all stick together, we’ll be doomed.” However, historically, the aggressors, more often than not, have been the empires. The smaller a country, the more likely it is to mind its own business.

In addition, the smaller a country, the more closely its leaders are to their people and, correspondingly, the more responsive they are to the people’s needs and goals.

The great majority of the armed conflict that exists today exists either in the larger countries, or, more often, due to the aggression of larger countries.

Brexit has most certainly been the cause of a trend for smaller entities to get up the courage to back away from the parasitical central governments. The hope would be that this trend will expand dramatically.

There can be no doubt that there are those who believe in and are doing their utmost to create a New World Order (they’ve been stating their intent for over a hundred years). Yet, just as we seem to be moving headlong in this direction, a reversal has begun to take place at the same time.

There can be no doubt that the reversal will be resisted strenuously; however, as the voting described above attests, this is a ground-up trend, not a government-generated trend, and, historically, strong ground-up trends have had a healthy track record of success.

*  *  *

Even “successful” independence movements never go smoothly. Extreme economic turmoil is simply built into the game. However, some people always manage to come out the other side much wealthier. We’re sharing how in our Guide to Surviving and Thriving During an Economic Collapse. Click here to download your free PDF copy now.

Japan Sounds Alarm On "Unprecedented, Critical And Imminent” Threat From North Korea

Following the landslide victory by Prime Minister Abe in Japan"s Sunday elections, which left his ruling coalition with a supermajority allowing him to change Japan"s constitution, Abe wasted no time in signalling a push towards his long-held goal of revising Japan"s post-war, pacifist constitution, however as Reuters reported earlier, Abe would "need to convince a divided public to succeed." Parties in favor of amending the U.S.-drafted charter won nearly 80% of the seats in Sunday’s lower house election, leaving the small, new Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) as the biggest group opposed to Abe’s proposed changes. Still, Abe claimed he wanted to get other parties on board, including Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike’s new conservative Party of Hope, and was not insisting on a target of changing the constitution by 2020 that he floated this year.

Yet, despite Abe"s soothing vision, just one day after the election Japan was already setting the groundwork for creating the strawman that would be needed to get public support largely behind Abe"s militant venture.

As a result, Japan’s defense minister said on Monday that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities have grown to an “unprecedented, critical and imminent” level, requiring “different responses” to the threat.

The minister, Itsunori Odonera, was quoted by AP as saying that this rising threat compels his country to endorse the U.S. view that “all options” must be considered, which President Donald Trump says includes possible military action. And since this pivot would require a revised constitution, the next step is already in play.

Odonera’s comments came at the outset of a so-called trilateral meeting in the Philippines (where over the weekend Russia was "delivering" weapons to the Duterte regime, as reported overnight) with U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and South Korea’s defense minister, Song Young-moo. Each made statements about North Korea before a group of reporters and news cameras, but none took questions according to AP.

Mattis was in the Philippines to attend portions of a two-day meeting of defense ministers from the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. He used the occasion to hold a three-way meeting with his counterparts from Japan and South Korea. He is scheduled later in the week to travel to Seoul to attend annual consultative talks with the South Korean government, which is expected to focus mostly on North Korea.

Elevating the North Korea bogeyman to unprecedented levels, and assuring that "no crisis will go to waste", Odonera said North Korea’s most recent underground nuclear test could have been a hydrogen bomb, which is vastly more powerful than an atomic bomb.

“The country has steadfastly improved it nuclear and missiles capability,” said Onodera. He added: “The threat posed by North Korea has grown to the unprecedented, critical and imminent level.”

 

“Therefore, we have to take calibrated and different responses to meet that level of threat,” he said, without elaborating on what “different” responses Japan favors.

Trump has said he will resolve the North Korea problem alone if necessary, to prevent the North from gaining the capability to attack the United States with a nuclear-armed missile.

As usual, the far cooler Mattis - who clearly does not have a constitution-revising agenda - was much more reserved in his remarks than Onodera, although he did slam Pyongyang for defying U.N. Security Council resolutions against its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. But the U.S. defense secretary did not mention any potential military action. Mattis instead emphasized a unified U.S.-Japan-South Korea position in pressuring the North to give up its nuclear program.

“North Korea’s provocations threaten regional and global security,” he said.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s defense minister, Song, said that North Korea’s behavior is “becoming worse and worse.” In brief remarks to reporters, earlier on Monday Song was asked about the risk of war against North Korea.

“I want to emphasize that war is not as easy as the journalists make it sound in the press and the media,” he said. “As defense ministers who are in charge of national defense and other high tech weapons such as ballistic missiles, we understand the very weight of engaging in a war and as such we will make all the efforts necessary to resolve the issue in a diplomatic and economic way as possible.”

He added: “However, if we are attacked then we will have to take firm actions.”

Most importantly, however, is that it has been a month since North Korea has engaged in any provocative actions, and contrary to expectations that it would launch a ballistic missile in early and mid October, so far Pyongyang has - despite launching the occasional verbal grande at Trump - kept a low profile. Which considering it is now in Japan"s best interest to have a provocative neighbor who will greenlight the desired constitutional changes, will likely change in the near future.

Oil Giants At Odds As Saudi-Russian Ties Improve

Authored by Nicholas Trickett via OilPrice.com,

Oil Royalties

Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud visited Moscow last Wednesday, the first such visit by a Saudi monarch since the Soviet Union collapsed. Two topics dominated the agenda: Syria and oil. Saudi Arabia has likely found itself in the uncomfortable position of accepting Assad’s grip on power into the future in hopes of drawing Russia further away from Tehran in trying to resolve the Syrian Civil War. To that end, Saudi Arabia is reportedly buying Russia’s S-400 missile system and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on industrial cooperation in the defense sector. Saudi Arabia is trying to use its leverage – financial resources – to influence Russia on other priority areas, namely Iran. As expected, energy played a big role during the visit and deals associated with it.

Reports say that $3 billion in projects have been agreed to between the two countries, including a $1.1 billion petrochemical plant to be constructed in Saudi Arabia by Russia’s Sibur and an agreement between Saudi Aramco and Gazprom Neft on drilling technology. A $1 billion investment fund for energy and technology was also announced. Russia and Saudi Arabia have worked together to try and raise crude prices by lowering production 1.8 million bpd with other producers. But these cuts have disproportionately affected Saudi Arabia’s standing on Asian markets and Russia’s state oil major Rosneft has jumped at the chance to grab market share and assets in Asia. As is so often the case, today’s solutions laid the seeds of tomorrow’s conflict. Saudi Aramco and Rosneft are positioning for a post-cut market, and Saudi Arabia may be offering cooperation to spite Qatar as well as temper the risks of its increasingly active foreign policy and proxy wars with Iran.  

China Syndrome

China has understandably played the leading role in Russia’s attempts to broaden its role as an energy supplier in Asia. Rosneft recently sold 14.16 percent of its shares to CEFC China Energy for about $9 billion by way of the Qatar Investment Authority and Glencore. The move reflected the challenges financial sanctions have created for the firm as well as China’s growing clout as an importer. Chinese demand hit 11.67 million barrels per day (bpd) and had risen 6 percent year-on-year in July. Rosneft was smart to finalize supply agreements with PetroChina set to boost its daily exports to China from 400,000 bpd to 600,000 bpd next year. Rosneft also signed an agreement with CEFC to jointly explore for Eastern Siberian reserves and increase direct deliveries to China.

These deals play into Russian-Saudi competition for the Chinese market. China’s oil imports are up 12.3 percent year-on-year, but cuts haven’t hit Russian exports. Saudi oil exports to China hovered at 1.03 million bpd so far this year, a 1.7 percent drop. Russia’s stood at 1.16 million bpd, a 13.2 percent increase. After closing the CEFC deal, Rosneft announced it expected to deliver 40 million tons of oil to China by year’s end, a 9 million ton increase on their expected deliveries. That would average out to around 800,000 bpd from Rosneft alone, assuring Rosneft’s dominant control over Russian supplies to the Chinese market. The increase in supplies has paralleled a long-standing project to develop a refinery in Tianjin. But the project, first announced in 2009, has no clear end date despite a press release concerning its implementation with CNPC in January.

Saudi Arabia has disproportionately lost share in China for several reasons. For one, it bears the burden of cut compliance. Angola overtook it because of China’s dominant position there and didn’t feel the need to comply. For another, Russian firms have built up new assets and export capacity in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Russian blends have more physical access to Asia-Pacific markets, making them more competitive than they’ve historically been. Finally, spreads on the market between light and heavy crude have narrowed, making Russia’s lighter crudes more competitive against Saudi heavy crudes. But Saudi Arabia is not without a means of responding.

Saudi Aramco reached a refinery deal with state-owned China North Industries Group Corp. in May around the Belt and Road summit. Though the refinery is smaller than that proposed in Tianjin, Saudi Aramco has one considerable advantage over Rosneft: it lacks the same messy history Rosneft has with China’s state firms and it’s not sanctioned. CEFC was a logical partner for Rosneft in China because, unlike CNPC and state-owned players, it could more easily afford to take the sanctions risk. It can also dangle shares to China. Further, the refinery deal signals a willingness to work with China’s independent refiners. These so-called “teapot” refineries have driven demand growth and provide Aramco greater diversity in business opportunities longer-term than Rosneft’s relationships with CNPC and CEFC afford it.

Ever since the company started talking about an IPO of 5 percent of its shares, China has been a logical partner. A sale to Chinese firms in exchange for investments into China’s downstream would be huge win. The Kingdom also signed a similar agreement for an investment platform with China worth $20 billion in late August, just as it became clear CEFC would acquire stakes in Rosneft. That throws a fair bit of shade on Russia’s $1 billion fund agreed to this last visit. Topping it all off, King Salman and Aramco also signed deals reportedly worth $65 billion with China in March.

Judging Saudi Arabia’s position against Russia’s on daily barrel counts alone is misleading. But Rosneft has signaled intentions to buy some Sinopec assets in Argentina, a move presaging greater interest in China’s petrochemical market. To access that market, it will need Sinopec in particular, a state firm, to ignore sanctions risks. If Aramco can beef up its relationships with private firms and independent refiners, it can limit Rosneft’s room to develop synergies between upstream and downstream operations on the Chinese market.

The Kingdom and India

Rosneft made a major splash by acquiring 98.6 percent of India’s Essar Oil with partners Trafigura and United Capital Partners, gaining the company’s refinery in Vadinar, a port, and 3,500 filling stations. The Vadinar refinery has a daily capacity of 400,000 bpd and assures Rosneft access to India’s growing oil market. However, the sale was meant to deleverage 60 percent of the Essar Group’s debt. There remains the perception that Indian firms lost out on the country’s growing downstream sector. India’s Intelligence Bureau and Home Ministry also red-flagged the deal on security grounds, citing the port’s proximity to the border with Pakistan and nearby military installations. Whatever the reason, there’s clearly significant concerns in India about the sale.

Saudi Aramco was bidding for the Vadinar refinery but didn’t match Rosneft’s willingness to pay off billions in Essar’s debt. As King Salman was in Moscow on Wednesday, Aramco issued statements that it plans to open an Indian subsidiary in the coming weeks. Back in June, the company showed its interest in exclusive talks with Indian counterparts like Indian Oil Corp., Hindustan Petroleum Corp., and Bharat Petroleum Corp. for a stake of a proposed 1.2 million bpd refinery on India’s west coast. Prime Minister Modi is likely facing pressure from two directions on the country’s energy security needs: China has thrown considerable financial resources at Saudi Arabia and now owns shares of Rosneft and India’s firms would be better positioned on Asia-Pacific oil markets with a more diverse array of international partners.

Saudi Arabia’s exports to India dropped 8.4 percent in the first half of 2017 as Russia has begun exporting more. Rosneft already owns an asset, though the US Treasury Department did throw up roadblocks last year. That places it firmly ahead on India’s market. But Saudi Aramco is most likely taking a hit now in the name of driving up prices for its public listing, which will provide a cash infusion exponentially larger than that gained from Rosneft’s privatization of shares last December considering estimates for Aramco’s market valuation. India is also signing more supply deals for exports from the US. Aramco has much better relationships on the U.S. market, particularly evidenced by its complete ownership of the Port Arthur refinery and its 600,000 bpd capacity. The U.S. Senate is looking to scrutinize any potential Rosneft acquisition of Citgo by way of Venezuela. Needless to say that Rosneft has few friends in the United States these days.

The ASEAN+ way forward

Aramco has moved to secure its position in Southeast Asia ahead of its IPO even though production cuts have led it to cut Southeast Asian exports to protect market share on larger markets like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Despite lower exports, Saudi Aramco bought a 50 percent stake of the PRPC Polymers project from Petronas Chemicals Group Berhad (PCG), signing a strategic partnership agreement. Aramco is investing $7 billion into the project, slated for completion in 2019, and will provide up to 70 percent of the petrochemical plant’s crude oil needs.

Last December, Aramco reached an agreement with Indonesia’s Pertamina for a $5 billion expansion and 45 percent stake of a refinery. The expansion, slated for completion in 2021, will put the refinery’s capacity at 400,000 bpd. Aramco sources most of the refinery’s crude supplies. Pertamina and Rosneft are reportedly expected to finalize a refinery deal at the end of this year for a new refinery at the same ownership split, but Pertamina is unlikely to get access to Russian upstream projects.

Russian crude blends have been more attractive to refiners in Northeast Asia but Saudi Arabia has defended its turf. Aramco held on to 40 percent of Japan’s imports in the first half of 2017 without any sustained gains for Russian crudes and agreed to add 1.9 million barrels of crude oil storage on Okinawa. The storage site on Okinawa is also used to deliver crude oil cargoes to South Korea and China. Rosneft has no such relationships, reportedly dangling shares before last year’s privatization in exchange for developing joint projects and creating joint ventures at different stages of production and marketing. But Japanese firms linked political concessions regarding the Northern Territories to any deal, a nonstarter.

Saudi Arabia is mulling the construction of 17.6 gigawatts worth of nuclear power plants by 2032 with the help of firms from China, South Korea, and France. South Korea is set to hold a ministerial visit on October 26 to discuss cooperation in several sectors, including nuclear power. As Saudi Arabia works out the tenders for nuclear projects, it has an opportunity to cement its energy security relationship with South Korea. Nuclear power will free up oil used for domestic power generation, possibly putting downward pressure on prices in Asia-Pacific markets as demand growth slows in the medium-term. Russia’s Rosatom has not gotten any attention for Saudi contracts.

The best laid plans of oil giants

Cooperation is set to deepen between the two countries’ energy sectors, but Rosneft and Aramco have different strategic outlooks that suggest that many of these moves are tactical on Saudi Arabia’s part and opportunistic on Russia’s part.

Most of the deals signed were MoUs, important symbols but relatively insubstantial commitments from either party unless more specifics emerge. Deals focused on Eurasia Drilling Co. and Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2. MoUs touched on Sibur, Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil’s trading arm Litasco. There was talk of cooperation between Rosneft and Aramco on crude oil trades, but there is a fundamental mismatch between the two countries’ intentions: Russia wants investment without political strings attached and Saudi Arabia wants Russia to back off of Iran.

Aramco targeted Rosneft’s competitors for memoranda and deals that would lead to projects for several reasons. Were Gazprom to gain access to Saudi fields or allow Aramco into Russia, it would gain considerable clout as a negotiator and lobby for policy pertaining to Saudi Arabia. Sibur is owned by Gennady Timchenko, a close friend of Putin’s who was named chair of the Russia-China Business Council. China has shown policy success by investing into projects owned by those close to Putin while balancing against drawing too much sanctions scrutiny. In short, Aramco wants to give other players in Russian policy circles a boost against their primary Russian competitor.

The U.S. Treasury Department revised its sanctions prohibitions on new debt on September 29, tightening the limits on Rosneft’s ability to finance major deals with U.S. partners. EU sanctions continue to target state oil firms like Rosneft rather than gas and remain an impediment. Rosneft’s debt to capital ratio has improved in the last year, a good sign for its fiscal health but not necessarily enough to avoid the byzantine dealing it went through for the privatization of shares last December. For its part, Aramco is set to benefit from up to $120 billion in debt Saudi Arabia is aiming to issue by 2020 as the country looks to increase its investments into renewables like solar. That debt alongside the IPO is likely to happen sometime late next year or early 2019 and will provide a dramatic infusion to state coffers to finance reform projects aimed at reducing Saudi Arabia’s oil dependency.

Aramco is set to take its trading operations further afield to begin trading non-Saudi crude oil with an eye towards feeding its growing range of refinery and petrochemical assets. The company is retreating to advance by targeting competitive moves into downstream projects and trading to minimize the effects of losses in market share. The issue remains that higher oil prices are needed for the IPO to maximize the money raised to finance projects like a $50 billion renewable energy initiative that would increase the amount of oil available for export.

Rosneft would also like higher prices, but has already sold all the shares it can while remaining a state-owned firm. CEO Igor Sechin is also fighting to undermine any institutional or informal constraints on his power in the country. Gazprom’s piped gas export monopoly, for example, is in his crosshairs. As a result, Rosneft has no time to waste. It’s going full bore, trying to acquire assets abroad to break out of the financial limitations of sanctions and grow and larger portfolio, expanding Russia’s foreign influence. There’s a reason the company has maneuvered in Venezuela, Kurdistan, and Libya in the last year.

Rather than count barrels, it would be best to consider how the two firms’ interests differ. Rosneft is feeding large amounts of military spending in Russia and is angling for greater power domestically. To a much greater extent, Aramco is the state in Saudi Arabia. It can afford a more measured approach given it always has the nuclear option: a radical break with production cuts and massive increase in production. As such, Aramco is preparing for an Asia-Pacific market where diversifying petrochemical assets will outweigh crude oil market share for profits. Rosneft is moving in the same direction, but may find that sanctions and domestic rivalry will hinder its attempts. Sechin has been on a winning streak for some time, but the elections may change things up. Aramco doesn’t have that problem looming on the horizon.

Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis: George Soros, Oil, & Lessons For India

"When George Soros comes to this or that country... he looks for religious, ethnic or social contradictions, chooses the model of action for one of these options or their combination and tries to "warm them up"," Egorchenkov explained...

 The ongoing crisis in Myanmar including tensions between Buddhist and Muslim communities and the military crackdown by Myanmar Army and police seems to be a multidimensional crisis with major geopolitical players involved according to a report by Sputnik International.

As per the report Dmitry Mosyakov, director of the Centre for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told RT that the conflict “was apparently fanned by external global players” and “has at least three dimensions”.

“First, this is a game against China, as China has very large investments in Arakan [Rakhine],” Mosyakov told RT.

“Second, it is aimed at fuelling Muslim extremism in Southeast Asia….

Third, it’s the attempt to sow discord within ASEAN [between Myanmar and Muslim-dominated Indonesia and Malaysia].”

The conflict is mostly concentrated in the country’s northwestern region in the Rakhine State which consists of vast reserves of hydrocarbons located offshore. This vast reserve of hydrocarbon is the major reason why external players are using the conflict to undermine Southeast Asian stability, according to Mosyakov.

“There’s a huge gas field named Than Shwe after the general who had long ruled Burma,” Mosyakov said.

In 2004 this massive Rakhine energy reserves were discovered and by 2013 China had connected Myanmar’s port of Kyaukphyu with the Chinese city of Kunming in Yunnan province with oil and natural gas pipelines. Through this oil pipeline China can bypass the world’s most congested shipping choke points – the Malacca Straits, while through the gas pipeline hydrocarbons from Myanmar’s offshore fields are transported to China.

The development of the Sino-Myanmar energy project coincided with the intensification of the Rohingya conflict in 2011-2012 when 120,000 asylum seekers left the country escaping the bloodshed.

Dmitry Egorchenkov, deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognosis at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia doesn’t believe that this is a coincidence. Although there are certain internal causes behind the Rohingya crisis, Dmitry believes that the crisis might be fueled by external players, most notably, George Soros.

By destabilizing Myanmar they could directly target China’s energy projects.

George Soros funded Burma Task Force has been actively operating in Myanmar since 2013 although Soros interference in Myanmar’s domestic affairs goes deeper than that.

In 2003, George Soros joined a US Task Force group aimed at increasing “US cooperation with other countries to bring about a long overdue political, economic and social transformation in Burma [Myanmar].”

A document published by the Council of Foreign Relation’s (CFR) in 2003 entitled “Burma: Time For Change,” states that “democracy… cannot survive in Burma without the help of the United States and the international community” and calls for an establishment of a group to implement the project.

“When George Soros comes to this or that country… he looks for religious, ethnic or social contradictions, chooses the model of action for one of these options or their combination and tries to ‘warm them up,"” Egorchenkov explained, speaking with RT.

According to Mosyakov, it is a globalist management policy to sow discord in nations by fuelling regional conflicts which allows them to exert pressure on those nations and ultimately gain control over their sovereignty. A recent example is the Ukrainian Crisis and the Greek Crisis before that. When the flames are out and the country ravaged with the crisis, it is time for the vultures to descend.

“BUY WHEN THERE IS BLOOD ON THE STREETS, EVEN IF THE BLOOD IS YOUR OWN”

– THESE ARE THE WORDS OF NATHAN MAYER ROTHSCHILD OF THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD, ONE OF THE FAMILY BLOODLINES THAT CONTROLLED THE EAST INDIA COMPANIES.

What one should understand is that a crisis just doesn’t take a toll on the infrastructure and human lives but it also ruptures the economy and puts the country in huge debt. And it is through this debt that the global players dictate their terms to sovereign nations for decades or even centuries if there is no course correction. That is the reason why both Ukraine and Greece appointed Rothschild as their debt adviser to assist with their growing debt crisis.

Lesson for India

What he means by Sudarshan Chakra is to sell off Indian PSU Banks to foreign players via #PARA, as we report here https://t.co/ucCH8U3wek

— GreatGameIndia (@GreatGameIndia) September 8, 2017

Even India is hunting for a solution to its Bad-Debt Crisis (read the corporate loans that state-owned banks wrote off, which were taken by arousing nationalistic sentiments in the media) which is a Rs 1.14 lakh crore (this is a conservative figure) scam as we explained in our special Demonetization issue War on Cash. However, a solution has already been prescribed by the deputy governor of Reserve Bank of India, Viral Acharya. His solution is to simple sell-off state owned units to foreign players bankrupted in the 2008 crisis. You can read all about it here – PARA – A New Central Bank For Strategic Sale Of India.

These Money Masters doesn’t lose anything in case the situation escalates and war erupts between China and Myanmar, infact they have everything to gain from it; just like they had everything to gain from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Educated folks call it Balance of Power. It is through this same strategy of Balance of Power that even the India-China conflict is being orchestrated. But we don’t have to rely on war to be in debt, our policy makers are already doing a good job at it. We are already in the midst of a major crisis, be it agriculture, economy, civil society and press or defense and security. This is the direction our policy makers have set for us, and it leads directly to destruction, unless we do a major course correction.

Could such a crisis be orchestrated in India?

This is the hypothetical question we raised after Liquor baron Vijay Mallya was allowed to flee India to take refuge in London. This was not the first time a person fleeing local law in foreign countries had taken shelter in London. Since decades, high-profile foreign offenders with considerable wealth have found refuge and a safe place to park their assets and enjoy a peaceful life in Britain.

Similar is the case of Russia. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union large-scale privatization of state-owned assets was implemented. From Glasnost and Perestroika (liberalization and privatization or globalization) – the tools created by the East India Company for enslavement of their colonies (known at the time as Free Trade) emerged the Oligarchs – who amassed vast wealth by acquiring state assets very cheaply (or for free) during the privatization process.

After coming to power Vladimir Putin set about on a massive purging of these oligarchs from Russia, the power struggle that continues to this day. The most famous case is that of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In 2003, Khodorkovsky was believed to be the wealthiest man in Russia (with a fortune estimated to be worth $15 billion) who accumulated considerable wealth through obtaining control of a series of Siberian oil fields unified under the name Yukos, one of the major companies to emerge from the privatization of state assets during the 1990s. Khodorkovsky was later backed up by Henry Kissinger, George Soros and Rothschilds as a candidate to run for a Presidential election against Putin as well as for an attempted revolution.

UK has been traditionally the largest sanctuary to not just money launderers and fraudsters but foreign terrorists and extremists as well. Everybody, who is somebody in the world of terrorism, has found a rear base in the UK.

There are as many as 131 pending pleas for extradition of wanted criminals from Britain by India alone.

Below are just some of the cases of individuals wanted in India and living in Britain:

1. Vijay Mallya (financial offences)


2. Lalit Modi (financial offences)


3. Ravi Shankaran (accused in the Indian Navy war room leak case)


4. Tiger Hanif (wanted in connection with two bomb attacks in Gujarat in 1993)


5. Nadeem Saifi (music director accused and acquitted in the Gulshan Kumar murder)


6. Raymond Varley (accused in child abuse cases in Goa)


7. Lord Sudhir Choudhrie (one of India’s most notorious arms-dealers and Italian consortium’s middleman in Finmeccanica helicopter scandal)


8. Several individuals related to the Khalistan movement


9. Several individuals related to the LTTE


10. Several individuals related to ISIS

Even MQM leader Altaf Hussein resides in London, under the protection of the British government, which has refused Pakistani government requests for his extradition to face trial for murder.

Last year, Khodorkovsky said Open Russia (a George Soros funded organisation) would provide logistical backing to 230 candidates running from various opposition parties or on independent tickets in September from the headquarters of his Open Russia foundation in London. With rise of Indian Oligarchs increasingly finding asylum in Britain, is it a far-fetched scenario for India as well when these Indian Oligarchs would be used for inciting revolution in India or even orchestrating elections – that is in case India goes for course correction?

Even so, there is a way to avert such a scenario as well as the impending crisis.

After Putin kicked them out of Russia the same Oligarchs setup shop in India under the same tried and tested ideology of enslavement – Glasnost and Perestroika (called in India as Liberalization and Privatization) during the 90s.

It is this group of Oligarchs or Robber Barons (as they are known in the United States of America) that is still operational in India.

What our intelligence agencies should be doing instead of spying on opposition political parties and depending on foreign agencies for information and direction is to track this shadow network and dismantle its grip on India as was done in America (the process that still continues to this day).

Japan's Shifting Power Alliances

Authored by Nomi Prins via The Daily Reckoning,

I’ve just wrapped up a long trip to Japan. And I’ve taken away one lesson from all of my conversations, speeches and research: The rise of nationalism in the U.S. will cause massive shifts in global trade alliances.

One of the main beneficiaries will be Japan. Now, Japan might not be on your radar, day-to-day, but it’s about to play a very important role in the world of Donald Trump.

Here’s what I mean…

During President Trump’s campaign, he often discussed making “better” trade deals for the United States with its partners.

Indeed, one of his first executive orders as President on January 23, 2017 involved removing the U.S. from the Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement, or TPP. That agreement originally involved 12 countries including the U.S.

Now, TPP is left with 11: Japan, Mexico, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. The TPP’s member countries account for 40 percent of global GDP, 20 percent of global trade, and 11.3 percent of the world’s population. It will still likely go ahead without the U.S., which will put America at a trading disadvantage.

However, this offers Japan good news for future trade and projects. Japan is well positioned to benefit both from existing alliances with the U.S. and growing ones in the rest of the world, particularly with China and the EU.

Another key agreement, called the RCEP, also excludes the U.S. but includes Japan. It represents 16 countries that account for almost half the world’s population, contribute 24% percent of global GDP and over a quarter of world exports.

The countries are Japan, Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. The economic and population growth rates of the RCEP countries far outpaces that of the U.S. and EU.

This trend of non-U.S. trade alliances is more pronounced than ever for three reasons:

First, because of the United Kingdom vote for Brexit last summer, which cast into flux the future trade and capital flows between the U.K. and its trading partners.

The second reason is the Trump doctrine of bilateral rather than multi-lateral trade agreements. Taking the U.S. out of critical multilateral contention during an intense period of international re-alignment means more economic opportunity for other budding alliances as well as a long-term power shift.  This would benefit Japan.

Finally, there is the ongoing West to East shift of power and influence. Since the Federal Reserve and its cohorts at the ECB and BOJ embarked upon quantitative easing, or asset buying to bolster the markets, debt to GDP levels in those areas jumped as well. Respectively, they are 90.1 percent for the ECB, 104.3 percent for the U.S., and 250.4 percent for Japan).

Nomi Prins delivering a speech to Canon Institute for Global Studies in Japan. Canon is a prestigious think tank populated with former government and central bank officials, and academics.

Pushback, particularly from China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has resulted in the yuan’s inclusion into the IMF’s special drawing right, or SDR. This is a way of securing currency flows and challenging the world’s main reserve currency, the U.S. dollar.

Japan stands ready to benefit from both its existing relationship with the U.S. and its involvement with China, the EU and other regional agreements.

All that said, the U.S. and Japan still represent about 30 percent of global GDP. With so much in flux worldwide and in Asia, their combined strength and diplomatic ties could prove more fruitful for both countries if translated quickly to real infrastructure building and development projects. These could create long-term demand for knowledge, supplies and jobs.

New Infrastructure Projects for Japan

The last time I was in Tokyo was a week after the U.S. election when I addressed the Tokyo stock exchange. There was much interest from the Japanese as to what the Trump presidency would mean for Japan, particularly in the areas of defense and trade.

Six months into Trump’s administration, that interest remains acute. In February, President Trump addressed military and defense, saying he is committed to “the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control.”

This was a victory for Abe, who came to Washington to develop a sense of trust with Trump and a solidification of the post-WWII U.S.-Japan alliance.

A White House statement confirmed policy continuity, noting, “Amid an increasingly difficult security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States will strengthen its presence in the region, and Japan will assume larger roles and responsibilities in the alliance.”

From the standpoint of joint infrastructure projects, there are other, nearer term synergies that are also attractive investment opportunities.

Since the beginning of the Trump administration, there have been two official visits between President Trump and Prime Minister Abe. Trump has not been to Japan as President yet but it’s rumored that he has a trip planned for November.

Meanwhile, the two leaders just met at the G20 summit in Hamburg, Germany. Before that meeting, Japan and the EU signed a historic, free trade agreement that will greatly increase trade and coordination between the two regions.

This is yet another sign about how eager Japan is to take a bigger position on the world stage. As the U.S. adopts a more nationalist tone to trade, major trading partners like Japan are looking for more regional capacity building. By diversifying international agreements, Japan could solidify its security while re-establishing itself as a reemerging Asian powerhouse.

Japan is also eager to get more involved in major infrastructure projects around the world. Just last week, the Japanese government set a new goal for Japan Inc., a network of corporate allegiances supporting construction, labor, and jobs. The goal is to export 30 trillion yen ($268 billion) worth of infrastructure packages by 2020.

According to its just-released draft plans, Japan Inc. will seek involvement in infrastructure projects over multiple phases, spanning development through post-completion, providing on-the-ground ongoing operational, maintenance, personnel training and consulting services.

Japan Inc. plans are multinational. The group, or its participating companies, could target India to get involved in the development of bullet trains and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for high-speed rail systems and non-public transportation projects.

Japan Emerges in High-Speed Competition

Japan, Inc. also launched a competitive move against China for a high-speed train from Malaysia to Thailand. This is a 350-kilometer link project, worth about $14 billion. Winning that, or a portion of that contract, could prove a boon for Japanese construction and engineering companies.

The winning company would be responsible for the design and construction of the railway systems, including tracks, power, signaling and telecommunications. The train will have a maximum operating speed of 320 kilometers per hour and cut travel time between the capitals to 90 minutes, compared with nearly five hours by car.

But there’s more. Japan, Inc. is also angling for the U.S. maglev train project. The initial leg is estimated at $10 billion to build — the Japan Bank of International Cooperation has offered to pay half of the cost.

Reuters (CNBC) reported on Feb. 3 that Tokyo had proposed an investment package for Trump that could generate 700,000 U.S. jobs and help create a $450 billion market. The proposal was in line with Abe’s strategy of promoting Japanese high-tech exports and expertise overseas.

Reuters sources also noted that Japan was proposing to invest 17 trillion yen (US$150 billion) in public and private funds in the U.S. over the next decade.

Japan’s main regional competitor, China, has also been gaining momentum on regional and international projects. Japan has missed some bids there, but it has the opportunity to use its unique favored-nation position with the U.S., and as a major partner in the ASEAN and RCEP agreements, to be well-placed to pick up fresh, lucrative contracts.

Topping that all off, Japan’s new free trade agreement with the EU will be the third largest in the world. It’s expected to benefit both powers immediately by removing tariffs for a number of products, including electronics, sake and tea from Japan.

If the Trump administration makes good on its promise to build cooperation with the Japanese, collaborating on infrastructure projects would only further Japan’s position in the region.