Does Australia Believe in International Law: The Case of Syria

One of the most common phrases heard from senior Australian government officials including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister is Australia’s belief in what it is pleased to call the “rules based international order.” This phrase is usually used in the context of implied or explicit criticism of another nation with whom Australia is in disagreement. For example, Australia is very prone to criticizing Russia’s “annexation” of Crimea, or China’s assertion of its claimed rights in the South China Sea.

The inference one is expected to draw is that other countries may breach international law but Australia is a model of probity by comparison. This claim looks slightly tattered in the light of Australia’s manifest breaches of international instruments that it is a signatory to in its treatment of refugees, or the bullying of East Timor over the development of maritime resources.

As serious as these matters are they pale in comparison with the waging of a war against another sovereign nation. The history of Australia’s involvement in the waging of a war against the sovereign government of Syria is a case in point.

On 16 September 2014 the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott gave an interview to the ABC. In the interview he expressed as reservations about Australia becoming involved in a war that was being conducted by the United States, mainly through its support of proxy terrorist groups who it was financing and arming in conjunction with its allies Saudi Arabia and Israel.

”The legalities” he said, “of operating inside Syria are quite different from the legalities of operating in Iraq at the request and in support of the Iraqi government.”

Two weeks after that interview the Australian government received legal advice dated 30 September 2014 that it failed to disclose or even indicate that it had received such advice. Abbott was overthrown in an internal coup by Malcolm Turnbull on 15 September 2015.

One week prior to the coup Australia had written a letter to the United Nations Security Council on 9 September 2015. In that letter Australia claimed that the United States was justified in making military strikes against Syria on the basis that Syria was “unwilling and unable” to prevent the use of its territory to conduct terrorist attacks against Iraq.

Curiously, the United States made the same claim in its letter to the Security Council justifying its actions on Syrian sovereign territory, but their letter was dated 23 September 2014. In other words, it took a whole year and a change of prime minister to persuade Australia that its actions could be justified in terms of the “unwilling and unable” doctrine. We do not know why the Australian government changed its mind, particularly as it had been sitting on legal advice about the advisability or otherwise of joining the Syrian war for nearly a year.

We do not know because the matter has never been debated in the Australian parliament and neither has the Australian government released the legal advice, which it had received in September 2014. Rather, its public statements on the matter have being misleading. For example, in August 2015 the Foreign Minister said that no decision would be made on whether to join the American assault upon Syria until it had received legal advice. She did not disclose that the Australian government had in fact received the legal advice nearly a year earlier.

As the government has refused to release the legal advice we do not know whether or not that advice relied upon the “unwilling or unable doctrine.” It is not a minor matter as the status of such a doctrine can best be described as dubious in international law, and without that fig leaf of legal respectability, there is no other basis upon which Australia could claim any entitlement to wage war in Syria.

Interestingly, when the Foreign Minister Julie Bishop was interviewed on ABC radio after the publication of an article by this writer criticizing the illegality of the decision, she claimed that the decision to join the war in Syria was made “pursuant to the collective self defence provisions of the article 51 of the UN Charter, and at the request of the Iraqi government”. No mention at all was made of the reliance upon the “unwilling or unable” doctrine.

There were a number of problems with the Foreign Minister’s explanation. First, the Office of the Prime Minister of Iraq issued a statement saying that it had made no such request of the Australian government. No written evidence of any such request has ever been produced by the Australian government. Furthermore, in their own letter to the Security Council dated 20 September 2014 the Iraq government had only asked for help within its own territorial boundaries to enable it to regain control of its own borders.

Specifically, Iraq did not invoke article 51 of the UN charter. The linking of an explicit request for help in the exercise of collective self-defence is legally significant as it is a precondition for the involvement of third nations, as has been recognised international law since the Nicaragua Case in 1986.

Equally curiously, neither the United States nor Australia that reportedly rely upon the “unwilling or unable” doctrine mentioned collective self defence in the numerous debates that took place in the Security Council before 30 September 2015, more than one year after strikes against Syria began.

The Syrian government has consistently protested in formal letters to the Security Council against the involvement of Australia and others on their territory. In their letter of 21 September 2015 to the Security Council Syria again complained that the actions of Australia and others did not follow any consultation with the Syrian government and that Australia (and others) had distorted both the provisions of international law and the UN Charter.

A similar complaint has been made by the Russian government, who unlike the United States and it’s so called coalition allies, is in Syria at the specific request of the sovereign Syrian government. Iranian, Iraqi and Hezbollah troops operating in Syria are similarly there at the request of the Syrian government.

Neither did Australia call upon the numerous relevant resolutions of both the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly is providing legitimacy for its position. Not a single one of those resolutions makes any reference to either article 51 or the unwilling or unable argument.

On the contrary, United Nations Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) specifically called upon “member states to cooperate and consistently support each other’s efforts to counter violent extremism”. On the 19^th of September 2014 the Security Council reaffirmed “it’s respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in accordance with the UN Charter.”

On 18 December 2014 the General Assembly reaffirmed “it’s strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and to the principles of the Charter.” There is no single document emanating from either the Security Council or the General Assembly that approves any unilateral military action, much less one relying upon the dubious doctrine of “unwilling or unable.”

This is hardly surprising. To adopt such a doctrine would significantly lower the thresholds contained in both Article 2.4 (the general prohibition on the use of force) and Article 51 (self defence) of the Charter. The Armed Activities decision of the International Court of Justice (2005) reinforces this view. The court expressly stated that the inability to put an end to irregular military activities does not justify a violation of Article 2.4.

Applied to the Syrian situation, the fact that as of 2015 Syria and it’s Russian, Iraqi, and Hezbollah allies had not then succeeded in defeating the ISIS terrorists did not justify third party intervention. Bishop’s statement and Australia’s letter to the Security Council is based on the assumption that Article 51 could be applied two non-state actors such as ISIS.

There is absolutely no support for this view, neither in international law texts nor any judgement all the International Court of Justice. Even if Iraq had asked for Australia’s help, as claimed by Bishop but refuted by the Iraqi Government, it would still be insufficient to justify Australia attacking Syrian territory. Under Article 39 of the UN Charter it is the Security Council that is the competent body to determine any threats to peace and to make the appropriate recommendations to restore International peace and security.

It is increasingly clear that the Syrian government with the assistance of its legitimate allies has succeeded in almost completely liberating its major cities from the terrorist occupation they have suffered for many years. This is despite the blatant obstruction by the United States that continues to support its proxy terrorist allies, and has openly attacked Syrian government forces, as well as occupying Syrian territory and setting up military bases. It has declared its intention to remain in Syria, despite the complete absence of any legal justification for doing so.

The Australian government for its part has made a token reduction in its military operations in Syria, but typically refuses to disclose details; continues to criticize the Syrian government; and remains unwavering in its support for the continuing illegal actions of the United States in Syria. It also seems incapable of acknowledging the critical role played by Russia in helping the sovereign Syrian government rid its territory of the terrorist menace.

Given that the fig leaf of legal respectability that the Australian government claimed for itself in respect of Syria has been demolished both in the legal and practical terms the time is now long past for the Australian government to withdraw completely for all military operations in Syria, and take some steps to match its rhetoric about its compliance with, and adherence to, the rules based international order with its actions.

James O’Neill, an Australian-based Barrister at Law, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Australia’s Dilemma: The Quad or its National Interest

In 2005 Japan raised the possibility of a separate grouping of four nations, Australia, India, Japan and the United States, as a potential counterweight to the growing power of China. It was an ill-considered notion then, and nothing has happened since then to make it a better idea. If anything, it is a worse idea now that was 12 years ago.

Notwithstanding the illogicality and counter-productive nature of the proposal we see the same four nations yet again raising the possibility of a “Quad” alliance. The one constant factor apart from the profound stupidity of the idea is that having an ambition to constrain China remains at the core. That Australia should even contemplate joining such an ad hoc alliance highlights the fundamental dilemma confronting Australia’s foreign policy.

On the one hand Australian foreign policy and defence commentators, strategists and politicians constantly reiterate that United States is the cornerstone or bedrock of Australia’s security strategy. The rhetoric surrounding this reached its apogee last year with Prime Minister Turnbull declaring that Australia and the United States were “joined at the hip” on defence and security issues.

On the other hand however, not only is Australia geographically located in the Asia-Pacific region, its trade and other relationships are increasingly integrated into what the Australian defence planners used to call “Australia’s Near North.”

The recently released trade statistics for the 2016-2017 calendar years are revealing. Of total exports of $291.4 billion, 71.8% went to the East Asia market (China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan). This compares with just under $19 billion for the whole of the European Union, and less than $17 billion for the whole of the Americas, from Canada to Patagonia. That latter figure was actually a decline of 5.9% over the previous year.

Conversely, trade with China rose 27.1%, Hong Kong 45.7%, Japan 17.4% and South Korea 15%.

In 2015 Australia signed both a free trade agreement with China, and also membership of the China initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

In December 2017 however, Australia was participating in a meeting in India, the so-called Raisina Dialogue, attended by the next US ambassador to Australia, well known Sinophobe Admiral Harry Harris, and the naval chiefs of staff of Japan, India and Australia.

In addressing the meeting, Harris said “the reality is that China is a disruptive transitional force in the Indo Pacific. They are the owner of the trust deficit that we have spent the last hour or so talking about.”

Harris’s terminology reflected the language of the latest Pentagon defence strategy, released in December 2017, that label to China and Russia “revisionist powers bent on undermining the international rules based order” and accused China of “predatory economics” that sees its expression in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

It was no coincidence that the theme of the Raisina Dialogue was “managing disruptive transitions.” In one sense that is true. The BRI will certainly “disrupt” the existing order, both in trade and geopolitically. Whether or not one sees that as a good or a bad thing, depends in part on one’s view of the existing geopolitical order.

This is the order that western politicians and commentators almost invariably cite as the “rules based international order”, the standard bearer and upholder of which is also almost invariably cited as the United States.

One of the greatest difficulties in persuading Australians to address the dichotomy between their perceived security interests (US centred) and their national trade interests (East Asian centred) is to have them understand that the parrot like recitation of the United States as an upholder of the rules based international system is based upon a complete fiction.

The United States has been at war for 225 of the 242 years since its independence in 1776. Since 1945 alone it has attacked and in many cases occupied, at least 37 nations, killing more than 30 million people in the process. It has engineered “regime change” in at least as many countries again. It is the single greatest violator of international law of any nation on the planet. Its list of broken international agreements is a major reason why Vladimir Putin described the United States last year as “not agreement capable.”

The BRI, contrary to Harris’s reported comments, is an outstanding example of multilateral peaceful development. Of course China wants a geopolitical benefit from its huge investments. The outstanding difference with the history of the Western great powers of old however, is that China does not and never has, sought to subjugate countries that provide its raw materials. Neither has it invaded other countries nor sought “regime change” in governments who failed to comply with its wishes.

The lessons of history are clear for those not blinded by ideology and a fantasy view of reality.

The Quad proposal is as internally inconsistent now as it was when first proposed in 2005. If it was truly a union of democratic forces seeking to provide peace and security in the Indo Pacific region, why then does it not include, for example, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea?

The reason should be obvious. Those three countries perceive the Quad for what it is: a thinly veiled anti-China alliance to replace the Obama administrations failed pivot to Asia. They are smart enough not to be associated with a scheme that would upset its most important trading partner and the major power in the region, if not yet the world.

There are also doubts about the external consistency of the Quad proposal. When first proposed by Japan’s Prime Minister Abe in 2005, the explicit aim was to assist in Japan in resisting China’s inexorable rise is a geopolitical power in East Asia. Now, although there are some lingering disputes between the two nations, as in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan is also actively cooperating with China in the construction of bridge and tunnel links to the Eurasian mainland so that Japan can benefit from the BRI links to European markets.

India similarly has a dispute with China over border issues, but it is also an important member of BRICS, recently became a full member of the SCO, and it is the starting point for the North South Transportation Corridor via Iran and Azerbaijan to Russia. That development alone could not be seen as consistent with the United States’ geopolitical objectives, which currently demonizes both Iran and Russia on a full time basis.

That leaves Australia, twisting on the horns of its self-created and unresolved dilemma. Despite the trade figures cited above; despite the apparent support of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for Australia to join the BRI following explicit invitations from the government of China and the strong support of a number of business related groups who see it’s enormous potential; it seems that the real driver of Australia’s foreign and trade policy is the Department of Defence.

The forthcoming ASEAN meeting being hosted in Canberra should be a golden opportunity to address the geopolitical realities. If history is any guide however, Australia will continue to foster its delusions and cling to the coattails of the United States.

Until the confusion as to what constitutes Australia’s real national interest is resolved, the country will continue to follow the United States and its disastrous path to the detriment of Australia’s economic and political well being.

James O’Neill, an Australian-based Barrister at Law, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Australia between the USA and China

At first thought, the title of this article may look inappropriate. Indeed, Australia has a political and military union with the USA, while Beijing (the main geopolitical opponent of Washington) is considered as a source of foreign policy troubles. However, Canberra (in contrast with Washington) tries not to use the term “threat” in this case.

Therefore, how can we say “between” while talking about Australia’s positioning in respect of the participants of the main geopolitical duet of the USA-China?

However, the real life does not often fit the simple schemes. The trip of the Australian mega-delegation headed by the Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull to the USA from February 21 to February 23 is a bright demonstration of this maxim.

The Joint Statement following the results of the negotiations between the honored Australian guest with the American President contains the mandatory in such cases set of political and diplomatic clichés that form the (undiscussable) “symbol of faith” of the union members.

In particular, it says about an American-Australian alliance that is “rock solid and based on a common purpose: to promote peace and prosperity” and commitment “to fostering an Indo-Pacific region where all countries abide by international law”, and that “there are no greater friends than the United States and Australia.”

Only after a careful reading one can see in the document the traces of the discussion of the main topic of the current policy, which is the revival prospects of the project for the creation of the “Four” in the region, that is a (quasi)union of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.

However, this topic is shifting to the center of the U.S. regional policy. Most likely, the transition from the long-standing conversations about the formation of the “Four” to practical events will be the main task of the new US Ambassador to Australia, Admiral H. Harris.

On the eve of Prime Minister’s visit, Australia believed that the general topic of “security” would be prevailing during the upcoming negotiations. It has found its reflection in the Joint Statement in the passage about the readiness to the joint struggle with “terrorism, cyber activity, or transnational crime”. It mentions the DPRK, of course, which tries to obtain the nuclear weapon illegally.

As for the “Four” project, the phrase “our two nations are committed to deepening our engagement with our allies and all partners” apparently demonstrates that this topic has been discussed (most likely).

It is worth mentioning that even the current government of the Australian Conservatives avoids taking any definite anti-Chinese position on the security issues in the region. Meanwhile, the “Four” project has a clear anti-Chinese sentiment.

Before going to Washington on February 20, Malcolm Turnbull, in an interview with Sky News, said that he did not view China as a source of threat because he did not see any “hostile intentions” coming from there.

As we have repeatedly noted on these pages, Australia’s restrained position on the issue of turning China into a global power is essentially connected with the exclusive advantage of developing trade relations with it. In summer 2015, the parties signed an agreement on a gradual removal of duties on the goods purchased from each other.

For the country, a quarter of whose GDP depends on the foreign trade, any measures promoting its development have a vital meaning. It is exactly for this reason that Australia is one of the 11 participants of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which further presupposes the gradual establishment of a free cross flow of goods and services.

Let us remind you that the TPP included 12 participants until January 2017. But then the new US President, Donald Trump, by his very first decree withdrew from the TPP its main participant, thus putting the entire project on the verge of collapse. It was saved in the “TPP without the USA” format mainly by efforts of Japan. Its “presentation” is to take place at the summit of the member states on March 8 in Chile.

Even now, the remaining 11 members of the TPP still hope for the possible return of the USA to the project, the country with the biggest domestic market. Donald Trump’s statement at the last forum in Davos has revived this hope. However, the entire statement is rather vague.

The probing of the “recent trends” in Washington in respect of the TPP was evidently the second main issue of the negotiations between Malcolm Turnbull and D. Trump. However, the result of this probing is still as unclear as it was after the discussion of the first topic.

The Joint Statement covering the issues of economic cooperation does not mention the TPP at all. It contains the most general statement, for example, “we are cooperating to ensure that the international trading system is rooted in market-based principles, fair competition, private sector-led development, and good economic governance.”

It notes that the USA is the largest foreign investor in Australia. Of course, it does not mention that PRC has long been Australia’s largest trade partner. The trade turnover between these two countries is 5-6 times larger than the volume of the U.S.-Australia trade.

China might easily steal leadership from the USA in the field of investment in Australia’s economy. However, Canberra (like Europe and the USA lately) protects it from excessive Chinese penetration for “strategic” reasons. Earlier, we commented on the failure of Beijing to invest in the Australian power distribution network system to the tune of 8 billion dollars.

In general, the Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s visit to the USA has brought nothing new in the splitting, which has long characterized Australia’s positioning in respect of the two world players.

In order to end Australia’s political insanity, the USA sends one of its main military hawks to Canberra as an ambassador. Let us see how successful he will be at this important but civil position.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Admiral Harry Harris to Become US Ambassador to Australia

One of the signs of the worsening situation in the Indian and Pacific ocean region, where the focus of world politics is shifting, is the strengthening of the military’s voice in the cacophony of the sounds that are coming from the Indo-Pacific Region.

Moreover, the trend towards the adoption of foreign policy functions by military organs is characteristic not only of the leading world power. Earlier we noted that the excessive (in the author’s opinion) publicity of the Commander of Indian Ground Forces, General B. Ravat nearly led to the disruption of the process of resolving an extremely dangerous conflict with the PRC, which had developed in the Himalayas during the summer of 2017.

These are all bad signals. For if the polysyllabic muse of professional diplomats can be silenced then the roar of guns will take its place.

Such unhappy sentiments are provoked by the announcement of the appointment of the current head of the most powerful American commander of the Pacific Command (USPACOM), Admiral Harry Harris, to the (vacant since September 2016), post of US Ambassador to Australia. However, judging by the site of the command, at the time of this article being written, he continues to act as head of USPACOM.

The IMC has repeatedly paid attention the political activity of Admiral Harry Harris. It is namely with him that the current actualization (almost forgotten) ‘Initiative of the Quartet’, the United States, Japan, India and Australia, in the second half of the last century is associated. Practical implementation of the ‘Quartet’ project will definitely lead to radical shifts (negative ones) in the region and in the world as a whole.

The first information that President Donald Trump was considering Harris’ candidacy for a ‘key diplomatic post in the face of rising tensions in the region’ appeared in the Washington Post in late August 2017.

It has also been reported that the candidacy of Harry Harris for the post of envoy to Australia enjoyed the full support of then-closest adviser to Donald Trump, Stephen Bannon, that is, one of the biggest ‘anti-China hawks’ of the United States. Apparently, Stephen Bannon’s ‘case’ continues to live on, although he himself has left the political arena.

The word ‘China’ occupies a central place in the current comments of the American press on Harris to an extremely important diplomatic post. Once again, the words or mantras, which he has repeatedly pronounced over the last two years on certain political platforms, have been reproduced. Such, for example, as: ‘undermining the international order’, ‘US military challenges in the region’. These words are invariably used as arguments in favour of creating the ‘Quartet’.

Harry Harris pays particular attention to the situation in the South China Sea, where, in his opinion, the notorious foreign policy ‘drive’ of the PRC is particularly evident.

Just at the time of the last burst of media attention to his personage, another call came in the South China Sea of a shock group led by aircraft carrier Carl Vinson. A spokesman for USPACOM said on board the aircraft carrier that in response to China’s construction work on the islands in the SCS, the US ‘will continue patrolling wherever international law is allowed’.

We recall that in this type of turnover, ‘notwithstanding’ Washington’s failure to recognize the very fact of China’s claims to 80-90% of the water area of ​​the SCM and, in particular, to own the islands located here. On some of them there has been active construction of various facilities, including military ones, over the past few years.

Recently, the Australian Navy has been actively joining in the “patrolling” in the SCM. However, this is only one of the two main, contradictory components of Australian policy towards the PRC (present, however, in American politics, but not in such a clearly expressed form). The second is related to Australia’s extreme interest in developing economic ties with the very same PRC.

Depending on the party affiliation of the country’s current leadership, in this political schizophrenia, one or the other component takes precedence. Now (for the second consecutive term) a conservative bloc led by the Liberal Party is in power.

Before that (from 2007 to 2013), the Labour Party was in power, whose leader Kevin Rudd immediately put an end to the ‘Initiative of the Quartet’ (as it seemed at the time) and brought anout a significant portion of the positive relations with the PRC in the political arena.

In the 2013 elections, the Labour Party suffered a severe defeat, in 2016 it significantly restored its positions in the parliament and in the next elections, which are to be held in the summer of 2019, may well return to power. It is important for the Australian conservatives that Harry Harris in the remaining year not ‘plough up’ the region very strongly.

Meanwhile, British conservatives have joined their colleagues from Australia, attempting to return to the London policy of the region ‘east of Suez’. On February 13, the Gardian newspaper reported that during the two-day visit to Australia, British Secretary of Defence G. Williamson had decided to send the anti-submarine frigate Sutherland (‘next month’) to the South China Sea.

It has also been said that the ship will enter the 12-mile zone around one of the islands, which the PRC claims to own. We note that earlier only American ships engaged in ‘calls’. ‘We fully support the United States in this’, said Gavin Williamson.

All the same, the phenomenon of British foreign policy is amazing! Only two weeks before the decision by the Minister of Defence, his boss, Prime Minister Teresa May had been on a visit to Beijing, where she smiled charmingly at the Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The beginning of an era of ‘creative and cultural cooperation’ had even been announced.

It should be noted that two years earlier, during Xi Jinping’s visit to London, a ‘golden era’ in the sphere of bilateral economic relations was spoken about. And how does this intention, an increasingly rosy ‘era’, fit in with the intention to send a British ship to China (as they believe in the PRC) to Chinese territorial waters?

So far, the era of confrontation with China by American-British-Australian conservatives is looming. Is this not indicative by the appointment of one of the US military’s ‘hawks’ to an important diplomatic post in the region ?

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Russia May Become a Leading LNG Supplier in Asia-Pacific

The serious environmental problems faced by China in the past decade have forced it to reform its energy industry. One of the main changes has been the large-scale transition from coal to a more eco-friendly type of hydrocarbon fuel – natural gas. China’s decision to shield its atmosphere from the products of coal combustion, replacing it with gas, which burns almost completely without leaving any harmful residues, proved to be beneficial for countries exporting natural gas, including Russia.

The environmental situation in China has long threatened the lives and health of its citizens. Factories and thermal power plants block out the sky of the country’s most industrialized areas with thick smog. It has reached the point where poor visibility on the roads due to smog causes car accidents. In these areas, significant mortality is recorded from diseases associated with failure of the respiratory system and poisoning with harmful substances.

The situation demanded radical action by the Chinese authorities. In March 2017, all the coal stations in Beijing and the surrounding areas were closed. For example, more than 33,000 facilities were withdrawn from operation in Hebei province. Such drastic measures resulted in fuel shortages. To make good the deficit, China’s energy sector needs huge amounts of natural gas.

China has its own gas fields which it is actively developing. In 2017, China produced more than 147 million cubic meters of gas, which was 8.5% more than the production in 2016. However, this quantity is not enough to meet the demands of China’s energy sector. Significant volumes have to be bought from abroad.

The cheapest way to supply natural gas from one country to another is via a gas pipeline. However, the construction of pipelines is a complex and expensive task, which can be made even more complicated if the terrain is challenging. In addition, once the pipeline has been built, it can be destroyed by a natural disaster or sabotage, or, in the event of deterioration in relations between the countries through whose territory it passes, it may simply be blocked.

For example, China is now receiving pipeline gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Myanmar. Despite friendly relations with these countries, China cannot be absolutely sure that there will be no interruption to supplies. In all the above countries, there is a certain level of terrorist threat associated with the activities of various extremist organizations. A much more reliable option, in that respect, would be the Russian “Power of Siberia” pipeline, which will transport gas from Russia to China and other countries of the Asia-Pacific region. However, it will not be operational until 2019.

To ensure its energy security, it makes sense for a large importer like China to buy gas not only from different countries, but also in different forms. Thus, China’s interest in liquefied natural gas (LNG) has increased significantly. LNG is transported by sea in special tankers. This method of gas supply is more expensive than using a pipeline, but it has its advantages. Most importantly, there is no need for a pipeline.

In 2017, China imported more than 94 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and, for the first time, more than 50% of this volume (about 52 billion cubic meters) was in the form of LNG. In terms of the volume of LNG purchased in 2017, China became the world’s second largest importer after Japan, surpassing the Republic of Korea. China is expected to increase its LNG imports in the coming years. Other major consumers of this energy source, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, also increased their imports of LNG in 2017. It is likely that in the near future the demand for LNG will continue to grow, and all its potential suppliers will be able to offer their goods on the world market, without any risk of having to reduce their prices.

In the current situation, none of the CIS nations now supplying China and the other countries mentioned above with LNG will be superfluous. Now, China buys most of its LNG from Australia, Qatar and Malaysia. The United States also intends to start producing and selling LNG, and its main target market may also be the Asia-Pacific region. However, for a number of reasons many experts believe that Russia is the most promising potential supplier of LNG to the Chinese market.

China’s transition to natural gas has coincided with the development of the Russian “Yamal LNG” project, which is concerned with the extraction, liquefaction and sale of natural gas from the South-Tambey gas condensate field (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region, the RF). The main shareholder of Yamal LNG Company is the Russian gas company Novatek, but in 2014, 20% of its shares were purchased by China’s National Oil and Gas Corporation. Another 9.9% of its shares were acquired by the Chinese Silk Road foundation in 2015.

In December 2017, Yamal LNG plant began its work on gas liquefaction. The first production line of the plant to be launched has a capacity of 5.5 million tons per year (one ton of LNG approximately corresponds to 1.4 thousand cubic meters of natural gas). Two more production lines are to be commissioned in 2018-2019. In 2018, supply of Russian LNG to China will begin.

For a number of reasons, it is expected that in the near future Russia will become a leading supplier of LNG to China, as well as to the countries of South-East Asia.

Firstly, there are huge natural gas deposits on the Yamal Peninsula and in Western Siberia, which are among the largest in the world. The proven natural gas reserves in the South-Tambey field, on the basis of which the Yamal LNG project is realized, amount to 926 billion cubic meters. There are also many gas fields in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region (the YNAO). In total, about 20% of the world’s known natural gas reserves are concentrated in this constituent entity of the Russian Federation. In addition to the Yamal LNG project, Novatek is currently working on the Arctic LNG-1, Arctic LNG-2 and Arctic LNG-3 projects in the YNAO. Thus, the Russian Federation has enough resources to become a major supplier of gas to China. The proximity of the liquefied natural gas plant to the gas fields reduces the cost of delivering raw materials for processing, and, consequently, the final cost of the product.

Secondly, the import of gas from YNAO to China is beneficial in terms of logistics. The Yamal LNG project will involve not only the production and processing, but also the supply of gas to customers. As part of the project, work on the development of transport infrastructure is under way. The key elements of such infrastructure are the Arctic port of Sabetta, and Sabetta International Airport, both on the eastern shore of the Yamal Peninsula, near the South Tambey field and the LNG plant. In addition, Novatek plans to build a transshipment terminal for LNG on the Kamchatka Peninsula. This will help to create an efficient logistics chain for supplying LNG to all parts of the Asia-Pacific region. Kamchatka is close to China, Korea and South-East Asia, but even closer to Japan. So, the Land of the Rising Sun would also benefit from acquiring large volumes of LNG from Russia.

Thus, as a result of its development of the YNAO fields and of LNG production, Russia may soon become a leading supplier of this product in the Asia-Pacific region. LNG is technologically more advanced and expensive than pipeline gas. Yamal LNG and other similar projects, and the introduction of Russian LNG into the Chinese market, together represent a big step forward for the entire gas industry of the Russian Federation.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Why an Iraq War Inquiry is More Necessary Than Ever

There has been a flurry of activity caused by the comments made by Green’s parliamentarians Adam Bandt and Richard di Natale over recently installed Liberal Senator Jim Molan. The facts relate to the Australian situation, but the issue has wider ramifications.

The ostensible reason for the attack on Molan was his sharing of two videos originating from a Neo Nazi far right group in the United Kingdom.

Bandt, who later withdrew his remarks, called Molan a “coward” and said that Molan should be prosecuted for his service in the Iraq war. In the Senate di Natale accused Molan of overseeing a “humanitarian catastrophe” nearly 15 years ago during the assault on Fallujah, Iraq.

Di Natale said that there was “a question that needs to be answered, and the only way with answer that is through an enquiry.”

Liberal politicians, from the Prime Minister downward, came to Molan’s defence, claiming that he was a “great Australian soldier” who “stood up for freedom.”

Lost among all the expostulations and threats of legal action were two key issues behind the remarks of both Bandt and Di Natale: were there war crimes committed in Iraq by Australian forces; and whether or not there should be an enquiry (as has happened in Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) into the precise circumstances surrounding Australia’s involvement in that disastrous war.

Instead we have seen sustained attempts two divert from legitimate questions surrounding this issue. It has been variously suggested that Molan is not racist; that it is somehow scurrilous to question the conduct of Australia’s servicemen; and that Bandt and Di Natale had a view “that anyone who goes to war is a war criminal.” That simply does not address the real issues.

To answer the first of those questions one needs to go no further then the assaults on Fallujah, the first of which occurred in April 2004 and the second, codenamed Operation Phantom Fury, in October 2004.

Before the second attack began, citizens were instructed to leave, but that did not extend to men aged 15-45 who were prohibited from leaving. Once the bombing began, all exits from the city were sealed off. According to the Washington Post, electricity and water were also cut off. The Red Cross and other agencies were denied access to the city to deliver humanitarian aid and render medical assistance.

A United Nations special rapporteur, Jean Ziegler, described these action as a

”flagrant violation” of the Geneva Conventions. Mr Zeigler was unquestionably correct. Cutting off water and electricity and denying access to humanitarian aid is prohibited under Article 54 (Protocol 1) of the Geneva Conventions.

The attacking forces also seized the city’s only hospital, taking its staff prisoner, and also bombed to destruction two other medical clinics. Eyewitness accounts described Red Cross workers being denied entry to the city, and ambulances trying to enter the city being fired upon. This is also a breach of Article 8 of the Geneva Conventions (Protocol 1).

There were further eyewitness accounts of snipers shooting women and children in the street, and unarmed men carrying a white flag were also shot. The United States also admitted using chemical weapons, including white phosphorus, napalm and depleted uranium weapons. The use of such weapons are banned under Protocol III of the United Nations Convention on Certain Weapons that Australia ratified on 29 September 1983. The United States has refused to ratify this Convention.

General Molan has admitted his role in planning and directing the attacks in Fallujah in October 2004. It is a matter of public record that Molan was seconded from the Australian defence forces to US forces in April 2004 and served as chief of operations through 2005. An article in the Australian emphasized that Molan not only planned, but directed the 2004 assault on Fallujah.

The horrific consequences for civilians of this assault have also been documented, with extraordinarily high levels of birth defects, infant and maternal mortality, and various cancers. Patrick Cockburn in the Independent described the results reported by Busby and his co-researchers as worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

There can be no serious argument therefore, that war crimes were committed in Fallujah (and elsewhere) in October 2004. Who then might be held responsible? Under the legal doctrine of common purpose, senior Australian officials are responsible for these attacks. Those individuals would include the defence Minister Robert Hill, the foreign minister Alexander Downer, and at the Prime Minister John Howard.

Under the doctrine of command responsibility Government and military officials can be held liable if they knew, or should have known, anyone under their command was committing war crimes and failed to prevent them from doing so. These principles are incorporated in the Statute of the International Criminal Court that Australia ratified on 27 June 2002 and which came into effect in Australian law on 1 September 2002.

Before persons alleged to have committed war crimes can be referred to the International Criminal Court however, the accused’s own State must take action against them, and only if that State is “unable or unwilling” to act will the ICC become involved.

There is legislation on the Australian statute books that is designed to provide a means off prosecuting alleged war criminals. The Howard government introduced a raft of legislative changes to the Criminal Code (Commonwealth) beginning in 2002 before the Iraq invasion. Part 5.3 of s100 of the Criminal Code, for example, creates the offence of a “terrorist act”. This is defined as being when there is serious harm to property or death caused with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, and with it the intention of coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the government of a foreign country, or intimidating the public or a section of the public.

It is submitted that this is precisely describes the actions of the Australian government and its officials, including military personnel, in the conduct of the Iraq War in general, and in specific instances of which Fallujah is a prime, but far from only example.

Successive Australian governments have refused to prosecute anyone involved in the events described above. The ICC’s requirement of a State being “unable or unwilling” to prosecute alleged war crimes has therefore been met. In these circumstances there is nothing to prevent a direct referral to the ICC Public Prosecutor who must then initiate their own inquiry.

It is this history that probably accounts for the reaction to questions raised about General Molan’s alleged responsibility for war crimes committed in Iraq. The politicians and mainstream media coming to his defence with frankly ridiculous and irrelevant claims are fully aware of their own potential liability for the events arising out of the original illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Di Natale was simply stating the obvious: there should have been a proper inquiry, there should be one now, and Australia’s persistent refusal to do so only undermines its frequently professed claims to being a strong supporter of the “rules based international order.”

James O’Neill, an Australian-based Barrister at Law, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

How the South Pacific Countries Are Selling Their Votes

Here it goes again! Several countries of Oceania (also known as South Pacific Nations), or however you want to call that vast, beautiful but thoroughly devastated part of the world, have voted “for Israel”, “for the United States’ proposed resolution at the United Nations”, and therefore, “against Palestine”.

As reported on December 22, 2017 by Al Jazeera:

“The United Nations General Assembly has voted by a huge majority to declare a unilateral US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital “null and void”.

At an emergency session of the General Assembly on Thursday, 128 countries voted in favour of a resolution rejecting US President Donald Trump’s controversial decision on December 6.

Nine countries voted against, while 35 abstained.

Trump had earlier threatened to cut aid to UN members who would vote against his decision.”

Did scarcely inhabited island-nations that are lost in the middle of a tremendous body of water, go crazy?

After all those horrific nuclear experiments committed there, against their people, by the United States, France and the UK; could local people sincerely believe that the truth as seen from Washington is the only legitimate truth on Earth?

After the naked modern day colonialism, which is being implemented by Australia, New Zealand, and France, and, of course, by the United States, have the people of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia become blind?

After total dependency, after decades of humiliation and virtual slavery, do the inhabitants of Oceania believe that their fellow victims in Palestine do not have the right to live in their own state, without barbed wire; that they shouldn’t have their own historical capital?

The answer to all these question is, actually: “No”.

They do what they are doing simply and only because they have no choice.

*

When working on my book Oceania, travelling all over the South Pacific, I visited a Jesuit priest and the region’s prominent intellectual, Francis X. Hezel. Our encounter took place in the capital of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) – Pohnpei.

Father Hezel has been amassing important materials and documents in his private archive, proving beyond any doubts that the US occupation of Micronesia after WWII led to a dramatic decrease of life expectancy and the standard of living of the islanders. He explained:

“Life here became shorter, and much worse than under the Japanese imperial rule. And this was not some ‘Communist propaganda’. It is written right here, in the report produced during that period by the US Department of State.”

But back to ‘voting’, or what is often called “vote selling”. Father Hezel offered a very explicit story to illustrate the reality:

“One day I had an entire television crew from Israel parked at my office. I had no idea what they were doing here. Why would they travel so far, to such a small and insignificant country? Finally I understood: the Israeli public was fascinated with this place; they wanted to know who are those people who keep voting in the U.N. against most of Security Council resolutions, in this way supporting Israel and the United States against the entire world…”

In my book Oceania, I later wrote:

“Pacific Island votes at the UN are openly for sale, especially when peace in the Middle East is at stake. To illustrate the absurdity of the game: at a time when several countries in the region are becoming uninhabitable as a result of global warming, both Nauru and Kiribati, itself one of the sinking nations and therefore a victim, voted against the Kyoto Protocol.

But it is not only profit that propels tiny nations in Oceania to sell their votes; it is also the fear of retribution.

“In the late 90’s our government voted at the UN against the US on the issue of landmines, recalled the then Foreign Minister of Marshall Islands (RMI), Tony deBrum. “As a result, our party lost the elections.””

In December 2017, out of the nine countries that voted against the UN resolution, one was the United States itself, while the other eight were: Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru, Palau, and Togo. Two were de facto US semi-colonies in Latin America, ruled by brutal pro-Washington cliques, one a tiny and dependent African nation, while four were the Micronesian and Polynesian nations and of course, Israel.

*

The Pacific Island nations are selling their votes, for profit or out of fear.

The West is also using them in an attempt to isolate China.

Presently, six countries of Oceania, have fully established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, after being, as was described to me by the former Foreign Minister of RMI, Tony deBrum, “encouraged” by the West.

These countries are: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.

At least three of them – Tuvalu, Marshall Islands and Kiribati – are at the frontline of the climate change disaster: they are becoming uninhabitable due to the global warming and consequent rising of sea level.

China is the only country that has been willing to, altruistically, help the countries of Oceania: by building anti-tsunami walls, by planting mangroves, by elevating schools, hospitals and government buildings, or by building sports facilities in places where around 90% of adults is suffering from diabetes, often due to dumping there some of the most unhealthy food from the US, Australia and elsewhere.

The more successful China got in helping South Pacific nations, the more ‘encouragement’ Taiwan received from the West; an ‘encouragement’ to come, to corrupt local ‘elites’, and to push China away. Any country that recognizes Taiwan as an independent nation gets diplomatic relations with China (PRC) broken immediately. Everyone knows it. And there is not one Western country that would take such an insane step.

After China leaves, the countries of Oceania can only rely on the pathetic, cynical and hypocritical “foreign aid” offered by the West, while their corrupt leaders negotiate with New Zealand and Australia the final ‘evacuation project’. Entire countries like Tuvalu may soon be forced to move abroad.

*

The selling of votes by South Pacific Island nations appears to be shameful, but in fact it is an act of total desperation.

The Empire has reached great mastery in implementing the “divide and rule” strategy.

The victims, often defenseless and robbed of everything, are forced to vote against those who are suffering similar fate at the opposite side of the world..

Andre Vltchek is philosopher, novelist, filmmaker and investigative journalist. He’s a creator of Vltchek’s World in Word and Images, a writer of revolutionary novel Aurora and several other books. His latest book: The Great October Socialist Revolution. He writes especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Russian and Japan are Building Up the Economic Co-operation

As is well known, both the geographical position of Japan and its need for the import of hydrocarbon fuels have facilitated the development of relations of that country with Russia. Only the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute stopped Japan from becoming one of the main Russian economic partners even several decades ago.

Not having their own hydrocarbon resources, the ‘Land of the Rising Sun’, nevertheless, established one of the most powerful industries in the world, by importing fuel from various countries. Whereby Russia, traditionally rich in oil and gas, although a neighbor of Japan, is not included into the list of its main suppliers, all due to somewhat clouded relationship that formed between the two countries after the Second World War.

Now, the main supplier of hydrocarbons to Japan is the Middle East region. The maritime delivery of the large shipments of energy carriers along the whole of the southern coast of Eurasia has always been difficult and costly. In the recent years, several factors emerged that make it even less convenient. One can refer to the instability and the terrorist threat in the Middle East, as well as the Chinese One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). Japan, discomforted by the strengthening of China’s positions across the whole of Asia, is not particularly enthusiastic about OBOR and its subproject ‘The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road’, which is aiming at uniting all the maritime routes along the coast of Eurasia into a single system, including the routes by which Japan is getting the hydrocarbons from the Middle East. China brings under control the key ports on this route, and Japan has started to be concerned over its energy security. All this is happening against the background of weakening the positions of the USA in the Indo-Pacific region, who is considered the traditional Japanese ally and partner. Obviously, all these processes in their integrity make Japan take a fresh look at its relations with Russia. Now, the cooperation between Russia and the ‘Land of the Rising Sun’ is actively being promoted, in the spheres of energy, finances and transportation.

The end of 2017 was remarkable by much news on the Russian-Japanese co-operation. This is related to the regular meeting of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov and TarōKōno from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, that took place on 24th November in Moscow. The two ministers discussed in detail the array of issues on the bilateral interaction, including the prospects of the joint economic activity on the Kuril Islands.

On the same day, the 13th meeting of the Russian-Japanese Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Issues took place, where the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Igor Shuvalov and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tarō Kōno were present. The issues of Russian-Japanese co-operation in the sphere of transport, energy and high technologies were discussed. The following topics were touched upon: participation of Japan in the development of Arctic gas fields and in the development of the Russian Far East, joint investment projects and many other issues. Upon conclusion of the meeting, Tarō Kōno announced that the Russian-Japanese relations have a huge potential, and that it is necessary to do everything possible for its implementation.

Soon after the meeting by both the heads of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission, one news after another started to emerge in the mass media, regarding the co-operation of the major Russian and Japanese companies.

In early December 2017, in Moscow, the Chairman of the Management Committee of Gazprom, Alexey Miller met Nobuhide Hayashi, Chairman at Mizuho Bank Ltd. Mizuho Bank Ltd. is one of the largest financial organizations in Japan, with which Gazprom has been successfully co-operating since 1999. The topic for negotiations was the possibility for capital participation of Mizuho Bank in the strategic projects of Gazprom, whereby the Russian corporation is going to start working on these projects in 2018. Mizuho Bank can invest its facilities into such projects as gas pipeline ‘Power of Siberia-1’, TurkStream, Nord Stream 2, Amur Gaz Processing Plant and others.

At the same time, the mass media informed us of the commencement of liquefied natural gas (LNG) production on the first processing train of the new Russian plant built on the Yamal Peninsula within the framework of the project ‘Yamal LNG’. This plant is being built with the participation of Russian and foreign companies, using the South Tambey Field as a resource base in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District of the Russian Federation. As soon as on 8th December 2017, the first loading of LNG was launched onto the tanker in Sabetta – the Russian Arctic port in the center of the Northern Sea Route. The launch of the second and third parts of the projects, known as processing trains, is scheduled for 2018-19, however the operational capacity is already sufficient to produce 5.5 million tons of LNG per year. The joint-venture parties – the Japanese construction companies JGC Corporation and Chiyoda Corporation, who have completed numerous projects in the gas industry, participated in the development of the Yamal LNG Project.

As is well known, Japan is included into the list of the major global importers of LNG, whereby it is much closer to the Northern Sea Route than China and South Korea. Possibly, it will be the ‘Land of the Rising Sun’ that will become the main consumer of Yamal LNG.

The Yamal project (ОАО ‘Yamal LNG’) is majority owned by the private Russian gas company Novatek, which is the second largest gas producer in the Russian Federation. It actively participated in the development of gas fields of the Far North of Russia and in the development of the Northern Sea Route. Novatek pursues strategic co-operation with the Japanese partners: in late November 2017, it had signed a memorandum of understanding with Japan’s Marubeni Corporation and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. The three companies are intending to explore options for a liquefied natural gas complex in Russia’s Kamchatka Region, envisaging both transshipping and marketing. According to the plan, LNG brought by ice-breaking tankers along the Northern Sea Route, will be reloaded onto the conventional tankers to reduce the carrier cost. From this point, LNG will be delivered to all the interested countries of Asia-Pacific Region, first to Japan, territorially close to Kamchatka Region. It is expected that the Japanese companies will make major investments into the project. Also, it is reported that the project received support of the Kamchatka Region government, as part of the gas will be used for the needs of this region of the Russian Federation.

Transport is one more important sphere of the Russian-Japanese co-operation. As it was mentioned above, China and its ‘The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road’ play an increasingly significant role in the maritime cargo traffic along the southern coast of Eurasia, in which Japan does not wish to participate as the junior partner. It is not impossible that the ‘Land of the Rising Sun’ will need alternative routes of communication with the countries of the Eurasian continent, free from the Chinese influence. Regarding this, Japan shows interest for the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway, as well as for the Northern Sea Route going along the northern coast of Eurasia. In early December 2017, the Holding ‘Russian Railways’ announced the creation of ‘one stop shop’ for Japanese companies intending to deliver cargos to Russia and Europe via the ports of the Russian Far East along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Representatives of Japanese companies can receive any necessary information on transport management via the territory of the Russian Federation, within a short time.

In mid-December 2017, it became known that the major Japanese trading companies SBI Holdings and Hokkaido Corporation decided to unite their efforts to provide assistance to small Japanese companies wishing to do business in Russia. The firms wishing to open their facilities and conduct business on the territory of the Russian Federation, will be given financial and informational support.

Thus, one can draw a conclusion that Russian-Japanese relations are likely to experience a prosperity phase. It is to be hoped that the parties will be able to consolidate the achieved success, and the co-operation of Russian and Japan will be developing steadily towards the mutual benefit and for the good of the whole Asia-Pacific Region.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

Australia’s “White Paper on Foreign Policy” is Officially Released

Australia’s “The White Paper on Foreign Policy” published on November 23 ) is important for a number of reasons. Mainly because we are talking about the first document of this kind for the last 14 years from a country, whose role is very significant in the processes occurring in the most important region for contemporary global politics, the Indian and Pacific Ocean region (IPR).

Although Australia does not belong to the group of leading regional and world players (such as the US and China), its relevance in the Indian-Pacific Region and, in particular, in the South-East Asian subregion, is quite comparable to the political and economic weight of such major Asian powers as India and Japan. With a population of 25 million people, Australia has the 13th largest volume of GDP. In terms of numbers, a relatively small but quite modern and capable armed forces of 52,000 servicemen. In 2015 defense was allocated over $23 million (12th place in the world).

However, in line with the 2016 “White Paper on Defense“, these expenditures will increase at an extremely high rate and already by the fiscal year 2020-2021 shall exceed $42 billion, i.e., 2 percent of national GDP. The third economy in the world, Japan allocates approximately the same amount on military needs in terms of absolute numbers.

Along with the United States, India and Japan, Australia is part of the project to form a quadripartite quasi-union, which has received the moniker Quad among journalistic circles. The shadow of this project, which first appeared in the middle of the last decade, again loomed on the sidelines of the regional forums that took place in November in Da Nang and Manila.

The key problem in positioning Australia in the region stems from its apparent foreign policy schizophrenia. While being part of the anti-Chinese alliance with the US (within the framework of the ANZUS pact since 1952), Australia maintains extremely profitable economic relations with that very same China, which accounts for almost a third of the country’s entire foreign trade with a positive 30 percent balance.

It is important to note the dependence of Australia’s foreign “dichotomy” on which of the two main parts of the country’s establishment is currently in power. Since 2013 it has been ruled by its Conservative half, led by current Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. This reality undoubtedly affected the content of Australia’s conceptual foreign policy document.

Noting the shift in the center of world political and economic processes to the Indian-Pacific Region, its authors point to the “dominant role of the US in the region, the main challenge to which is China.”

Noteworthy, however, is the observation of “strategic tensions, threats to economic growth and the disruption of the flow of goods and investment subsequent to possible significant increases in protectionism.” This phrase imparted a negative message to the economic policy of President Donald Trump, in which, inter alia, the United States was withdrawn from the Transpacific Partnership project. But in Australia it was with TPP that there were special expectations for further economic development.

In general, the word “economy” is used most frequently, whether it is the basis of the country’s foreign policy or its objectives. For example: “A strong, competitive economy will be the foundation of our prosperity. A growing economy will maximize our weight in the world.”

The document outlines five main points of the Government’s foreign policy:

-“To promote the openness, content and prosperity of the Indian-Pacific Region, in which the rights of all States are respected;

-To provide more opportunities to our businesses everywhere and to resist protectionism;

-To guarantee security and freedom to Australians in the face of threats such as terrorism;

-To promote and protect international law, which provides stability and prosperity, as well as to cooperate in solving global problems;

-To intensify efforts to ensure sustainability in the Pacific Ocean and, in particular, in East Timor.”

The aforementioned long quote requires some commentary. As we have stated on various occasions, such texts by Chinese political opponents use the well-entrenched language of euphemisms.

Expressions such as “openness”, “freedom”, “international norms” and “rights of all States” implicitly imply the source of threats to the efficacy of the categories being referred to. These words invariably appear in the official documents of the United States, Japan, Australia itself, when, for example, the issue of territorial disputes between the PRC and its neighbors in the subregion of South-East Asia are discussed.

Similar expressions were used a year ago in Australia’s “White Paper on Defense”, which states, inter alia, that American-Chinese relations will play the decisive role in the Indian-Pacific Region for the foreseeable future. This document leaves no room for doubt as to which of the two world giants will remain a key partner for Australia in securing its national security.

The same words about the need to “maintain law-based order” in the Indian-Pacific Region were used in a press release about the meeting of the responsible representatives of the Foreign Ministries of India, Indonesia and Australia, which took place in Indonesian Bogor at the end of November.

With regard to the last of the aforementioned paragraphs of the MFA’s “White Paper”, it reflects Australia’s growing influence on the situation not only in East Timor (which, almost 20 years ago, Canberra played a decisive role in its achieving statehood), but also in the Island States of the south-western Pacific Ocean.

In China, of course, they could not fail to pay attention to the impressive conceptual document on the foreign policy of an important player in the game, unfolding in the Indian-Pacific Region. Mainly, the key thesis about the “dominant role of the United States” in the Indian-Pacific region and Australia’s intention to deepen allied relations with Washington, as well as participate in the formation of multilateral alliances.

The Chinese Global Times points out that, in security matters, Australia is even ahead of the US, because American policy toward China is much more complex than it may seem to some Australian Foreign Ministry officials. The outcome of the recent visit to Beijing by the American President is cited as an indication of this complexity.

Perhaps, in connection with this, the Chinese Global Times recalled, as a reminder, that for China, who is Australia’s largest economic partner, that the latter is not even in the top ten of its trade counterparts. And that Beijing could reorient “to the other side” in economic ties with Canberra without inflicting any significant damage to itself.

In this kind of partnership, China uses both sticks and carrots. For example, in July of this year, six Australian beef companies were denied access to the Chinese market, which accounted for about a third of the total of this product exported by Australia to China. At the end of November, the ban was lifted, resulting in a very positive reaction from the Minister of Trade of Australia, Steven Ciobo, on the “gratitude to China by the coalition government of Malcolm Turnbull“.

Still, it’s not very convenient to stand on your feet, fanning out in different directions. But it seems that, in particular, in the text of the document discussed here, Australia intends to remain in this uncomfortable position.

It is important, however, not to sit on the political “divide”, which (without special preparation) is fraught with painful consequences.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific Region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

 

DFAT’s White Paper and Modern Reality

In 2018 the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) will release a new White Paper, setting out possible scenarios for the future conduct of Australia’s foreign policy. It would be unwise to expect any substantial, let alone radical, departure from the foreign policy format that has prevailed since at least the end of the Second World War.

One clue as to how the policy framework might be formulated may be found in the 2016 Defence White Paper. Not the least of the reasons for expecting a similarity of approach is that it has become increasingly clear that it is the Department of Defence that is the real driver of foreign policy. This has a number of dangers, not least because the mindset of military personnel and their quasi- civilian department, construes the world in a fundamentally different conceptual framework from DFAT, that at least in theory adopts a broader perspective from that of the military.

It is also inescapably the case that DFAT’s White Paper will have a non-negotiable starting point of the US Alliance being the cornerstone of Australia’s defence policy. Foreign policy initiatives must therefore be formulated within the context of whether or not what Australia wants is consistent with US geopolitical objectives.

On the practical side that process is already well advanced, with Australian military personnel already integrated into the American military structure. Other manifestations include the US spy base at Pine Gap, an integral part of the US war machine worldwide, and US military bases on Australian soil.

Australia also takes part in joint military exercises such as operation Talisman Sabre, that are clearly directed against China, or other joint military exercises, as with the current exercises that are directed against North Korea.

The fact that these and similar military exercises are directed against Australia’s largest trading partner and may therefore pose a conflict with Australia’s economic security is not something likely to be addressed in the White Paper.

To that military support, Australia also gives unwavering political support, in everything from prime ministerial statements about being “joined at the hip” with the US, to UN voting support for the violent apartheid regime in Tel Aviv, to maintaining a discrete silence about the US and UK supported war by Saudi Arabia against Yemen.

Judging by various public comments by politicians and military personnel in recent months, a fundamental underpinning of the allegiance to American imperialism (for that is exactly what it is) is the assumption that if we are attacked then the US will come to our aid. Quite who might attack us, and why, is never clearly spelt out.

An extension of that policy assumption is that (a) the US is both willing and able to come to Australia’s aid; and (b) that the US itself is not going to be rendered incapable of sustained warfare in very short order.

Assumption (a) is one that seems to rest on little more than faith. The frequently invoked ANZUS treaty does not bear the weight attributed to it, as anyone bothering to actually read its provisions would readily ascertain. It contains no guarantee greater than a commitment to “consult”, political rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is in reality a fragile basis for policy, although such a notion is unlikely to ever be canvassed in the White Paper.

Assumption (b) is even more potentially dangerous because if the US is itself incapable of inflicting unsustainable losses upon its serious adversaries, Russia and China, and is in turn itself likely to be devastated, then thinking about Australia’s position as likely to be the furthest thing from the American mind.

How realistic is this scenario? It is in my submission much be more probable than the boastful claims of US military superiority and invulnerability would encourage the Australian public to believe. The US’s ability to project military power relies upon its naval forces, especially aircraft carriers, and ICBMs able to deliver devastation to their intended targets.

Unsurprisingly, with Russia and China have invested heavily in their ability to defend against both forms of attacks, and to respond with crushing effectiveness. That analysis takes no account of the psychological effect of a conventional or nuclear attack on the US “homeland”. One has only just think of the psychological impact of the 9/11 events where only 3000 people were killed, and consider what an impact the loss of tens of millions in the space of a few minutes might be.

As any serious analyst of the current state of military technology knows, both the Russians and the Chinese have the ability to destroy the US carrier fleet and to deliver missiles onto US cities, against which the US has no real defence.

The Russians have developed for example, the Zircon 3M22 hypersonic missile that has a range of up to 1000 km and a speed of Mach 8 (9,800 km/h). It’s electronic sophistication is such that it can penetrate any defence system, and it can be launched from almost any platform (ship, submarine, land, and even a humble fishing vessel).

For an attack on remoter targets, such as the cities of its enemies, the Russians have the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, with a range of 10,000 km and 10 to 15 independently targetable warheads. It has a maximum reported speed of 25,000 km/h (7 km/s). Its electronic sophistication is such that, as with the Zircon, there is no effective defence.

The Chinese have developed their own equivalent systems, the Dong Feng 21D and the Dong Feng 41 for short range anti-ship and long-range ICBMs respectively. The Dong Feng 41 has a range of 12,000 km and carries 8 to 10 independently targetable warheads.

It is perhaps superfluous to add that Australia has no means of defence against either the Russian or Chinese ICBMs.

In terms of defending against a counter attack the Russians have the S400 (and shortly the S500) anti-ballistic missile defence that is vastly superior to any American equivalent. It effectively gives Russia control over its air space and the adjacent territorial waters. That system has been supplied to China (and other Russian allies).

All Australian cities are within range or both the Russian in Chinese ICBM systems, contrary to some absurd remarks made by defence department personnel earlier this year. The notional defence that Australia has is the alleged American guarantee, which, it is suggested, is not a sound basis upon which to rely.

Even if the guarantee were real, military capacity and effectiveness would remain a serious question. Again, these are issues unlikely to be openly addressed in the White Paper.

It is to be hoped that the forthcoming DFAT White Paper will at least consider these brutal realities when proposing future policy frameworks. That is almost certainly a vain hope. Instead, one can expect more of the same old delusional thinking, and with it the very real risk of exposing Australia to an uncertain security future. That risk is enhanced by Australia’s continued willingness to join in the US’s wars of choice where there is no discernible Australian security interest.

As much as our foreign policy and defence mandarins may resist it, the fact is that the geopolitical world is undergoing rapid change and the comfortable certainties of past decades are no longer good enough.

Australia has an opportunity to grasp the challenges and formulate a real national interest policy for the 21st century. The chances are that it will not.

James O’Neill, an Australian-based Barrister at Law, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

India, China, and the USA: the Situation around Mauritius

An island state, the Republic of Mauritius is not a frequent news item. The republic consists of the two large islands – Mauritius and Rodriguez, and a number of small islands and reefs in the Indian Ocean, 900 km east of the island of Madagascar. The state is well known as one of the best resorts in the world. However, in addition to its perfect climate, Mauritius is strategically located on the Asia-Africa sea route. This makes it quite attractive to China, which hopes to turn Mauritius into an important point on its 21-st Century Maritime Silk Road, which is the sea sub-project of the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). However, the major traditional partner of Mauritius is India, which does not welcome the growing Chinese dominance and does not approve of the OBOR. Quite possibly, the island state could become the next arena of the Indian-Chinese confrontation.

In June 2017, for the first time during quite a long period, Mauritius attracted the attention of the media by submitting territorial claims to Great Britain. These concerned the Chagos Archipelago located in the Indian Ocean halfway between Africa and Indonesia. In 1965, Great Britain separated the archipelago from its colony in the Indian Ocean, which included Mauritius. Thus, when Mauritius gained independence in 1968, the Chagos Islands remained in British possession. According to Mauritius authorities, this was a violation of the UN Declaration No. 1514 “On the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Nations” accepted in 1960, which prohibited the partitioning of colonies before their independence. All the indigenous citizens of the islands that remained the property of Great Britain were deported. In 1971, a strategic air base of the United States was placed on Diego Garcia Island, one of the largest islands on the Chagos Archipelago.

As a result of the claims by Mauritius, the situation with the Chagos Islands was considered by the UNO in June 2017. During the voting in the UN General Assembly, 94 countries out of 184 supported the desire of Mauritius to address the Hague International Court to establish the legal status of the archipelago.

As expected, the USA, its ally Japan, and South Korea opposed this decision and supported the right of Great Britain.

The air base in the center of the Indian Ocean is vitally important for America, as it guarantees its military presence in South Asia, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. Up to 70% of the world crude oil transportation and up to 50% of all container traffic are carried out through the Indian Ocean. Control over these sea routes has a huge impact in the entire Asia. Therefore, the American air base on Diego Garcia Island is extremely important both for the USA and for its allies such as India, Japan and South Korea. These countries are the world’s largest importers of hydrocarbons, and get most of the fuel from the Middle East through the Indian Ocean. They are interested in making provisions for the Americans to ensure the security of these supplies. They are also interested in US military presence holding back the spread of the influence of China, which India, South Korea and Japan fear.

In its turn, the People’s Republic of China would be pleased with the withdrawal of the Americans. China also receives most of its energy through the Indian Ocean. Being a competitor of the USA, it perceives the American military presence as a threat to the security of its energy supply.

So far, nothing threatens the base. After the vote in the UN General Assembly, the representative of Mauritius to the United Nations, Jagdish Koonjul, announced that Mauritius would propose that the US prolong the presence of its air base on Diego Garcia in case of the transfer of the Chagos Archipelago to his country. However, America does not have such a close interaction with Mauritius as with Great Britain. This means that Mauritius may allow the American military forces to remain on its territory on other terms and conditions that are not so favourable as before. In the event of the relations deterioration, Mauritius would be able to demand that the United States leave Diego Garcia Island, which would be virtually impossible during the period of the British control over it. Thus, if the Chagos Archipelago is transferred to Mauritius, the US status in the Indian Ocean will be less stable. As was mentioned before, this fact should exhilarate China and worry India, Japan, and South Korea.

However, curiously enough, India voted for the submission of the issue of the ownership of Chagos to the International Court. This is probably due to India’s fear of relations with Mauritius deteriorating. As is known, most citizens of Mauritius are ethnic Hindu, the descendants of workers who were brought here by the British in the colonial period. This fact ensures the good relations of the island state with India.

However, a Chinese expatriate community also lives on the island. Although smaller than the Hindu population, it is very powerful. Large financial assets are concentrated in the pockets of the Mauritian Chinese. Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi visited Mauritius in February 2017. The participation of the island state in the 21-st Century Maritime Silk Road project was among the major issues that he discussed with Mauritius Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth. If Mauritius joins OBOR, the Chinese influence in this state may increase multiple times.

Such a development of the situation should worry India, which is actively competing with China for dominance throughout the Indian-Pacific territory. Mauritius is strategically important to India due to its strategic location as mentioned above, as well as due to the fact that the Indian radio electronic intelligence base is located there. Mauritius is also important because of its proximity to Madagascar, where an Indian Navy base is being built and the second Indian foreign radio electronic intelligence base is located. These two bases allow India to monitor events on the entire territory to the east of Africa. In addition, Seychelles, located near Mauritius, is host to another Indian Navy base. Thus, the growing presence of China on Mauritius is not favourable for India. Perhaps, to keep Mauritius in its sphere of influence, India is ready to make concessions and even weaken the position of its US ally on the island of Diego Garcia.

This is one of the versions explaining the vote of India at the UN General Assembly in June. However, an unambiguous interpretation could be given only to a few events in the world politics. It cannot be excluded that the transfer of Diego Garcia Island to Mauritius does not threaten the future of the American base on the island. Surprisingly, for many experts, China, which is interested in the US position weakening, abstained from voting in the UN General Assembly. Perhaps this is because China does not feel confident enough in Mauritius. In fact, the most influential power in this state is the rapidly-developing and rich India, which will do everything to preserve the US base, while the United Kingdom is rapidly losing its weight on the international arena.

This explains the position of the abstaining China. However, in this case, the question arises as to why the USA voted against submitting the Chagos Islands issue to the International Court if India is its ally and will preserve the base on Diego Garcia. Perhaps, because the US prefers to deal with allies that depend on it, but not with those on which it depends. America wishes to be the head in any alliance, and the transfer of Chagos Islands to Mauritius may result in its falling under the influence of India. This would lead to the strengthening of India’s position in the America-India relations and the weakening of the US role.

Thus, it can be summarized that the situation around Mauritius and Chagos Islands is quite complicated, and it is difficult to predict its impact on the power balance between India, China, and the US. Apparently, this matter is a great success for Mauritius: being at the intersection of the interests of such rich states, it can exploit the situation to receive various benefits from each of them.

Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”