Showing posts with label cia hackers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cia hackers. Show all posts

Thursday, March 9, 2017

5 Major Revelations from Vault 7 the CIA & Media Do Not Want You to Know

Believed more significant than leaks from NSA contractor Edward Snowden, Wikileaks’ Vault 7 release of some 8,000 CIA documents detailing the extent of the agency’s hacking and surveillance toolbox has already dealt the planet a gut-check — making painfully clear no true privacy exists in 2017.


Officials have already launched an investigation in an attempt to determine who forked over such a sizable cache of markedly sensitive information — which, incidentally, represents merely 1 percent of the total number of documents, according to Wikileaks.


Beyond the near certain constitutional, legal, and ethical transgressions of the CIA evidenced in Vault 7, one thing became stunningly clear this week: whoever leaked the information — lone wolf or group, politically or morally motivated — is potentially even more damaging an Enemy Number One to the Central Intelligence Agency than Snowden has proven to be for the NSA.


“Mr. Snowden’s leaks revealed names of programs, companies that assist the NSA in surveillance and in some cases the targets of American spying. But the recent leak purports to contain highly technical details about how surveillance is carried out. That would make them far more revealing and useful to an adversary, one person said,” reported the Wall Street Journal this week.


“In one sense, Mr. Snowden provided a briefing book on U.S. surveillance, but the CIA leaks could provide the blueprints.”


Without transparency, government inevitably trims away privacy rights and other liberties. Greater than any need for adherence to authoritarian rule of law, blowing the whistle on corrupt, illegal, and unseemly practices of those in power constitutes an act of paramount importance — so integral to maintaining checks and balances, in fact, government propaganda to the contrary still has a large swath of the populace questioning Snowden instead of the National Security Agency and U.S. government.


Keep in mind that if you blame the messenger, you won’t focus attention on government wrongdoing. It’s unfortunately telling most Americans who could identify Edward Snowden — many, only vaguely as a ‘traitor’ — likely would not remember the names of any domestic surveillance programs he disclosed.


As the world waits with bated breath for the next dump from the pot-o-gold that is Vault 7, it’s imperative to examine five of the more insidious and dubious revelations this week — and how, if at all, they affect you.


We Got the Dankest Malware


In what seems to be a snide thumb of the nose at popular culture, the CIA named several of its collection and hacking tools after Hollywood movies — and agents aggrandized their exploits and electronic ‘weapons’ behind the scenes.


“The tools described in the documents carried bizarre names,” reports CBS News, “including Time Stomper, Fight Club, Jukebox, Bartender, Wild Turkey, Margarita and ‘RickyBobby,’ a racecar-driving character in the comedy film, ‘Talladega Nights’ — a tool to pillage and insert files on ‘newer versions of Microsoft Windows and Windows Server.’”


RickyBobby operated “as a lightweight implant for target computers” — introduced without triggering antivirus or security software — exploiting files included with Windows systems for over a decade.


But don’t think this goodie bag is withheld for use solely within the United States — or that the CIA doesn’t share the ‘wealth.’ According to CBS News, the “documents show broad exchanges of tools and information among the CIA, NSA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as intelligence services of close allies Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.”


Vault 7 included commentary from cocksure CIA agents — what would have to be considered a bit of comedic relief were it not for the underhanded topic-at-hand — including the telling:


“You know we got the dankest Trojans and collection tools.”


‘Reckless Beyond Words’


Documentation shows system vulnerabilities developed by the CIA — and shared with allied foreign governments — were then apparently left open for any hacker, anywhere in the world, to exploit for any purpose. Wikileaks stated,


“‘Year Zero’ introduces the scope and direction of the CIA’s global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of ‘zero day’ weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include Apple’s iPhone, Google’s Android and Microsoft’s Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into covert microphones.”


Further, the intelligence agency paid to retain the holes for future use. Snowden tweeted,


“If you’re writing about the [email protected] story, here’s the big deal: first public evidence USG secretly paying to keep US software unsafe.”





Essentially, the CIA put its covert forays into the systems of anyone it chooses to target — particularly journalists, human rights groups, and prominent activists — above privacy and security protections for the entire population.


Snowden affirmed in a series of tweets the authenticity of Vault 7 documents — and blasted the spy agency for inexcusable imprudence, stating,


“The CIA reports show the USG developing vulnerabilities in US products, then intentionally keeping the holes open. Reckless beyond words.”




“Why is this dangerous? Because until closed, any hacker can use the security hole the CIA left open to break into any iPhone in the world.”


“Evidence mounts showing CIA & FBI knew about catastrophic weaknesses in the most-used smartphones in America, but kept them open — to spy.”




Your Car Can Kill You — Particularly If the CIA Wants You Dead


That characterization in cable television shows and movies of the Central Intelligence Agency as the dark arm of the United States Government carrying out surreptitious operations — including targeted killings — isn’t, of course, a departure from the truth.


But how, exactly, the CIA executes such missions without being detected has been the subject of innumerable theories, but remained unsubstantiated conjecture — that is until Vault 7 revealed the agency can seize control of your vehicle remotely. In a lengthy press release, Wikileaks noted,


“As of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and trucks. The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations.”



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Upon this revelation, suspicion immediately trained on the odd circumstances surrounding the untimely death of government critic and award-winning journalist, Michael Hastings, in 2013.


Hastings garnered acclaim and won the George Polk award for his career-defining 2010 report for Rolling Stone, which portrayed General Stanley McChrystal, commander of NATO’s International Assistance Security Force in the Afghanistan War, in a negative light — ruffling feathers in the upper echelons of the government and ultimately costing the general his career in the process.


Shortly before his Mercedes inexplicably rocketed through a Los Angeles neighborhood and exploded into an intense fireball — (before or after directly striking a palm tree, according to authorities and witnesses, respectively) — Hastings disclosed he’d grown leery of being followed and surveilled by government actors, and appeared to fear for his life.



In fact, the 33-year-old journalist told a friend and neighbor he believed his car had been tampered with — just before it careened down the road, headlong into a tree, burning his body so badly, the coroner only secured identification through a match in the FBI’s database.


Hastings’ fatal crash — officially deemed accidental despite lingering questions — occurred on June 18, 2013. CIA documentation proves the agency sought improvements to technology allowing it to seize control of vehicle systems just one year later — putting a remotely-affected assassination within the realm of the plausible.


“There is reason to believe that intelligence agencies for major powers — including the United States — know how to remotely seize control of a car,” former U.S. National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism, Richard Clarke, told Huffington Post shortly after Hastings’ death.


“What has been revealed as a result of some research at universities is that it’s relatively easy to hack your way into the control system of a car, and to do such things as cause acceleration when the driver doesn’t want acceleration, to throw on the brakes when the driver doesn’t want the brakes on, to launch an air bag.


“You can do some really highly destructive things now, through hacking a car, and it’s not that hard.”



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Smart Devices — Too Smart for Comfort


For years, cybersecurity and technology experts, as well as privacy and rights advocates, have admonished the public to beware the convenience proffered by devices linked to the Internet of Things — described by Jacob Morgan in Fortune as “the concept of basically connecting any device with an on and off switch to the Internet (and/or to each other). This includes everything from cellphones, coffee makers, washing machines, headphones, lamps, wearable devices and almost anything else you can think of.  This also applies to components of machines, for example a jet engine of an airplane or the drill of an oil rig.”


Connecting devices — such as a cell phone, washing machine, smart TV, or home management system — might save time, but CIA documents reveal the same hardware of convenience offers ease of access for agents to install malware and use built-in microphones and cameras to spy whenever they see fit — even if the device is powered off. Wikileaks notes,



“The increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn comparisons with George Orwell’s 1984, but ‘Weeping Angel’, developed by the CIA’s Embedded Devices Branch (EDB), which infests smart TVs, transforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic realization.


“The attack against Samsung smart TVs was developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom’s MI5/BTSS. After infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a ‘Fake-Off’ mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on. In ‘Fake-Off’ mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server […]


“The CIA’s Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to remotely hack and control popular smart phones. Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user’s geolocation, audio and text communications as well as covertly activate the phone’s camera and microphone.”


Wired’s Matt Burgess elaborates that Weeping Angel “targeted the Samsung F8000 Smart TV. They say the TV could be turned into ‘covert listening devices’ by putting the TV into ‘fake-off’ mode. When the televisions appeared to be off, it was possible for conversations to be recorded. The CIA documents, which are from 2014, state ‘future work’ on the vulnerability could include capturing video from the televisions and being able to leave Wi-Fi turned on while ‘fake-off’ mode was enabled.”


While this is indeed ominous for obvious reasons, AsTech president Andrew McDonnell and other experts argue there’s no reason for panic, as he told Fortune,


“Many of the vulnerabilities cited in this tool set are well-known. ‘Smart’ TVs, old Android phones (like the President’s), unpatched routers, and a host of other devices have known vulnerabilities that are not exclusive to the CIA. These implementations may have been exclusive, but that doesn’t mean only the CIA had exploits. If genuine, there are likely some proprietary vulnerabilities or zero-days in there. Ultimately, secret backdoors in software — whether intentional or based on an exploit — make everyone less safe: there’s no way to control who uses them.”


Who Actually Hacked Who?


Perhaps the most debated and disputatious disclosure in the first batch of Vault 7 documents is the epiphany the CIA has collected a voluminous library of hacking techniques and code it can employ and customize as needed for certain exploits.


“The CIA’s Remote Devices Branch’s UMBRAGE group collects and maintains a substantial library of attack techniques ‘stolen’ from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation,” Wikileaks reports.


“With UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving behind the ‘fingerprints’ of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen from.”


At first blush, such an operation seems to aptly explain limited evidence wrangled by U.S. officials from ostensive hacks of assorted government systems by supposed Russian state actors — Wikileaks even intimates as much.


However, upon review of the content of Vault 7 documents, some information technology experts disagree this tidbit evinces CIA complicity in framing Russia for hacking.


According to SearchSecurity, “There is no evidence these false flag attacks were planned or took place, and there appears to be no references in the CIA documents that indicate the agency planned to use these stolen attack techniques in such a manner.”


Indeed, pinning an attack on Russia this way, though feasible, would not necessarily be efficacious or guaranteed success — and while Wikileaks specifically mentions the Russian Federation in its Vault 7 statement, The Intercept points out nothing in the actual CIA documentation suggests these tools would or had been used in this manner. To wit, Russia isn’t mentioned at all, in conjunction with UMBRAGE or digital footprints.


But this is the CIA, after all, and considering its intricately-woven operations and intense cloak of secrecy, to say adamantly whether or not agents purposefully left Russian ‘fingerprints’ to lay blame on propaganda’s currently highlighted State enemy cannot be known with certainty.


*****



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A final point worth noting, although these hacking tools and exploits show the CIA perfectly proficient in carrying out a massive surveillance effort, analysts claim the agency focuses on specific individuals for specific reasons — contrary to the NSA’s spying dragnet and collection practices — so the worst of the revelations don’t pertain to the average person.


But that doesn’t mean it hasn’t happened, either, as Wikileaks explained, documents show agents coordinate with technology staff to render customized exploits and data collection when necessary, and “the list of possible targets of the collection are ‘Asset’, ‘Liason Asset’, ‘System Administrator’, ‘Foreign Information Operations’, ‘Foreign Intelligence Agencies’ and ‘Foreign Government Entities’. Notably absent is any reference to extremists or transnational criminals.”


Poised to release the next treasure from Vault 7, Wikileaks continues to set Washington ablaze by forcing the government’s corrupt, unethical, greedy, and power-drunk officials to center stage under white-hot spotlights — where they must come to terms with the fact the American public stopped swallowing the excuse of security to give up liberty and privacy some time ago.

Tuesday, March 7, 2017

Wikileaks unveils ‘Vault 7’: “The largest ever publication of confidential documents on the CIA”

Last night Wikileaks announced that it has released an encrypted torrent file which reportedly contains information on the mysterious “Vault 7”, and which we now know is the biggest “collection of material about CIA activities obtained by WikiLeaks.publication in history.” It can be downloaded now at the following URL, and accessed using the password “SplinterItIntoAThousandPiecesAndScatterItIntoTheWinds”


Wikileaks had previously announced that it would hold an 8am Eastern press conference, as part of the unveiling.




However, there appeared to have been some complications, with Wikileaks tweeting that “the press conference is under attack: Facebook+Periscope video used by WikiLeaks’ editor Julian Assange have been attacked. Activating contingency plans”




Wikileaks then announced that “As Mr. Assange’s Perscipe+Facebook video stream links are under attack his video press conference will be rescheduled.”




In a separate tweet, Wikileaks has just released the passphrase to decrypt the torrent file: RELEASE: CIA Vault 7 Year Zero decryption passphrase:


SplinterItIntoAThousandPiecesAndScatterItIntoTheWinds




As a result, since Assange appears to have been unable to launch his previously scheduled press conference, he has gone ahead and issued the press release on Vault 7 Part 1 “Year Zero, which is titled: Inside the CIA’s global hacking force:


Press Release


Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed


Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named “Vault 7” by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency.


The first full part of the series, “Year Zero”, comprises 8,761 documents and files from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence in Langley, Virgina. It follows an introductory disclosure last month of CIA targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012 presidential election.


Recently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized “zero day” exploits, malware remote control systems and associated documentation. This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive.


“Year Zero” introduces the scope and direction of the CIA’s global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of “zero day” weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include Apple’s iPhone, Google’s Android and Microsoft’s Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into covert microphones.


Since 2001 the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The CIA found itself building not just its now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of covert, globe-spanning force — its own substantial fleet of hackers. The agency’s hacking division freed it from having to disclose its often controversial operations to the NSA (its primary bureaucratic rival) in order to draw on the NSA’s hacking capacities.


By the end of 2016, the CIA’s hacking division, which formally falls under the agency’s Center for Cyber Intelligence (CCI), had over 5000 registered users and had produced more than a thousand hacking systems, trojans, viruses, and other “weaponized” malware. Such is the scale of the CIA’s undertaking that by 2016, its hackers had utilized more code than that used to run Facebook. The CIA had created, in effect, its “own NSA” with even less accountability and without publicly answering the question as to whether such a massive budgetary spend on duplicating the capacities of a rival agency could be justified.


In a statement to WikiLeaks the source details policy questions that they say urgently need to be debated in public, including whether the CIA’s hacking capabilities exceed its mandated powers and the problem of public oversight of the agency. The source wishes to initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use, proliferation and democratic control of cyberweapons.


Once a single cyber ‘weapon’ is ‘loose’ it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by rival states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.


Julian Assange, WikiLeaks editor stated that “There is an extreme proliferation risk in the development of cyber ‘weapons’. Comparisons can be drawn between the uncontrolled proliferation of such ‘weapons’, which results from the inability to contain them combined with their high market value, and the global arms trade. But the significance of “Year Zero” goes well beyond the choice between cyberwar and cyberpeace. The disclosure is also exceptional from a political, legal and forensic perspective.”


Wikileaks has carefully reviewed the “Year Zero” disclosure and published substantive CIA documentation while avoiding the distribution of ‘armed’ cyberweapons until a consensus emerges on the technical and political nature of the CIA’s program and how such ‘weapons’ should analyzed, disarmed and published.


Wikileaks has also decided to redact and anonymise some identifying information in “Year Zero” for in depth analysis. These redactions include ten of thousands of CIA targets and attack machines throughout Latin America, Europe and the United States. While we are aware of the imperfect results of any approach chosen, we remain committed to our publishing model and note that the quantity of published pages in “Vault 7” part one (“Year Zero”) already eclipses the total number of pages published over the first three years of the Edward Snowden NSA leaks.


* * *


Analysis


CIA malware targets iPhone, Android, smart TVs


CIA malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development Group), a software development group within CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA’s DDI (Directorate for Digital Innovation). The DDI is one of the five major directorates of the CIA (see this organizational chart of the CIA for more details).


The EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational support of all backdoors, exploits, malicious payloads, trojans, viruses and any other kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert operations world-wide.


The increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn comparisons with George Orwell’s 1984, but “Weeping Angel”, developed by the CIA’s Embedded Devices Branch (EDB), which infests smart TVs, transforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic realization.


The attack against Samsung smart TVs was developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom’s MI5/BTSS. After infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a ‘Fake-Off’ mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on. In ‘Fake-Off’ mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server.


As of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and trucks. The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations.


The CIA’s Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to remotely hack and control popular smart phones. Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user’s geolocation, audio and text communications as well as covertly activate the phone’s camera and microphone.


Despite iPhone’s minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in 2016, a specialized unit in the CIA’s Mobile Development Branch produces malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones and other Apple products running iOS, such as iPads. CIA’s arsenal includes numerous local and remote “zero days” developed by CIA or obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms contractors such as Baitshop. The disproportionate focus on iOS may be explained by the popularity of the iPhone among social, political, diplomatic and business elites.


A similar unit targets Google’s Android which is used to run the majority of the world’s smart phones (~85%) including Samsung, HTC and Sony. 1.15 billion Android powered phones were sold last year. “Year Zero” shows that as of 2016 the CIA had 24 “weaponized” Android “zero days” which it has developed itself and obtained from GCHQ, NSA and cyber arms contractors.


These techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, Wiebo, Confide and Cloackman by hacking the “smart” phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic before encryption is applied.


CIA malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux, routers


The CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with its malware. This includes multiple local and remote weaponized “zero days”, air gap jumping viruses such as “Hammer Drill” which infects software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors for removable media such as USBs, systems to hide data in images or in covert disk areas ( “Brutal Kangaroo”) and to keep its malware infestations going.


Many of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA’s Automated Implant Branch (AIB), which has developed several attack systems for automated infestation and control of CIA malware, such as “Assassin” and “Medusa”.


Attacks against Internet infrastructure and web servers are developed by the CIA’s Network Devices Branch (NDB).


The CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control systems covering Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as EDB’s “HIVE” and the related “Cutthroat” and “Swindle” tools, which are described in the examples section below.


CIA ‘hoarded’ vulnerabilities (“zero days”)


In the wake of Edward Snowden’s leaks about the NSA, the U.S. technology industry secured a commitment from the Obama administration that the executive would disclose on an ongoing basis — rather than hoard — serious vulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or “zero days” to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and other US-based manufacturers.


Serious vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge swathes of the population and critical infrastructure at risk to foreign intelligence or cyber criminals who independently discover or hear rumors of the vulnerability. If the CIA can discover such vulnerabilities so can others.


The U.S. government’s commitment to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process came after significant lobbying by US technology companies, who risk losing their share of the global market over real and perceived hidden vulnerabilities. The government stated that it would disclose all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on an ongoing basis.


“Year Zero” documents show that the CIA breached the Obama administration’s commitments. Many of the vulnerabilities used in the CIA’s cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have been found by rival intelligence agencies or cyber criminals.


As an example, specific CIA malware revealed in “Year Zero” is able to penetrate, infest and control both the Android phone and iPhone software that runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts. The CIA attacks this software by using undisclosed security vulnerabilities (“zero days”) possessed by the CIA but if the CIA can hack these phones then so can everyone else who has obtained or discovered the vulnerability. As long as the CIA keeps these vulnerabilities concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they will not be fixed, and the phones will remain hackable.


The same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the U.S. Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system administrators, security officers and engineers. By hiding these security flaws from manufacturers like Apple and Google the CIA ensures that it can hack everyone &mdsh; at the expense of leaving everyone hackable.


‘Cyberwar’ programs are a serious proliferation risk


Cyber ‘weapons’ are not possible to keep under effective control.


While nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and visible infrastructure involved in assembling enough fissile material to produce a critical nuclear mass, cyber ‘weapons’, once developed, are very hard to retain.


Cyber ‘weapons’ are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated like any other. Since they are entirely comprised of information they can be copied quickly with no marginal cost.


Securing such ‘weapons’ is particularly difficult since the same people who develop and use them have the skills to exfiltrate copies without leaving traces — sometimes by using the very same ‘weapons’ against the organizations that contain them. There are substantial price incentives for government hackers and consultants to obtain copies since there is a global “vulnerability market” that will pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies of such ‘weapons’. Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such ‘weapons’ sometimes use them for their own purposes, obtaining advantage over their competitors in selling ‘hacking’ services.


Over the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which consists of government agencies such as the CIA and NSA and their contractors, such as Booze Allan Hamilton, has been subject to unprecedented series of data exfiltrations by its own workers.


A number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have been arrested or subject to federal criminal investigations in separate incidents.


Most visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Harold T. Martin III with 20 counts of mishandling classified information. The Department of Justice alleged that it seized some 50,000 gigabytes of information from Harold T. Martin III that he had obtained from classified programs at NSA and CIA, including the source code for numerous hacking tools.


Once a single cyber ‘weapon’ is ‘loose’ it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.


U.S. Consulate in Frankfurt is a covert CIA hacker base


In addition to its operations in Langley, Virginia the CIA also uses the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt as a covert base for its hackers covering Europe, the Middle East and Africa.


CIA hackers operating out of the Frankfurt consulate ( “Center for Cyber Intelligence Europe” or CCIE) are given diplomatic (“black”) passports and State Department cover. The instructions for incoming CIA hackers make Germany’s counter-intelligence efforts appear inconsequential: “Breeze through German Customs because you have your cover-for-action story down pat, and all they did was stamp your passport”


Your Cover Story (for this trip)
Q: Why are you here?
A: Supporting technical consultations at the Consulate.


Two earlier WikiLeaks publications give further detail on CIA approaches to customs and secondary screening procedures.


Once in Frankfurt CIA hackers can travel without further border checks to the 25 European countries that are part of the Shengen open border area — including France, Italy and Switzerland.


A number of the CIA’s electronic attack methods are designed for physical proximity. These attack methods are able to penetrate high security networks that are disconnected from the internet, such as police record database. In these cases, a CIA officer, agent or allied intelligence officer acting under instructions, physically infiltrates the targeted workplace. The attacker is provided with a USB containing malware developed for the CIA for this purpose, which is inserted into the targeted computer. The attacker then infects and exfiltrates data to removable media. For example, the CIA attack system Fine Dining, provides 24 decoy applications for CIA spies to use. To witnesses, the spy appears to be running a program showing videos (e.g VLC), presenting slides (Prezi), playing a computer game (Breakout2, 2048) or even running a fake virus scanner (Kaspersky, McAfee, Sophos). But while the decoy application is on the screen, the underlaying system is automatically infected and ransacked.


How the CIA dramatically increased proliferation risks


In what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that for the most market valuable part of “Vault 7” — the CIA’s weaponized malware (implants + zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and Command and Control (C2) systems — the agency has little legal recourse.


The CIA made these systems unclassified.


Why the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the ‘battlefield’ of cyber ‘war’.


To attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate with their control programs over the internet. If CIA implants, Command & Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet. Consequently, the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying/war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution. This means that cyber ‘arms’ manufactures and computer hackers can freely “pirate” these ‘weapons’ if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on obfuscation to protect its malware secrets.


Conventional weapons such as missiles may be fired at the enemy (i.e into an unsecured area). Proximity to or impact with the target detonates the ordnance including its classified parts. Hence military personnel do not violate classification rules by firing ordnance with classified parts. Ordnance will likely explode. If it does not, that is not the operator’s intent.


Over the last decade U.S. hacking operations have been increasingly dressed up in military jargon to tap into Department of Defense funding streams. For instance, attempted “malware injections” (commercial jargon) or “implant drops” (NSA jargon) are being called “fires” as if a weapon was being fired. However the analogy is questionable.


Unlike bullets, bombs or missiles, most CIA malware is designed to live for days or even years after it has reached its ‘target’. CIA malware does not “explode on impact” but rather permanently infests its target. In order to infect target’s device, copies of the malware must be placed on the target’s devices, giving physical possession of the malware to the target. To exfiltrate data back to the CIA or to await further instructions the malware must communicate with CIA Command & Control (C2) systems placed on internet connected servers. But such servers are typically not approved to hold classified information, so CIA command and control systems are also made unclassified.


A successful ‘attack’ on a target’s computer system is more like a series of complex stock maneuvers in a hostile take-over bid or the careful planting of rumors in order to gain control over an organization’s leadership rather than the firing of a weapons system. If there is a military analogy to be made, the infestation of a target is perhaps akin to the execution of a whole series of military maneuvers against the target’s territory including observation, infiltration, occupation and exploitation.


Evading forensics and anti-virus


A series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which are likely to assist forensic crime scene investigators as well as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Nokia, Blackberry, Siemens and anti-virus companies attribute and defend against attacks.


“Tradecraft DO’s and DON’Ts” contains CIA rules on how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints implicating the “CIA, US government, or its witting partner companies” in “forensic review”. Similar secret standards cover the use of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware communication (pdf), describing targets & exfiltrated data (pdf) as well as executing payloads (pdf) and persisting (pdf) in the target’s machines over time.


CIA hackers developed successful attacks against most well known anti-virus programs. These are documented in AV defeats, Personal Security Products, Detecting and defeating PSPs and PSP/Debugger/RE Avoidance. For example, Comodo was defeated by CIA malware placing itself in the Window’s “Recycle Bin”. While Comodo 6.x has a “Gaping Hole of DOOM”.


CIA hackers discussed what the NSA’s “Equation Group” hackers did wrong and how the CIA’s malware makers could avoid similar exposure.


Examples


The CIA’s Engineering Development Group (EDG) management system contains around 500 different projects (only some of which are documented by “Year Zero”) each with their own sub-projects, malware and hacker tools.


The majority of these projects relate to tools that are used for penetration, infestation (“implanting”), control, and exfiltration.


Another branch of development focuses on the development and operation of Listening Posts (LP) and Command and Control (C2) systems used to communicate with and control CIA implants; special projects are used to target specific hardware from routers to smart TVs.


Some example projects are described below, but see the table of contents for the full list of projects described by WikiLeaks’ “Year Zero”.


UMBRAGE


The CIA’s hand crafted hacking techniques pose a problem for the agency. Each technique it has created forms a “fingerprint” that can be used by forensic investigators to attribute multiple different attacks to the same entity.


This is analogous to finding the same distinctive knife wound on multiple separate murder victims. The unique wounding style creates suspicion that a single murderer is responsible. As soon one murder in the set is solved then the other murders also find likely attribution.


The CIA’s Remote Devices Branch‘s UMBRAGE group collects and maintains a substantial library of attack techniques ‘stolen’ from malware produced in other states including the Russian Federation.


With UMBRAGE and related projects the CIA cannot only increase its total number of attack types but also misdirect attribution by leaving behind the “fingerprints” of the groups that the attack techniques were stolen from.


UMBRAGE components cover keyloggers, password collection, webcam capture, data destruction, persistence, privilege escalation, stealth, anti-virus (PSP) avoidance and survey techniques.


Fine Dining


Fine Dining comes with a standardized questionnaire i.e menu that CIA case officers fill out. The questionnaire is used by the agency’s OSB (Operational Support Branch) to transform the requests of case officers into technical requirements for hacking attacks (typically “exfiltrating” information from computer systems) for specific operations. The questionnaire allows the OSB to identify how to adapt existing tools for the operation, and communicate this to CIA malware configuration staff. The OSB functions as the interface between CIA operational staff and the relevant technical support staff.


Among the list of possible targets of the collection are ‘Asset’, ‘Liason Asset’, ‘System Administrator’, ‘Foreign Information Operations’, ‘Foreign Intelligence Agencies’ and ‘Foreign Government Entities’. Notably absent is any reference to extremists or transnational criminals. The ‘Case Officer’ is also asked to specify the environment of the target like the type of computer, operating system used, Internet connectivity and installed anti-virus utilities (PSPs) as well as a list of file types to be exfiltrated like Office documents, audio, video, images or custom file types. The ‘menu’ also asks for information if recurring access to the target is possible and how long unobserved access to the computer can be maintained. This information is used by the CIA’s ‘JQJIMPROVISE’ software (see below) to configure a set of CIA malware suited to the specific needs of an operation.


Improvise (JQJIMPROVISE)


‘Improvise’ is a toolset for configuration, post-processing, payload setup and execution vector selection for survey/exfiltration tools supporting all major operating systems like Windows (Bartender), MacOS (JukeBox) and Linux (DanceFloor). Its configuration utilities like Margarita allows the NOC (Network Operation Center) to customize tools based on requirements from ‘Fine Dining’ questionairies.


HIVE


HIVE is a multi-platform CIA malware suite and its associated control software. The project provides customizable implants for Windows, Solaris, MikroTik (used in internet routers) and Linux platforms and a Listening Post (LP)/Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to communicate with these implants.


The implants are configured to communicate via HTTPS with the webserver of a cover domain; each operation utilizing these implants has a separate cover domain and the infrastructure can handle any number of cover domains.


Each cover domain resolves to an IP address that is located at a commercial VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider. The public-facing server forwards all incoming traffic via a VPN to a ‘Blot’ server that handles actual connection requests from clients. It is setup for optional SSL client authentication: if a client sends a valid client certificate (only implants can do that), the connection is forwarded to the ‘Honeycomb’ toolserver that communicates with the implant; if a valid certificate is missing (which is the case if someone tries to open the cover domain website by accident), the traffic is forwarded to a cover server that delivers an unsuspicious looking website.


The Honeycomb toolserver receives exfiltrated information from the implant; an operator can also task the implant to execute jobs on the target computer, so the toolserver acts as a C2 (command and control) server for the implant.


Similar functionality (though limited to Windows) is provided by the RickBobby project.


See the classified user and developer guides for HIVE.


* * *


FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS


Why now?


WikiLeaks published as soon as its verification and analysis were ready.


In Febuary the Trump administration has issued an Executive Order calling for a “Cyberwar” review to be prepared within 30 days.


While the review increases the timeliness and relevance of the publication it did not play a role in setting the publication date.


Redactions


Names, email addresses and external IP addresses have been redacted in the released pages (70,875 redactions in total) until further analysis is complete.


  1. Over-redaction: Some items may have been redacted that are not employees, contractors, targets or otherwise related to the agency, but are, for example, authors of documentation for otherwise public projects that are used by the agency.

  2. Identity vs. person: the redacted names are replaced by user IDs (numbers) to allow readers to assign multiple pages to a single author. Given the redaction process used a single person may be represented by more than one assigned identifier but no identifier refers to more than one real person.

  3. Archive attachments (zip, tar.gz, …) are replaced with a PDF listing all the file names in the archive. As the archive content is assessed it may be made available; until then the archive is redacted.

  4. Attachments with other binary content are replaced by a hex dump of the content to prevent accidental invocation of binaries that may have been infected with weaponized CIA malware. As the content is assessed it may be made available; until then the content is redacted.

  5. The tens of thousands of routable IP addresses references (including more than 22 thousand within the United States) that correspond to possible targets, CIA covert listening post servers, intermediary and test systems, are redacted for further exclusive investigation.

  6. Binary files of non-public origin are only available as dumps to prevent accidental invocation of CIA malware infected binaries.

Organizational Chart


The organizational chart corresponds to the material published by WikiLeaks so far.


Since the organizational structure of the CIA below the level of Directorates is not public, the placement of the EDG and its branches within the org chart of the agency is reconstructed from information contained in the documents released so far. It is intended to be used as a rough outline of the internal organization; please be aware that the reconstructed org chart is incomplete and that internal reorganizations occur frequently.


Wiki pages


“Year Zero” contains 7818 web pages with 943 attachments from the internal development groupware. The software used for this purpose is called Confluence, a proprietary software from Atlassian. Webpages in this system (like in Wikipedia) have a version history that can provide interesting insights on how a document evolved over time; the 7818 documents include these page histories for 1136 latest versions.


The order of named pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first). Page content is not present if it was originally dynamically created by the Confluence software (as indicated on the re-constructed page).


What time period is covered?


The years 2013 to 2016. The sort order of the pages within each level is determined by date (oldest first).


WikiLeaks has obtained the CIA’s creation/last modification date for each page but these do not yet appear for technical reasons. Usually the date can be discerned or approximated from the content and the page order. If it is critical to know the exact time/date contact WikiLeaks.


What is “Vault 7”


“Vault 7” is a substantial collection of material about CIA activities obtained by WikiLeaks.


When was each part of “Vault 7” obtained?


Part one was obtained recently and covers through 2016. Details on the other parts will be available at the time of publication.


Is each part of “Vault 7” from a different source?


Details on the other parts will be available at the time of publication.


What is the total size of “Vault 7”?


The series is the largest intelligence publication in history.


How did WikiLeaks obtain each part of “Vault 7”?


Sources trust WikiLeaks to not reveal information that might help identify them.


Isn’t WikiLeaks worried that the CIA will act against its staff to stop the series?


No. That would be certainly counter-productive.


Has WikiLeaks already ‘mined’ all the best stories?


No. WikiLeaks has intentionally not written up hundreds of impactful stories to encourage others to find them and so create expertise in the area for subsequent parts in the series. They’re there. Look. Those who demonstrate journalistic excellence may be considered for early access to future parts.


Won’t other journalists find all the best stories before me?


Unlikely. There are very considerably more stories than there are journalists or academics who are in a position to write them.


Via ZeroHedge







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