Showing posts with label Kirkuk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kirkuk. Show all posts

Thursday, October 19, 2017

Barzani's Failed Kurdistan Project: A Deathblow To The Partition Of Iraq And Syria

Submitted by Elijah Magnier, Middle East based chief international war correspondent for Al Rai Media


The project to divide Iraq was dealt a deathblow by a decision of the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi to send the Army and the security forces to recover all Iraqi territories controlled by the Kurds of Massoud Barzani. The Kurdish leader was riding the horse of Iraqi partition (in fact, a lame horse) to establish a Kurdish state in the northern part of the country. Following the failure of Barzani’s project in taking advantage of the fight against ISIS and therefore declaring his “state”, every country in the Middle East is abandoning him because no one likes to be associated with failure.


Barzani sent envoys (I personally met some) around the globe who returned with apparently promising results: “over 80 countries promised to recognise the new State of Kurdistan”. These promises turned out to be false (“no friends but the mountains”), other (existing) political alliances turned out to be stronger and Barzani was left alone with his empty promises and unreliable advisers.



Iraq forces in the office of the departed Kirkuk Governor, October 16, 2017. The photo spread widely on social media after Iraqi national forces entered Kirkuk city.


Countries of the region – France, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to start with – are now establishing a clear and unambiguous relationship with Baghdad’s government. Abadi, following an authorization of parliament, used a fist of iron to fragment the partition project – not only of Iraq – but of the entire region, that was supposed to be sparked off by the Kurds in Iraq and in Syria and via the regime change attempt in the Levant.


In less than 48 hours, the Iraqi army, with all its security services (army, popular mobilization units, Counter-Terrorism, Federal Police), extended its control over Kirkuk, Khanaqin (Diyala), Bashiqa, Makhmour (Nineveh) and Sinjar - the city that leads to the borders with Syria. All territories that were established for Baghdad’s control under the US administrator Paul Bremer in 2003-2004 (with the limits of Kurdistan) are back now in place.


Abadi forced the Kurdish Peshmerga to return to the old areas they controlled in 2003 after they took advantage of the “Islamic State’s” (ISIS) occupation of large Iraqi territories in the north and north-east and north-west of Iraq in 2014.


Most importantly, the Baghdad government has started its recovery of territory (following Kurdistan referendum) from the rich province of Kirkuk – which produces more than 65 percent of Iraq’s northern oil (about 500,000 bpd) - a region which accounts for about 40 percent of Iraq’s total national oil production. Kirkuk includes the oil fields of Tawke, Peshkabir, Atrush, Shaikan, TaqTaq, Khurmala Dome Avana Dome, Bab Jambur, BaiHasan: all were recovered and are now under Baghdad’s central government control.


Thus, by recovering Kirkuk (and its oil fields), Abadi stopped the rise of the “State of Kurdistan”, which cannot exist with the remaining northern oil without substantial financial support from Baghdad to pay the salaries of the army (Peshmerga) and official employees, and this as long as Erbil delivers the full production of oil: in exchange 17% of its revenue will be due to Kurdistan. Massoud Barzani will have to withdraw from the political scene because he will be unwilling to beg for the return to the archaic relationship with Baghdad government and obey the Prime Minister- this might prove just too humiliating.


Pavel Talabani, the son of the Iraqi ex-President Jalal Talabani, declared that the Kurdish army in the eastern regions of Khanaqin-Sulaymaniyah was under the command of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, thus taking his distance from Erbil, further isolating the Kurdish Leader Masoud Barzani: who is in fact the biggest loser today in Iraq.


The first to abandon Barzani was Turkey, which has announced that it will close its border (after days of hesitation awaiting the concrete results of Massoud’s separatist rejection of biding by the constitution and Baghdad’s reaction to it) with Kurdistan and handed over the main crossing point between the two countries to the central government in Baghdad and its forces. Saudi Arabia followed immediately with direct contact with King Salam, who offered his congratulations to Abadi and rejected Barzani’s rebellion.


With the collapse of the Barzani project, the United States had much less hope than before of pushing Syrian Kurds towards independence from Damascus. Baghdad has regained control of the crossings between Iraq and Syria in Sinjar – Rabi’a. Two more crossings remain outside of Baghdad’s control: Tanf under US control temporarily and al-Qaem under ISIS. This means no support, no exit and no entrance will remain legally available to the Syrian Kurds. The new situation will lock down the airspace from Syrian al-Hasaka which is surrounded by Turkey in the west, by the forces of Damascus in the south and by the regular Iraqi forces in the east.


Nope. Recent events dealt a deathblow to partition:



The Sykes-Picot agreement
, which divided the Levant in the wake of World War I, was revived after analysts and diplomats called for the redrawing of the borders of the Middle East region, especially Iraq and Syria, the creation of a new state called Kurdistan (Iraq and Syria), a new Sunnistan (for Sunni in Anbar-Iraq and Idlib – Syria) and Shiistan in south of Iraq.


Turkey has begun to review its policy with Iraq and it will certainly find common ground with Baghdad so that it withdraws its troops from Bashika and other areas now that Abadi has showed his teeth against Erbil’s decision and his willingness to wage war against those who want to divide Iraq (and without considering the cost).


The attractive commercial relationship, that has been at the centre of the attention of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, will prevail, and will encourage Iraq and Turkey to re-establish good neighbourly relations ( Turkish-Syrian relationships will certainly follow after the war ends in Syria).


The US will be forced today to reconsider its presence in the north-east of Syria because such a presence has now become meaningless. The US forces are stationed in al-Tanaf without any strategic purpose and in al-Hasaka/Raqqah with the Kurds, whereas ISIS has been defeated in its Syrian capital. In fact, it is possibly easier for its own proxies – the Syrian Kurds – to give up this alliance in time, before this same US drops them. Kurdish interests don’t lie with Washington but with Damascus, ready to establish a constructive dialogue with them if they stop being seduced by the US’s temporary interest in the Levant.


And lastly, Haider al-Abadi gave himself the political impetus he had missed in recent years. Yes, Iran played a key role in warning Masoud Barzani, a day before the start of the Iraqi operation to recover all territories from the Peshmerga: the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Qasem Soleimani alerted Barzani to the gravity of the situation (but in vain). He pressed the Iranian-Talabani ally to stand down and take distance from Barzani, and to support Abadi in countering Kurdistan’s “partition plans”.


But it was Abadi’s final decision to act. He rendered a huge service to Syria and to his own country. Abadi has secured himself a strong place in the Iraqi political arena and the upcoming elections as a Prime Minister for a second term. It will be very difficult to compete with him, he who destroyed ISIS but, above all, the “hero” who exploded the biggest danger of all: the partition of Iraq … and Syria.

Friday, October 6, 2017

Iran, Iraq, And Turkey Unite To Block Kurdish Oil Exports

Authored by Zainab Calcuttawala via OilPrice.com,


Iraq, Iran, and Turkey are taking a unified stance against Kurdistan’s oil sector after the region elected to seek independence from Baghdad in a referendum in September, according to a new report by Rudaw.



“In the case of northern Iraq; Iran, Iraq and Turkey will form a tripartite mechanism and will decide on shutting down the oil,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said after a meeting with leaders from the other two nations on Thursday.


A day before the vote, the Iraqi central government issued a statement calling on “neighboring countries and countries of the world” to stop buying crude oil directly from Kurdistan and only deal with Baghdad.


Turkey’s Ceyhan port provides an outlet for the Kurdish Kirkuk oil to meet international markets without interference from Baghdad. Erdogan, Tehran and other members of the international community had censured Erbil for proceeding with the independence referendum as Iraq recovers from a three-year war against the Islamic State (ISIS). The Turkish leader had previously threatened to cut Kirkuk off from Ceyhan, but did not provide details on how such a measure would be carried out.


Russia’s oil majors side with Kurdistan in its quest for an independent fossil fuel establishment. Rosneft signed off on a $1 billion gas pipeline deal with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) a week prior to the historic vote, signaling Moscow’s approval of a hypothetically separate Kurdistan.


Both Iran and Turkey house sizeable Kurdish populations, so the referendum raises fears that Kurds from other nations may seek similar political solutions.


Kurdistan produces around 600,000 bpd of crude oil, or about 15 percent of Iraq’s total output. After the votes were counted, the KRG said that the ‘Yes’ to independence option won at the polls, with 92.73 percent of voters opting to grant Erbil its own regime.

Sunday, October 1, 2017

Why Despite Threats, Turkey Won't Impose Sanctions On Kurdistan After The Referendum

Submitted by Elijah Magnier, Middle East based chief international war correspondent for Al Rai Media


High-ranking sources in Kurdistan (Erbil) said that the Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani “expected the sanctions already announced by Baghdad and expects many more sanctions to come in the future”. Nevertheless, “the referendum was an essential step to undertake,” otherwise Barzani would no longer be considered the Kurdish leader.


“We are not afraid of Turkish sanctions because Ankara would lose more than it will gain if the common borders are closed. The Turkish representative promised us (months before the referendum) that harsh political measures will be adopted against Kurdistan but that no economic sanctions would be seriously considered. After all it is up to Turkey to stop sending its oil tankers to recover our oil production at a cheap price if Erdogan considers it a practical move within his own economy,” said the source.




The Erbil leadership knows that the Kurds lived through hunger and genocide throughout the years, sometimes living in the mountains for decades. Therefore, although any threat to their existence won’t be taken lightly, it cannot affect the process of independence that has been put on their desired track. The Kurdish leaders will agree to allow Baghdad to control airports (Erbil and Suleymaniyeh) as requested by Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, and would like to reestablish good neighbor relationships with all surrounding countries, particularly since the declaration of independence may require two or three years to put into concrete effect.


The 1800 km long borders between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq will force Erbil to send more Peshmerga troops to reinforce its security all along its borders and especially in disputed areas. However, for many countries the referendum has created embarrassment and reshuffled many of the alliances in the Middle East: the implications of this have yet to be considered. It is Turkey that will be holding the key to the success or failure of a new “state” in the Middle East: Iraqi Kurdistan.


A pipeline network connects Iraq’s northern oil fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Photo: Anadolu News Agency.


A pipeline network connects Iraq’s northern oil fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Image source: Anadolu News Agency.


Turkey, a summary of its role in the recent history of Syria and Iraq:


  • Turkey supported the uprising of Sunni tribes in 2014 when these metamorphosed into the “Islamic State” (ISIS) terror group. Ankara didn’t ask its consulate diplomat to abandon the diplomatic mission, and so the diplomatic staff became prisoners in ISIS’ hands, to be later exchanged with hundreds of mujahideen and their families held by Turkey.

  • Ankara allowed the Iraqi Peshmerga to cross its territory into Syria to help the YPG (the Syrian branch of Turkey’s most sworn enemy: the PKK) and recover Ain al-Arab (Kobane) from ISIS in the north of Syria.

  • Turkey opened its borders to Jihadists from al-Qaeda and ISIS under the excuse of “bringing down the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad”.

  • Turkey brought down a Russian jet while bombing jihadists along the Syrian borders, pushing Moscow to heavily engage in the Syrian war and give the upper hand to Assad.

  • Turkey allowed al-Qaeda and the foreign fighters of the Turkistani group to occupy the bordering city of Kessab. The city was later recovered but Ankara created another military balance by expulsing from its territory of thousands of members of al-Qaeda who then occupied the city of Idlib, today the center of al-Qaeda in Syria (also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham).

  • Turkey asked its Syrian proxy to pull out of the city of Aleppo, rendering its liberation easier and less costly for the Syrian Army and its allies, which marked a real turning point in the war in Syria.

  • Turkey joined the de-confliction negotiation in Astana (Kazakhstan) after reconciliation with Moscow and the return to normal relations between both countries.

  • Turkey moved its forces into Syria to stop the creation of a Kurdish “state” known as “Rojava” (from al-Hasaka to Efrin) and disrupted a Kurdish Syrian access to the Mediterranean that could have been also used in the future for the Iraqi Kurds in case of sanctions against Iraqi Kurdistan.

  • Turkey considered Iran a “terrorist state sponsor” but kept its diplomatic relationship with Tehran. It increased economic exchanges and fully collaborated with Iran in Astana as partners and guarantors in Syria.

  • Ankara did not hesitate to support the Iraqi Kurds in order to enjoy economic advantages, and to keep its forces in the north of Iraq. Despite many attempts by Baghdad to remove the Turkish troops, Ankara rejected all demands and hid behind “the Kurdistan request” so as to maintain several hundreds of officers and soldiers in Iraq.

  • Turkey is not expected to implement any economic sanctions against Erbil despite Erdogan screaming, “the Kurds will go hungry”. There is no doubt, however, that Turkish officials will continue launching verbal attacks against Barzani but doubt remains about economic sanctions and the cessation of oil purchases.

To sum it up: President Erdogan declared war on the Syrian Kurds but prevented them from losing Kobane; declared war on Assad but supported him to recover Aleppo; declared war on terrorism but allowed ISIS and al-Qaeda to enjoy all support from Turkey and bought oil from ISIS; threatened the Iraqi Kurds but still bought their oil while keeping its hundreds of trucks queuing up on their borders; promised to keep al-Qaeda under control in Idlib during the last Astana meeting, but allowed it to launch military offensives afterwards.


It is obvious that the Iraqi Kurds are aware of Ankara’s unstable and continuously changing of policy, very confident that any other measures by surrounding countries (Iraq and Iran) can be easily overcome in the future, as long as Erdogan is offering alternatives. The cost is that the Iraqi Kurds fall into Ankara’s hands and control, but it looks like Barzani is happy with this outcome: as long as he has his new state, pushing its place onto the Middle East map, right in the middle.


Iran and Iraq


The Kurdish referendum pushed Iraq into the arms of Iran when the relationship between Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abadi and Iranian officials was at its lowest level. Today Abadi (and most Iraqis) sees in Iran the only sincere partner to count on, and can rely on the Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the case of any military escalation against Kurdistan, particularly in the disputed Iraqi cities, with Kirkuk at the top of the list.


Baghdad is confident that Barzani didn’t take this step without a blessing from the Americans, which is expected to become more visible in the coming months, according to Iraqi officials in Baghdad. It seems Washington decided to swap its relationship with Baghdad with that of Erbil because, apparently, it won’t be able to support both at the same time.


Supporting Erbil is more attractive to the US and its regional allies (particularly Saudi Arabia), in the hope that the Kurdish Iraqi move would trigger the appetite of the Kurdish Iranians (and the Syrian Kurds who are already on this same path). If this happens and we observe an uprising in Iran (the Saudis already promised to support any unrest in Iran), the Iranian economy and that of the government of Baghdad will be both under severe pressure.


Iran supported Barzani in 2014 and provided him with weapons (at a time when the US was denying any support to Iraq, during the 6 months after the fall of Mosul in 2014), but it is today in an undeclared war against Erbil, fully behind Baghdad’s measures and supporting future escalation and punitive steps.


No one can wind back the clock to before the Kurdish referendum. However, it is still possible for Barzani to avoid contributing toward a further mess in this increasingly reshuffled Middle East. He could indeed consider all these issues as an unnecessary concern, similar to a "storm in a tea cup". Unfortunately, it seems the Kurdish leader is determined to continue his path, denying any immediate intent for concrete realization of independence, yet without excluding it.

Friday, September 22, 2017

"I Think There Will Be War" - Iraqi Kurds Fear Conflict After Referendum

Authored by Tom Westcott via Middle East Eye,


Official fears violence after 25 September independence vote, as disputes grow in areas controlled by Kurd forces outside original KRG borders.



Fears of fresh conflict in northern Iraq are bubbling to the surface weeks before Iraqi Kurds hold a contentious vote on independence, with warnings of war over disputed, ethnically mixed border regions and reports of Shia forces pushing Kurd officials from a town to prevent voting.


The Kurdistan Regional Government, or KRG, has refused repeated requests from Baghdad, the US and regional powers to postpone its 25 September referendum, saying it would only do so if an alternative was presented by Iraq’s central government.


Tensions have risen in areas liberated by KRG forces outside the region’s original 2003 borders, including the city of Kirkuk. On Monday the KRG’s president, Massoud Barzani, said “any attempt to change the reality using force” in Kirkuk “should expect that every single Kurd will be ready to fight.”


Dr Jutyar Mahmoud, a member of the region’s independence referendum commission, told Middle East Eye that disputed territories such as Kirkuk were the focus of fears of a new conflagration after the referendum.





“We will face border problems in the near future and I definitely think there will be another war, and soon,” he said.



He described Iraq as “militarily weak,” after three years of battling the Islamic State (IS), during which time forces have suffered extensive losses, particularly in the recent nine-month fight to liberate Mosul.


A greater threat, he said, was posed by Iraq’s other army – the Iranian-backed paramilitary Hashd al-Shaabi, or Popular Mobilisation force.





“The Hashd are another threat and maybe Iran will push them to fight us,” Mahmoud said, adding that Iraq’s prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, “doesn’t control the Hashd, but Iran can.”




Jutyar Mahmoud considered the Hashd a greater threat than Iraq’s regular army (AFP)


Hostile acts


His comments preceded bouts of recent unrest in some of the contested border regions. On Saturday, local Arabs pulled the KRG flag from a council building in Mandali, in the province of Diyala, and staged an armed, albeit peaceful, protest in the town.


The next day, the town council sacked the Kurdish mayor and overruled a previous vote that agreed to the town’s participation in the referendum, according to the Kurdish news service Rudaw. Claims that the Hashd were involved were denied by a well-placed source, who said such actions were not in line with the force’s policies.


The source told MEE that if local fighters affiliated with the Hashd were involved, they were representing themselves, not the Hashd al-Shaabi.


Also on Saturday, Kurdish Turkmen were urged to boycott the referendum by eight Turkmen parties in Kirkuk, who repeated Baghdad’s line that the vote is unconstitutional.


In Sinjar, 2,000 Yazidis have joined the Hashd, according to the force’s spokesman Ahmed al-Asadi.


Yazidi refugees living in camps said the move was prompted by dissatisfaction with the Kurdish peshmerga forces for failing to protect them from IS in 2014, and what they said was ongoing neglect and marginalisation of Yazidis under the KRG.


Adding to extant tensions are limitations of voter eligibility. Although northern Iraq has long been ethnically mixed, Arabs relocated under former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s Arabisation schemes are not eligible to vote in the referendum, said the KRG referendum commission’s Mahmoud.


Voting in the disputed territories would also be limited to areas controlled by the peshmerga, Mahmoud said, adding that Hashd forces had made it clear that they would not accept ballot boxes being placed in any areas under their control.


Kirkuk’s tinderbox


Both the peshmerga and Hashd forces are maintaining a strong military presence in several disputed territories, including Kirkuk province.


Several thousand Turkmen Hashd fighters reportedly control what Hashd spokesman Asadi said was the lion’s share of the province, but he insisted any talk of war was political bluster.





“The Hashd al-Shaabi were founded to ensure the stability and security of Iraq, not to ignite sectarian or regional wars,” he told Middle East Eye.



“Anyone who promotes these ideas about war between Iraq and Kurdistan are outsiders intent on destabilising the security and stability of Iraq.



“The affairs in Kurdistan are not going to lead to a war and such talk is nothing but a passing political tempest to satisfy some political matters for some Kurdish politicians.



“We view Kurdistan as an Iraqi land and we will defend it as we continue to defend all of Iraq.”



Asadi said “brotherly ties” between Hashd fighters and the Kurds had been proved by how they stood united in one trench to defend Iraq in the battle against IS.



Baghdad, the US and regional powers have urged the KRG to postpone its referendum (Reuters)


Brotherly ties


Dr Kemal Kerkuki, a peshmerga commander stationed near IS-occupied Hawija, echoed this sentiment, saying the chance of war with Iraq was “very, very narrow, if not impossible” – but was keen to reiterate the strength of the peshmerga.





“The peshmerga forces are always ready to defend our lands and I think the fight against IS has shown the whole world what our forces are capable of,” he said.



“However, we are determined to use the referendum and all democratic tools in our negotiations with Baghdad for an amicable divorce.”



Kerkuki insisted defeating IS remained a priority for both the KRG and Baghdad, and said there was ongoing cooperation between Iraqi and peshmerga forces.


Having swiftly defeated IS in Tal Afar, Iraqi forces are now preparing to begin their operations to retake Hawija, in one of the many disputed areas along the border regions between the KRG and Iraq.


Kerkuki admitted there were recurrent problems between rival Iraqi forces but remained adamant that the referendum would help resolve rather than exacerbate problems in the border regions.





“The referendum is a peaceful and democratic tool to solve the chronic problems between the Kurdistan region and Iraq,” he said.



“The referendum is a tool to defuse war and intra-city conflicts in the newly liberated areas, particularly the so-called ‘disputed areas’.”