As it has become obvious from the events unraveling in Syria, one would be right to bet on the destruction of radical terrorist groups instead of entering into some sort of negotiations with those. After all, the talks in Astana, just like the Geneva talks that were held prior to those, failed to create preconditions for the peaceful settlement of the Syrian conflict, effectively delaying the reconstruction of the country. However, Damscus’ partition in those allowed anti-Assad forces, including the Kurdish SDF forces supported by Washington to seize Syria’s oil and gas fields. As the fight against ISIS rages on, it’s still impossible to accurately predict when the war in Syria is going to come to an end.
The spokesperson for the Turkish President, İbrahim Kalın has recently announced that the start of the Congress of the National Dialogue of Syria that was to be held in Sochi on November 18 is going to be delayed. It was assumed that the Congress would bring a total of 33 different organizations operating in Syria together, including the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). However, Ankara opposed the participation of this group rather vocally, while stressing that the PYD is a terrorist formation that is linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This protest resulted in Russia withdrawing the invitation sent to the PYD altogether, while rescheduling the entire event.
However, the idea of holding a similar Congress doesn’t look relevant anymore. Syria has been divided into several occupation zones, which can be roughly divided in two sides – the American that stretches across eastern and southern parts of the country, and the Russian-Turkish-Iranian zone, that is way more fragmented than the US one, which makes it increasingly more difficult to resolve disputes between the countries that support them and their allies. The north of Syria is by far the most troubled area, as consultations on the situation in this zone are being held around the clock in Astana, where the Russian Federation, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran are negotiating the rules of engagement that would be then dictated to their allies in Syria. However, that’s where a dispute arose between Turkey and Russia over the issue of Kurdish participation. The issue looked rather puzzling since to gather the Congress of 33 organizations together one had to bring Turkish and Kurdish representatives to the same negotiating table, which has become too tall of a task for anybody to handle. However, without every single group being featured at the table, the agreements that could be reached lose all sense. Therefore, it was necessary to reschedule the Congress until this fundamental conflict is resolved. It is no accident that Tayyip Erdogan is planning to visit Russia on November 13 to meet with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.
In the south of Syria, in Deir ez-Zor, an extremely complex configuration is being built. There remains a fundamental question of control over the transport routes in Abu Kamal. There’s an extremely important intersection of roads that is located near oil and gas pipelines. The small town itself is of little value, but the intersection near it along with the road stretching from Abu Kamal to At-Tanf that are of utmost importance. Washington agreed that this area can be taken under control by Iraqi forces supported by pro-Iranian Shia detachments, but it’s way more complicated than that. The configuration of the Iraq offensive is pretty tricky: the advancement is going to be led by Shia pro-Iranian fighters of the paramilitary group Hashd al-Shaabi, followed by the military police, with Iraqi army following at the rear. The complexity of the moment lies in the fact that Hashd al-Shaabi can hand over the crossroads to the forces of Bashar-al Assad, the scenario that Americans are opposing. However, should those Shia forces replaced by the Iraqi military units, the crossroads will most certainly be transferred to the Kurdish SDF units.
In order to control the situation around Abu Kamal, Washington dispatched a margin of its 3,000-strong force stationed in the territory controlled by the SDF. The task force is already influencing the events on the ground by capturing the Tishrin dam on the Euphrates only to hand it over to the SDF forces. Apparently, the same scenario is being implemented now in Abu Kamal, but the forces used for this operation are much more numerous due to the presence of an invasion force from Iraq.
At the same time it remains unclear who is going to establish control over the border crossing from At Tanf to Abu Kamal. Washington wanted the crossing to be occupied by the so-called Free Syrian Army dispatched in the “de-escalation zone” in the south. Initially, it was these forces were going to try to capture Abu Kamal as well, but this led to a conflict with Assad, so Washington decided not to create problems until a more important mission is fulfilled – the defeat of ISIS. That’s why Americans agreed to allow the pro-Iranian Shia groups to take the crucial intersection near Abu Kamal, but they got stcuk near the T-2 base. This means that the Free Syrian Army forces will try to become active again in its attempts to seize more ground. The US is seeking ways to create the most complicated configuration of zones of control possible in the south, trying to deprive Assad from access to both the oilfields and the transit route to Iraq. If the Pentagon is to achieve this goal, than it would allow Assad to take Abu Kemal due to its relative unimportance.
Everything points to the fact that the war in Syria will get considerably less intense for a period of time as the parties will begin preparing for negotiations on the division of the territory, although few agree with the way it’s distributed now. Assad and the Iranians have already announced their readiness to release Raqqa from the Kurds. It goes without saying that Ankara is pretty contended with this scenario may as well demand Russia to support this liberation, thus trying to solve its own problems at somebody’s else expense. However, it’s unlikely that Moscow will be eager to get involved in the conflict with the Kurds.
In the south of Syria, the situation is developing in the direction we’ve been witnessing. The Syrian army troops supported by the Hezbollah managed to enter Abu Kemal. Iraqi troops are holding positions to he south of Abu Kemal, while Shia forces hasn’t left the T-2 area. This latest advancement has forced American advisers to leave the city urgently.
The so-called Islamic State still has a number of small towns under its control along the riverbed of the Euphrates River and the support of Sunni tribal detachments. It’s difficult to describe those as a part of ISIS since have their own war against everyone. It is these tribes that are now making it difficult for the Kurds to advance, as there’s little ISIS militants left to hold the line. According to various reports, ISIS has completely withdrawn its elite units from Syria. In total, there is no more that a thousand ISIS militants left in Syria supported by local militias that have no more that 4 thousand fighters. And those fighters can hardly be described as ISIS members, since for the most part they’ve been members of local self-defense units that kept their towns safe from all sorts of aliens.
As a whole, ISIS has managed to conduct a massive evacuation, with at least 15,000 militants and about 25,000 civilian specialists leaving Syria in the last 6-9 months. Those forces are forming sleeping cells across the region. What can such cells, demonstrated by ISIS militants near Palmyra, where no more than 200 militants would defend a small city for three weeks, while whipping out anybody who supported the Assad government.
Apparently, the terrorist war will be conducted along the tried and tested lines, with skirmish attacks from the desert and routine terrorist attacks within cities. Just the other day in Deir ez-Zor got struck by a large terrorist attacked that resulted in dozens of deceased people. This whole layout is quite familiar for ISIS, with the group going underground for the third time in its short history so it’s perfectly capable of waging a protracted terrorist war. It’s only difficulty now is that it now has a surplus of people and resources for this kind of warfare.
The situation in Syria, meanwhile, is developing in such a way that ISIS becomes the lesser of the existing problems. The contradictions between the “winners” are now gradually becoming the agenda at hand, and the more we see those appear, the more rigid they become. Assad has already declared a major asault being launched against Raqqa, which is going to result in a major aggravation of the problems Damascus has had with Washington, but it all depends on Iran’s position. If Tehran decides to support Assad’s actions, then the US is unlikely to risk a conflict with both the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And then the Kurds will have to yield. In addition, Erdogan will be pushing Moscow toward the struggle against the Kurds, since he cannot resist the temptation of solving his own problems at somebody’s else expense.
Much depends also on Iran’s actions in the Abu Kemal area, where Shia forces are going to get stuck in a fierce battle against the remnants of ISIS and the Free Syrian Army forces.
The final nail to the coffin of the delicate balance achieved can be the decision of the Free Syrian Amry to leave Jordan and take the entire Jordan-Syrian border under its control, making it a direct route for any kind of forces. Therefore, one can only hope that Iran will come to rescue.
Clearly, it is too early to even speak about the end of the Syrian conflict. It will continue, but in a different form and between different forces. Russia has already announced its intention to withdraw its military forces from Syria, leaving just enough soldiers to man two of its military bases. It’s clear that sooner or later armed clashes will lead to a situation when it will be necessary to solve the issue politically. And it will be up to Iran, Turkey and the United States to decide who is going to have what.
Alexander Orlov, Political Scientist and Expert Orientalist, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
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