The face-off between India and China had global implications, but even now tensions have not gone anywhere.
The phase of a possible direct military confrontation between China and India on the Doklam plateau now seems to have been left behind.
This became clear once the leading Indian newspaper Times of India published an article which would state that according to India’s Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister Narendra Modi responded positively to the invitation presented by China’s leader Xi Jinping to attend the next summit of the BRICS member states, which would start at the beginning of September.
Secondly, which is even more important to emphasize, is that the same article announced the withdrawal of Indian troops from the territory of the Doklam plateau, which was presented as the end of the 73-day confrontation of the two Asian giants on a tiny stretch of land.
It can be asserted quite confidently that the invitation wasn’t issued until the very moment that President Xi received reliable guarantees of the forthcoming withdrawal of the Indian regular troops.
Since in mid-August the absolute majority of media sources weren’t really discussing Modi’s participation in the BRICS summit, focusing on the very real prospects of an armed conflict between the two major nuclear powers instead. Such a prospect loomed over us all once allegations about a possible ultimatum being drafted by Beijing started circulating in the international press.
That’s when one could smell gasoline in the air, since unlike the face-off we’re witnessing on the Korean peninsula, which is however dangerous but it is still tightly controlled by the major players in this conflict – the US and China, this latest face-off could lead to grave consequences.
Both Chinese and Indian comments to the Times of India report are noteworthy. The first statements by the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China fully corresponded to the initial position of the country’s leadership in resolving this conflict: India must withdraw its combat units “from our territory” without expecting any expressions of gratitude for this.
In a press release presented to the general public by Beijing it was announced Chinese border guards would continue patrolling the Doklam plateau to ensure the completion of ongoing road construction works. It was also emphasized that in the process of resolving the conflict there was no backstage discussions held and any repetition of the incident would inevitably lead to a war.
However, any further statements were softened noticeably, and aspects of opening favorable prospects to the economic cooperation of the Asian giants have been occupying a front stage in those.
This aspect of Chinese-Indian relations was presented by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi as the right way of disarming a dangerous conflict between China and India in the Himalayas. The very fact that this face-off has been left behind was presented by the Chinese Global Times as “a victory for Asia”.
As an example of the very real possibility of coordinating the actions in the world economy, a joint Sino-Indian initiative was put forward during the discussion within the WTO framework of a possible support that states must provide to agriculture businesses. The content of this initiative was directly confronting the proposals of the leading Western countries.
The softening of Chinese rhetoric should be attributed to the obvious desire of Beijing to both maintain at least some level of bilateral ties with India that was established in the period before the conflict in the Himalayas, and, secondly, not to aggravate New Delhi’s possible drift towards China’s geopolitical opponents.
Judging by the comments that Indian readers would provide to the articles about the incident on the Plateau Doklam, they perceive New Delhi’s steps as a defeat of their country. As for Modi’s trip to China it was portrayed as a move “in the teeth of a Chinese dragon.” For sure, India’s Prime Minister could not ignore such sentiments and until the very last moment the prospect of his meeting with the Chinese leader within the BRICS framework remained unclear.
But the understandable negative emotions of ordinary Indian citizens are a direct result of the extreme simplification of the motivation that governed New Delhi in its decisions. It seems more likely that, after sacrificing a pawn when finding itself in a tight corner, it continues the struggle to improve its strategic positions in a big chess game with China.
By getting itself in a face-off on the Doklam plateu, New Delhi faced a prospect of real war with China the outcome of which would hardly differ much from the conflict of 1962, but also a dilemma of a long-term strategic scale: finally throwing back the rhetoric about an independent foreign policy and fully integrate itself in what is still referred to as “the West”; or maintain a certain freedom of maneuver in relations with alternative global forces, for example, playing an active part in the BRICS.
However, in India they can not fail to take into account the very term the West losing any content. It is unlikely that the aggravating tensions between leading players will make the so-called West any stronger, even though those tensions are being pursued by those political forces in America that were rooting for Hillary and are looking for a chance to bounce back in the saddle.
The fact that the government of Narenda Modi has chosen the path of a complex strategic game with China is evidenced by the trip of the Indian Prime Minister to Myanmar, undertaken immediately after the end of the BRICS summit. Previously, we discussed various aspects of the US-China struggle for influence over this strategically important country and in recent years, India was getting actively involved in this struggle.
The next notable event will be connected with the next visit of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to India, which will be held in mid-September. Against the backdrop of the continuing “political trace” from the incident on the plateau, the reports in China saw the very fact of this trip as evidence of Japan’s support of India, as well as the further strengthening of Japan-India relations with obvious anti-Chinese implications.
It’s a given that India’s leaders need no advice, but it seems that the appeal of China’s proposal to transform the competition in a win-win partnership is pretty obvious.
However, one can also say the same about China’s relations with Japan and the whole US foreign policy. Since there’s obviously no state that can find friends without improving its economic ties with other players.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
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